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Abstract 
 
The adoption of performance-related pay schemes is part of the wider market-type reforms 
occurring in public services today. However, this ‘managerial revolution’ has prompted an 
academic debate for and against these practices. The main questions raised revolve around the 
novelty, objectivity and compatibility of such practices to which this study responds.   
The thesis argues that the value of an incentive scheme policy is a function of the 
organisational environment, objectivity of performance measurement processes and perceived 
equity of the installed scheme. The research uses data from in-depth interviews, questionnaires, 
and desk research based on a case study of performance-related pay schemes in UK local 
authorities.  
The evidence indicates a strong support at policy level for the use of market-type managerial 
reforms, but less support on the ground for the performance-pay thesis. There are difficulties 
encountered in the setting, measuring and rewarding qualitative performance of intangible 
targets such as intellectual capital. The evidence perceives PRP schemes to be vulnerable to 
failure as they are installed as ‘off-the-shelf’ ‘stand-alone’ rather than organisation specific 
motivational devices. The study looks at the ‘new’ role of management accounting systems in 
meeting ‘performance information needs’ of public sector managers as a potential area for 
further research. 
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Part I:  
Introduction 
Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.1. The Context of the Research  
The past two decades have seen a process of almost continuous reform in managing public 
services through importation of market-type managerial practices into the public sector. The 
reforms have all aimed at improving the quality of performance in public services, creating new 
forms of relationship between public and private sector organizations, and new types of 
regulation and accountability. Conversely, these public management reforms have, in a variety 
of ways, been transferred to the state systems of developing and transitional economies (DTEs) 
(McCourt and Minogue, 2001). This managerial 'revolution' has therefore necessitated a need 
for DTEs to learn from the experience of developed countries.   
The literature on public management reforms indicates that the changes have been driven by a 
combination of factors including: the assault on the traditional assumptions of public sector 
generally; responses to changes in economic theory; the impact of changes in the private sector, 
particularly globalisation as an economic force; and changes in technology (Hughes 1999; 
Farnham and Horton, 1998). This change in economic thinking has profoundly affected the 
public bureaucracy regime. It has now gradually reformed activists and believers in the 
classical ‘Weberian’ public administration theory at the higher levels of the bureaucracy while 
economic theories spread through the new public management (NPM), in form of public choice 
theory, agency theory and transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1986; Walsh, 1995; Boston et 
  
 
- 2 -
al., 1996).  
The philosophy of NPM is to instil market-type discipline and a culture of performance 
orientation within public sector organisations (PSOs) with a view to minimising the cost of 
service quality and augment the degree of accountability through motivational strategies. Dixon 
et al (1998) describe NPM or managerialism as a ‘private sector prescription for public sector 
problems.’ They argue that, using ‘results-oriented’ market-type managerial approach is a 
universal therapy for the public sector’s ‘self-evident’ inadequate performance (ibid.). It is 
within this spirit that performance management (PM) theory has become one of the central 
pillars of NPM today.   
However, although the reality is somewhat different, the impression has been created that NPM 
practices are an integral part of globalisation and have been implemented ‘wholesale’ in all 
OECD member countries. Despite issues of compatibility being paramount, the current research 
activity in this subject has paid less attention to the ‘new’ role of motivation theory and its 
applicability in public service institutions during this NPM era. Therefore, the main focus of 
this research is to examine the applicability of motivation theory in this ‘new’ form of 
performance management environment using the case of performance-related incentive 
schemes in the British local authorities (BLAs).     
1.2. Research problem 
1.2.1. The debate for and against market-type PM practices 
The research problem is derived from the debate for and against the application of market-type 
motivational devices as a package of managerial reform practices generally, and PM techniques 
in particular. Farnham and Horton (1996) argue that PM has become an important feature of 
public services in Britain since the introduction of managerial reforms in the country. PM aims 
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at improving the quality of public service delivery by focusing on the achievement of end-user 
needs (Otley, 1999). Similarly, the PM framework is argued to use systems which help PSOs to 
plan, delegate, assess and reward the operation of their activities and services (ibid.). However, 
as Mwita (2000) argues, the effectiveness of this process depends on the timeliness and 
reliability of performance information flows from and to the management accounting system 
(MAS). Being an important framework for managing incentives and reward systems, the PM 
model aims at achieving high standards of work, quality output and satisfying customer needs 
(Beaumont, 1993).  
In contrast, however, the rival literature argue that radical managerial changes in PSOs have 
been imposed by the central government ‘off-the-shelf’ from the private sector to complicate 
and frustrate management in PSOs (Isaac-Henry, 1998; Kloot, 1998). The changes are in terms 
of the scope, functions, structures, the ways in which they are financed, how they are managed 
and who manages them. Generally, although motivational devices such as performance-related 
pay schemes (PRPs) have been introduced, this ‘quiet managerial revolution’ has created 
tensions between those who manage them – and are increasingly highly paid – and those who 
are managed within them, especially professional groups such as doctors, nurses and teachers, 
who are paid less (Horton and Farnham, 1999).  
In particular with respect to PRPs, several scholars and practitioners have noted that there is a 
growing tension within human resources management (HRM) literature about the schemes and 
the processes currently used to reward individuals (Smith, 1992; Legge, 1995; Kessler and 
Purcell, 1992). However, it appears that many of the motivational initiatives pursued represent 
no more than a ‘shuffling of the pack’ (Kessler and Purcell, ibid: 274), rather than any 
innovative, integrated strategy (Storey, 1992: 27), which could be considered as part of a 
distinctive strategic PM approach. 
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Empirical studies are questioning whether extrinsic performance-based incentives and reward 
systems such as PRP schemes have had any impact at all on the individuals’ contribution to the 
organisation as a whole (Heery, 1998; Wright, 1995). Recent studies of some PSOs in UK have 
concluded that PRP in particular has had no impact on organisational or individual performance 
(Edis, 1995; Kelly and Monks, 1996; and Armstrong, 1998). Further more, empirical studies 
show that in practice, much of the dissatisfaction with performance appraisal comes from the 
ineffectiveness of the system in achieving some of the purposes for which the schemes are 
established (Campbell, 1996; Bititci et al 1997). An interesting issue which arises here and 
remains unattended is, “does the achievement of the purpose of an incentive scheme or reward 
system constitute a prime source of motivation in a public sector environment?” 
Studies also indicate that some of the problems with performance-based incentive schemes 
(PBIs) are attributable to the flaws in the design and implementation of the performance 
appraisal schemes in organisations (Campbell, 1990; Rogers, 1990; Armstrong, and Murlis, 
1991). In 1997, the OECD launched a survey to evaluate the impact of performance pay 
schemes for public sector managers in five OECD countries (Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States). The managers’ verdict in this survey was that the 
processes used to measure performance are critical to the success of PBIs.  
Evidences from other surveys consistently show that managers spend little time on the 
measurement process of individual performance (Palmer, 1993; Ghobadian and Ashworth, 
1994). This issue of objective performance measurement and accountability (PMA) is 
fundamental to the generalisations of motivation theory in a PM framework. Besides 
McClelland’s (1961, 1975) achievement theory, the study applies the theorems of goal-setting, 
expectancy, reactance and equity theories of motivation (Vroom, 1964.; Locke, 1968; Adams, 
1965) to examine the research problem stated in s.1.2.2 below.  
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1.2.2. Research problem and the main argument  
 Generally, the thesis examines the role of motivation theory in a public sector environment 
following this wholesale adoption of market-type principles in managing performance. The 
thesis adopts a balanced and inclusive approach that performance is achieved if it is defined as 
embracing three interrelated variables: behaviours (processes), outputs, and outcomes (value 
added or impact). The main assumption of the thesis is that for a standard PM model to be 
effective it must comprise, among other dimensions, a performance-related incentive and 
reward policy.  
In particular, the problem addressed in this research is “How appropriate are market-type 
motivational strategies in managing performance in political institutions such as local 
authorities?” In other words, the study examines the ‘goodness of fit’ of performance-pay 
reward systems and the attributes of a compatible performance-based motivational strategy in a 
public sector environment. Essentially, the study acknowledges that motivation theory has a 
vital role to play in managing performance, but it argues that the satisfactional value of such a 
strategy is a heterogeneous phenomenon. Furthermore, the thesis argues that by and large, the 
compatibility of such a policy is a relational construct, which requires a conducive background-
operating environment to prevail. Specifically, the hypothesis of this study is to attest the 
claims and generalisations made in the literature about the effect of motivation theories on 
performance at workplaces.  
The main proposition of the study is that the motivational value (MV) of an incentive and 
reward system policy is a function of three variables:  
• Firstly, the operating environment in terms of the overall organisational culture, values 
and the capacity (OC) to change;  
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• Secondly, the objectivity and ‘goodness of fit’ of the performance measurement and 
accountability processes (PMA); and  
• Thirdly, the stakeholders’ perceived equity (PE) of the installed performance-related 
incentive scheme and reward system.  
The evidences gathered from this research has consistently indicated that PBIs generally, are 
organisation specific rather than ‘off-the-shelf’ ‘stand-alone’ motivational devices. 
Consequently the study argues that although the PM model principles are applied, in the case of 
PRP schemes in the British local authorities, adequate capacity to implement them is lacking. 
Secondly, there is strong evidence to suggest that given the qualitative nature of performance in 
public sector, it is difficult to operate performance measurement and accountability schemes 
objectively. Thirdly, reward systems that attempt to link performance to pay are not perceived 
to be equitable amongst stakeholders because they contradict with conventional values in 
public sector environment - in general they are described to be divisive, discriminative and 
eccentric. 
1.2.3. The purpose and focus of the study  
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, is to understand underlying tensions in 
compensation and reward systems management within PM framework in PSOs. Secondly, to 
draw lessons relevant for developing countries from the experience of British local authorities 
in the formulation and implementation of PM model insofar as incentives and reward systems 
(IRS) are concerned.  
Empirical studies on PM practices suggest that the current debate on reward systems 
management has prompted numerous academic enquiries about this subject mainly in the 
central government (OECD, 1998; Kelly and Monks, 1996) and proportionately less in the 
context of local government system (LGMB, 1996). As a contribution to knowledge this study 
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has focused on the local government system.  
In particular, the study focuses on the following issues: (1) the capacity of local authorities to 
manage organisational change; (2) the objectivity of processes of performance measurement, 
accountability and reward issues within the performance management framework in the British 
local authorities; and (3) the perception of local government managers about the equity 
attributes of a successful PBI scheme in a public sector environment.  
1.3. Research issues and objectives of the study  
1.3.1. Research issues 
The three issues which are addressed in this research are briefly outlined below: 
1. The first concern in about the capacity of public sector organisations to manage market 
oriented reward systems and incentive schemes within the framework of PM model; 
2. Second is about the ability of public sector organisations to measure managerial 
performance objectively, and enhance managerial accountability using PBI schemes to act 
as a motivator;  
3. The third is about the stakeholders’ perception of equity of PBI schemes;    
The first issue prompts an examination of the capacity of organisations in terms of the existence 
of a conducive environment for effective management of market-type performance-based 
reward systems and incentive schemes. The second and third issues are mainly focussing on the 
characteristics of a successful PBI scheme. These issues and specific questions are listed in 
1.3.2 below, in s.4.9 of Chapter Four and in the PM model analytical framework in s.5.4 of 
Chapter Five in this thesis.  
1.3.2. Research objectives and questions  
The study has two main objectives. These objectives along with their respective topic guide 
questions are as follows: 
(1) To understand capacity issues and objectivity of the processes of measuring 
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qualitative performance for the purpose of motivation in a local government environment; the 
guiding research questions were: 
(i) What organisational capacity do local authorities need to undertake strategic 
direction in bringing about in-house organisational cultural change commensurate 
with market-based managerial techniques?  
(ii) Is ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ an obstacle to use performance-related-pay schemes? 
(iii) What conditions are in place in the British local government system to sustain the 
effective implementation of private sector-based employee incentive and reward 
structures such as PRP given the qualitative nature of performance in the sector?  
(iv) What approaches do British local authorities use to measure performance of such a 
qualitative nature for motivational purposes?  
(2) To survey the perception of equity of performance-based incentive schemes from the 
viewpoint of British local government senior managers; the guiding research questions were:  
(i) What characteristics constitute a successful performance-pay incentive scheme for 
public sector managers in local authorities?  
(ii) Does individual performance related pay motivate people? 
(iii) Why does individual performance related pay not work effectively in the UK public 
sector?  
These are broad questions designed for guidance only. The specific operational questions are 
listed in Appendices A and B at the end of this thesis.  
In the first objective, the thesis seeks to examine the organisational capacities necessary for 
implementing market-type performance-based pay schemes as one of the dimensions of 
performance management system. The study assesses the techniques used in operating 
performance measurement and accountability schemes designed within the PM model 
framework in the British local authorities. For the purpose of this study, capacity refers to the 
organisational structures, conditions in terms of the PM framework and processes put in place 
in the local government system to allow the successful and smooth implementation of 
performance-based employee rewards and incentive structures.  
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The second objective is to survey the perception of public sector managers in the British local 
government system about the equity attributes of successful PBIs. In this context several 
aspects of such schemes are examined including the following issues: (a) acceptability of the 
performance-pay linkage; (b) the ability of pay to act as a motivator for managerial 
performance; (c) the rationale for introducing a PBI scheme in a public sector environment; and 
(d) drawbacks with PBI schemes. Others include: (e) objectivity of measuring managerial 
performance; (f) feedback systems; (g) appeals systems; (h) joint consultations; and (i) 
organisational culture. The responses to these issues has not only indicated the degree of 
institutional acceptance of the PBI schemes, but has also signified the capacity of PSOs to 
adapt to market-type managerial reform practices.  
1.4. The theoretical framework   
The previous sections have presented the research problem, a brief summary of research issues 
and objectives of the study. This section presents the major bodies of theory that characterise 
this research problem and constitute the theoretical framework of the study as covered in detail 
in Part II of this thesis.  The main theories are related to motivation, PM and performance-
related incentive schemes and reward systems management.  
The process of motivation as conceptualised in Chapter Two is broadly based on a number of 
major bodies of motivation theory, which attempt to provide in-depth explanations of what it is 
all about. Some of them, like the crude ‘instrumentality’ theory (Taylor, 1911) which was the 
first to be developed, have largely been discredited, at least in psychological circles, although 
they still underpin the beliefs of some managers about motivation and reward systems. 
The second is the needs or content theory - as developed by Maslow (1954), Alderfer (1972) 
and McClelland (1975). The third classification is the process or cognitive theory - which is 
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concerned with the psychological processes or forces which influence motivation as affected by 
people’s perceptions of their working environment and the ways in which they interpret and 
understand it. This category is very relevant for this study as it embraces the by-product 
theories of expectancy, goal-setting, achievement, reactance and equity (AGREE). The fourth 
category comprises the Herzberg’s (1957) - two factor (motivation-hygiene) theory; 
behavioural theory (Skinner, 1974); and social-learning theory - as developed by Bandura 
(1977).  
Besides these major bodies of the theory of motivation, other subsidiary theories relevant to this 
study are performance management (chapter three) and PRP incentives and reward systems 
management (Chapter Four). It is essential that these other theories be reviewed in order to 
facilitate the whetting of the research issues about which data has been collected. The bottom 
line is that both the parent and subsidiary bodies of theories reviewed are fundamentally 
instrumental in the achievement of the main objective of the study, i.e. to test the 
generalisations of motivation theory and examine the compatibility of performance-based 
incentive schemes and reward systems in a public sector environment.  
Review of the literature narrows down to a kind of balanced approach to designing and 
implementing motivation policies. Firstly, individuals must learn the program of their 
organization’s culture if they are to make the system work. Secondly, organisations must 
survey a catalogue of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation tendencies of their employees if they 
are to improve the quality of their delivery through performance-based incentive policies.   
Thirdly, PM is one dimension of the current reforms in public sector management. PM is seen 
in a broader perspective as encompassing both the development of performance information 
and how it is used by management for decision-making and by external parties for 
accountability purposes. Finally, it is important to integrate PBIs within the whole PM 
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framework rather than being treated as ‘off-the-shelf,’ ‘stand-alone’ incentive packages and 
reward systems.  
Although this tendency prompts a number of empirical studies addressing issues surrounding 
public sector reforms within the NPM paradigm, generally little focus has been made to 
examine the issue of compatibility of market-type managerial approaches in PSOs.  In 
particular, fairly less attention has been so far paid to examine the role of motivation in 
managing performance in this era of NPM in a local government environment. This study 
therefore is an attempt to bridge this research gap and encourage further academic enquiries 
around this contemporary phenomenon of rewarding public performance using market-type 
schemes.  
In summing up, the literature has indicated that employee motivation is an invaluable 
dimension of performance management. The literature reviewed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
demonstrates that variants of motivation theories, PM techniques and PBIs must be integrated 
to bring about the achievement culture within public services. To this end, process motivation 
theories of AGREE have an important role to play in the whole practice of designing PBIs and 
managing performance in organisations.   
1.5. Contributions of the study 
Essentially, the study is intended to be a theoretical contribution to the partial but growing body 
of knowledge about the role of motivation theory in managing performance in a public sector 
environment – especially the adoption of performance-based incentive schemes (PBIs) in 
public services. By and large the contribution of this study to knowledge may be viewed in 
three perspectives: 
• the use of PM model as a research tool;  
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• the testing of generalisability of motivation theorems of AGREE in a public sector 
environment through which we have one proposition regarding the significance of 
‘environmental contingency’ motivational approach to managing performance in PSOs,  
• lessons from the experience of UK local authorities in the implementation of 
performance-pay schemes as a motivational device, and 
(a) PM model as a research tool 
Through out this study it has been demonstrated that the PM model is an invaluable strategic 
management solution which can integrate organisational and individual objectives in a balanced 
way. However, PM model framework can be used as research tool for the purpose of eliciting 
and analysing data from the field as presented in Table 5.1 in chapter five.  
(b) Testing motivation theorems   
As a second theoretical contribution, this study seeks to test the validity and applicability of 
five generalisations of motivation theories of AGREE (as highlighted in s.1.4 above) in a public 
sector perspective. The goal-setting theory predicts that there is a reciprocal utility between 
motivation enhancement and attainment of legitimate performance targets given job-holders’ 
commitment, agreement, and participation in the setting of SMART objectives. The theory also 
predicts potential operational problems and loss of focus when multiplicities of goals are 
pursued (McClelland, 1975). Expectancy theory predicts that employee motivation is enhanced 
if performance (not effort) is adequately rewarded (Vroom, 1964). Achievement theory 
(McClelland, 1975) asserts that the success of the manager is a function of the need for 
achievement. Therefore, effectiveness of a manager, innovative ideas and passionate to achieve 
targets are all the main features of the achievement theorem. Reactance theory of motivation 
(Brehm, 1966) assumes that given that,  
‘a person has a set of free behaviours, he (she) will experience reactance whenever any 
of these behaviours is eliminated or threatened with elimination, and when a free 
behaviour of an individual is eliminated (or threatened) his desire for that behaviour or 
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for the object of it will increase.’  
Finally, the equity theory (Adams,1964) advocates that a performance-pay incentive scheme 
should not only reward all performers fairly, but also must be seen to operate equitably.  
(c) Extractable lessons for developing economies 
Generally, the lessons may be classified into five main categories as follows: (i) attributes of a 
successful PBI scheme; (ii) community involvement in decision-making processes; (iii) lessons 
about the PM model approach to improving public service quality; and (iv) lessons about 
performance measurement. All these lessons are elaborated in ss.10.2.3 of Chapter Ten in the 
thesis. 
1.6. Justification and significance of the research 
According to the Transparent International (TI) Annual Report 2001, three billion people live 
in cities today, accounting for almost every second person on earth. Urbanisation particularly in 
developing world, is growing at a rapid pace, making urban systems of governance, 
performance management and service provision increasingly important for the well being of a 
large segment of the world’s population. Engagement with the private sector is one of the 
cornerstones of public sector reform initiatives undertaken with a view to addressing issues 
related the achievement culture in the provision of quality goods and services.  
The initiative to bring about the achievement culture within public services has to be aligned 
with appropriate managerial approaches that appreciate the contemporary role of motivation in 
improving the quality of performance. Besides, the general review of the theories of motivation 
in Chapter Two and that of performance management in Chapter Three has led to the 
conclusion that there is a legitimate and authentic link between systematic management of 
incentive schemes and reward systems on one hand and for public sector managers to improve 
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the quality of public service delivery on the other.  
This link signifies the central role that process motivation theories of AGREE have to play in 
bringing about the ‘achievement culture’ within public services. It means that research 
activities leading to the understanding of the role of motivation in the public sector and lessons 
drawn from such studies are significantly relevant for developing economies now rather than 
later. Empirical studies addressing the role of motivation in managing organisational 
performance in general have rarely gone beyond the private sector.  
Therefore, this thesis is a further extension of current studies examining the scope of PM and 
practice of PRP schemes in a public sector environment. The study also helps to stimulate a 
debate that motivation theory has a ‘revised’ role to play in managing performance following 
recent public sector reform processes which have incorporated many market-type managerial 
practices from the private sector. Most importantly, the study helps to pinpoint the extent to 
which performance information is now becoming an invaluable input in the decision-making 
processes even in politically flavoured institutions such as local authorities.  
By and large, the essence of this study is based on two main strands: first, the growing interest 
in applying market-type rewards and incentive schemes in the public sector; secondly, the 
overwhelming debate about the appropriateness of these ‘off-the-shelf’ market-type 
motivational policies in public services.  
There is a two-fold reason why this subject is significantly worthwhile now. First, the PRP 
schemes have not been in practice long time enough for previous studies to trace their 
compatibility and carry out an impact assessment. Secondly, factors such as the qualitative 
nature of public performance, local government culture and attitudes, adequacy of performance 
measurement skills, and management information systems are potentially a threat to the 
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effectiveness of the PRP scheme in a public sector setting. 
DTEs are overwhelmingly urged by the international community and the market alike to reform 
the way public services are managed in their respective economies. In response to this, most of 
these countries are now adopting various NPM practices all of which being transposed from the 
private sector. PM is one of these practices. In Tanzania for example, the New Public Reform 
Programme (NPRP) has been designed to bring about changes in every aspect of how business 
is carried out by all public services.  
Among other things the NPRP is designed to launch a strategic process for transforming the 
role, capacity and performance of public service on a sustainable basis. The activities of this 
process fall under five components: (i) restructuring the public service; (ii) performance 
improvement; (iii) pay reform; (iv) records and information systems; (v) capacity building; and 
(vi) communication, education, and programme monitoring1.  
With respect to performance improvement strategy, the NPRP has emphasised the installation 
of PM system throughout the public service in order to ensure that all public service 
organisations provide the highest quality services and that results-oriented management 
practices are applied. With respect to pay reform, the NPRP stipulates that pay structures will 
be streamlined and rationalised through results-oriented job evaluations and every hardworking 
employee will be rewarded accordingly.   
Within this context, the government seeks also to transfer the roles, mandates and 
responsibilities, as well as the resources for delivery of basic social services such as primary 
                                                 
1 Rugumyamheto, J. (2000), Paper presented at the inaugural ceremony of the Launch of Public Service Reform 
Programme by the Permanent Secretary, President’s Office, Civil Service Department on 20/6/2000, Sheraton 
Hotel, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
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education, primary health care, agricultural extension services, district and rural roads, to the 
LGs and community based organisations2.  
Unfortunately, these reform initiatives are launched in a very weak private sector and very 
corrupt public sector environment. The realisation of all these goals will be far reaching unless 
developing countries learn from the experience of other developed economies on how to 
manage market-type managerial reforms. However, because the contexts are different, an 
emerging question is that of transferability. 
The final justification and significance of this study is based on the novelty of the application of 
PM model as a research tool (Kloot & Martin, 1998) to address the five key questions relating 
to NPM as mentioned above and elaborated in s.5.4 in this thesis. 
1.7. Methodology 
A field or survey within case study methodology was used as this study is seen to be 
exploratory research of a contemporary phenomenon. Field studies and interviews during case 
studies provide richer data than can be gained from survey research, and can explore causal 
effects more closely (Yin, 1994). The completed transcripts were analysed using the Statistical 
Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 10.0 computer programme to determine recurring 
themes. Quotes gathered from the interviewees during case studies have been used to give 
meaning to the results and are presented in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine. 
The research was conducted using a combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection 
methods. A pilot study was launched in March 1999 and was based on two councils – 
Birmingham and Solihull. The main study was undertaken using the survey within case study 
                                                 
2 Speech by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, H.E. Benjamin Mkapa, on the official launch of the 
new phase o the Public Sector Reform Programme, 20/6/2000, Sheraton Hotel Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
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approach. Both questionnaire and interview techniques were used to examine the key research 
issues cited in paragraph 1.3 above.  
The study mostly interviewed senior managers in the British local government authorities (see 
Appendix D). The objective was to gain a senior managerial perspective on the application of 
market-type performance management systems, performance measurement processes and 
equity perceptions of performance-pay schemes in a local government context. The interviews 
used open-ended topic guide questions to elicit as much information as possible, and were 
taped (with permission) and transcribed for later analysis. Two different sets of survey 
questionnaires were sent out to 420 local authorities using electronic mail (e-mail) facility for 
cost effectiveness. In total 122 of these questionnaires were returned – a response rate of about 
29.0 per cent. The breakdown of this number of respondents is summarised in Appendix D of 
this thesis. 
1.8. The Scope of the Study 
According to OECD, (1998) and Heery, (1998), there has been very little evaluation of whether 
improvements due to adoption of market-oriented practices in the public sector have actually 
occurred or not and whether benefits justify costs. Due to the scope of the study, this thesis has 
not been able to assess whether the schemes are meeting their stated objectives or in other 
words, the study does not evaluate the impact of the PRP schemes. The objective of this study 
is not to evaluate the effectiveness of NPM practices in the public sector. However, the study 
intends to provide a comprehensive overview of the role of motivation theory in PM as one of 
the crucial dimensions of NPM regime as a whole. For reasons of manageability, the study 
concentrates on the implementation of one of the several NPM practices in the British local 
government system. Although an attempt is made to cover all of the relevant issues, variations 
in the data available for analysis have meant that some topics could only be examined 
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and discussed in a relatively trivial way.  
1.9. Structure of the Thesis  
Apart from this introductory Part I, the rest of the thesis is organised into four main parts. 
PART II is the literature review and consists of four chapters: Chapter Two reviews the 
conceptual framework of motivation and employee compensation and reward systems. 
Chapter Three discusses the theory of performance management as an overview framework 
within which performance-based rewards systems and incentive schemes (PBRIs) are 
introduced. Chapter Four reviews world-wide empirical studies about PBIs across public 
sector organisations with a view to understanding what is known so far about the subject matter 
of the study. Most importantly, chapter four draws upon fundamental issues that underlie the 
research problem towards which this study seeks to contribute.  
PART III consisting of Chapter Five is about research methods and analytical framework. 
Part IV comprises four chapters and is concerned with data collection and analysis. Chapter 
Six examines capacity issues of British local authorities to implement PBIs as transposed from 
the private sector and reviews the evidence supporting the use of performance management and 
PRP. Chapter Seven presents the finding about performance measurement and accountability 
practices in relation to PBIs decisions across British local authorities. Chapter Eight examines 
the question of the perception of stakeholders about the equity of PBIs in the local government 
environment. Chapter Nine deals with case study interviews, summaries and analyses of the 
evidence gathered to attest the hypothesis of the study. Finally, Part V contains only Chapter 
Ten which summarises key conclusions, contributions and potential areas for further research.  
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1.10. Conclusion 
Various initiatives are undertaken by governments the world over to motivate their employees 
in order to improve the quality of public services. To achieve this mission, public sector 
managers are encouraged to adopt market-type techniques in managing performance. This 
quest for quality public services has brought into the limelight the need for thorough research 
on the ‘revised’ role of motivation theory in managing performance – hence this study. It is 
argued that the importation of market-type managerial practices in PSOs have raised a number 
of debatable research issues. The debate revolves around compatibility issues of market-type 
motivational schemes and the role of motivation theory in managing public services.   
This study seeks to contribute towards this debate in three ways. Firstly, by using the PM 
model as a research tool; secondly, by testing the motivation theorems of AGREE, and thirdly, 
by extracting lessons relevant for local authorities in developing countries from the UK model.  
This chapter has introduced the research problem, research issues and hypotheses and has laid 
the foundations for the thesis. Then, the research has been justified, the underlying theories and 
methodology briefly described. Finally, the chapter has outlined both the scope of the study and 
the structure of the thesis. On these foundations, the thesis can proceed with a detailed 
description of the research. 
  
 
- 20 -
 
 
 
 
 
  Part II 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- 21 -
Chapter Two 
THEORIES OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 
MOTIVATION AND REWARD SYSTEMS 
2.0. Introduction 
Chapter one was concerned with the context of the study which argues that organisations are 
nowadays concerned with what should be done to achieve sustained high levels of performance 
through motivated people. This means giving close attention to how individuals can best be 
motivated through such means as incentives, rewards, leadership and, most importantly, the 
work they do and the organisation context within which they carry out that work. The aim, of 
course, is to develop effective PM frameworks, to redress the role of motivation processes and 
a work environment, which will help to ensure that individuals deliver results in accordance 
with the expectations of their clients. 
This chapter presents a broad review of three key theories of human resource management 
(HRM), motivation and reward systems management. The chapter begins with a snapshot of the 
evolution of theory, research, and practice of HRM – including strategic HRM. Then it narrows 
down to the theory of motivation as a dimension of strategic HRM and reviews the various 
developments in the theories of motivation. The chapter  concludes with looking at the 
literature on compensation and reward systems management.  
2.1. Theoretical Evolution, Research, and Practice of HRM 
The Human Resource Management (HRM) function, once responsible for record-keeping and 
maintenance, has evolved into a strategic partner, sharing comparable boardroom status with 
disciplines such as accounting, marketing, and finance (Dulebohn, Ferris, & Stodd, 1995). 
Despite the fact that alternative perspectives regarding the limited contribution of HRM 
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have been suggested (Stewart, 1996a, 1996b), a positive relationship between the development 
of HRM as a strategic ally and company performance has been shown (Huselid, 1995; Huselid, 
Jackson, & Schuler, 1997; Plevel, Lane, Schuler, & Nellis, 1995; Schuler & Jackson, 1987). In 
line with practice has been HRM research that has grown from its largely theoretical origins to 
view organizational activities from an interdisciplinary perspective (Jennings, 1994; Wright & 
McMahan, 1992), concerned with a progression toward methodological and theoretical 
development (Ferris & Judge, 1991). Significant reviews of the literature chronicle both the 
development of the HRM function, as well as the evolution of research designed to explain this 
phenomenon (Fisher, 1989; Jackson & Schuler, 1995; Mahoney & Deckop, 1986; Snell, 
Youndt, & Wright, 1996). 
Recently, the study of HRM has adopted a cross-functional approach that has expanded its 
breadth of analysis beyond the functional tasks of selection, training, compensation, and 
performance appraisal. One line of research, the strategic human resource management 
(SHRM) perspective, attempts to align HRM functions and activities with the overarching 
strategic goals of the organization (Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 1991). The international 
perspective acknowledges the importance of the global economy, as well as emphasizes the 
value of designing HR activities that address cross-cultural concerns (Napier, Tibau, Janssens, 
& Pilenzo, 1995). Finally, the political view assumes that unwritten, informal activities may 
have consequential effects on the design and implementation of HRM functions and activities. 
Barney, (1991); Katz & Kahn, (1978); Miles & Snow, (1978), laid the theoretical foundation 
for the macro-level HRM (i.e., strategic human resource management) research that has 
proliferated in much of the current literature (Huselid, 1995; Wright & McMahan, 1992). 
This era has also brought into the limelight country-level differences with respect to the 
development of HRM. For example, Ferguson (1961) reviewed the expansion of HRM 
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activities in the United States, while Farmer (1958) traced the growth of practice in England. 
Further, Harrell (1953) suggested that the political atmosphere of the country in which an 
organization resides significantly impacted both research and practice during the early years of 
the field. Although these reviews were not comparative in nature, they did illustrate that 
different regions of the world are more (or less) concerned with some HRM activities than 
others. Moreover, these early reviews provided scholars a point of reference when conducting 
research assessing cultural implications of HRM (MacDuffie & Krafcik, 1992; Mendonca & 
Kanungo, 1994). 
Related to current research assessing the impact of organizational politics on HRM, Gellerman 
(1959) outlined the steps necessary to identify influential individuals and made suggestions 
regarding the tactics used to persuade others. Moreover, researchers acknowledged the value of 
understanding the "informal" as well as "formal" elements of organizations (Cicourel, 1958). 
Later, Mintzberg (1983) described politics as 
"individual or group behavior that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, 
and above all, in the technical sense, illegitimate - sanctioned neither by formal 
authority, accepted ideology, nor certified expertise . . ." (p. 172). 
Clearly, strategic, international, and political perspectives of HRM represent three of the most 
significant areas of practical and theoretical concern on which theory and research in HRM has 
focused in the past decade and a half. As such, comprehensive reviews of the HRM literature 
have focused a great deal of attention surveying the existing body of literature, as well as 
prescribing mechanisms for extending research in these important areas. In the following 
sections, research published subsequent to these prior reviews is examined, and future research 
directions are offered that may help the field grow even more briskly than it has in the past. 
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2.1.1. Strategic Perspective on Human Resources Management 
Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) is an area that continues to evoke a lot of 
debate as to what it actually embraces Mabey, Salaman and Storey (eds.) (1998). Definitions 
range from 'a human resource system that is tailored to the demands of the business strategy' 
(Miles and Snow 1984) to 'the pattern of planned human resource activities intended to enable 
an organization to achieve its goals' (Wright and McMahan 1992). Although the difference 
between these two seems subtle, the implications of the difference are considerable. Where in 
the first definition human resource management is a 'reactive' management field in which 
human resource management becomes a tool to implement strategy, in the latter definition it 
has a proactive function in which human resource activities actually create and shape the 
business strategy (Sanz-Valle et al. 1999). 
Over the past 10 or 15 years, numerous theoreticians have argued that the human resources of 
the firm are potentially the sole source of sustainable competitive advantage for organizations 
(e.g., Dyer, 1993; Pfeffer, 1994; Snell et al., 1996; Wright & McMahan, 1992). These works 
have drawn on the resource based view of the firm (Barney, 1991, 1995) and have argued that 
few of the more traditional sources of sustainable competitive advantage (e.g., technology, 
access to financial resources) create value in a manner that is rare, non-imitable, and non-
substitutable. The degrees of the human resource value creation process, however, are 
extremely difficult, if not impossible for competitors to imitate, as they are path dependent and 
causally ambiguous. That is, the complexities created through the social and historical 
embeddedness of the human resource value HRM programs (Pfeffer, 1989). Whereas each of 
these programs of research is important and distinct in its own accord, they share a common 
characteristic. Namely, research in these areas is relatively new and has historically not had the 
benefit of a richly developed theoretical base to build upon. However, this trend appears to be 
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changing as researchers have constantly developed conceptual models of HRM that have 
moved research away from its theoretical origins. 
In this section, we re-examine the comprehensive reviews of the HRM literature that have been 
published, with greater emphasis on those that have surfaced over the last 15 years. A survey of 
all reviews, as well as an inspection of all major directions of HRM research that have occurred 
over this time frame, extends beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore we focus on major 
trends that have helped shape current modes of thinking in the substantive areas that are 
discussed more fully in the remaining sections of this review. Specifically, the thesis unfolds as 
follows: 
1. First, we briefly review research that provided the groundwork for contemporary studies in 
the areas of strategic HRM, international HRM, and political influences on HRM, which 
appear to be the three dominant perspectives that theory and research in HRM have taken in 
the past 15 years;  
2. Second, we examine more current reviews that have addressed these important topics 
(Ferris & Judge, 1991; Fisher, 1989; Jackson & Schuler, 1995; Mahoney & Deckop, 1986; 
Wright & McMahan, 1992); and 
3. Finally, we provide a discussion of the "state-of-the-art" research that has extended the 
body of literature in these substantive areas. Included in this final discussion are 
prescriptions for integrating interdisciplinary work into future research and suggestions for 
moving the science and practice of HRM into the next millennium. 
Excellent reviews of theory and research on specific HRM practices (e.g., selection, 
performance appraisal, etc.) have been published in recent years in the volumes of the 
Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, the Annual Review of Psychology, the 
Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management series, and other outlets. We see no 
reason to duplicate those reviews here. Instead, we take a more refined and focused approach 
on particular issues and themes in HRM that have emerged in recent years, and which 
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we feel can lead the field in productive directions. 
2.1.2. Theoretical Foundations 
Most of the early reviews of the literature are published by notable industrial psychologists, 
such as Shartle (1950), Brown and Ghiselli (1952), and Harrell (1953). As a consequence, these 
reviews tend to emphasize applied individual-level issues, such as employee testing, training, 
and motivation. However, even at these early stages of development, antecedents of what many 
consider significant contemporary trends in the HRM domain are defined. For example, 
Gilmer's (1960) discussion of situational variables reveal the importance of matching personnel 
strategies with organizational strategies. Further, Gilmer (1960) invites researchers to design 
measures to assess the relationship between "individual personalities" and "company 
personalities" (p. 337). These contributions, as well as those provided by organizational 
theorists some years later (e.g., creation process cannot be reverse engineered or easily teased 
out). This value creation process does meet the criteria for a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage as set forth by the resource based view of the firm. This argument justifiably focuses 
academic attention on the competitive imperative to strategically manage the human resources 
of the firm. 
Consequently, a field of inquiry has emerged that actually bills itself as research in strategic 
human resource management (SHRM). Whereas numerous studies in this area have provided 
substantial empirical and theoretical contributions to the field of HRM, this area of 
investigation is still in its infancy, with scholars only recently trying to reach some common 
theoretical and empirical ground on which to build. Perhaps never before has Mahoney and 
Deckop's (1986) commentary on the fragmented nature of HRM research been more applicable 
than to this area of work. 
2.1.3. The concept of strategic approach to HRM 
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Whereas the entire area of exploration is deemed to be strategic in nature, the concept of 
"strategic" takes on various definitions in the literature. For instance (and addressed at more 
length in following paragraphs), some researchers have focused merely on the relationship of 
various human resource practices and systems to firm performance and have labeled this 
relationship as strategic in the sense that it is extremely important to the organization's 
objectives of profitability and viability. On the other hand, some research has delved into 
examinations of "fit" of various human resource practices and systems with the organization's 
competitive strategy - a quite different notion of "strategic" conceptually. It comes as no 
surprise, then, that there is little coherence among empirical results in the field. 
2.1.4. The approaches to Strategic HRM 
Chadwick and Cappelli (1999) articulate both the current state of affairs in SHRM research, 
and the potential reasons for the lack of consensus reflected in empirical work in this area. They 
argue that all current approaches to SHRM research are strategic in the sense that they focus on 
the relationship between sets or systems of HRM practices and policies, and organizational 
outcomes. This awareness contrasts earlier research that was concerned primarily with 
individual HRM practices and their contributions to variance explained in some organizational 
level outcome. Chadwick and Cappelli maintain, however, that researchers have different goals 
with regard to their particular research in SHRM, and consequently there is considerable 
variance in the operationalization of the term "strategic." Three approaches to SHRM research 
are examined. 
1. The first stream of research is strategic in the sense that it is concerned simply with the 
contribution of HRM to the financial performance of the firm. Chadwick and Cappelli 
(1999) speculate that this body of work is deemed strategic because it examines a chief 
strategic concern of organizations (i.e., the bottom line).  
2. The second approach to SHRM is concerned with organizations' strategic 
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choices in managing their competitive environments, and the manner in which these choices 
are reflected in the firms' HRM systems.  
3. The third approach identified by the authors investigates the degree of "fit" between 
organizational strategy and the sets of HRM practices and policies of the firm. In these 
studies, it is assumed that "external fit" (i.e., fit with strategy) and "internal fit" (i.e., 
consistencies and synergies among practices) have an impact on organizational outcomes. 
Consequently, these studies examine the degree to which sets of HRM practices and 
policies are congruent with those deemed to be most appropriate for their strategic type.  
Given these different approaches to SHRM, it is evident that a more consolidated field of 
investigation would be beneficial to the development of knowledge in this area. Despite 
shortcomings, however, investigations to date show SHRM to be an fascinating and abundantly 
fruitful area for research. Along these approaches are several analyses to test the soundness of 
the three dominant theoretical perspectives in the HRM-firm performance literature: the 
universalistic, contingency, and configurational perspectives. Results of the analyses provide 
some support for each of the three perspectives. 
2.1.4.1. The universality approach to strategic HRM 
Huselid's (1995) work reflects what has come to be known as the "universalistic" approach to 
SHRM, and it is indicative of the first approach outlined in the Chadwick and Cappelli (1999) 
categorization. This perspective assumes that there are certain "best" HRM practices that will 
contribute to increased financial performance, regardless of the strategic goals of the firm. 
Whereas other scholars have concurred with this assumption (e.g., Delaney, Lewin, & 
Ichniowski, 1989; Osterman, 1994; Pfeffer, 1994), there has been little work that provides a 
definitive prescription as to which HRM practices should be included in a "best" practices 
system. Delaney et al. (1989), for example, utilizes 10 practices that related to selection, 
performance appraisal, incentive compensation, job design, grievance procedures, information 
sharing, attitude assessment, and labour- management participation. Huselid (1995) 
  
 
- 29 -
adds three additional practices to the list: recruiting intensity, average training hours per year, 
and the criteria for promotion. Pfeffer (1994), however, advocates the use of 16 management 
practices to achieve higher productivity and profits. 
In recent work, Delery and Doty (1996) identifies seven practices consistently considered to be 
"strategic" in nature. Practices identified were internal career opportunities, formal training 
systems, appraisal measures, profit sharing, employment security, voice mechanisms, and job 
definition.  
2.1.4.2. The contingency approach to HRM 
A number of theoreticians and researchers, however, argue that a ‘contingency’ perspective is 
the more appropriate approach to SHRM (e.g., Butler et al., 1991; Dyer, 1985; Dyer & Holder, 
1988; Dyer & Reeves, 1995; Lengnick-Hall & Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Milkovich, 1988; Schuler, 
1989; Jackson & Schuler, 1995). The contingency approach differs from the universalistic 
perspective in that the studies have attempted to link HRM systems and the complementarity of 
variations of HRM practices to specific organizational strategies (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Youndt, 
Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 1996). Schuler (Schuler, 1989; Schuler & Jackson, 1987) argued that 
HRM practices which are not synergistic and consistent with organizational strategy, and which 
conflict (i.e., with regard to intended outcomes) with other HRM practices are confounding in 
effect, and create ambiguity that can inhibit both individual and organizational performance. 
2.1.4.3. The configurational approach to SHRM 
A closely related body of work calls for a ‘configurational’ approach to SHRM, and argues that 
it is the pattern of HRM practices that contribute to the attainment of organizational goals 
(Wright & McMahan, 1992). Similar to the contingency approach, the configurational approach 
argues that fit of HRM practices with organizational strategy is a vital factor in the HRM-firm 
performance relationship. However, the configurational approach takes this 
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argument a step further in asserting that there are specific "ideal types" of HRM systems that 
provide both horizontal and vertical fit of HRM practices to organizational structure and 
strategic goals. More specifically, there are certain, specific systems of HRM practices that 
result in the highest internal consistency and complementarily (horizontal fit), as well as 
congruence with organizational goals (vertical fit). The configuration of practices that provides 
the tightest horizontal and vertical fit with any given strategy, then, would be the ideal type for 
an organization pursuing that particular strategy (Delery & Doty, 1996). Contingency theorists, 
generally, have not gone so far as to prescribe these ideal types. 
2.1.5. Comparative analysis and Research Gaps 
All approaches are overwhelmed by many of the same limitations. As noted in previous work 
(e.g., Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Chadwick & Cappelli, 1999; Dyer & Reeves, 1995), there is 
little consensus among researchers with regard to precisely which HRM practices should be 
included. Is there a single "ideal type" of HRM system that is universally effective, or does it 
depend on the strategy of the firm? Further, if the match of the HRM system to strategy does 
indeed matter, what HRM practice bundles are appropriate for achieving fit to the various 
strategies investigated (Wright & Sherman, 1999)? There are glaring discrepancies in the 
prescriptions made by different scholars in this area. Becker and Gerhart (1996) pointed to 
internal promotion systems and formal grievance procedures as examples of this inconsistency. 
Some studies have regarded these HRM practices as "best" or "high performance" practices, 
whereas others have noted the association of these practices with unionization, and have 
categorized them as components of bureaucratic HRM systems (Wright & Sherman, 1999). 
2.1.5.1. The Issue of Constraints to HRM system 
A related area that remains relatively less researched is whether environmental and contextual 
factors constrain the availability or suitability of HRM system content, and how the 
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effects of these constraints play out at the individual and organizational levels. Jackson and 
Schuler (1995) suggest that variations in contextual factors act as constraints on (or 
enhancements of) the system of HRM practices that may be available or appropriate for 
implementation in any given organization. They argue that HRM systems may be contingent 
upon, and directed by, these contextual factors. More specifically, whereas most of the previous 
research in the HRM area has focused on "high performance practices" or "best practices" as 
the generic solution to HRM issues, they suggest that this may not be the case. 
Certain practices and groups of practices may be more or less effective in the attainment of 
both individual and organizational outcomes in varying contexts. Further, the implementation 
of some practices may be totally infeasible given the existence of contextual constraints. 
Organizational structure and culture, for instance, may pose such constraints. If the structure of 
the organization is highly hierarchical with an accompanying bureaucratic culture, it is unlikely 
that participative management could be successfully implemented without significant changes 
in that structure and culture. Not only is such a structure not conducive to the effectiveness and 
success of a participative management program, but lines of authority and chains of command 
might also inhibit the acceptance of such a practice by both labour and management. The 
potential for contextual constraints on the composition of HRM systems poses interesting 
questions for future research. 
2.1.5.2. The Issue of Current Measures of Strategy  
Another troublesome area in SHRM research concerns the measures of strategy used in the 
studies to date. Whereas inconsistencies in operationalization of HRM systems contribute to the 
lack of uniformity across studies, differences in the measures of strategy used may also account 
for the lack of consensus in results. Recent conceptual pieces have been critical of researchers 
in this area, suggesting that they have incorporated antiquated notions of firm 
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strategy (e.g., Chadwick & Cappelli, 1999; Wright & Sherman, 1999; Wright & Snell, 1998). 
Most studies have utilized such typologies as those of Porter (1980) or Miles and Snow (1978). 
These generic categorizations have little in common with the realities of the modern 
competitive environment with which organizations are confronted. First, categorizations are 
exclusive, assuming that organizations pursue a certain strategic goal while ignoring other 
strategic concerns. Second, they depict the competitive environment, and consequently 
organizational strategy, as being static instead of dynamic. 
There is much evidence that neither of these two assumptions is valid. These typologies assume 
a specific and narrow strategic positioning of the organization. Whereas organizations may 
concentrate, to some lesser or greater extent, on any of these particular strategies, there is 
sketchy and empirical evidence that many factors are strategic considerations in modern 
organizations (e.g., DeMeyer, Nakane, Miller, & Ferdows, 1989; Harper, 1992). Results of 
examinations assuming such a restricted view of strategy are necessarily limited. As suggested 
by Chadwick and Cappelli (1999), future tests of the HRM-strategy relationship might be better 
served by considering strategy to be along a continuum, involving a number of strategic factors 
that are seen by the organization to be more or less important as competitive priorities. 
Research of this nature might provide further insight into the lack of consensus among results 
that currently exists in the literature. 
2.1.5.3. The Issue of Static Competitive environment 
The assumption of a static competitive environment, and consequently a static organizational 
strategy is also an issue that is being increasingly questioned. There is evidence that very few 
firms operate in static, stable environments. Instead, firms are faced with multiple competitive 
pressures to which they must respond, and these pressures change rapidly, requiring continual 
adaptation if an organization is to remain viable. The fact that organizational 
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environments are dynamic has evoked much speculation about the prescription for tight fit of 
HRM systems with any particular strategic goal. Chadwick and Cappelli (1999) pointed out the 
dysfunctionality of external fit in arguing that as fit to external conditions becomes closer or 
tighter, this can become more problematic as competition changes. Embedded systems and 
structures are difficult to change under any circumstances, and the greater the intermeshing or 
fit of such systems, the more entrenched they become, and the more difficult they are to 
modify. 
2.1.5.4. The Issue of organizational flexibility 
Increasingly, the field of SHRM is recognizing this need for organizational flexibility, through 
"flexible HRM systems" or "flexibility-enhancing" HRM systems (Harrell-Cook, 1999), and 
this appears to be an area in need of further research and development. Wright and Snell (1998) 
note that fit and flexibility have been depicted by some researchers as opposite ends of the 
spectrum. They adopt the complementary perspective of Milliman, Von Glinow, and Nathan 
(1991), however, and argue that both fit and flexibility are necessary to organizational 
effectiveness. We would carry their argument one step further, and contend that, for firms in 
highly turbulent environments, flexibility is imperative in order to achieve fit of employee and 
organizational capabilities with changing competitive priorities. Future research in SHRM 
should consider that strategy is dynamic in unstable environments. Moreover, examinations 
into HRM practices and systems that provide the firm with the capabilities to swiftly and easily 
adapt to changing environmental demands should be conducted. 
2.1.5.5. The Issue of HRM-strategy link 
Further, investigations into the HRM-strategy link have almost exclusively focused on 
predominant intended strategy of the firm and assumed that the professed intended strategy is 
equivalent to the emergent or realized strategy. Examinations based on that assumption 
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are inherently flawed, as it is an assumption that must certainly prove to hold for few, if any, 
firms in today's intensely unstable competitive environment. Further, most studies of the HRM-
strategy link presume that the intended strategy is uniformly known and understood throughout 
the organization. Given this uniformity in understanding, HRM professionals have the 
knowledge and ability to implement policies and practices that would be most effective in 
achieving strategic goals (an assumption that ignores bounded rationality). The foregoing 
assumptions are questionable, and should receive consideration in future research in SHRM. 
2.1.5.6. The Issue of HRM systems’ differential impact on organizational effectiveness 
Another issue posed, but as yet unaddressed, is to what extent do the various practices in HRM 
systems have differential impact on organizational effectiveness, including not only financial 
performance, but also success in implementing organizational strategy, and achievement of 
strategic goals. Typically, studies have used an additive measure, combining the specific 
practices into an outweighed composite. It has been argued that aggregating the data into a 
composite is appropriate as firms can improve their performance by either increasing the 
number of HRM practices that they have in place, or by increasing the number of employees to 
whom these practices apply (MacDuffie, 1995; Youndt et al., 1996). However, if there is a 
differential impact of various HRM practices on firm performance, the absence (or presence) of 
any particular practice would have a greater (or lesser) effect on results than is indicated by 
equal weighting. 
A related issue concerns the operationalization of HRM practices in these studies. Specifically, 
the measures used to date have been very genetic in nature. For instance, most studies have 
asked only the extent to which organizations utilize "formal performance appraisals." However, 
the use of "formal performance appraisals" can mean very different things in different HRM 
systems. Are the performance appraisals developmental in nature? Do they include 
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co-worker or customer input? Are forced rankings used? Are appraisals reflective of traditional 
subjective supervisory ratings? Certainly, the type of appraisal most conducive to achieving 
organizational goals would vary across organizational contexts. The generic "formal appraisal" 
is thereby limited in the amount of information it conveys. The same is true of generic 
measures of selection methods, reward systems, and other HRM practices. More definitive 
constructs would provide richer information and insight into the effectiveness of these practices 
and their appropriateness given variance in organizational goals. 
An issue of further concern is that of HRM effectiveness. There are two perspectives of HRM 
effectiveness in need of theoretical and empirical attention: (1) the effectiveness with which 
HRM policies and practices are implemented; and (2) the effectiveness of these policies and 
practices in producing desired results. The only study to date examining these issues was 
conducted with regard to the second perspective. Huselid (1995) found a positive relationship 
between HRM capabilities and overall HRM effectiveness, as well as a positive impact of 
HRM effectiveness on firm performance. Both measures of HRM capabilities and HRM 
effectiveness, however, were determined through surveys of senior HRM executives. As the 
potential for bias exists in such measures, other studies utilizing multiple respondents are 
needed to bolster these findings. 
A related question is "effectiveness with regard to what?" Does effectiveness mean primarily 
firm financial performance? Stockholder satisfaction? Or, are there other measures of 
effectiveness that need to be considered in order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the impact of HRM systems? Many theoreticians have suggested that a balanced scorecard 
approach offers the potential for a more appropriate measure of effectiveness. This approach 
focuses on multiple stakeholders including investors, customers, and employees, and it has 
been proposed as a more complete measure of total performance (Ulrich, 1997). The 
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assessment of effectiveness is simply one more example of conceptualization and measurement 
issues with which future researchers will be confronted. 
2.1.5.7. The Issue of refinement and development of HRM Theoretical models 
A final issue, and one that is perhaps most integral to our understanding of the HRM-firm 
performance relationship is that of the "black box." More specifically, if there is indeed an 
impact of HRM systems on firm performance, how do these effects occur? What are the 
mechanisms through which these effects manifest themselves? Do these effects vary under 
different levels of contextual or environmental factors? These questions call for theory 
refinement and the development of more comprehensive theoretical models of the HRM-firm 
performance relationship that include intermediate linkages and boundary conditions.  
A recent attempt to more precisely articulate these intermediate linkages and processes was 
proposed by Ferris et al. (1998). They developed a social context theory of the HRM-
organization effectiveness relationship which suggests some specific directions for research in 
this area. Further, empirical investigations of such models, testing for mediation (intermediate 
linkages) and moderation (boundary conditions) would greatly enhance our understanding of 
the dynamics of the HRM-firm effectiveness link. More definitive empirical validation of the 
"hows" and "whys" of this relationship might also prove to be the most convincing evidence to 
practitioners of the value of the HRM function. As such, this type of research should be given a 
high priority by HRM scholars. 
Of the issues and research gaps identified in this section, this study will examine further a 
research question more related to the  issue of organizational flexibility. That is public sector 
organisations flexing themselves to accommodate market-type managerial practices. In 
particular the research will look at the compatibility of market-type motivational devises such 
as performance-related pay schemes using the case study of British local authorities. 
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However, before we narrows our focus to this end let us first of all review the underlying 
literature on motivation. This is the concern of the next section. 
2.2. The Theory of Motivation 
Application of the theory of motivation is based on a number of assumptions and 
generalisations. In addition to examining the compatibility of market-type managerial practices 
and extracting lessons there from, this study seeks to attest five of the theorems of motivation 
(AGREE) by using the case of PRP schemes in British local authorities. The purpose of this 
chapter therefore is to review the main theories and conceptual framework of motivation and its 
role in managing peoples’ performance at workplaces.  
Motivation as an issue pervades the study of PM and employee compensation and reward 
systems. The key question of reward systems is "What makes us tick?" Ideas about motivation 
are fundamental to several theoretical responses to that question (Kleinbeck, et al, 1990). 
Theorists differ in the emphasis which they place on the dynamic and motivational aspects of 
performance, depending on the aspects of personality, which are the focus of their interest.  
2.2.1. Definition of motivation 
Motivation is incidental to or defined by goal-directed behaviour (Locke, op. cit.). This implies 
that motivation is concerned with the strength and direction of that behaviour. In other words it 
implies that motivation takes place when people expect that a course of action is likely to lead 
to the attainment of a goal and a valued reward - one which satisfies their particular needs. 
Well-motivated people are therefore those with clearly defined goals who take action which 
they expect will achieve those goals (Erez and Zion, 1984). They make effective contributions 
at work because of strongly developed feelings of behavioural commitment. As the literature 
argues they acknowledge that their efforts are required to further both the needs of the 
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organisation and their own interests (Tarkenton, 1986, and Robinson, 1992). Therefore, in the 
context of PM model, the process of motivation entails positive reinforcement progression. 
2.2.2. The Process of Motivation 
The process of motivation can be modelled as shown in Figure 2.1 below. This is a needs-
related model and it suggests that motivation is initiated by the conscious or unconscious 
recognition of unsatisfied needs. These needs create wants, which are desires to achieve goods 
or obtain something.  
Figure 2:1. The process of motivation 
      2. Establish 
goal 
 
       1. Need                            3. Take action 
 
    
 
        4. Attain goal 
 
Source: Armstrong, M. (1993) 
Goals are then established which will satisfy these needs and wants and a behaviour trail is 
selected which it is expected will facilitate the achievement of the goal. If the goal is achieved 
the need will be satisfied and the behaviour is likely to be repeated the next time a similar need 
emerges. If the goal is not achieved the same action is less likely to be repeated. 
This model describes how individual motivation process takes place. It is based on the 
motivational theories related to needs (achievements), goals, equity, behaviour modelling 
(reactance) and expectancy, as described later in this chapter. It is also influenced by three 
concepts relating to motivation and behaviour: reinforcement (Hull, 1951), homeostasis, 
intrinsic and extrinsic theories. The model can be used to illustrate a process of motivation 
which involves setting of corporate goals that are likely to meet individual and organisational 
needs and wants, and encourage the behaviour required to achieve those goals. 
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2.2.3. Reinforcement theory and motivation 
As experience is gained in taking action to satisfy needs, people perceive that certain actions 
help them to achieve their goals while other actions are less likely. Some actions bring rewards; 
others result in failure or even punishment. Reinforcement theory, as developed by Hull (1951), 
suggests that successes in achieving goals and rewards act as positive incentives and reinforce 
the successful behaviour, which is repeated the next time a similar need emerges (Daniels, 
1989).  
The implication of reinforcement theory in the role of motivation in managing and rewarding 
performance is that the more powerful, obvious and frequent the reinforcement, the more likely 
it is that the behaviour will be repeated until, eventually, it can become a more or less 
unconscious reaction to an event. Conversely, failures or punishments provide negative 
reinforcements, suggesting that it is necessary to seek alternative means of achieving goals. 
This process has been called the ‘law of effect’ (Armstrong, op. cit.). 
The degree to which experience shapes future behaviour does, of course, depend, on two main 
factors. Firstly, on the extent to which individuals correctly perceive the connection between 
behaviour and its outcome. Secondly, on the extent to which they are able to recognise the 
resemblance between the previous situation and the one that now confronts them. Perceptive 
ability varies between people, as does the ability to identify a correlation between events. For 
these reasons, some people are better off at learning from experience than others; just as some 
people are more easily motivated than others. 
Insufficient attention is paid in motivation theories to the influence of expectations. No 
indication is given of any means of distinguishing in advance the class of outcomes, which 
would strengthen responses and those which would weaken them. It is therefore important to 
understand how the ‘law of effect’ operates when managing and rewarding 
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performance at workplaces.  
2.2.4. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
Legge (1995) suggests that an individual can usefully be conceived as a system of biological 
needs, psychological motives, values and perceptions. This means that an individual’s system 
operates so as to maintain its internal balance in the face of the demands placed upon it by 
external forces and it develops in response to his or her basic needs to solve the problems 
presented by the external environment. But an alternative argument could be that each 
individual system will have unique characteristics because different individual systems develop 
with different patterns of needs, values and perceptions; and individual systems are not static, 
but continue to develop as they encounter new problems and experiences. 
Motivation at work can take place in two ways. First, people can motivate themselves by 
seeking and carrying out work (or being given work), which satisfies their needs or at least 
leads them to expect that their goals will be achieved. Secondly, management can motivate 
people through such methods as pay, promotion, praise, recognition etc. Respectively, these 
two types of motivation can be described as intrinsic and extrinsic motivating factors 
The main difference between these two types of motivation is that extrinsic motivators can 
have an immediate and powerful effect, but it will not necessarily last long. Intrinsic 
motivators, which are concerned with the ‘quality of working life’ (a phrase and movement 
which emerged from this concept), are likely to have a deeper and longer-term effect because 
they are inherent in individuals and not imposed from outside. 
2.3. Developments in the theories of motivation 
The process of motivation is broadly based on a number of theories, which attempt to provide 
an in-depth understanding of what it is all about. These theories have proliferated 
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over the years and include, among others: (a) the instrumentality theories - based largely on the 
scientific management writings of Taylor (1890, 1911); (b) the needs or content theories - as 
developed by Maslow (op. cit.), Alderfer (1972) and McClelland (1975); (c) the process or 
cognitive theories - which are concerned with the psychological processes or forces which 
influence motivation as affected by people’s perceptions of their working environment and the 
ways in which they interpret and understand it.  
The process theories embrace the expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), goal-setting theory (Locke 
and Ladham, 1968, 1990), reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) and the equity theory (Adams, 
1965). Others included are Herzberg’s (1957) - two factor (motivation-hygiene) theory; 
behavioural theory (Skinner, 1974); and social-learning theory - as developed by Bandura 
(1977). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review all of these theories in detail. However, 
but for their relevance to the conceptual framework of this study, process theories of motivation 
are briefly reviewed in the next subsections. Process motivation theories which are also known 
as cognitive theories are most important because they are concerned with people’s perceptions 
of their working environment and the ways in which they interpret and understand them. 
Process theories are certainly more useful to managers than needs theories because they provide 
realistic guidance on motivation techniques. 
2.3.1. Process (or Cognitive) theory of motivation 
In the process motivation theory, the emphasis is on the psychological processes or forces that 
affect motivation, as well as on basic needs. Process or cognitive theory can certainly The 
processes are expectations (expectancy theory); goal achievement (goal theory); behavioural 
choice (reactance theory); perceptions or feelings about equity (equity theory) and self-efficacy 
theory (Bandura, 1997). These theories (abbreviated as AGREE in this thesis) have a direct 
linkage to this research and will provide a useful analytical framework when 
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examining the role of motivation in managing performance. They are briefly conceptualised 
below. 
(a) Expectancy theory of motivation 
The concept of expectancy was originally contained in the valency-instrumentality-expectancy 
(VIE) theory, which was formulated by Vroom (1964). The Expectancy theory has three main 
motivational forces based on ‘valence’, ‘instrumentality’ and ‘expectancy’. Valence stands for 
value – meaning the attractiveness of the outcomes. Instrumentality refers to the degree to 
which improved job performance is expected to lead to desired outcomes, i.e. the belief that if 
we do one thing it will lead to another. Expectancy entails the degree to which increased effort 
is perceived to lead to increased job performance i.e. the probability that action or effort will 
lead to an outcome.  
This concept of expectancy was defined in more detail by Vroom as follows: 
“Whenever an individual chooses between alternatives which involve uncertain 
outcomes, it seems clear that his behaviour is affected not only by his preferences 
among these outcomes but also by the degree to which he believes these outcomes to be 
possible. Expectancy is defined as a momentary belief concerning the likelihood that a 
particular act will be followed by a particular outcome. Expectancies may be described 
in terms of their strength. Maximal strength is indicated by subjective certainty that the 
act will be followed by the outcome, while minimal (or zero) strength is indicated by 
subjective certainty that the act will not be followed by the outcome.” 
Motivation is only likely when a clearly perceived and usable relationship exists between 
performance and outcome, and the outcome is seen as a means of satisfying needs. This 
explains why extrinsic financial motivation - for example, an incentive or bonus scheme - 
works only if the link between effort and reward is clear and the value of the reward is worth 
the effort. It also explains why intrinsic motivation arising from the work itself can be more 
powerful than extrinsic motivation; intrinsic motivation outcomes are more under the control of 
individuals, who can place greater reliance on their past experiences to indicate the extent to 
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which positive and advantageous results are likely to be obtained by their behaviour. 
Porter and Lawler (1968) developed this theory into a model, which follows Vroom’s ideas by 
suggesting that there are two factors determining the effort people put into their jobs: (a) The 
value of the rewards to individuals in so far as they satisfy their needs for security, social 
esteem, autonomy, and self-actualisation; and (b) The probability that rewards depend on effort, 
as perceived by individuals - in other words, their expectations about the relationships between 
effort and reward. Thus, the greater the value of a set of awards and the higher the probability 
that receiving each of these rewards depends upon effort, the greater the effort that will be put 
forth in a given situation.  
These are good from the viewpoint of the organisation if they correspond with what it thinks 
the individual ought to be doing. They are poor if the views of the individual and the 
organisation do not coincide. This shows how important it is to apply a PM model, which 
attempts to match both individual and organisational goals and needs, and sets forth a balanced 
strategic action plan necessary to achieve both of them. 
Expectancy theory is a theoretical framework that may be used to understand why PRP 
succeeds or fails to motivate staff. It argues that a new reward system will succeed in 
motivating employees if and only if three separate conditions are satisfied; employees must 
believe that they can achieve what is being asked for; employees must believe that achieving 
what is asked for will reliably generate the new rewards on offer; and employees must value the 
new rewards sufficiently. If, therefore, public sector managers do not feel able to achieve what 
is being asked for by the community, or if they do not believe that changing their behaviour 
will reliably bring them the rewards, or if they do not think the additional rewards on offer are 
big enough, then expectancy theory predicts that the new system will fail to enhance their 
motivation. 
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(b) Goal-setting theory of motivation 
Specificity of goals theory (Locke, op. cit; Locke and Ladham, 1968, 1990) explains the ‘goal 
setting’ motivational force. Specific goals increase the desire to performance even better, and 
difficult goals, when accepted, result in higher performance than easy goals. The main strands 
of the goal-setting theory are that there must be optimal level of challenge; goal clarity; and 
feedback – feed-forward loops or management information systems (MIS).  An important 
implication of this path-goal theory of motivation is that individuals tend to choose which goals 
they want to pursue and the appropriate conduits that will help them achieve these goals. 
Individuals subjectively measure the probability of each course achieving success and then 
choose one with the greatest chance of success.  
This theory is based on three basic arguments. First, individuals have different goals. Secondly, 
that people only act to achieve their goals if there is a chance of success. Thirdly, that the value 
of the goal affects the level of motivation. The goal theory is in line with the 1960s concept of 
management by objectives (MBO). The MBO approach, however, often failed because it was 
tackled bureaucratically without gaining the real support of those involved and, most 
importantly, without ensuring that managers were aware of the significance of the processes of 
agreement, reinforcement and feedback, and were skilled in practising them. In the contrary, 
the goal theory plays a vital role in the PM processes, which were evolved from the largely 
discredited MBO approach.  
Goal setting theory focuses on the nature of the objectives laid down or agreed to in the first 
step of the performance management process. More generally, goal setting theory predicts that 
performance management systems are more likely to enhance employee motivation if they 
result in goals that are well-defined rather than vague, specific rather than general, and 
challenging rather than easy to attain. Remember the SMART acronym, which 
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emphasises that goals or objectives should be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and 
time-bound. Consequently, goal setting theory suggests that a multiplicity of goals is likely to 
cause problems, because it reduces goal clarity. Being under pressure to meet many goals, 
especially where some of them are ambiguous, makes it difficult for employees to focus their 
efforts properly. 
Over and above these properties of goals, however, goal setting theory also predicts that 
employee motivation will be enhanced only if people not only accept, or are committed to, the 
goals that are set, but also if they participate in the whole process of setting them. This requires 
them to believe that their goals are attainable and legitimate. The relevance of this theorem for 
this study is that for local government officers, this must mean that the objectives should make 
sense to them as professional public service managers and not violate their professional 
judgments. It also means that an employee should trust the person setting the goals; externally 
imposed goals may be rejected as illegitimate (for a more extended treatment of goal setting 
theories, and the other theories discussed here, see Arnold et al, 1995). 
(c) Achievement theory 
Another refinement of the process theory of motivation is that of McClelland  (1975). He 
argues that the need for achievement is strongly associated with the success of the manager. 
The implication of the McClelland’s argument is that the ideal manager would always want to 
work more effectively, would want to come up with new ideas and to get things done! 
McClelland (ibid) suggests that managers with a high need to achieve shared certain attributes. 
These include: a preference for situations where they can take responsibility; they were 
moderate risk takers; and they needed clear objectives and tasks with regular feedback.  
The success of the manager is a function of the need for achievement. Therefore, effectiveness 
of a manager, innovative ideas and passionate to achieve targets are all main features of 
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the achievement theorem. In other words, we could say that an ideal manager would always 
want to achieve and cultivate the ‘achievement culture’ within his/her organisation.  
(d) Reactance theory of motivation 
Reactance theory is a behavioural modelling concept and was formulated by Brehm (1966). It 
is based on the premise that to the extent that people are aware of their needs and the kinds of 
behaviours necessary to satisfy these needs, and providing they have the appropriate freedom, 
they can choose behaviour patterns so as to maximise need satisfaction. If, however, this 
freedom to act is threatened, people will be motivationally aroused and react in accordance with 
the principle of homeostasis, to avoid any further loss of freedom. In essence, as Brehm says: 
“Given that a person has a set of free behaviours, he (she) will experience reactance 
whenever any of these behaviours is eliminated or threatened with elimination, and 
when a free behaviour of an individual is eliminated (or threatened) his desire for that 
behaviour or for the object of it will increase (1966:122).” 
The implication of this theory for this research is that individuals are not passive receivers and 
responders. Instead, they actively strive to make sense of their environment and to reduce 
uncertainty by seeking to control factors influencing rewards. “You may take a horse to the 
water but you can not force it to drink!”. So are human beings. Management may have all sorts 
of brilliant ideas about motivating employees, but they will not necessarily work unless they 
make sense to the people concerned in terms of their own values and orientations. People will 
also be motivated to increase performance when social comparisons are favourable. This is the 
concern of the equity theory as reviewed below. 
(e) The equity theory of motivation 
Adams (1965) derived the equity theory after observing the tendencies of people making 
‘social comparisons’ about their earnings. An employee compares his/her job's 
inputs:outcomes ratio with that of referents’. The equity theory then argues that if the employee 
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perceives inequity, he/she will act to correct that inequity, which may be in terms of lower 
productivity; reduced quality; increased absenteeism; and voluntary resignation (Adams, ibid.).  
The main motivational forces of the Equity theory are the ‘income:outcome’ ratio; over-
compensation; and under-compensation. Other important fairness ratios of the equity theory are 
the contribution:reward ratio, and the effort:reward ratio.  Therefore the designing of any 
compensation and reward system should take these ratios into account for such an incentive 
scheme to be effective. 
Equity theory stresses the importance of relative wages. This might refer to wages of some 
employees relative to others, or of managers relative to other professions. Therefore, the 
theoretical implication of this study is that individual PRP systems inevitably change the 
distribution of wages within a profession, which may raise inequity issues leading to some 
degree of de-motivation for those who think the new distribution is unjust.  
In effect, the practical implication of the equity theory is that people will be better motivated if 
they are treated equitably and de-motivated if they are treated inequitably. This theory explains 
only one aspect of the processes of motivation and job satisfaction, although it may be 
significant in terms of morale. Jaques (1961) also emphasises the need for such systems to be 
perceived as being fair and equitable. In other words, the reward should be clearly related to 
effort or level of responsibility and people should not receive less money than they deserve 
compared with their fellow workers. Jaques (ibid.) calls this the ‘felt-fair’ principle. The next 
section attempts to examine the relationship between motivation theories and performance 
because it is this linkage, which underpins the nature of this research. 
These theories raise at least four fundamental questions about the structure and mechanics of 
PRP regimes in general, and about those other issues of addressed in this study in particular. 
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First, is goal clarity likely to be secured? Second, is goal commitment likely to be secured? 
Third, are people likely to be confident that they will be given the rewards if they deliver on 
their objectives? Fourth, are the rewards on offer sufficiently attractive? 
2.3.2. Motivation - Performance linkage   
Money, in the form of pay or some other sort of remuneration, is the most obvious extrinsic 
reward. Money provides the carrot which most people want. However, doubts have been cast in 
the literature on the effectiveness of money. It is argued that while the lack of money can cause 
dissatisfaction, its provision does not result in lasting satisfaction either (Herzberg et al (1957). 
There is something in this, especially for people on fixed salaries or rates of pay who do not 
benefit directly from an incentive scheme. They may feel good when they get an increase; apart 
from the extra money, it is a highly tangible form of recognition and an effective means of 
helping people to feel that they are valued. But this feeling of jubilation can rapidly die away.  
Figure 2.2: Performance, Pay and Motivation Model 
 
       Building blocks of motivation 
 
Needs   Values   Goals   Action 
 --------------------- ----------------  -----------------  ---------------- 
 E.g. food             e.g. money             e.g. receive            e.g. go to work 
     can buy food  payment 
 
Source: Locke and Henne, 1986 
Locke and Henne (1986) argue that there is a strong link between an employee’s performance, 
pay and motivation. This linkage can be perfected by the building blocks as illustrated in Figure 
2.2 above.  
As noted by Goldthorpe, et al (1968) from their research into the ‘affluent worker’, pay is the 
dominant factor in the choice of employer and considerations of pay seem most powerful in 
binding people to their present jobs. Financial incentives do motivate people who are strongly 
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motivated by money and whose expectations that they will receive a financial reward are high. 
But less confident employees may not respond to incentives, which they do not expect to 
achieve. It can also be argued that extrinsic rewards may erode intrinsic interest - people who 
work just for money could find their tasks less pleasurable and may not, therefore, do them so 
well. What we do know is that a multiplicity of factors is involved in performance 
improvements and many of those factors are interdependent. Money can therefore provide 
positive motivation in the right circumstances not only because people need and want money 
but also because it serves as a highly tangible means of recognition. But badly designed and 
managed compensation and reward systems can demotivate.  
Verhellen (1994) argues that motivation strategies aim to create a working environment and to 
develop policies and practices, which will provide for higher levels of performance from 
employees. According to Tarkenton (1986), they will be concerned with measuring motivation 
to provide an indication of areas where motivational practices need to be improved; ensuring, 
so far as possible, that employees feel they are valued; developing behavioural commitment; 
developing an organisation climate which will foster motivation; improving leadership skills; 
job design; PM; compensation and reward management; and the use of behavioural 
modification approaches. One of these strategies, reward systems management is briefly 
conceptualised in the following subsections. Another relevant strategy for this research, 
performance management, is discussed in detail in chapter three. 
2.4. Compensation and Reward Systems (CRS) management theory 
Employee reward systems management is concerned with designing, implementing and 
maintaining reward systems, which are geared to the improvement of organisational team and  
individual performance (Armstrong, 1993; Beaumont, 1993). This aspect of personnel 
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management used to be called salary administration, but is now regarded as a limited 
description of one aspect of the whole subject of remuneration (Butler, 1986).  
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Figure 2.3: The Reward System Model 
Business 
Strategy 
 
       Reward 
      Strategy 
 
 
Performance   Job    Market rate  Employer 
 Management  evaluation   survey   benefits 
 
  
       Pay                        Pay levels                                        Non-financial 
 Structure   and differentials         rewards  
 
 
 Performance   Total 
 Pay    remuneration 
 
       
 
       TOTAL REWARD 
 
Source: Armstrong, M. (1993) 
Figure 2.3 above is a model which demonstrates that an employee reward system consists of an 
organisation’s integrated policies, processes and practices for rewarding its employees in 
accordance with their contribution, skill and competence and their market worth. It is 
developed within the framework of the organisation’s reward philosophy, strategies and 
policies. The model contains arrangements in the form of processes, practices, structures, and 
procedures which will provide and maintain appropriate types and levels of pay, benefits and 
other forms of total reward. 
2.4.1. Designing strategy of compensation and reward systems  
According to leading CRS theorists there should ideally be a two-way relationship between 
reward systems and strategic planning (Butler, op. cit.; Armstrong, op. cit.; and Beaumont, op 
.cit.). This link requires an organisation to consider the essence of its compensation philosophy.  
Table 2.1 below presents a list of some of the leading issues and questions which are embedded 
in such a compensation philosophy that need to be considered in the formulation or design 
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of a CRS policy. 
Table 2.1: Strategic issues in the design of compensation-reward systems 
The basis for rewards - The issue is whether pay is to be job-based or skills or competence-based. 
Pay for performance - Questions here include the extent of performance-based pay, the particular aspects of 
performance and whether it is based on individual or group performance. 
Market position - The issue here is how their reward system compares to that of other organisations. 
Internal-external pay comparison-orientated :- The issue here is the relative emphasis given to the attainment of 
internal or external equity. 
Centralised-decentralised reward strategy :- The issue here is the extent to which one seeks to standardise reward 
systems throughout the organisation. 
Degree of hierarchy:- The question here concerns whether an organisation seeks a relatively hierarchical or 
egalitarian reward system. 
Reward mix :- The issue here is the balance between pay and benefits, financial and motivational rewards, 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
Process issues: 
Communication policy :- The question is how relatively open or closed communication policy concerning reward 
systems should be adopted.  
Decision-making practices:- The question here concerns the extent or range of individuals involved in the relevant 
processes of decision-making. 
Reward system congruence :- The need is to ensure that the various design features of reward systems are 
internally consistent and consistent with the nature of larger organisational strategy. 
Source: Adapted from Edward E. Lawler III, (1984) 
The need to establish such a linkage is derived from the potentially powerful impact of 
compensation systems on organisational performance via a number of routes, such as attracting 
and retaining labour, motivating employees and reinforcing organisation culture.   
2.4.2. Elements of an employee compensation-reward system  
With reference to Figure 2.3 above, a reward system consists of financial and non-financial 
rewards. Financial rewards of an employee consist of fixed (and/or variable) pay and employee 
benefits, which together comprise total remuneration. The system also incorporates non-
financial rewards (recognition, praise, achievement, responsibility and personal growth) and, in 
many cases, performance management processes. These include any rewards, 
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which focus on the needs people have to varying degrees for achievement, recognition, 
responsibility, influence and personal growth.  These two forms of elements of a reward system 
are discussed below.  
2.4.3. Employees’  Compensation-Reward Strategy 
Reward strategy defines the intentions of the organisation on how its reward policies and 
processes should be developed to meet business requirements. The fact that payroll costs can 
comprise 70 per cent or more of the total costs incurred by an organisation explains the need to 
adopt a strategic approach to reward which ensures that added value is obtained from any 
investment in pay. 
An effective reward strategy 
An effective reward strategy is based on several attributes including corporate values and 
beliefs; flows from the business strategy to which it also contributes; and is driven by business 
needs and ‘fits’ the business strategy. The strategy should also be seen to align organisational 
and individual competences; integrate with other personnel and development strategies; and be 
congruent with the internal and external environment of the organisation - the content of the 
strategy will be contingent on those environments. An effective reward strategy provides for 
the reward of results and behaviour that are consistent with key organisational goals, thus 
driving and supporting desired behaviour. The strategy must be linked to business performance 
which adopts a competitive strategy perspective that is practical and implementable. Finally, 
the strategy must have been evolved in consultation with key stakeholders, taking full account 
of their views on what they believe is best for them – unless such an account is taken, reward 
initiatives like performance pay can fail totally. 
2.4.4. Developments in the Reward Systems management scene 
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The theories of motivation as reviewed in this chapter are relevant for this study because they 
explain how individuals can be influenced to adapt new behaviours and illustrate the various 
drivers of employee performance. However, effective implications of these motivational forces 
can depend on two variables (Dixon, et al. 1998): (i) The individuals’ attitudes and values, 
notably their capacity and willingness to build the motivation they need to adopt new 
behaviours; and (ii) The individuals’ personal characteristics, notably their capacity and 
willingness to be critically observant of their own behaviours and motivators, so developing the 
capacity to manage their own behaviour change. 
Within personality theory, theorists such as Murray (1989) have placed a heavy and explicit 
emphasis on the motivational process itself and the variety of needs, which motivate human 
behaviour, such as need for affiliation, need for nurturance and so forth and so on. Other 
motivational theorists have concentrated on non-biological or particularly human motivations, 
such as achievement motive (McLelland, ibid) or the power motive (Wright, 1994). Whereas 
all of the motivation ideologies are predominantly private sector based, the observed theoretical 
gap is their implication and compatibility in a public sector environment during this NPM era.   
A survey of pay systems practice in 480 British organizations conducted by the CBI and Hay 
Management Consultants (1996) found that: ‘The most significant factors driving change in 
pay and benefit policy are the need to strengthen the link to business performance, cost control, 
support for organisational change and recruitment and retention pressures. The need to provide 
more flexibility in pay and benefits systems is expected to become more important.’  
The survey provided the following information on developments in the participating 
organizations: almost half had changed some area of their pay strategy or policy in the last two 
years, the main areas being in pay structure, pay progression practice and the introduction of 
profit-related pay; 13 per-cent plan to introduce team pay; 30 per cent are 
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making changes to their benefits packages, mainly to provide more flexibility; around 17 per 
cent plan to introduce a broadband pay structure; and 45 per cent have introduced or plan to 
introduce some form of competency or skill-based HRM, mainly for training and development 
purposes and as a basis for PM. This survey and other recent UK studies (Armstrong and 
Baron, 1995) have suggested the main areas where changes are taking place or at least being 
contemplated are in reward policies and practices.  
These are summarised in as follows:  
From To 
1. Narrowly defined jobs and job    standards. Broader generic roles - emphasis on competence and 
continuous development. 
2. Inflexible job evaluation systems sizing tasks, 
rewarding non-adaptive behaviour and empire 
building and encouraging point-grabbing. 
Flexible job evaluation processes assessing the value 
added by people in their roles, often within job 
families. 
3. Hierarchical and rigid pay structures in which the 
only way to get on is to move up. Focus is on the 
next promotion. 
Broad-banded pay structures where the emphasis is 
on flexibility, career development pay and 
continuous improvement. Focus is on the next 
challenge. 
4. Emphasis on individual PRP. More focus on team performance through team-
based pay 
5. Consolidation of rewards into base pay. More emphasis on variable or ‘at risk’ pay. 
Source: Armstrong and Baron, 1995 
These movements include innovations such as competence-related pay, broad-banding and 
team pay, which are the most forward looking of the current developments taking place in the 
context of increased devolution of pay decisions to line management and more involvement of 
employees. They also reflect an increasing strategic concern about getting value for money 
from the reward system as evidenced by the increased interest in variable pay. Compensation 
and reward management processes as covered in Chapter Four can provide direct motivation 
through various forms of performance-based pay as long as close attention is given to the 
significance of AGREE theories. 
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(a) Paying for performance — incentive or reward? 
When defining the objectives of pay-for-performance schemes, many people treat the terms 
incentive and reward as being interchangeable. But there are significant differences, and when 
defining objectives and evaluating results it is necessary to distinguish between them. The 
essential distinction is that incentives are forward-looking while rewards are retrospective. 
Financial incentives are designed to motivate people to improve their performance – to make a 
greater contribution by increasing effort and output and by producing better results expressed in 
terms of objectives and targets for profit, sales turnover, productivity, cost reduction, quality, 
customer service, turnaround and delivery on time.  
Financial rewards provide extra money for achievement in terms of contribution or output. The 
emphasis is on recognition and on equity, in the sense of paying people according to their just 
deserts (‘the labourer is worthy of his hire’). Recognition is, of course, an important form of 
motivation and therefore may provide an incentive, but the relationship between pay and future 
performance is not always as clear as some people would like to believe. This difference 
highlights the fact that schemes which are designed to provide motivation and incentives may 
in practice fail to do this directly, although they will be a useful means of recognising 
contribution. This distinction points the way to another aspect of reward processes about which 
there is often confusion — the difference between incentives and bonuses. 
(b) The difference between incentives and bonuses 
The terms incentive and bonus are often contrasted. In this thesis, the terms resemble each other 
in that they are both payments, which are linked to performance. But there the similarity ends. 
Incentives: are payments linked to the future achievement of previously set and agreed targets; 
and bonuses: are essentially rewards for success and are paid out as a lump sum. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical frameworks of HRM and has explored the various 
theories of motivation, which explain and amplify the basic process of rewarding performance. 
The chapter has also examined the implications of these theories on PM and reward systems 
management. Essentially, the chapter has argued that a considerable number of changes have 
taken place in both the science and practice of human resources management (HRM) some of 
which having interesting integrative potential with HRM to produce innovative and insightful 
streams of research. Some of these have already been suggested and are underway, whereas 
others are newer ideas, but all could benefit from more extensive development of the science 
and practice of HRM.  
Secondly, the chapter argues that motivational theories underpin the examination of the role of 
compensation and reward systems in the goal achievement process. It has described a way to 
look at motivational and cognitive processes and the interaction between both. More 
importantly, the chapter has revealed that this theoretical framework outlines the central 
variables that constitute a successful PM process in organisations. Goal setting, feedback 
mechanisms, and moderators or drivers of the transformation of goals into results have 
constituted the focus of the review.  
All the motivational theories reviewed so far explain how employees’ behaviour can respond to 
various personal, organisational and environmental variables to influence performance. A host 
of theories have been developed to address behavioural issues and some of these are discussed 
in Chapter Three.  However, the conclusions we may derive from the foregoing literature 
review are that: (i) employees aiming to increase their wage are less likely to show an interest 
in job satisfaction; (ii) employees not involved in increasing their wage are more likely to show 
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an interest in job satisfaction; (iii) an organisation cannot generalise about what motivate 
employees.  
The key issues involved in the design of an employee motivation policy include organisational 
capacity to operate the incentive schemes, the framework within which the schemes have to 
operate, and the perception of stakeholders about equity of the schemes. The aim is to 
understand the fundamental motivational structures of achievement behaviour and to test these 
motivational theorems that are crucial for the efficiency and effectiveness of managers at work. 
Before we focus on the methodology of examining these issues let us review further the 
conceptual frameworks of HRM system and the PM model within which the CRS policy is 
designed to operate. This is the concern of Chapter Three below. 
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Chapter Three  
THE THEORY OF HRM AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT   
3.0. Introduction 
This study examines performance-based incentive schemes (PBIs) and reward systems 
management as an important dimension of the performance management (PM) model. The 
previous chapter has reviewed the literature on the mainstream theories of Human Resource 
Management, Motivation and Reward Systems. Its main purpose was to pinpoint the important 
attributes, concepts and theories of HRM, motivation, compensation and reward policy. This 
chapter examines the framework within which such a policy is designed to operate and its 
linkage with HRM systems.  
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part reviews the existing literature on 
HRM and performance in the light of the existing association between the two in order to 
identify key gaps in knowledge and help to focus further the research priorities. It  also presents 
a model within which to explore these linkages. The second section dwells on the relevance of 
behavioural theory on managing performance. This is followed by the conceptual framework of 
performance and the PM process. The ultimate focus is on the implication of the PM model on 
organisational strategy and how the PM model can be applied to modify the behaviour of 
employees. The third part is on performance measurement processes and reward policy themes 
and contrasts between three main performance measurement and control techniques. The 
chapter concludes by looking at the PM model as a tool for strategic HRM. 
3.1. HRM and Performance: a review and research agenda 
The impact of human resource management on performance has become the dominant      
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research issue in the field. There has been a rash of studies demonstrating a positive association 
between human resource management (HRM) and performance, providing encouragement to 
those who have always advocated the case for a distinctive approach  to the management of 
human resources. While these studies represent encouraging signs of progress, statistical 
sophistication appears to have been emphasized at the expense of theoretical rigour. As a result, 
the studies are non-additive, except in a very general way. The aim of this section is to present 
a form of research agenda which seeks to reintroduce theory into the empirical debate and to 
use this to review some of the emerging empirical findings. 
If we are to improve our understanding of the impact of HRM on performance, we need a 
theory about HRM, a theory about performance and a theory about how they are linked. The 
interest in HRM and performance partly respects a view that the debates about theory in HRM 
had become rather reflective and boring. Perhaps it is only when the empirical data begin to 
emerge that we realize how important the theory is. Lets begin by briefly reviewing where we 
stand on theories of HRM, of performance and of the link between them and then review some 
of the recent literature within a simple framework. Finally, we outline the issues emerging from 
this review and highlight some of the developments that need to occur in theory and practice if 
we are to improve our understanding of HRM and performance.  
3.1.1. Theory about human resource management 
In any empirical study, we need to have a clear view about our independent variable. At present 
we seem to have only confusion. There appear to be three broad categories of general-level 
theory about HRM and a host of more specific and concrete theories about particular areas of 
policy and practice, such as quality, commitment and performance-related pay (PRP). The three 
categories of theory can be labelled strategic, descriptive and normative. 
3.1.1.1.Strategic theories of HRM 
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These are primarily concerned with the relationship between a range of possible external 
contingencies and HRM policy and practice. Some of the best-known UK research in this 
category has been reported by Hendry and Pettigrew (1990) whose main concern was to 
identify and classify key environmental influences on HRM. In their work, HRM policy and 
practice becomes, in a sense, the dependent variable, judged in terms of how well it fits the 
context. The implicit but untested hypothesis is that a good fit will be associated with superior 
performance. In their research, Hendry and Pettigrew concentrated on mapping the context, 
identifying an inner context (within the organization) and an outer context (in the wider 
environment) and exploring how HRM adapted to changes in context rather than analysing any 
link to performance. 
In the USA, attention has focused more on classifying types of HR strategy, often drawing on 
existing models of corporate strategy. One frequently cited example has been presented by 
Miles and Snow (1984), building on their earlier work on strategy and structure. They propose 
that each of their strategic types of firm will need to adopt a different set of HRM policies and 
they are reasonably precise about some of the variations. Again the hypothesis is that those 
firms that have a fit between business strategy, structure and HRM policy and practice will 
have superior performance. A similar rationale lies behind the work of Schuler and Jackson 
(1987) which outlines three HRM strategies linked to Porter’s (1980) three general competitive 
strategies.   
 There are several other writers whose work falls within this broad focus on strategy. They are 
helpful in identifying influences on strategic fit and sometimes in specifying types of fit. But 
they are often simplistic in characterizing HRM, usually identifying about four broad areas of 
activity such as selection, training and development, rewards and careers. While the implication 
is that those firms achieving fit between business strategy and HRM strategy will 
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have superior performance, they are weak in specifying the process whereby HRM is linked to 
performance. Finally, they generally adopt a limited view of performance, defining it largely in 
financial terms.  
3.1.1.2. Descriptive theories of HRM  
These set out to describe the field in a comprehensive way. The two best known are those 
presented by Beer and his colleagues from Harvard (Beer et al. 1985) and by Kochan, Katz and 
McKersie (1986) from MIT. In both cases, there is an attempt to capture the broad field and to 
address some of the interrelationships. For Beer at al. this means listing four broad areas of 
HRM policy and practice and four key outcomes. For Kochan and colleagues it entails a 
systems approach, describing the interrelationships between levels. Both are essentially 
descriptive, mapping the field and classifying inputs and outcomes. Both can be developed into 
theory, but only at a very general level of specification. A strength and a weakness in this 
respect is the emphasis on an open systems approach which may accurately capture an element 
of reality but fails to offer specificity.  
By providing conceptual maps of the field, these models do provide a broad classification of 
the content of HRM and of a range of outcomes. Both are useful in adopting a stakeholder 
approach and in identifying a range of outcomes of interest to the various stakeholders. 
However, they are essentially employee relations models concerned with the managers’ role in 
balancing competing interests, in highlighting the scope for choice and in identifying some of 
the influences on the choices. Despite implicit preferences on the part of their authors, by 
specifying a range of choices and not recommending specific approaches, they are largely non-
prescriptive. They therefore provide no clear focus for any test of the relationship between 
HRM and performance. 
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3.1.1.3. Normative theories of HRM 
Models or theories of this type are more prescriptive in their approach, reflecting the view 
either that a sufficient body of knowledge exists to provide a basis for prescribed best practice 
or that a set of values indicates best practice. Often these two perspectives become con ated. 
One of the best known examples of this approach is Walton’s work on control and commitment 
(Walton, 1985). In presenting the contrast between the two approaches to the management of 
human resources, he follows McGregor (1960) some twenty-five years earlier in saying these 
are in one sense ideal types but in practice if you wish to flourish you have no choice. He is 
prescribing a commitment strategy as the distinctive basis for HRM. The same general analysis 
can be found in the work of Lawler (1986, 1992), although he uses the language of involvement 
rather than HRM.  
More recently, the work of Pfeffer (1994) has attracted a lot of attention. He lists sixteen HRM 
practices (subsequently amended to thirteen (Pfeffer, 1995) on the grounds that the precise 
number and presumably the precise nature of the practices is neither clearly known nor 
particularly important) which he advocates on the grounds that their positive effects are now 
well established. This fits with an essentially a theoretical stream of work about ‘high 
performance’ work practices. 
Guest (1987) attempts also to capture some of the spirit of this approach by seeking to present it 
within a coherent framework, specifying some of the links so that the resulting model can at 
least be tested – and possibly refuted. The central hypothesis is that if an integrated set of HRM 
practices is applied with a view to achieving the normative goals of high commitment to the 
organization plus high quality and flexibility, then higher worker performance will result. The 
assumption is that this will have a positive impact on organizational performance. Unlike other 
approaches, this normative perspective argues that specific practices and specific HRM 
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goals will always be superior.  
There are a number of problems with this view of HRM. One is that it focuses predominantly 
on the internal characteristics of HRM at the expense of broader strategic issues. In doing so, 
and in advocating a best set of practices while ignoring the variety of pressures and consequent 
business strategies, it is taking a considerable risk in implying ‘one best way’. A second 
problem is that, while the goals of HRM can be reasonably well defined, the related list of 
HRM practices is far from clear (for an outline of the variables included in the various studies, 
see Dyer and Reeves (1995) and Becker and Gerhart (1996)) and awaits either a clear 
theoretical specification or a much stronger empirical base.  
Each of the three approaches outlined has some sort of theoretical basis in either 
contingency/business strategy, systems theory or OB/motivation theory. Each implies rather 
different levels of analysis. Only the second and more particularly the third begin to specify the 
dimensions of HRM policy and practice in any way potentially helpful for measurement and 
even they are not really sufficiently precise. In summary, we still lack a coherent theoretical 
basis for classifying HRM policy and practice, a problem that becomes more apparent when we 
start to look at the empirical research.  
3.1.2. Theory about performance  
There is no general theory about performance per se. However, we have a number of 
approaches and models, often built on specific disciplinary perspectives, such as economics, 
psychology or production management, which help us to understand and classify aspects of 
performance. This is not an easy task. In the field of Organizational Behaviour, measurement of 
performance is often described as the criterion problem. We might be tempted to extend this to 
the study of HRM. 
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We can begin to make sense of performance by highlighting a number of distinctions. First, we 
can focus on issues concerning the content of performance. Second, we can consider the types 
of data. Third, we can consider linkages within a broad view of performance and thereby begin 
to explore causal links between HRM and performance.  
3.1.2.1 The content of performance and outcomes 
The issue of the nature of data overlaps with the question of what types of data are of interest. 
Who are the stakeholders of performance – and is this the same as outcomes? Arguably, 
performance is a company-dominated criterion while outcomes are potentially much broader. 
They may include environmental issues, job satisfaction, contribution to community activities 
and so on. There is a risk, in looking at organizationally determined performance criteria, that 
some of these issues are ignored. 
It could be argued that, if the concern is narrowly for company performance, this does not 
matter. On the other hand, if the implicit theory of HRM is that results are achieved through 
effective utilization, as opposed to exploitation, of human resources, they might be very 
important. However, even this may not be enough, since we know from a mass of research that 
there is only a very weak link between performance and job satisfaction (Staw, 1986). Also, 
there is some indication that highly successful companies may not be those in which workers 
prefer to work (Levering et al., 1984; for a fuller discussion, see Guest, 1992).  
Building on the stakeholder analysis, one of the terms sometimes use in discussions about 
HRM is the concept of ‘the balanced scorecard’. This simply implies that it is not enough to 
concentrate on one view of performance at the expense of the others. As in the old socio-
technical systems theory, it is necessary to optimize each dimension rather than maximizing 
one at the expense of the others. Typically, the items on the scorecard are those of importance 
to the financial, customer and employee constituencies. If we accept this, we need 
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multiple criteria of performance, a point highlighted in the descriptive models of HRM and 
implicit in the whole idea of taking human resource management seriously. It means we must 
be wary of emphasizing one of these interests at the expense of the other, particularly if we are 
using one-off rather than time series measures. 
3.1.2.2. Measures of performance  
There are essentially three types of performance data available (Locke and Latham, 1990); 
these are measures of output of goods and services, which may be quantitative (units produced, 
customers served) or qualitative (number of errors, customer complaints); measures of time, 
including lateness, absence, lost working time, failure to meet deadlines); and financial 
indicators, which include a large array of possibilities. These may be interrelated; thus absence 
reduces unit production levels which reduces profits. 
Where ‘hard’ quantitative data are not available, we may wish to resort to measures of 
behaviour. Ideally, we observe people at work, noting whether they approach customers and 
offer help, or noting whether they observe safety procedures. Failing that, we can obtain reports 
either from an ‘observer’, such as the superior or a peer or subordinate, or from the person 
under study. 
The same perspective can be adopted for performance data of interest to other stakeholders, for 
example those concerned with the environment. The measurement becomes more complex 
when applied to employees, since we will need to add subjective evaluations. The important 
point is that they should be collected systematically, perhaps through mechanisms such as 
attitude surveys. 
Of course, an analytic framework for considering the range of performance data cannot hide 
biases and preferences – perhaps for financial measures – nor can it prevent subjective 
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interpretation and weighing of the information. The simple point is that as researchers we 
should perhaps be aware of the range of types of data that might be collected to indicate 
performance. There is also an implicit judgement about preferred priority, starting with the 
‘hard’ measures, followed by behaviour, followed by reports or ratings. We may of course wish 
to balance the post-modernist view that all performance measures are social constructions, open 
to a variety of interpretations, against a recognition that broadening the definition of 
performance and providing evidence about any link between HRM and performance may be 
one of the more effective means of ensuring that policy makers take HR issues seriously.  
3.1.2.3. Linkages in performance data  
Data on their own tell us very little. We need some basis for comparison, either cross-sectional 
or longitudinal; we also need to understand the relationships between types of performance 
data. As already noted, absence may reduce production which may affect profits. Many 
linkages of this type can be made. If we move towards a behavioural model, then we might 
wish to link employee perceptions to their behaviour, to individual or group-level performance 
outcomes which affect unit performance and thus to company profits. To understand, as 
opposed to measuring the performance, we need to make these linkages. There may be an 
association between HRM practices and company profit, but, without some linkages, we will 
not know why; we have no theory. This implies that we need a range of types of performance 
measure at the individual, group, unit and company level to begin to establish these linkages. 
To date, HRM has been weak in this area.  
3.1.3. Theory about the link between HRM and performance  
Neither the strategic nor the descriptive model provide much insight into how HRM policy and 
practice translates into high performance. They sensibly view HRM as only part of the 
explanation for high performance and suggest that, when the various subsystems 
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including the HRM sub-system are aligned and supporting each other, superior performance is 
likely. The right people will be in the right place doing the right things. It is a managerial model 
of organizing, particularly in the strategic version. The descriptive models, because of their 
employee relations roots, give more weight to the active role of employees, but mainly in 
negotiating order.  
In contrast, the normative approach has its roots firmly in organizational psychology and is 
built on lower-range, more specific behavioural theories. The assumption is that ‘appropriate’ 
HRM practices tap the motivation and commitment of employees. The factors that constitute 
‘appropriate’ practices are derived from the specific theories of organizational commitment, job 
design, goal setting and so on. The key features of this approach are that HRM provides a 
coherent integration of these behavioural theories and that they spell out the linkages between 
practices and performance.  
It is possible to develop theories of alignment, explaining a series of linkages to performance, 
both at the broader level of strategy and at the more specific level of HRM practices. Starting 
with the latter, the expectancy theory of motivation provides one possible basis for developing 
a more coherent rationale about the link between HRM practices and performance. An 
approach close to expectancy theory was adopted by MacDuffie (1995). As he puts it,  
Innovative human resource practices are likely to contribute to improved economic 
Performance only when three conditions are met: when employees possess knowledge 
and skills that managers lack; when employees are motivated to apply this skill and 
knowledge through discretionary effort; and when the firm’s business or production 
strategy can only be achieved when employees contribute such discretionary effort. I 
will argue that all three conditions must be met for HR practices to contribute to 
performance. (MacDuffie, 1995: 199)  
Although expectancy theory is concerned primarily with motivation, it is also a theory about 
the link between motivation and performance. Specifically, it proposes that high performance, 
at the individual level, depends on high motivation plus possession of the 
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necessary skills and abilities and an appropriate role and understanding of that role. It is a short 
step to specify the HRM practices that encourage high skills and abilities, for example careful 
selection and high investment in training; high motivation, for example employee involvement 
and possibly performance-related pay; and an appropriate role structure and role perception, for 
example job design and extensive communication and feedback. These are illustrated in Figure 
3.1. We therefore have a theory which links HRM practices to processes that facilitate high 
individual performance; it is, furthermore a theory which fits well with the individualistic 
orientation of the normative approaches to HRM.  
Figure 3.1: Linking HRM practices and HRM outcomes 
Selection 
Socialization        Skills and Ability 
Training and development            (Quality) 
Quality improvement programmes 
 
Single status  
Job security        Effort/Motivation 
Internal promotion          (Commitment) 
Individualized reward systems 
 
Communication  
Employee involvement 
Team working       Role Structure and Perception 
Job design        (Flexibility) 
Flexible job descriptions       
 
Source: Guest, D. E., (1997)  
Before getting too enthusiastic about any theory linking HRM practices and performance, we 
should bear in mind that any analysis of influences on company profits or factory output or 
even absence levels quickly leads to the conclusion that factors other than HRM are involved. 
Therefore, we need to have a theory about when human resources matter more; for example, 
the human factor may be more important in the service sector. We also need a theory about 
how much of the variance can be explained by the human factor. Is any statistically 
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significant influence, for example where a regression reveals that HRM explains 2 per cent of 
the variance in performance, a good result? Or should we, as Becker and Gerhart (1996) 
suggest, be paying much more attention to size effects than to statistical significance? Can we, 
as Huselid (1995) has recently attempted, put a price on the benefits of good HRM? For this, 
we need a rather broader conceptual framework as well as an accepted basis on which to judge 
what constitutes an important result.  
Moving on to a possible broader framework linking HRM and outcomes, the starting point 
should be the recognition, as noted above, that the distinctive feature of HRM is its assumption 
that improved performance is achieved through the people in the organization. Any theory of 
linkages should explicitly build on this. A model that illustrates the kind of linkages that might 
be explored, albeit using arbitrary categories for HRM strategy and HRM practices, is 
presented in Table 3.1 below. Its main value in the present context lies in highlighting the 
range of related outcomes that need to be considered in any model that seeks to understand the 
impact of the ‘human’ factor in human resource management.  
Table 3.1 below acknowledges a role for external context and strategy but suggests, at its core, 
that HRM practices should be designed to lead to HRM outcomes of high employee 
commitment, high quality staff and highly flexible staff. High commitment will be assessed 
using standard measures and based on the definition popularized by Mowday, Porter and Steers 
(1982) of identification with the values of the organization, a desire to belong to the 
organization and a willingness to do things for the organization. High quality staff refers to the 
capabilities and to the knowledge and skills of staff. Flexibility refers to functional rather than 
numerical flexibility. The specific practices that help to achieve these outcomes were illustrated 
in Figure 3.1 above. According to the model, only when all three HRM outcomes are achieved 
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can we expect behaviour change and higher performance. 
Given the framework in Table 3.1 below, it is essential to measure HRM outcomes to 
understand how HRM impacts on performance. As we move on through the remaining stages in 
the model, we would expect the impact of HRM to become progressively weaker as other 
factors intervene. The model in Table 3.1 separates changes in behaviour, performance and 
financial outcomes.  
Table 3.1: Linking HRM and performance 
HRM  
strategy 
HRM 
practices 
HRM 
Outcomes 
Behaviour 
outcomes 
Performance 
outcomes 
Financial
outcomes 
 Selection  Effort/ Motivation High: Profits 
Differentiation 
(Innovation) Training Commitment  
Productivity 
Quality 
Innovation 
 
      
Focus 
(Quality) Appraisal  Cooperation   
 Rewards Quality  Low: ROI 
   Involvement Absence  
Cost 
(Cost-reduction) Job design   Labour turnover  
    Conflict  
 Involvement Flexibility Organizational citizenship 
Customer complaints  
Labour turnover  
 Status and Security     
Source: Guest, D. E., (1997)  
It is important to note that under the broad heading of performance there are further distinctions 
that can be made, for example between performance and effectiveness, which is a subjective 
assessment of performance and perhaps productivity; and between performance, which is 
concerned with output, and productivity, which is concerned with input-output ratios. Since 
effectiveness may be considered quite differently by the various stakeholders, it will be 
desirable where possible to include additional measures of effectiveness alongside the more 
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objective outcome measures.  
3.1.4. The empirical evidence about HRM and performance: a conceptual framework  
There are now a growing number of studies which make a serious attempt to link HRM and 
performance. (There are, of course, hundreds which examine particular aspects of HRM and 
performance.) They are not all looking at quite the same thing so they are cumulative in only a 
very general sense. One interesting attempt to identify the various possible approaches has been 
derived from the work by Venkatraman (1989) whose aim was to classify the various types of 
‘fit’ in research on strategy. More recently, his approach has been adapted slightly by 
Sivasubramaniam and Kroeck (1995) to classify the various perspectives on HRM. The concept 
of ‘fit’ or ‘integration’ is central to many attempts to theorize about HRM so this seems an 
interesting way of trying to proceed.  
 Table 3.2: Forms of HRM fit 
 Criterion specific Criterion free 
Internal 
 Fit to an ideal set of practices 
Fit as gestalt 
Fit as ‘bundles’ 
External Fit as strategic interaction Fit as contingency 
 Source: Guest, D. E., (1997)  
Essentially, they suggest that the various types of HRM fit (Table 3.1 above) can be ordered 
along two dimensions of Internal–External fit and Criterion specific or Criterion free. This 
provides four main possibilities, although one is further sub-divided.  
Fit as strategic interaction seeks to link HR practices to the external context and reflects the 
standard strategic approach. A key point is that there is a choice about how to respond to and 
interact with the environment. Once that choice has been made, then HR strategy and practice 
must match it. The hypothesis is that those organizations with the appropriate response and the 
right match will report superior performance. The typical test of this is to examine the 
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link between the Miles and Snow strategic types and the HRM practices associated with each 
and relate this to some measure of performance. The level of theory specification implies that 
performance will be measured mainly through financial criteria.  
Fit as contingency reflects the traditional contingency approach, suggesting that those 
organizations whose HR policy and practice is more responsive to external factors will report 
superior performance. These external factors may include the nature of the market, legislative 
changes or features of the specific sector. This approach tends to assume that a particular 
response will always be superior, but it does not specify the type of response or any class of 
responses, although there is no reason why this could not be done.  
Fit as  an ideal set of practices implies that there exists a set of ‘best HRM practices’ – 
Pfeffer’s (1994) list might be one example – and the concern is with how close organizations 
get to the ideal set of HR practices. The hypothesis is that those closer to the ideal type will 
report higher performance.  
Fit as gestalt implies that the key to effective HRM lies in finding an appropriate combination 
of practices. In addition, it is assumed that the sum is greater than the parts. It may be the 
synergistic combination of all the practices or it may be the specific. ‘architecture’ or culture 
which binds them together. This is sometimes seen as the nonreplicable element which can 
provide organizations with an HR-based source of competitive advantage. One implication of 
this model is that the study of specific aspects of HRM such as pay or training may provide a 
distorted picture. Unless very careful controls are used to take account of all other HRM 
practices, it is possible that the results may overstate the influence of the specific practice by 
picking up the combined impact of the set of practices. In principle, this approach differs from 
the ideal type concept of fit in not specifying the dimensions of HRM practice; and from both 
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the ideal type and the ‘bundles’ approach described below in being multiplicative rather than 
additive. By implication, if one key aspect is missing, the gestalt may not exist.  
Fit as ‘bundles’ implies the existence of distinctive patterns or configurations – what are 
sometimes called ‘bundles’ – of practices and the key is to determine which are the most 
effective. In principle there may be a number of possible combinations or configurations of 
practices which will lead to high performance; for example, some organizations may emphasize 
job security as the building block; others prefer training and development. The other practices 
fit around these. To test this, the key is to look not so much at the total number of HRM 
practices but to take those who adopt above a certain number, perhaps the median, as long as a 
distinctive core exists. Within each bundle some substitutability may exist; for example, 
statistically, there may be little to be gained by reporting both use of realistic job previews and 
psychometric tests in selection since both are equally indicative of careful selection. Although 
in principle this approach allows for equifinality, or some substitution, in practice certain 
clusters may consistently emerge, indicating the limited range of effective combinations.  
Most reported studies of HRM and performance can be classified within one or other of these 
categories. However, we are some way from seeing all the possibilities tested. Indeed, Delery 
and Doty (1996) argue that there are really three main approaches – the strategic contingency 
approach, the best practice approach and the configurational approaches, representing external 
fit, internal fit and systems theory – and that these provide rich competing theoretical 
perspectives. Since there has been very little research on the pure contingency approach and, 
apart from some specific case studies, little exploration of the ‘gestalt’ perspective, the next 
section concentrates on these three main approaches.  
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3.1.5. The empirical studies of HRM and performance  
A number of studies linking HRM and performance have been published; others have been 
presented in conference papers or exist in the form of working papers. They are mostly, but not 
exclusively, cross-sectional. The studies vary in quality, particularly with respect to their 
measurement of HRM policy and practice, although they share a tendency to display some 
statistical sophistication. While some range widely across industry, others concentrate on 
particular sectors.  
(a) External fit: HRM as strategic integration  
There is some support for this approach. Huselid (1995) has found that those organizations that 
link HRM practices to strategy report higher financial performance outcomes. Delery and Doty 
(1996) found modest support for a fit with the Miles and Snow typology. Youndt et al. (1996) 
found support for this type of fit in a sample of ninety-seven manufacturing plants, more 
particularly with respect to the fit between high performance HRM practices and a quality 
strategy. MacDuffie (1995), in contrast, explicitly rejects this hypothesis, claiming that in his 
international study of car-manufacturing plants he found no evidence that a ‘fit’ of appropriate 
HRM practices to mass production was able to compete with flexible  production.  
(b) Internal fit: HRM as an ideal set of practices  
This is the most widely tested and the most strongly supported type of fit. Almost every study, 
including those already cited but also those reported by Huselid and his colleagues (Huselid, 
1995; Huselid, Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Delaney and Huselid, 1996), by Arthur (1994), 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1994) and MacDuffie (1995) support this type of fit. 
Essentially, what they all show, either across industries or within a specific sector, is that the 
more of the high performance HRM practices that are used, the better the performance as 
indicated by productivity, labour turnover or financial indicators. Where different types of fit 
were compared, this was invariably the one that received strongest support. The main exception 
to this general pattern, to date, is the study by Youndt at al. (1996) which finds that a ‘fit’ 
between high performance HRM practices and a quality strategy provides the best results. 
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(c) Configurational fit: HRM as bundles  
Huselid and Becker (1995), in a panel study, have provided a partial test of this by examining 
the impact of three separate factors which emerged from their factor analysis of a list of HRM 
practices. These they label selection and development, motivation and HR strategy, though the 
labels may not be very appropriate. Although support was strongest for the cumulative measure 
of ‘fit as ideal type’, there was significant independent support for each of these factors. In a 
study using subjective measures of organizational performance, Delaney and Huselid (1996) 
failed to find any positive impact for specific combinations of practices as opposed to the total 
number of HRM practices. However Delery and Doty (1996) found some support for the 
configurational approach in their study in the banking sector.  
Guest and Hoque (1994) examined the impact of HRM comparing those above and below the 
median number of HRM practices in a sample of greenfield sites. When this was combined 
with a measure of the presence of an HRM strategy, it was found that establishments in this 
group reported superior HRM outcomes (commitment, employee quality, aspects of flexibility) 
and employee relations outcomes but not superior productivity or product quality. This 
highlights the need to take into account the range of outcomes and performance indicators. The 
study also hinted at a ‘cluster’ or ‘bundle’ reflecting deliberate low use of the proffered set of 
HRM practices. Those who did this as a deliberate strategy had poorer HRM and employment 
relations outcomes but reported no differences in productivity and product quality. This in turn 
raises a somewhat neglected issue of the costs of HRM practices.  
Bringing these results together, there is empirical support for each of the three main approaches 
to HRM and performance but consistently stronger support for the internal fit model with its 
view that those organizations that use more high performance HRM practices report higher 
performance. The general approach represented by this stream of research is sufficiently 
encouraging to suggest that it is continued and improved. There is no doubt that it is attracting a 
lot of research interest in North America. It is to be hoped that it can do the same in 
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Europe. However, in taking it forward, we need to be aware of the shortcomings and in so 
doing return to the issue of theory.  
3.1.6. Emerging issues for future research on HRM and performance  
The .first key issue is the lack of theory about the nature of HRM practices. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Guest, 1987), it is not the presence of selection or training but a distinctive approach 
to selection or training that matters. It is the use of high performance or high commitment HRM 
practices. There is little consensus on what these are and little interest to date in developing 
theory about what they might be. I would propose that we build on something like expectancy 
theory, in a way outlined above, to provide a sensible rationale for these practices. As 
MacDuffie (1995) indicates, expectancy theory, or some variation of it, can also point to a 
range of configurations depending on preferred rewards and perhaps indicating when 
performance-related pay can be considered a high performance practice. The alternative is to 
adopt a statistical approach and to see what emerges from factor analysis or some variation (for 
an example of this, see Wood and Albanese, 1995). In building a set of best practices, we 
should also take care to account for cultural differences, for example in  practices associated 
with training, job security or trade unions. Finally, in collecting  information about high 
performance HRM policy and practice, we need to be cautious about the validity assumptions 
underlying use of data collected at head office as a basis for company-wide statements about 
HR practices in what might be multi-plant sites.  
A second concern is to improve our measures of performance. Indeed, performance may be the 
wrong term. It might be more sensible to use the term ‘outcomes’. One argument might be that 
the unitarist philosophy underlining HRM implies that the employees share the concern of 
shareholders for profit. However, it would be unwise to  accept this assumption. What we need 
are outcomes that reflect the concept of the balanced score card. The idea of balance, 
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like the concept of optimizing socio-technical systems, implies that compromises may 
sometimes be necessary. The plant-level studies reported by Arthur (1994), MacDuffie (1995) 
and Guest and Hoque (1994)  measure productivity and quality, but those by Huselid (1995) 
and others using company-level measures overwhelmingly emphasize financial criteria. Despite 
the attractions of financial indicators for any attempt to convince senior managers of the impact 
of HRM, we need to use a greater range of outcome measures if only to understand how and 
why HRM has an impact on financial results.  
The study by Guest and Hoque raises the question of contradictory criteria. Their 
establishments categorized as ‘ugly’, with a deliberate strategy of low uptake of high 
performance HRM practices, reported performance outcomes as good as any other category but 
had poorer HRM outcomes and employee relations outcomes. The firms got good results but 
were not attractive places in which to work. The other studies took no account of contradictory 
outcome criteria.  
Only when we have made progress in measuring the independent and dependent variables can 
we begin to give full attention to the way in which they are linked. At present the studies report 
a promising association between HRM and outcomes, but we are not yet in a position to assert 
cause and effect. We need to develop theory which integrates aspects of strategy and strategic 
integration with something like expectancy theory to create specific hypotheses about linkages. 
Case study research can help to generate some insights which can be more extensively tested. 
So too can studies of specific practices or issues such as quality or commitment where theory is 
sometimes more specific. To establish linkages, we also need longitudinal research designs, 
ideally with some sort of interventions to alter HRM practices.  
In summary, we need to improve our theory and empirical testing on all three fronts – the 
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nature of HRM, the nature of the outcomes and the nature of the linkages. As usual, we need to 
find the right combination of survey-based and case-study-based research. And we need to 
ensure that the research is not confined to the certain countries only such as USA. We can now 
say with increasing confidence that HRM works. But this is a skeletal finding and we need to 
put a lot of flesh on the bones. Let us now narrow our review to focus on issues relating to 
performance management per se. we begin this by reviewing the relevance of behavioural 
theory in the process of managing performance. 
3.2. Relevance of behavioural theory on managing performance 
Behavioural psychologists such as Skinner (1974) emphasise that behaviour is learnt from 
experience. They play down, even dismiss, the significance of internal psychological factors 
and instinct and are only interested in the external factors that directly influence behaviour. 
They believe that learning takes place mainly through the process of reinforcement. Three 
behavioural theories relevant for this study are social learning (Bandura, 1977), attribution 
(Davies, et al., 1993). and role modelling (Cacciabue, 1998). Social learning theory combines 
aspects of both behavioural and expectancy theories. It recognises the significance of the basic 
behavioural concept of reinforcement as a determinant of future behaviour but also emphasises 
the importance of internal psychological factors, especially expectancies about the value of 
goals and the individual’s ability to reach them.  
Attribution theory is concerned with how we explain our performance after we have invested 
considerable effort and motivation in a particular task (Four types of explanations may be used 
to account for either success or failure - these are ability, effort, task difficulty and luck. For 
example, if success or failure is explained in terms of effort, then high motivation may follow. 
If, on the other hand, failure to achieve is explained in terms of task difficulty or bad luck, the 
result may be a loss of motivation. Incorrect attributions may be the result of 
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inadequate feedback, and managers can do much to influence attributions and therefore 
motivation by feedback, communication, appraisal and guidance. This will affect subsequent 
motivation. Guthrie and English (1997) argue that the activity of the manager in this context 
can be described as social information processing. Essentially this entails communicating 
information to influence social perception of aspects of the work setting. It works best in highly 
ambiguous situations. For example, where there is little clear feedback from the job on 
performance, if someone tells you are doing well, if the source is credible and there is an 
absence of other information, you will be inclined to believe you are doing well and therefore 
persist in your behaviour. 
Modelling behaviour on a ‘role model’ can motivate people A role model is someone whose 
approach to work and ability to getting things done produces a measure of inspiration and a 
desire to follow the example provided by the model who could be a manager or a colleague. A 
role model can be anyone. Role modelling can take place when inspirational leadership is 
provided (Lendrem, 1986). It is also one of the forces, which can operate within groups. There 
is, of course a negative side to role modelling. The behaviour of a manager or of fellow team 
members can produce de-motivation. 
In addition to these three theories there are two other important concepts of behavioural 
modification and the ABC model of behaviour change. These are briefly discussed next.   
3.2.1. Behavioural modification 
Behavioural modification or organisational behaviour (OB) modification uses the behavioural 
principle ‘operant conditioning’ (i.e. influencing behaviour by its consequences). Five steps for 
behavioural modification have been defined by Mulhins (1996) as follows: -identify the critical 
behaviour - what people do or do not do which needs to be changed; measure the frequency - 
obtain hard evidence that a real problem exists; carry out a functional analysis - identify 
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the stimuli that precede the behaviour and the consequences in the shape of reward or pun-
ishment, which influence the behaviour; develop and implement an intervention strategy - this 
may involve the use of positive or negative reinforcement to influence behaviour (i.e. providing 
or withholding financial or non-financial rewards); evaluate the effects of the intervention - 
what improvements, if any, happened and if the interventions were unsuccessful, what needs to 
be done next? 
3.2.2. The ABC Model of Behaviour Change 
The ABC Model of behaviour change is composed of three elements - Antecedents, Behaviour, 
and Consequences. The Model advocates that, behaviour can be changed in two main ways - by 
what comes before it (ex-ante), and by what comes after it (ex-post) (Ayers, 1995). When you 
try to influence behaviour before it occurs, you are using antecedents. When you attempt to 
influence behaviour by doing something after it occurs, you are using consequences. The PM 
model is based on the systematic use of antecedents and consequences to improve the current 
behaviour - performance (Daniels, op. cit.). An antecedent prompts behaviour, which is 
followed by a consequence. An understanding of the way these elements interact allows 
managers to analyse performance problems, take corrective measures, and design work 
environments and management systems in which high performance will prevail and current 
behaviour modified. 
3.3. The Conceptual Framework of Performance 
The changes, which have taken place in the public sector domain, have created considerable 
interest in the concept of performance, and as a consequence the vocabulary of local 
government management has been filled with phrases beginning with that word performance. 
For example performance measures, performance indicators, performance review, performance 
appraisal, etc. etc. (Rogers 1990).  
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A distinction is often made between ‘measures’ as being precise and direct assessments of 
performance and ‘indicators’, as being more indirect assessments; i.e. they are only indicative 
of performance rather than ‘real performance’ (ibid., 1990). The term ‘review’ refers to control 
procedures or continuous monitoring of performance. The term ‘appraisal’ is used in relation to 
evaluations or measurement (stocktaking) of the whole performance process of individuals.  
3.3.1. Definition of performance 
The concept of performance is an old phenomenon in a working environment especially in the 
private sector. If you can’t define performance, you can't measure or manage it (Armstrong and 
Baron, 1998). Daniels (op. cit.) defines the term performance as a process, which entails a 
number, or series, of behaviours, directed towards the achievement of some predetermined 
goal. The Oxford English dictionary defines performance as the "accomplishment, execution, 
carrying out, and working out of anything ordered or undertaken".   
The Longman’s Dictionary of Contemporary English (new edition) defines performance as ‘... 
the action or manner of carrying out an activity, piece of work, etc.; the ability of a person to do 
something well; behaviour.’ This refers to outcomes/outputs (accomplishment), but also states 
that performance is about doing the work, as well as being about the results achieved.  
Armstrong and Murlis (1994) argue that "performance is a multi-dimensional construct, the 
measurement of which varies, depending on a variety of factors."  They also state that it is 
important to determine whether the measurement objective is to assess performance outcomes 
or behaviour. That is one should distinguish between outcomes (results/output) and behaviour 
(the process). 
There are different views on what performance is.  This is a challenge to public sector 
managers because the overwhelming debate on performance today is whether it entails 
behaviour, results, or both. Performance is referred to as being about doing the work, 
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as well as being about the results achieved (Otley, 1999).  It could be regarded as simply the 
record of outcomes achieved.  On an individual basis, it is a record of the person’s 
accomplishments (Armstrong and Baron, 1998).  Performance can be regarded as behaviour - 
i.e. the way in which organisations, teams and individuals get work done (ibid).   
Campbell (1990) believes that "performance is behaviour and should be distinguished from the 
outcomes because they can be contaminated by system factors." What is implied in the 
Campbell’s argument is that performance measurement can only focus on an individual/group’s 
final output, if and only if, system factors are controllable. That is, after a person has performed 
and produced a quality output, this product may deteriorate due to system factors that are 
outside the control of the performer.  
Others argue that performance should be defined as the outcomes of work because they provide 
the strongest linkage to the strategic goals of the organisation, customer satisfaction, and 
economic contributions (Rogers, 1994; Fitzgerald and Moon, 1996). In contrast, both Edis 
(1995) and Kane (1996) argue that performance is something that the person leaves behind and 
that exists apart from the purpose.  Bevan & Thomson (1991) are concerned that: 
“Performance should be defined as the outcomes of work because they provide the 
strongest linkage to the strategic goals of the organisation, customer satisfaction, and 
economic contributions.” 
System failures, if any, though uncontrollable by the performer are still within the horizon of 
the organisation and should not be taken as a scapegoat.  Hood (op. cit.) also supports this view 
that: 
“Performance means both behaviours and results.  Behaviours emanate from the 
performer and transformed performance from abstraction to action.  Not just to the 
instruments for results, behaviours are also outcomes in their own right - the product of 
mental and physical efforts applied to tasks - and can be judged apart from results.” 
Performance is about how things are done as well as what is done.  This is the so-called "mixed 
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model" of PM (IPM, 1992), which covers competency levels and achievements as well as 
objective setting and review.   
3.3.2. Factors affecting performance 
According to Armstrong and Baron (op. cit.) performance as defined above is affected by a 
number of factors, including the following: (a) personal factors - the individual's skill, 
confidence, motivation and commitment. (b) Leadership factors - the quality of encouragement, 
guidance and support provided by the managers and team leaders. (c) Team factors - the quality 
of support provided by colleagues. (d) System factors - the context of work and facilities 
(instruments of labour) provided by the organisation; and (e) Contextual (situational) factors - 
internal and external environmental pressures and changes. All these factors should be taken 
into account when measuring performance for pay decisions.  
Research has proved that traditional approaches to performance appraisal attribute variations in 
performance to personal factors, when, in fact, they could actually be caused in part or entirely 
by situational or systems factors (Atkinson and McCrindell, 1997). Essentially, the assessment 
of individual performance must necessarily consider not only what individuals have done (the 
results), but also the circumstances in which they have had to perform (Deming, 1986). This 
assessment process should extend to the performance of the manager as a leader, because what 
the performer does is mainly a reflection of the manager’s behaviour in terms of on-the-job 
training, coaching and guidance. Campbell, et al. (1993) argues that determinants of job 
performance are knowledge, skill and motivation factors. In his model of performance3, 
Campbell argues that the three variables have a functional relationship the impact of which 
determines or influences an individual’s performance.  
                                                 
3 Adapted from Campbell, et al. (1993) 
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What is being hypothesised here is that there is a functional or causal relationship between an 
individual’s level of performance and determinants of that performance. That is the direct cause 
of what people do (their performance) is some function of knowledge/skills, systems and 
employee motivation/attitudes. Therefore, any performance measurement process for PRP 
purpose must incorporate these variables to achieve objectivity and desired effectiveness. 
Whereas knowledge refers to facts and things (knowing what to do), skill refers to ability to 
perform and motivation is a function of whatever independent variables are stipulated by a 
person’s favourite incentive theory.  
3.3.3. Dimensions of Performance  
Fitzgerald et al (1991) suggest a results-determinants performance measurement model of six 
dimensions. Two of the performance dimensions are the results of strategy consisting of 
competitiveness and financial success measures. The remaining four measures are determinants 
of the success of these strategies: quality, flexibility, resource utilisation and innovation. 
Similarly, Atkinson et al (1997) differentiate between primary objectives (i.e. results) and 
secondary objectives (i.e. determinants). They argue that primary objectives are externally 
oriented in the sense that they aim to achieve results that are the (long-term) mission of the 
organisation. The concern is mainly with measurable deliverables. In contrast, they say that 
secondary (operational) objectives are internally oriented and are concerned with how goods 
and services will be delivered. 
In a similar argument, Kaplan and Norton’s (1992, 1996) balanced scorecard recommends a 
performance measurement model of four dimensions of performance: financial, customer 
satisfaction, internal business processes, and innovation or growth and learning.  Kaplan and 
Norton effectively consider the three dimensions of quality, flexibility and resource utilisation 
in Fitzgerald et al’s model to be the single dimension of internal business processes. 
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Classifying results as financial and customer; and determinants as internal business processes, 
innovation (growth) and learning can comprehend the similarity of the Kaplan and Norton's 
dimensions to those of others. 
3.3.4. Performance measurement in local government 
The literature on PM in government is starting to address issues of strategic linkages with 
operational performance and this is consistent with the literature on the dimensions of 
performance in general. However the literature on PM in local government is less strategic in 
focus. It is still largely grounded in operational concepts of efficiency, with a lower emphasis 
on the dimensions discussed above. Palmer’s (1993) research provides evidence that 
organisations concentrate on measuring what is easily measurable and in local government this 
results in a bias towards measuring performance in terms of economy and efficiency, rather 
than effectiveness. Palmer concludes that the types of indicator most frequently used relate to 
costs, volume of service, utilisation rates, time targets and productivity – all measures of 
economy and efficiency, not effectiveness.  
Increasingly there are many pressures on local government to plan for the future rather than 
adopt an incremental approach, which include the tender process and competition; central 
requirements for formal plans and increased ‘customer’ focus (Flynn and Talbot 1996). Flynn 
and Talbot further suggest that much of the pressure for improved performance in the short 
term may militate against strategic planning and strategic performance management. Budget 
constraints, cost reduction strategies, purchaser/provider splits and a focus on financial 
performance can fragment local government and prevent a strategic overview being adopted. 
Whether or not a strategic focus is evident, performance measurement and review is important 
in local government. It became important in British local governments in the 1980s because of 
five interrelated factors: pressure from the central government and the Audit 
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Commission; greater public expectation and consumerism; compulsory competitive tendering; 
changing culture and attitudes among local authority managers; and loss of confidence 
(Ghobadian and Ashworth 1994). These factors are still prevalent in the local governments 
today where this research was carried out. The British government introduced wholesale 
changes in its system of local government in a very short space of time to refocus the emphasis 
on PM across the board. What implication if any does the PM approach have on organisational 
service quality management strategy? This is the concern of the next section.  
3.3.5. Service Quality Management 
Service quality management may be described as the process of minimising the performance 
gap between actual delivery and customer expectation. In order to improve the service quality, 
managers have to adopt “customer-oriented” techniques because service providers directly 
address user needs. This is the philosophy of performance management. In this regard, the PM 
model appeals to be most ideal. In a pragmatic approach, some scholars attempt to define 
service quality by identifying gaps between provider and consumer in their respective 
perceptions of service quality (Ballantine and Modell, 1998) or the performance measures they 
use (Fitzgerald & Moon, 1996). In every economic entity, however, top management must be 
the frontiers of identifying these 'performance gaps' and providing the avenue, framework and 
empowerment for their therapy.   
Performance and quality management is concerned with maximising the value added through 
the process of allocating and managing resources such that the initial ‘costs’ are exceeded by 
the subsequent ‘benefits’ derived from the deliverance process (Horton & Farnham, 1999). 
Management of quality has dominated public-service organisations in the 1990s. It was an idea, 
which germinated in the private sector, where intense market competition forces companies to 
look at the quality of their products, rather than price or design, as the key to market 
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success. Therefore, quality is defined as ‘conformance to requirements’ (Crosby, 1984), ‘fitness 
for purpose’ (Juran, 1989) and ‘meeting the requirements of the customer’ (Oakland, 1989). In 
the UK, the enthusiasm for quality was imported into the public services through the Citizen’s 
Charter (1991).  
Management of quality reflects acceptance by public managers that the users of public services 
are their ‘customers’ and ‘clients’. The latter should be provided with services meeting their 
expectations and eliciting high levels of customer satisfaction. It is also considered that cus-
tomers of the ‘business’ should be consulted about the services they want and whether their 
needs are being met.  As a result approaches and techniques for managing quality, initially used 
in the private sector, such as BS5750, quality circles,  Total Quality Management (TQM), and 
PM, have been widely introduced into the public services, to meet the needs for ‘continuous 
improvement’ and ‘customer care’ (Koch, 1992; Sanderson, 1992; Skelcher, 1992). 
3.4. Performance management theory 
Performance management (PM) is a novel concept in developing countries relative to 
developed economies. There are various versions of theoretical, practical descriptions and 
conceptions of PM. However, they all agree that PM is the process of optimal management and 
allocation of resources to achieve a common end in an organisation. Edis (1995) says that PM 
entails the managerial approach that links people and jobs to the strategy and objectives of the 
organisation. Slater, et al., (1998) argue that PM is a ‘Value Adding’ process of organisational 
performance. It is defined within the context of private sector organisations as a systematic, 
data-oriented approach to managing people’s behaviours at work that relies on positive 
reinforcement as the major way of optimising performance (Daniels (op. cit.).  
Furthermore, you must develop a way to measure these behaviours and their results, and 
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determine the methods for changing or modifying them if necessary. The final steps are to use 
those methods, evaluate the results and give feedback to performers. Data-oriented means that 
an organisation must use performance data to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies 
employed (secondary objectives) to achieve the primary objectives (Fitzgerald, et al 1991). The 
techniques and practices of PM are derived from the field study of Applied Behaviour Analysis 
- the term used to describe the scientific study of behaviour (Baer, et al 1968). In order to 
understand behaviour, applied behaviour analysts use the same scientific methods that physical 
sciences employ, i.e. precise definition of the behaviour under study, experimentation, and 
consistent replication of the experimental findings. 
PM is also defined as an integrated set of planning and review procedures, which cascades 
down through the organisation to provide a link between each individual and the overall 
strategy of the organisation (Rogers, 1994). Similarly, the National Association of Head 
Teachers (NAHT, 1991) describes PM as a mix of managerial techniques through which 
individual jobholders: have greater clarity about what their organisation is trying to achieve; 
understand what is expected of them in their job; are entitled to regular feedback on how well 
they are doing; have continuous support from their managers; and have an opportunity to assess 
their overall performance achievements over a given period.  
PM is a much broader concept than just appraisal. Performance appraisal (or evaluation or 
measurement) is an important element in performance management and it is part of an 
integrated approach, incorporating processes, attitudes and behaviours which together produce 
a coherent strategy for raising levels of individual performance achievements.  
The LGMB (1993) and the Audit Commission (1995) in UK have adopted a broad definition of 
the PM model that encompasses the functions and processes that may be used to manage both 
organisational and individual performance. This kind of vision of PM concept creates 
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a more integrated approach to the management of performance and enhancing of accountability 
in local authorities in general.  
These two institutions, suggest that in order to improve both organisational and individual 
performance the following management functions are important: defining and setting 
organisational and individual aims and objectives; corporate planning; linking organisational 
strategy and service objectives to jobs and clients; identifying staff training and development 
needs; assessing the results through personal appraisal using relevant performance indicators; 
performance agreements or contracts; using the knowledge gained through training to modify 
performance attitudes; external and internal communication systems; and organisation 
development (OD) and performance review. 
The term PM refers to any integrated, systematic approach to improving organisational 
performance to achieve corporate strategic aims and promote its mission and values (Edis, 
1995). This implies that a PM system aims at improving the results of people’s efforts by 
linking these to the organisation’s corporate objectives. That is, PM is the means through which 
employees’ performance can be improved by ensuring appropriate recognition and reward for 
their efforts, and by improving communication, learning and working arrangements as 
stipulated in the balanced scorecard model (Kloot and Martin, 1998).  
Therefore, installing a PM system in an organisation entails creating and supporting the 
‘achievement culture’ and thus ensures that effort is generated that results in performance 
which in turn results in real achievements. By ‘achievement culture’, it means a combination of 
performance orientation and professional excellence (Edis, ibid). The PM model (Mwita, op. 
cit.) stems from a clear understanding by every member of the organisation’s mission and 
values, and what it wants to achieve. 
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This study will adopt the definition given by The Local Government Management Board as a 
systematic approach to managing effectively that links the policies, priorities, strategy and 
service objectives of the council to jobs and people (LGMB, 1993). This is because despite 
variations in the approach its most detailed form is based on: setting corporate, service, team 
and individual objectives; recognising and rewarding achievement; identifying training and 
development needs; and then using the knowledge gained to modify objectives and methods as 
necessary.  
Figure 3.2: The 5-Dimensional PM Model 
 
(1) Mission Statement  
 -    Purpose of existence 
 -   Community expectations 
-    Values 
(2) Strategies and plans 
-     Corporate objectives    (5) Management Accounting 
-     SWORT4 analysis           Information System  
-    Training, development and retention policies   
(3) Action Planning                 
-    Operational objectives    - Feedback/fee- forward loops    
-    Key tasks & responsibilities     - Performance information-set 
-    Resource allocation – mapping   - Timely availability for planning,  
-    Performance target setting         decision-making and control, 
-    Agreement & performance contracting  - Suggestions box 
(4) Performance recognition 
-   Measurement of performance 
-   Rewards and sanctions 
-   Training needs assessment 
 
Source: Mwita, J. I. (2000) 
Essentially, the main objective of a PM system is to create a ‘performance and achievement’ 
culture (based on the expectancy theory) in an organisation. Its prime purpose is to improve 
performance and motivate staff by concentrating on priority objectives, raising commitments 
and releasing potentials. It should, however, be integrated with other service management and 
                                                 
4 SWORT denotes organisational Strategic Analysis in terms of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, market 
Risks and Threats due to competition and so on. 
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HRM policies, such as service planning and training and development. In addition, employers 
have the option of relating PM to their reward strategies such as PRP. 
The PM model is systematic in approach and managers can adopt the principles of Systems 
Analysis theory to link primary and secondary objectives of an organisation (Burch, 1992). 
Systems Analysis (SA) is described as the organized step-by-step study of detailed procedure 
for the collection, manipulation and evaluation of data about an organisation for the purpose not 
only of determining what must be done, but also of ascertaining the best way to improve the 
functioning of the system (Skidmore, 1994; Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Holwell, 1998). 
PM processes can provide for goal setting, feedback and reinforcement. 
The success of any PM model depends on managers developing a strategy that promotes 
achievement with the right motivation ‘or positive reinforcement’ and performance-based 
information-set from and to the management accounting system as shown in Figure 3.2 above. 
3.4.1. The stages in the PM model System 
The PM model as depicted in Figure 3.1 above can be implemented by observing several 
stages. The stages constitute a job-related PM model as recommended by the NAHT (1991) in 
UK and are outlined in a form of steps below. In practice, they should not necessarily follow 
one another rigidly as shown here, but this is just a general operational framework of what 
needs to be done in the PM model system. 
Step 1: Accountabilities describe the purpose for which a job exists. They do not change from 
year to year unless the job changes. They are generally about eight in number and 
should describe measurable results. By reference to the accountabilities, a jobholder can 
quickly assess whether all the responsibilities of a post are being met.  
Step 2: Performance Measures are ways of measuring the achievement of key accountabilities 
or goals. They can be objective or subjective. The selection of appropriate methods of 
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performance measurement will help the job-holder and the appraiser assess 
effectiveness. 
Step 3: Performance Standards are target levels of performance. Once a system to measure 
performance has been determined, a standard can be used either to set a goal or to 
determine a level of achievement. 
Step 4: Goals should reflect the immediate priorities of a job. They indicate specific, 
measurable levels of achievement expected within a given period of time. They can be 
related to standards and can be used to influence how a job-holder meets particular 
accountabilities. 
Step 5: Action Plans are the steps taken to fulfil accountabilities and defined goals. They help a 
job-holder to plan work and monitor its completion. Good action plans describe the 
assumptions, constraints and deadlines which affect each task. 
Step 6: Progress Reviews should occur regularly during a performance period, which is usually 
one year, so that the job-holder and the appraiser may review progress and revise plans 
as necessary. 
Step 7: Performance Appraisal is normally held at the end of the performance period. Job-
holders are assessed to see if they have fulfilled their accountabilities and achieved their 
goals, using the agreed performance measures. The job-holder and the appraiser review 
accountabilities, test performance measures for rating and rewarding, identify 
development and training needs, work on career plans and agree goals for the next year. 
In evaluating PM systems in a LG perspective, several issues need to be noted. 
3.4.2. The PM model approach to service delivery 
 
(i) Accountabilities to focus on results  
First, accountabilities should normally focus on results. Traditionally, job descriptions 
concentrate on the tasks, duties and actions expected of a job-holder, i.e. on what a person does. 
In contrast, however, PM model is concerned with the results – with what a person achieves. 
(ii) Principal accountabilities to define key responsibilities 
Secondly, principal accountabilities should be capable of clearly defining the areas of 
responsibility of a job and the results, which a job-holder must produce if the purpose of 
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the job is to be fulfilled. In most well-structured jobs there are about eight principal or key 
accountabilities, each of which represents an activity within the job-holder’s control (Campbell, 
1996). Accountabilities are continuing. They do not change unless the job itself is reshaped. 
Results to be achieved in any given period of time are termed goals (ibid.).  
(iii) Statements of accountabilities for precision  
Thirdly, statements of accountabilities should be straightforward, authoritative short statements 
and to the point. A statement of accountability should guide the appraising manager by 
pinpointing specific key areas of concern. According to Cambridgeshire County Council (1992) 
such a statement should consist of a single sentence in the following form:  
VERB  --------------------------------Æ Approve…… 
DIRECT OBJECT OF ACTION Æ….safety measures……. 
  RESULT-------------------------------Æ….to reduce the rate of accidents  
  
In the example there is an assumption that safety measures will reduce the rate of accidents. In 
the performance appraisal meeting the appraiser will judge performance not only on the number 
of safety measures introduced and the outputs of the safety officer but also on the reduction in 
the rate of accidents, the effectiveness of the work, the results.  
In the same example, the implied criterion of measurement is the current rate of accidents. The 
performance standard could be set at an agreed percentage figure. It is helpful to be as specific 
as possible when selecting a verb. It is recommended that the use of general terms such as 
‘manage’ should be avoided but used only when more precise action verbs will not do (NAHT, 
op. cit.). 
The accountabilities of supervisors and subordinates must be properly related to each other. A 
single accountability of a supervisor may give rise to several distinct accountabilities among 
subordinates. Care should be taken such that accountabilities for the same result are not 
needlessly carried elsewhere in the organisation. 
(iv) The purpose of performance measures 
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Fourthly, considering performance measures in evaluating PM system should provide evidence 
of whether the intended result has been achieved and the extent to which the job-holder has 
produced the output. These two aspects should not be confused: part of the review process is to 
check the implicit assumption in the accountability that the action produces the desired result. 
(v) Performance measures to be related to accountabilities 
Fifthly, is about the relationship of performance measures to accountabilities. Performance 
measures will work only if they are directly related to adequate and clear accountability 
statements. If accountability statements conform to rules, they will focus on the end-results and 
suggest measurement criterion. Thus, the key question to be answered in forming a 
performance measure is ‘how progress towards the end result may be determined?’  
Implementation of the PM model will not be effective unless specific performance plans, 
measurement and control techniques are laid down. In practice there are various approaches the 
application of each one of which depends on the nature of an organisation. However, following 
recent public sector reforms it is becoming hard to draw a line between a private or public 
sector organisation because the same managerial techniques which have been predominant in 
the private sector for decades, are becoming widespread the public sector. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to review all the planning and control techniques but for the purpose of this 
study three techniques of budgeting, economic value added (EVA) and balanced scorecard are 
reviewed in ss.3.6 below.  
3.5. Implication of the PM model for organisational strategy 
The linkage between organisational strategy and performance is the cornerstone of the Kaplan 
and Norton’s balanced scorecard and has been enormously acknowledged in the literature 
(Atkinson and McCrindell, 1997; Atkinson et al (1997).  When strategic concerns are 
impounded into a PM system, rather than the more limited concept of measurement, 
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they become the focus of performance in an organisation. In the government sector, given that 
objectives are often stated in non-financial terms, non-financial performance measures needed 
as conventional financial reporting will not fully capture performance (Guthrie and English 
1997). Performance measurement is essential for choosing between alternative strategies and 
prioritising activities.   
Kloot and Martin (1998) examined how PM systems incorporating strategic and operational 
issues are developed and integrated across LG in the State of Victoria, Australia. The aim of 
their research was to understand how in the LG environment, performance measurement 
systems are linked in an integrated holistic way to strategic choices of councils such that their 
overall operations efficiency and effectiveness are improved. Their argument is that when this 
occurs across the organisation a performance management system is in place. This study has 
extended this argument further by examining not only the capacity of local authorities to 
establish this linkage, but also the role of motivation in managing performance with particular 
interest in the rewards systems which are related to performance. 
3.5.1. Linking corporate plans with community needs 
Local government corporate plans are strongly community focussed, with the strategic 
imperative being related to satisfying community needs. Community and customer relations are 
areas, which are generally well handled by local government, a common trend found across 
public sector services (Ballantine et al op. cit.). Community satisfaction is an area over which 
the British Local Government (BLG) mandates performance measurement. Each council 
surveys community perceptions of overall leadership, image, customer service and service 
delivery performance by, and reinforces accountability to the government.  
Councils need to manage how communities perceive their performance in two ways. First, they 
need to manage how the general community perceives their performance. Second, they 
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need to manage how those who use specific council services as customers perceive the 
council’s performance. Formal performance measurement is evident as councils undertake 
extensive market research to gauge community perceptions of their performance across both 
these primary and secondary dimensions. Surveys and focus groups are conducted by 
independent market research organisations on an annual basis. In-house groups may conduct 
other market research much more frequently, for example monthly client surveys to judge the 
quality of services provision. 
3.5.2. The PM model and measurement of performance 
The five areas the PM model presented in Table 5.1 in ss.5.4.1 of chapter five constitute the key 
issues of concern for this study. These issues are not novel in the study of HRM literature and 
are linked to the five aspects of the PM model presented in Figure 3.1 above. Studies 
addressing aspects of them have been part of the performance planning, measurement and 
control systems and wider management literature for many years (Kaplan and Norton, op. cit.).  
The integration of the five areas provides a description of the overall PM framework of an 
organisation, which is relatively novel. It is argued that the five areas are heavily inter-
connected and procedures introduced to address one question may well impact upon the other 
areas identified. The PM model is not intended to provide a normative or prescriptive 
framework, but rather to provide a more comprehensive descriptive framework within which 
the features of an overall organisational performance planning and control system can be 
assessed and evaluated. 
3.6. Performance Measurement Systems 
In examining the development and use of performance measurement in British local 
government, Ghobadian and Ashworth (1994) suggest characteristics of performance 
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measurement systems that are consistent with the principles underlying the balanced approach 
to performance management set out in Table 3.3 below. We believe that an integrated, holistic 
performance measurement system that did all of these things would, in fact, be a performance 
management system.  
Performance-measurement information is influenced by who constructs the indicators and who 
does the measuring (Lawler and Rhode (1976) quoted in Palmer, 1993). Palmer also notes that 
‘utilisation is likely to be highest when decision-makers are involved in these activities’ (p.33). 
Table 3.3:Performance measurement systems 
Multiple measures 
Ongoing and evolving process 
Identify trade-offs between various 
dimensions of performance 
Capture both efficiency and 
effectiveness dimensions of 
performance 
Qualitative and quantitative 
measures 
Link measures to corporate 
objectives 
Enable management to plan and aid 
decision making designed to meet 
requirements of different 
organisational levels 
Avoid measures becoming ends in 
themselves 
Measures cannot be manipulated by 
managers being measured 
Source: Ghobadian and Ashworth (1994) 
In the British experience approximately half of the respondents indicated that the introduction 
of performance measurement was not part of a coherent strategy (Palmer, ibid., p. 33). This is 
clear evidence that there is no overarching, holistic performance management approach in a 
significant proportion of UK local government. The preoccupation is with measurement for 
purposes of compliance and control. This is clearly an important point when we consider the 
myriad of issues people in Australian local government experience as this industry faces 
significant, on-going change. 
Recent Australian research confirms that prior to the 1990’s reforms performance 
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measurement, let alone performance management, was not a high priority in Victorian local 
government (Kloot et al 1997). Managerialist changes instituted by the State Government, 
consistent with managerialist changes in other Australian government sectors, New Zealand, 
the UK, Canada and the USA (Dixon et al, op. cit.) now demand a focus on performance 
measurement. The most obvious managerialist change is the introduction of compulsory 
competitive tendering which requires performance information for the purposes of contract 
specification and management (Palmer, op. cit.). The primary focus in the UK was, as Palmer 
and Ghobadian and Ashworth (1994) report, on financial information. This is also the case in 
Australia. 
Another major driver for the establishment of performance information systems in BLG was 
the legislative requirement for councils to prepare annual performance management plans 
containing measures and indicators, designed to increase accountability. Over the last few years 
councils have refined and improved the quality of this process as they provide feedback to 
stakeholders: councillors, council employees, the community and the Government.  
The adoption of managerialist private sector practices by British local government suggests that 
there should be an increased focus on performance management. Strategic planning, business 
re-engineering, customer service, quality assurance, performance management, risk 
management and accrual accounting under-pin managerialism (Dixon et al op. cit.). The first 
five of these practices are central to the research reported in this study, linking as they do the 
concepts of Fitzgerald et al (1991), Kaplan and Norton (1996) and Atkinson et al (1997). 
3.6.1. Performance measurement and reward policy themes 
Performance-related pay is a logical component of reforms aimed at more efficient and more 
effective, delivery of public services and is consistent with the rationalist economic philosophy 
that began to influence policy makers in OECD countries in the 1980s. The 
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rationale for the shift toward economic policies of smaller government, privatisation and low 
inflation was outlined in an OECD report dealing with structural adjustment and economic 
performance (1987).  
These policies were, in a general sense, a response to the economic malaise that struck many 
OECD countries in the 1970s and early 1980s, the symptoms of which were low growth, low 
productivity and weak investment in conjunction with high unemployment and inflation. Flynn 
(1990) has identified several themes in the policies and reform agendas of the economic 
rationalists.  
Some of these themes, but not all of them, are consistent with the measurement and rewarding 
of performance in the public sector. These include, among others, use of market mechanisms to 
allocate resources; competition amongst service providers; public choice as policy theme; 
transaction cost theory as policy theme; and strategic performance measurement. 
3.7. Performance Planning, Measurement and Control Techniques 
Current strategic management literature suggests that there should be a strong linkage between 
strategic plans and performance measures. Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) balanced scorecard and 
Fitzgerald et al’s (1991) results and determinants framework attempt to explain this linkage. 
The PM model framework flags up some vital issues for studying and revising the practice of 
performance pay incentive schemes as well. These issues will be considered in more depth by 
looking at three popular techniques (one old and two new) that have been developed to improve 
organizational PM planning, measurement and control systems.  
The techniques are budgeting, Economic Value Added [EVA™]5, and the Balanced Scorecard 
Approach (BSA). The significance of these techniques is that they provide the impetus for the 
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linkage between primary and secondary objectives, which is a vital ingredient for PM planning, 
control, and decision-making process. Although these techniques are sometimes seen as 
competing approaches (Otley, 1999), for the purpose of this study they will be regarded as 
complementary. The two new techniques have been explicitly devised to allow a more 
structured approach to performance measurement and to avoid some of the problems associated 
with some traditional performance planning and control methods, such as budgeting (ibid.).  
Ideally, the framework should now be applied in practice to examine the overall performance 
planning and control systems of an organisation (Fitzgerald and Moon, 1996). The aim is to 
illustrate that the questions posed, give insight into the techniques discussed, and raise a variety 
of interesting research questions that can be explored. The following sections will briefly 
discuss each of these three techniques. 
3.7.1. Budgeting 
Budgeting has traditionally been a central plank of most organisations’ financial planning and 
control mechanisms, as it is one of the few techniques capable of integrating the whole range of 
organisational activity into a single coherent summary (Shillinglaw, 1994; Jones, 1996). 
Performance is defined essentially as profitability; in a profit centre. The overall measure of 
performance combines an output measure (revenue) with an input measure (cost) and the 
budgeting process seeks to keep the two elements in balance (Drury, 1998). In a public sector 
environment, cost centres are more problematic as results can no longer be measured in 
financial terms, and thus cannot be directly compared with costs. The budgeting process tends 
to assume a given level of output or sales and attempts to determine an appropriate level of 
spending (Otley, op. cit.). 
                                                                                                                                                           
5 EVA™ is a trademark of the Stern Stewart Corporation. 
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Budgeting and the PM Model 
The budgeting technique addresses the five aspects of the PM model as follows: 
(i) Objectives 
In order to develop a budget there is a need for an underlying performance plan by which the 
organisation’s objectives are expected to be achieved and which serves as the basis for the cost 
structure underlying the budget.6 
(ii) Target setting  
Target setting has long been seen as an important part of budgeting, with both the process (e.g. 
participation) and the outcome (e.g. target difficulty) being the subject of behavioural 
accounting research (Otley, op. cit.).  
(iii) Performance evaluation 
Clearly much of the influence of performance evaluation is driven by the desire of managers to 
please their superiors and thus gain some form of reward (financial or otherwise).  
(iv) Rewarding performance 
Although reward structures and incentive schemes have received some attention (particularly 
in the agency literature), the topic has been more implicit than explicit in the budgeting 
literature.7  
(v) Performance information system 
Finally, feedback loops are assumed to exist because of the regular reporting of (typically 
monthly) accounting variances and the consequences that these engender. The virtue of the 
budgetary planning and control process is that it provides an encompassing framework by 
means of which all aspects of an organization’s activity are encapsulated into a single set of 
financial planning statements against which actual outcomes can be monitored. However, the 
                                                 
6 However, it has to be recognized that the phenomenon of the ‘planless budget’ also occurs, with budget numbers 
merely being extrapolated from past experience.  
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downside of the narrowness of the budgetary process has been likened to driving a motorcar 
solely by looking through the rear view mirror that provides only an imperfect reflection of the 
intended destination (Otley, op. cit.). 
3.7.2. Economic Value Added (EVA™) 
EVA™ has been developed by the Stern Stewart Corporation as an overall measure of financial 
performance that is intended to focus managers’ minds on the maximisation of shareholders’ 
value.8 The technique is a purely financial performance measure but can be used to demonstrate 
how a particular scheme of performance measurement needs to address each of the areas 
mentioned, though with a narrow scope (Otley, 1999). It is argued that the EVA™ technique 
can avoid some of the performance measurement problems currently experienced with other 
financial performance measures (Otley, ibid.).  
EVA™ and the PM model 
EVA™ as a financial measurement technique is used to address the five dimensions of the PM 
model as follows: 
(i) Objectives 
The first question in the EVA™ framework for analysis is thus answered by the assertion that 
the single objective of such a stock market quoted organization is to deliver as much value as 
possible to the shareholders. The surrogate measure for this value is defined in historic 
accounting terms in a way that minimizes the dysfunctional consequences inherent in the use of 
any such measure. However, it needs to be recognized that the measure does not anticipate the 
earning of future income, despite the existence of predictions based on stock market valuations, 
                                                                                                                                                           
7 The literature on performance evaluation and style of budget use is also relevant, although the connection with 
rewards is still usually implicit or expressed in terms of obtaining a good evaluation from a superior [see Briers 
and Hirst (1990) for a useful overview]. 
8 Stakeholders other than shareholders are not explicitly considered in the EVA™ framework. At best, other 
stakeholders are seen in an instrumental manner as parties with whom contracts are entered into, as the means 
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but it remains an historic income measure. Stern Stewart would argue the EVA™; is the best 
surrogate for or predictor of future share price performance, but this remains an open empirical 
question. 
(ii) Target setting  
The second question about target setting is largely unanswered. The means by which such 
outcomes are to be attained are not specified. The most charitable interpretation of this is that a 
much decentralised organisation is envisaged which allows subordinate managers a great deal 
of discretion over their operating activities. In such circumstances, it could be argued that it is 
inappropriate to constrain subordinates by insisting they operate to plan; rather, they have to 
deliver value by whatever means they can invent.  
With regard to target setting, at a glance one would imagine that this is a simple issue, because 
the implicit standard against which residual income or EVA™ is assessed is zero.9 However, 
this only holds true where valuations are conducted on a net present value (NPV) basis. 
Because EVA™ takes a more historic view and only uses accounting rather than economic 
valuations, there can be an ‘inheritance effect’ whereby managers can benefit from or be 
penalized by the past history of the organisation.  
For example, in the ‘rust bowl’ industries, the depreciated historic cost of assets may exceed 
their market valuation; here, EVA™ is expected to be negative and a target of zero would be 
over-ambitious. Thus, the EVA™ approach pays particular attention to the setting of 
appropriate targets. The objective appears to be the traditional one of attempting to ensure that 
                                                                                                                                                           
by which the objective of increasing shareholder value is attained. See, for example, Otley and Emmanuel 
(1976). 
9 There are some other sufficient conditions for such a relationship to hold, discussed in O’Hanlon and Peasnell 
(1998). 
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targets are ‘tip-toe’, ‘stretch’ or challenging, whilst still being regarded as realistic by those 
who will be required to attain them. 
(iii) Reward structures  
Reward structures are the third major focus of the EVA™ approach. Not only is this a by-
product of the Stern Stewart history (it was originally a compensation consultant), but reflects 
an awareness of the imperfect nature of the EVA™ measure, even after all the recommended 
adjustments have been made. The central suggestion is that, although bonus calculations should 
be based on the attainment of target levels of EVA™, such a bonus should not be paid 
immediately in cash, but should be subject to smoothing over a 3-year period and payable in 
full only if performance is maintained into the future. The reason for using this method is 
explicitly motivational and designed to avoid potentially dysfunctional short-term behaviour. 
Stern Stewart thus recognise the potential dysfunctional effects of short-term performance 
targets coupled too closely to financial rewards, and have developed a scheme to reduce the 
worst of such effects. 
(iv) Forward planning 
Finally, Stern Stewart also briefly discusses the process by which future targets should be 
adjusted in the light of actual results. Here again they are at pains to avoid the circularity that 
can result from a strong management team being expected to perform well and thus inflating 
stock market expectations. If this were to be allowed to inflate EVA™ targets, a good 
management team would be penalised purely because they were expected to deliver 
shareholder value. A compromise is therefore proposed which is again based on an historic 
approach, perhaps benchmarked against what is being achieved elsewhere (Kloot and Martin, 
op. cit.). 
The EVA™ literature is therefore a good example of the performance management framework 
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being used in practice, albeit to just a single over-arching measure of financial performance. 
Each of the five major questions is addressed, although the second question is touched upon 
only implicitly. By concentrating on a single over-arching financial performance measure, the 
EVA™ approach is able to disregard questions of strategy, although only at the cost of spending 
a great deal of effort on discussing the capitalisation of items, such as R&D expenditure. That 
is, strategies that require current spending to produce expected future benefits must be 
‘properly’ accounted for.  
In summary, the approach has been well worked through, and represents one of the most 
coherent performance management systems currently on offer. Nevertheless, even under its 
own assumptions concerning organisational objectives, it is clearly not as comprehensive as it 
claims, and is particularly weak in measuring and monitoring the means by which managers 
have adopted to achieve their overall objectives. 
3.7.3. The balanced scorecard approach (BSA) 
Finally, the Balanced Scorecard Approach (BSA) is a multi-dimensional approach to PM 
planning, control and decision-making process that is linked specifically to organisational 
strategy.10 The technique was developed by Kaplan and Norton at the Harvard Business School 
since the early l990s (op. cit). The BSA is used to indicate a technique which has addressed one 
or two questions in some detail, but which has also neglected other important questions.  
The Balanced Scorecard (BS) shown in Figure 3.3 below is potentially a powerful tool by 
which senior managers can be encouraged to address the fundamental issue of effectively 
deploying an organization’s strategic intent (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996). The BS literature 
also indicates that it is as much the process of establishing a scorecard that yields benefit as the 
                                                 
10 Compare Kaplan and Norton (1992) and Kaplan and Norton (1996) to see how the approach has been developed 
during that period. 
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Vision 
and 
Strategy 
resultant measurement schema. Kloot and Martin (op. cit.) argue that in practice, PMS require 
the four dimensions of the balanced scorecard i.e. financial, community/customer, internal 
business processes; and growth/innovation and learning. 
Figure 3.3: The Balanced Scorecard: a framework to translate strategy into actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P. (1996) 
The balanced scorecard is designed to be at the centre of an organization’s PM planning and 
control mechanisms to effectively deploy strategy, to link operational practices with strategic 
intent, and facilitate objective performance measurement. However, it cannot stand-alone and 
its links with more traditional planning and control systems need to be reviewed. For example, 
in Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 197) there is a diagram with the balanced scorecard 
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placed at the centre, illustrating the benefits that can flow from its adoption.  
The Balanced Scorecard is thus a potentially powerful tool by which senior managers can be 
encouraged to address the fundamental issue of effectively deploying an organisation’s 
strategic intent. It focuses on establishing links between strategic objectives and performance 
measures; it also pays some attention to measuring the achievement of the components of the 
strategic plan the organisation has espoused (i.e. the means that it is believed will lead to the 
desired ends). However, the literature is remarkably silent on these points. Procedures for 
mapping means-end relationships are not explicated. In addition and surprisingly, target-setting 
is not mentioned despite its central role; the links with reward structures are neglected; and the 
establishment of information systems and feedback loops are taken for granted. All of these 
neglected areas provide opportunities for further research. 
This analysis is intended to give an indication of how the proposed PM model framework can 
be used to analyse planning and control techniques that are being used in many organizations. It 
can be seen that no single technique has developed answers to all five of the questions posed, 
although the application of such techniques requires attention to be paid to them all.  
3.7.4. Comparative Analysis of the three techniques 
It may therefore be beneficial for both practitioners and researchers to consider all of the 
aspects identified in evaluating and refining the above techniques. However, there is a 
significant shortcoming in analysing single techniques in this way. It may be that, although a 
particular technique does not address all of the issues identified, such matters are dealt with by 
a combination of a variety of techniques in an overall organizational planning and control 
system. A more holistic approach is clearly appropriate, with the unit of analysis being the 
organization. Here an attempt should be made to analyse the totality of the planning and control 
systems being utilised against the issues defined above. 
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It is important to be clear at this point that the purpose of the framework outlined is not 
intended to serve as a prescription for ‘best practice’ on the assumption that explicit procedures 
for developing a performance measurement and management system which emphasise the 
establishment of comprehensive and quantitative measures of performance, explicitly linked to 
financial rewards, is the universally best way forward. At the very least, there is insufficient 
evidence available to substantiate such a position, and the distinct possibility that in many 
circumstances such an approach may be counter-productive.  
An overall summary is given in Table 3.4 below. 
Table 3.4: Comparison of the three planning and control techniques analysed using the PM model framework 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on the three techniques examined above. 
However, there is a dearth of information available concerning what is current practice in major 
business, and what is the impact of different configurations of planning and control 
mechanisms. Rather, the intention has been to develop a framework, which can provide a 
structure for examining extant practice in a more holistic way than has previously been the 
case. 
The PM Model Budgetary Control EVA™ Balanced scorecard 
Objectives 
 
Financial objectives: 
- profit; 
- cash flow; and 
- ROCE 
Single financial objective. 
 
Multiple objectives based 
on strategy. 
 
Strategies and 
plans 
Means/end relationships not 
formally considered, although 
budget is based on a plan of 
action. 
Delegated to responsible 
managers.  
May be considered when 
setting targets. 
Implicit in selecting some 
performance measures; no 
formal procedures 
suggested. 
Targets  Best estimates for financial 
planning; literature on target-
setting gives some guidelines 
for control. 
Some guidelines  given 
with respect to 
‘inheritance effect’ 
Not considered, despite 
being central to ‘balance’. 
Rewards Not addressed, despite many 
rewards now being made 
contingent upon budget 
achievement 
Appropriate incentive 
schemes a central part of 
the methodology. 
Not addressed. 
Feedback  
Short-term feedback of budget 
variances. Incremental 
budgeting from year to year. 
Some discussion of 
longer-term impact. 
Reporting of performance 
assumed, but no explicit 
guidance given. 
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3.8. The PM model as a Strategic HRM tool 
The PM model as discussed in this chapter adopts a strategic approach to managing 
performance in an organisation. This means that we need to review the conceptual framework 
of strategic HRM model so that the link between the two can be clearly shown. Managing 
strategically is increasingly a way of life for organisations faced with the tumultuous economic, 
political and cultural forces of the NPM era. In order to be successful organisations have to deal 
with and respond to primary questions regarding the formulation and implementation of 
strategy in their organisations. 
The area that is getting much attention in recent years is HRM because it has been the most 
neglected strategic area and also it will be central to the implementing the needed cultural and 
political changes in organisations (Fombrun, Tichy, and Devanna, 1994). A process for 
changing the HRM of an organisation in the future will need specific strategic frameworks for 
dealing with the challenges of change (Storey, J. (ed) (1995)). The PM model as a tool is one of  
such frameworks which needs to be integrated within the organisational context of strategic 
HRM model.  
These frameworks enable organisations’ strategic stance externally translate into the 
management systems articulated to reinforce their organisational goals. The PM model as a 
strategic HRM tool emphasises exactly that. It begins with the mission statement of the 
organisation which is the long-term vision, then translates this into corporate objectives. Theses 
are derived from both within and outside the organisation through consultation of all 
stakeholders – process and environmental. Correspondingly, Fumbrun, et al. (1994:34) argue 
that strategic management involves consideration of the following:  
(i) Mission and Strategy: An organisation needs a reason for being (mission), and a sense of 
how to display materials, information, and people to carry it out (strategy).  
(ii) Formal Structure: People and tasks are organised to implement the 
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organisation’s strategy. The organisation’s formal structure includes its systems of financial 
accounting and information dissemination. 
(iii) Human Resource Systems: People are recruited and developed to do jobs defined by the 
organisation’s formal structure; their performance must be monitored and rewards allocated 
to maintain productivity.   
At this junction the link between the PM model and strategic HRM model is clearly established 
with a common view of achieving primary objectives of the organisation. 
3.9. Conclusion 
There is a growing body of evidence supporting an association between what are termed high 
performance or high commitment human resource management (HRM) practices and various 
measures of organizational performance. However, it is not clear why this association exists. 
This chapter has argued that to provide a convincing explanation of this association we need to 
improve our theoretical and analytic frameworks in three key areas. These are the nature of 
HRM, and especially the rationale for the specific lists of HR practices; the nature of 
organizational performance; and the linkage between HRM and performance.  
The term performance as defined in this chapter leads us to the conclusion that, when one is 
managing the performance of teams and individuals, not only inputs (behaviour) and outputs 
(results) should be considered, but also other factors that influence that performance are equally 
important. Conceivably, behaviours, results and value-added are inseparable and 
interdependent variables. They are all important dimensions of a PM system. It is important to 
determine whether the measurement objective is to assess performance outcomes or behaviour. 
Therefore, an organisation should distinguish between outcomes (results/output), behaviour 
(the process) and appropriate performance measurement devises. This thesis adopts a rather 
comprehensive view that performance is achieved if it is defined as embracing three 
interrelated variables: behaviours (processes), outputs and outcomes (value added or impact). 
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This chapter has also provided a comprehensive review of a 5-D PM framework within which 
the delivery of quality services may be improved. In particular the chapter argues that PM 
model provides an important integrating framework, both academically and practically to focus 
on optimisation of customer service level. Secondly, there is a need to link PM systems design 
with issues of policy, strategy, operations, assessments and information systems. Thirdly, the 
model reflects and correlates the aims of an organization and the plans that have been 
developed to achieve them. This form of PM framework when integrated with appropriate 
performance measurement models such as EVA and balanced scorecard can be the basis for 
generating well focussed research questions in a systematic way as applied in this research. 
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Chapter Four 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON PRP INCENTIVE SCHEMES  
4.0. Introduction 
The preceding two chapters have provided both the literature survey of various alternative 
theories and conceptual framework for motivation and PM. This chapter is concerned with 
incentive schemes which attempt to link pay to performance. Several scholars for example 
Kloot and Martin (1998); Hughes (op. cit); and Kelly and Monks (op. cit) have questioned the 
linkage between public sector managers’ performance and pay. The chapter attempts to 
responds to this question by examining various relevant empirical studies that have addressed 
the practice of performance-pay policies. The chapter is organised into three main parts. It 
begins by reviewing the background and conceptual framework of performance-pay incentive 
schemes; then it reviews the empirical studies about these incentive schemes; and concludes by 
recapping key research issues for this study. 
4.1. The Background of Performance-pay schemes 
Performance pay schemes are part of a wider set of reforms to the structures and managerial 
processes of PSOs that have been implemented in many OECD countries during the 1980s to 
date. These reforms have been described as the “new managerialism” because of their frequent 
adoption of techniques from the private sector and the elevation of managerial skills, relative to 
policy and advisory skills (Flynn, 1990). The new managerialism has involved a 
comprehensive process of change to public sector organisations, with an emphasis on 
decentralised managerial and financial control and the fostering of what is described as a 
“performance culture” that places greater emphasis on accountability and value for money or 
Best Value.  
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The idea that pay should be related to performance is a dominant theme in both economic and 
psychological writings on compensation and rewards system management (CRSM). Baker, et 
al., (1990:594) note that:  
“... economic models of compensation generally assume that higher performance 
requires greater effort ... In order to provide incentives, these models predict the 
existence of reward systems that structure compensation so that a worker’s expected 
ability increases with increased productivity.”  
Matching compensation to the productivity of individual workers, particularly managers, is 
considered necessary as an incentive for effort and to attract and retain competent managers. In 
the HRM literature, arguments for the adoption of performance pay schemes are usually based 
on AGREE motivational theories.  The incentive effects of PRP schemes, it is argued, lead to 
higher levels of effort that, in turn, lead to higher levels of performance (Flynn, op. cit.). 
4.1.1. Requirements and assumptions of performance-pay schemes 
The implication of AGREE theories is that there are three major requirements for effective 
performance-pay schemes. First, rewards must be of sufficient size so that, in economic and 
expectancy theory terms, bonuses or merit increments are of sufficient value to recipients to be 
motivating. Secondly, that the distribution of rewards must be equitably made so that there is a 
significant positive relationship between performance and pay awards, and that this relationship 
is understood by potential recipients of awards. Thirdly, equal rewards for staff that perform at 
the same level must be made, so that rewards are perceived to be as equitable as possible. 
This simple and compelling logic for linking pay to performance as a means of motivation, 
performance enhancement and accountability reinforcement is based on several assumptions 
(Lawler, 1990; Locke and Ladham, ibid). The first is that organisations can accurately measure 
individual outputs. Secondly, that individual outputs contribute to organisational performance 
i.e. achieve predetermined organisational goals and objectives of which individuals will have 
(in some way) participated in setting. Thirdly, that individual outputs and the resulting 
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organisational performance are a synergy effect of individual effort. Fourthly, that rewards, 
including pay, can be administered in a way that captures their expected incentive value for the 
potential recipients. 
In fact, these assumptions are difficult to satisfy in practice, particularly in relation to 
managerial roles in PSOs. It is very difficult to objectively measure the marginal product of a 
manager. The value created by an individual manager’s efforts and decisions is often 
inseparable from the value created by others, or from external factors such as changes in 
budgets, political decisions or industrial turmoil.  
Kotter (1982) argues that the efforts of individual managers may contribute to organisational 
performance in complex and uncertain ways. Much of a manager’s activity at work is spent in 
seemingly unproductive communication with other managers, subordinates and clients 
(Mintzberg, 1994; Kotter, ibid.). As a result, the assessment of managerial performance often 
depends upon subjective performance appraisals against job performance criteria with 
ambiguous links to organisational performance. The resulting ambiguity weakens the effect of 
pay on subsequent performance (Merchant and Manzoni 1989). Ambiguous performance 
criteria may also be associated with lower levels of perceived pay equity and lower pay 
satisfaction. 
4.1.2. Preconditions for successful introduction of PRP schemes 
Despite the difficulty of doing so, the importance of attempting to satisfy the above mentioned 
conditions has been recognised as a necessary part of the design and ongoing modification of 
performance-related pay schemes in the public sector in several countries (OECD, 1998). In 
Ireland, for example, the Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector, in its 
1987 report, identified the following as preconditions for the successful introduction of 
performance pay schemes. (a) It must be possible to identify clear objectives for 
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an individual on an annual basis; (b) an organisation must already have a system of 
performance management, a result-oriented system of management, in operation; (c) it must be 
possible to have informed, consistent and objective performance appraisal; and (d) a job holder 
must be capable of exerting control over the achievement of pre-set objectives and performance 
targets.  
4.1.3. Relating rewards to organisational performance 
The preceding section suggests that the more standardised a performance-pay scheme, the 
higher the risk of being incompatible to the existing organisational cultures, hence vulnerable to 
failure  According to Hughes (op. cit.), rewards can be related to organisational performance by 
means of profit-sharing, gain-sharing, profit-related pay and share ownership schemes. Such 
rewards aim to: (a) enable employees to share in the success of the organisation; (b) increase 
the identification of employees with the organisation; (c) focus employees’ attention on what 
they can contribute to organisational success; and (d) obtain tax advantages for employees 
through approved profit sharing or share schemes and profit-related pay — such ‘tax-efficient’ 
schemes enable the organisation to get better value for money from its investment in HRM. 
Schemes relating rewards to organisational performance, sometimes known as company-wide 
or factory-wide schemes, can be used to bring areas for improvement to the attention of 
employees. But they are not effective as individual motivators because the links between effort 
and reward are too remote (Hughes, op. cit.; Isaac-Henry, op. cit.). Many organisations, 
however, prefer not to link pay rises explicitly to the cost of living. Their policy is to respond to 
movements in market rates in order to maintain their competitive position, bearing in mind that 
increases in market rates are affected by the cost of living. They do not want to be committed to 
an ‘index-linked’ approach, even in times of low inflation. 
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4.1.4. The public - private compensation gap 
The review and reform of public sector pay systems during the 1980s was influenced by a 
widening compensation gap between public and private sectors. Data collected by OECD 
(1990) show that across a range of OECD countries, salary levels of public sector managers 
lagged behind those of private sector managers by as much as 30 - 50 per cent during the 
1980s. The disparities were greatest at the most senior levels of management. Because of these 
disparities, public sectors in several countries have experienced difficulties in recruiting and 
retaining managers especially those with specialist qualifications. The adoption of performance 
pay schemes was, in part, an attempt to improve the flexibility of PSOs in rewarding managers 
and to improve the competitiveness of the public sector in labour markets. 
4.2. Individual PRP as a motivator 
At the heart of this research is the issue of whether market-based incentive schemes would 
succeed in raising the motivation levels of public services. In this and the next section we 
examine this question for the individual performance related pay scheme in the case of British 
PSOs.  
4.2.1. Background 
It is never possible to be completely confident about the success of a new payment scheme 
before it is in place, but we do have two ways of assessing its chances of success. First, we can 
look at the success or failure of similar PRP schemes in other relevant sectors. Secondly, we 
can review the literature on PRP and ask whether the scheme has had structural features, which 
on theoretical or empirical grounds, make its success or failure more likely.   
In some respects individual PRP is beginning to get an undeservedly hostile press. 
Commentators are increasingly asserting that it does not work, and indeed that it is counter-
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productive. Hood  (1995), for example, writes:  
“this kind of individualistic, market-based payment system has had unintended and 
undesirable consequences in the private sector, demotivating employees ... in the round, 
payments by results increase worker turnover, lower morale and reduce commitment 
(ibid., p. 127).” 
To take another, and perhaps more authoritative example, the well-known academic Jeffrey 
Pfeffer claims that individual PRP arrangements have ‘numerous problems’ and that the 
research evidence ‘suggests that they are frequently ineffective’ (Pfeffer, 1998, p. 96). In spite 
of these supposed failures, such systems are on the increase, at least in UK. So, unless we wish 
to suppose that managers are utterly wrong-headed we might want to pause before concluding 
that they cannot work.   
The fact is that a whole variety of individual PRP arrangements do succeed in providing 
employees with incentives to work more effectively. The most obvious form of PRP comes 
from an employee’s chances of being promoted. Few people would deny that promotion 
prospects motivate a large number of employees to work harder and more purposefully; and 
few would deny that individual performance has a lot to do with who is promoted. Of course, 
not everyone seeks promotion, and money is not the only reward for being promoted, and no 
one would claim that objectively measured performance is the only determinant of promotion. 
But PRP, via promotion, is clearly a powerful motivating force. 
Other forms of individual PRP also seem to have success. Payment by results (PBR) systems 
have a long history of use and success in certain manufacturing industries, and there are clear 
indications from recent case studies that their introduction can raise productivity sharply 
(Lazear, 1998). Nor is this success confined to manufacturing. Among workers in the 
Warwickshire County, for example, annual bonuses based substantially on individual 
performance clearly have had a significant effect on employee behaviour. So these systems can 
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work. But these successes do not mean that all forms of PRP work equally well in all 
organisations. There are by now a number of case studies of their impact in the UK public 
sector. The next subsections summarise the key insights from these cases of PRP schemes.  
4.2.2. Empirical case studies of PRP schemes in the public sector 
The typical conclusion from these studies is that individual performance related pay has not 
generally been a great success. Before reporting on these studies, however, it is worth looking 
at how they typically go about assessing the success or failure of PRP schemes. Managers 
normally introduce individual PRP schemes primarily in an attempt to bring about an 
improvement in their employees’ productivity (see Cannell and Wood, 1992, for other reasons). 
But productivity is usually hard to measure with any precision or objectivity, which means that 
neither managers nor outside researchers find it easy to estimate the impact of PRP on 
productivity. So, managerial ambitions from PRP schemes are usually expressed in the indirect 
language of ‘incentives’ or ‘motivation’ rather than in the direct language of actual production. 
As conceptualised in chapter 2 above, motivation is not the same as performance or 
productivity, and it does not refer to behaviour as such. Rather, it refers to willingness or 
preparedness to do something, e.g. a willingness to work harder, or to focus on one thing rather 
than another. This means that it is intrinsically hard to establish whether someone’s motivation 
has changed, because it is a state of mind, not a directly observed form of behaviour. 
(a) PRP scheme in the British Inland Revenue 
Further evidence on the effect of performance pay on staff motivation comes from a study of a 
PRP in the Inland Revenue Service in the United Kingdom civil service (Marsden and 
Richardson, 1991). This study surveyed staff on their views concerning the impact of the 
scheme on their own behaviour and that of others.   
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The study found that although a majority of staff (57 per cent) accepted the principle of relating 
pay to performance, only a small minority (12 per cent) felt that performance pay had raised 
their motivation at work. Staff at the more senior grades reported the least positive motivational 
response towards performance pay. Officers responsible for carrying out performance 
appraisals (about 20 per cent of the total sample) were also asked how performance pay had 
affected their staff. Only a small minority reported any perceived improvement in the quantity 
or quality of work of their staff, or in staff commitment to their work. It was concluded that the 
respondents never reported a very strong motivational effect, although there was always a 
minority, usually small, who felt that PRP had affected their behaviour in the direction which 
management had sought. 
As a cross-check on these responses the authors asked those respondents who were also 
appraisers, or line managers, to answer similar questions on their subordinates. Appraisers were 
typically no more enthusiastic about the motivational effects of PRP than were staff as a whole. 
Certainly there was no sign that the self-reported data from staff seriously understated any 
positive effects of the PRP scheme. Not all forms of employee response to performance related 
pay are organisationally beneficial.  
Inland Revenue staff certainly saw some adverse implications from their experience of 
performance related pay, with majorities agreeing that morale and co-operation among staff had 
suffered. Indeed, after looking at all the available evidence, the authors concluded that:  
“the positive motivational effects of Performance Pay …were at most very modest. It is 
hard to see that they had been felt to any degree by more than a small minority of staff. 
... Even worse, there is clear evidence of some demotivation. Although we cannot be 
sure of this, it would be easy to conclude that the net motivational effect, although 
small, was actually negative’ (Marsden and Richardson, 1994, p.253).” 
 Actual performance levels in the Inland Revenue, however, seem to have risen substantially 
during the 1990s. As Marsden and French note,  
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“… work loads of the organisation as a whole have remained roughly constant while 
staff numbers have been cut quite severely. This implies a potentially large increase in 
productivity.’ (1998, p.35).  
This raises a problem for studies seeking to assess the impact of PRP. Such schemes are very 
often introduced at more or less the same time as other changes, for example, new methods of 
organising work, or privatisation, or labour shedding programmes. A rise in productivity (i.e. 
output per head) might in those circumstances result from technical progress, more efficient 
organisation, work intensification, fear of losing one’s job, or whatever. The fact that 
productivity goes up after PRP is introduced is therefore not sufficient evidence that the pay 
scheme itself has stimulated productivity.  
The survey evidence from the Inland Revenue in Britain suggests that PRP affected employee 
performance to only a minor degree, though there was a growing differences in opinions 
between line managers and staff in this respect. 
(b) PRP scheme in British local government  
The effects of performance related pay have also been very carefully studied in local 
government, where it is very extensively in use. Heery (1998) surveyed staff in four different 
local authorities, each of which had its own particular scheme. One continued to use industry 
pay agreements but had added cash bonuses reflecting both individual and team performance. 
Two others had replaced the traditional incremental scales with their own modified scales; in 
one, progression through the new scale was governed by performance reviews, and in the other 
a cash bonus based on performance was added to the scale progression. The fourth authority 
had introduced a more radical system, replacing incremental scales with a complex salary 
matrix; in this authority, annual awards were heavily influenced by assessed performance.  
In many respects, these results echo those in the two studies of the Inland Revenue. Heery’s 
own verdict was as follows.  
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‘The research presented above indicates that PRP schemes of the kind operated in local 
government tend to have a rather limited impact on workers’ behaviour. The process of 
work in the four authorities, it seems, runs along its established course and PRP has 
been insufficient to jolt it down a radically new path. Like other (new human resource 
techniques]. PRP in this respect appears to be something of a damp squib’ (pp.2-19). 
(c) PRP scheme in the British NHS 
A third study, by Dowling and Richardson (1997), looked at a system of PRP for managers in 
the National Health Service which had been in place for nine years. At the time of the study, 
the system took the form of an annual assessment of how far individual objectives had been 
met, and then a salary increase based on that judgement. The survey was directed to all the 
managers in six NHS Trusts in the UK. The authors’ own conclusion was that:  
‘the scheme is working, albeit to a limited extent. It may not frequently have a powerful 
effect on managers’ motivation or behaviour, but where there is a discernible impact, it 
tends to be favourable for the scheme. Importantly, there is no serious suggestion that 
the scheme is inducing counter-productive changes.’ (Dowling and Richardson, 1997, 
p.353). 
In yet another study of PRP in the NHS, Marsden and French were interested in comparing the 
effects of a scheme of individual PRP in one Trust. This was a variant on other schemes already 
discussed but it also had an explicit quota or target distribution of performance ratings; 60 per 
cent of staff were to be classified as ‘good, 20 per cent as ‘superior’ or ‘excellent’ and 20 per 
cent as ‘acceptable’ or ‘poor’. These were not absolutely rigid targets but any significant 
deviation from them would be examined and had to be justified.  
In some respects performance related pay looks to be more successful in this organisation than 
in the others already considered, with more than 30% of respondents acknowledging some 
specific motivational improvements. On the other hand, there is again a clear tendency for trust 
and co-operation to be threatened and a dismaying majority identifying jealousies and loss of 
morale. These may reflect a generalised agitation rather than costly behavioural consequences 
but they should nevertheless be a source of concern for the proponents of PRP. Further 
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evidence on the impact of the scheme came from the responses by line managers. If line 
managers are right, PRP was having quite a strong impact in this Trust.  
Naturally, half of them saw the PRP scheme as inducing some degree of improvement on the 
quantity of work and in the willingness of staff to go beyond their job descriptions. It is also 
interesting that they should have this view for a group of employees in a sector where 
motivation is traditionally thought to come not from money but from a variety of intrinsic 
rewards. 
(d) Performance related pay in the Water industry 
Results that echo those of Heery, Marsden and French and of Marsden and Richardson were 
found in an as yet unpublished study by Thomson (1997) of employees in the Water industry. 
Water in UK is, of course, no longer in the public sector but it probably still has important 
remnants of the public service tradition, so the results are of relevance to this study. The PRP 
scheme in place at the time of the study was similar to some already described. There was, first, 
a complex assessment process of individual performance, based on seven criteria (including 
such things as working relationships, adaptability, customer service and managing others). The 
overall performance assessment was then translated into an individual pay increase by applying 
it to the organisation’s salary matrix.  
As in previous studies, fewer than 20 per cent of the respondents see any change in the forms of 
work behaviour that managers were looking for. And, as before, trust between employee and 
manager tends to be threatened, jealousies are reported and team-working is seen to be 
somewhat compromised. 
(e) Performance related pay in the Employment Service 
Marsden and French (op. cit.) also looked at the impact of performance related pay in the 
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Employment Service. The Employment Service had a complex form of PRP scheme, known as 
‘equity share’. Under this scheme, individual performance was appraised against preset 
objectives, which resulted, as in the Inland Revenue, in a box marking (from A for ‘exceeded’ 
to D for ‘not met’).  
There is a familiar pattern to these results by now. There are definite but small indications of 
positive motivational effects together with more serious indications of reduced co-operation 
and tensions at work. The authors’ own conclusion was that: 
“the Equity Share scheme is not only failing to motivate many of the staff, but it also is 
believed to damage relations between managers and staff among a sizeable minority of 
staff. Given these responses, it would be fair to surmise that the net effect of 
performance pay on motivation has been negative. (Marsden and French, op. cit., 
p.51).” 
Marsden and French also sought the views of line managers on the impact of performance 
related pay in the Employment Service. Line managers tended to see somewhat less benefit to 
their system of PRP than did their counterparts in the follow-up study of the Inland Revenue. 
They again saw the greatest effect to be on work quantity, rather than, say, on work quality. 
This is to be expected in what is, after all, a bureaucratic organisation with a lot of clerical staff. 
The situation for other services, say teaching, and the relative importance of quality and 
quantity, is likely to be different. 
(f) The case of PRP in schools 
Finally, we turn to Marsden and French’s study of PRP for school head teachers. It is difficult 
to see from this case any enthusiasm for PRP scheme amongst head teachers. The authors’ own 
conclusions are a little more shaded, however. They conclude that: 
‘the most widely held view among heads and deputies,  who have now had pay linked to 
performance for six years, is negative. They do not agree with the principle; its impact 
on target setting has been small, and that on personal motivation small or irrelevant; 
and it is believed to damage morale in schools and weaken team working. However, if 
one concentrates on the replies of those who have received performance enhancements, 
the judgments are markedly less negative and often positive.’ (Marsden and 
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French, op. cit, p.121).  
The authors then consider two interpretations of their findings on PRP, one that is ‘optimistic’ 
for PRP scheme and the other ‘pessimistic’. On the balance, they clearly believe that the 
pessimistic case dominates their enquiry. This does not mean that PRP would be necessarily an 
outright failure for teachers, although it must be said that, on the basis of Marsden and French’s 
study of head teachers, the ground in education looks to be more than usually stony.  
On the other hand, if PRP were to energise even 20 per cent of teachers it might on balance be 
considered a success, especially if there was only limited de-motivation among the remaining 
80 per cent. In other words, it might be deemed, if not a dramatic success, then at least a modest 
one. The chances of achieving even this depend on a number of factors, especially certain 
structural features of PRP schemes.  
The “pessimistic verdict” about PRP in PSOs is what can be derived from the review of these 
studies. Despite issues of compatibility of market-based incentive schemes being raised in the 
current debate, none of the empirical studies reviewed so far have explicitly addressed them. To 
bridge the gap therefore, this study argues that unless issues of organisational capacity to adapt 
to market-based managerial changes, and stakeholders attitude surveys are primarily addressed 
the same verdict will prevail in developing countries where PBIs are contemplated. 
4.3. Effectiveness of Individual PRP in UK public sector 
Following on from the reviews of the various case studies on PRP in Section 4.2 above, this 
section examines the question of why individual PRP has had such a limited impact on 
performance in UK public sector. The aim is to assess the extent to which issues of 
compatibility of market-type motivational policies in the public sector are such a topical theme 
in the whole debate surrounding their implementation in PSOs. A related issue is whether the 
  
 
- 126 -
PRP schemes in UK public sector reproduce features which have contributed to this limited 
effectiveness, thereby making it more likely that it would also fail to motivate public sector 
employees elsewhere on a significant scale. In order to understand where these schemes might 
go wrong it is worth drawing on five theories of motivation, namely AGREE, the framework 
which is then used to probe a variety of structural weaknesses in the schemes that have been in 
place.  
4.3.1. Acceptability of PRP principle 
Reviews of case studies in s.4.2 above indicate a blanket acceptability of PRP principle because 
Marsden and Richardson found that 57 per cent of Inland Revenue staff agreed that 
performance related pay was ‘good in principle’ (Marsden and Richardson, 1994, p.250). 
Marsden and French found much the same perception five years later. 60 per cent of Heery’s 
local authority staff thought that it was right that individual performance should have a strong 
influence on pay increases (Heery, op. cit., p.157). 67 per cent of Thomson’s water company 
staff thought that relating pay to performance was in general a fair way of paying staff. 72 per 
cent of those in the Employment Service, and 57 per cent of those surveyed in NHS Trusts 
agreed that the principle was a good one (Marsden and French, op. cit, p. 43-88). 
The sole exception among all those who had experienced PRP were the headteachers. Marsden 
and French found that only 29 per cent of NAHT members and 42 per cent of SHA members 
expressed agreement with the principle of performance related pay (Marsden and French, op. 
cit, p.113). This may reflect what the literature takes to be the ‘culture’ in teaching but it may 
also be the case that PRP faces special difficulties in education. Whatever is true for teachers, 
however, the modest motivational impact of PRP in the earlier studies cannot be attributed to a 
wholesale resistance to the principle of linking pay to performance. Rather, it must come from 
the PRP as it has actually been experienced. 
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The final observation is that employees may accept the principle but they may simultaneously 
deny that relating pay to individual performance has materially affected their own behaviour at 
work. They might think it right that someone who does a better job should be paid somewhat 
more, just as they may accept that better performers deserve promotion that is more rapid. But 
they may also believe that the amount of work they do, and how they do it, are determined by 
other things for example, by internalised professional or personal standards. So agreeing with 
the principle of PRP might reflect the criterion of fairness rather than an acceptance of the 
incentive argument. What about the financing of the scheme?  
4.3.2. Financing PRP Schemes 
Curtailment of the funding available for performance pay, by limiting the rewards, which the 
schemes can deliver, undermines the likelihood of achieving performance gains or other 
organisational benefits. Budgets for performance pay schemes serve many different functions 
and, in combination with other design features such as quotas, may act as a major constraint on 
the success of a PRP scheme. Inadequate funding and changes in budgets have hindered the 
operation of several schemes. For example, the Canadian performance pay scheme for the 
Management Category was suspended for several years due to a lack of funding, and even 
when it did operate, the rewards paid were often small due to budget constraints. From 1985 to 
1991, funds were available for the scheme to operate as intended. 
In the United States, the performance bonus scheme for the Senior Executive Service, which 
was introduced under the provisions of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, was originally 
budgeted for up to 50 per cent of staff in each agency to receive awards in any year. Soon after 
the first round of awards was announced, Congress effectively halved the budget for the 
scheme by reducing the quota of staff who could receive an award to 25 per cent. The Office of 
Personnel Management (the central personnel agency of the Federal government) 
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further reduced the quota to 20 per cent. This generated dissatisfaction and cynicism among 
executives whose salaries had been limited by a “pay cap” for several years and who viewed 
the performance awards as an opportunity to gain justified salary increases (Milkovich and 
Newman, 1996).  
The experience in Canada and the United States provides some specific illustrations of the 
more general problem that funding for performance pay schemes in the public sector may be 
vulnerable to budgetary cutbacks in times of economic constraint. This is a critical issue 
because the level and stability of funding for schemes are likely to have a major impact on the 
success of schemes. Another likely impediment is the ability of PSOs to use qualitative 
performance indicators.  
4.4. Recap of the Research Issues and Questions 
Literature and the evidence provided by empirical research tend to present a less optimistic 
picture of the viability of the ‘off-the-shelf’ schemes promoted by scholars (Mabey and 
Salaman, 1995; and Hughes, 1999). They suggest that successful PM model practices, of which 
PRP may be one dimension, may need to be user-designed or organisation specific. However, 
there seems to be a consensus by both textbook writers and empirical researchers that a series 
of issues and questions summarised below surround the operation of PBI schemes in general 
and remain inadequately researched.   
The adoption of market oriented reward systems along with other NPM practices has not been 
without resistance on the ground. The issue of compensation and reward systems management 
in the public sector can be seen as indicative of the contradictions that exist within the 
discipline of HRM with the following key research issues dominating the debate: 
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4.4.1. Difficulties in cultural change 
In many public organisations, strategy is imposed from above either by politicians or by ‘heroic 
management parachuted in by charismatic chief executives’ (Pollitt op. cit: 283). The 
introduction of private sector-based reward systems and incentive schemes in PSOs requires 
basic rethinking of the traditional cultures, beliefs, values and behaviour of managers and 
workers. Efforts by central governments across the board to restructure PSOs over the last two 
decades have had limited success (Pettigrew, et al., 1992). There are examples in local 
government, where newly appointed chief executives arrive with ready-made strategic plans 
which often are not discussed within the organisation as a whole and sometimes bear little 
reality to the organisation’s work or culture (Isaac-Henry, op. cit.).  
In executive agencies too, there are complaints that in formulating strategic plans ‘individual 
employees on whom performance of the organisation is highly dependent have been largely 
ignored’ (Martin, 1999:37). A general criticism of the attempt to change management 
philosophy and practice is that although government and public sector managers acknowledge 
the importance of culture, they have not been prepared to invest the resources of time, effort 
and money in bringing about the appropriate cultural change.  
Indeed at times it could be argued that culture is often treated as something which can be turned 
on and off by managers at their own discretion (Pettigrew, et al, op. cit.). One local chief 
executive having taken up his post in 1997 was reported to have set himself the task of 
obtaining effective corporate leadership, sound finance, organisational change, performance 
review and community involvement, all within his first nine months in office (Local 
Government Chronicle, 1997:12). Often much effort is spent on the ‘what’ of change and little 
on the ‘how’ (ibid.). As a result, culture, which is considered of such significance to 
effectiveness of ‘change management,’ has been neglected in favour of efficiency 
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and meeting targets. This is one of the reasons why the issue of capacity of PSOs to 
accommodate managerial practices from the private sector is of such significance for this study. 
4.4.2. The issue of capacity to accommodate change 
Associated with the aspiration for addressing the issue of changing culture and increasing 
openness in an organisation is the need to develop what Collinge and Leach (1995) call the 
‘capacity’ of the organisation. While the context, content and processes are crucial to the 
outcome of cultural change, those factors can themselves influence and be influenced by the 
organisation’s capacity for taking strategic direction and to accommodate change. Empirical 
studies note that a pay system can be used as a vehicle for organisational culture change 
(Kessler and Purcell, op. cit.; Armstrong and Murlis, op. cit.). However, PRP may simply be 
one of a number of initiatives designed to achieve cultural change. Armstrong and Murlis (ibid: 
73) suggest that `the necessary culture may already have to be in place for a system of PRP to 
work effectively', as PRP alone may be incapable of becoming the primary driving force of 
cultural change.  
Analysis of capacity issues  
For the purpose of this study, capacity refers to the conditions in terms of the PM framework 
and processes put in place in local government system to allow the successful and smooth 
implementation of performance-based reward systems and incentive structures.  Thus as a 
strategy to simplify the analysis of research findings relating to capacity issues, it is 
conceptualised that to ‘develop and refine strategic direction, a local authority, for example, 
must strengthen this capacity for strategy formulation and implementation’ (Collinge and 
Leach, op.cit:344). 
Capacity in this context is concerned more with conditions, organisational structures and 
processes for effective development of strategy than with the substantive strategy itself. It is 
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argued that in developing such capacity for organisational cultural change some of the 
following features must prevail (ibid. 345-6): (i) The articulation by leaders (politicians as well 
as officials) of the need for such a strategic capacity; (ii) The creation of conducive bodies, 
structures and communication systems at corporate level, to facilitate greater co-operation and 
breakdown duplication; (iii) The development of a culture which rejects short-termism and 
departmentalism and is more conducive to a more integrated approach.  
However, there is no one best way of introducing change in organisations. Conventional 
wisdom suggests that effective change involves consideration of stakeholder interests, 
participation, effective communication and development, and learning as some of the various 
means of changing organisational, attitudes and behaviour. 
4.4.3. The issue of performance-based reward systems & incentive schemes 
The literature argues that PM process should ensure that good performance is recognised in 
such a way that the job-holder feels fairly rewarded for his/her achievement and is motivated to 
maintain (or improve) on good performance next year (NAHT, 1995). Cash and/or non-cash 
incentives should reward good performance (however it is defined). If cash is used (called 
Performance Related Pay - PRP) it should supplement a base salary which is felt by job-holders 
to be fair, equitable and competitive (reflects job responsibilities and market rate).  
PRP schemes, which link incentives to the results of an individual performance assessment, 
have spread rapidly through the public services in recent years and are often regarded as 
indicators of a fundamental shift in the employment relationship (Heery, op. cit). In a public 
sector environment, the creative use of non-cash incentives can go a long way to stimulate the 
good performer (who might be good).  
PRP scheme is one of the most widely copied private sector practices, which is used to get the 
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personal commitment and accountability of senior public sector managers. PRP was introduced 
into the civil service in 1985 (OECD, 1993). PRP provides for periodic increases in pay, which 
are incorporated into salaries, resulting from assessments of individual performance and 
personal value to the organisation. Supporters of PRP argue that where scope for increasing 
salary budgets is severely limited, PRP enables the money available to be distributed in the 
most cost-effective way. It is also claimed that it enables employers to reward excellence and 
retain key staff (ibid.).  
Critics of PRP, on the other hand, argue that there is no evidence that the ‘performance-pay 
linkage’ strategy motivates people unless large sums are involved (OECD, 1997). One of the 
conditions for the establishment of effective performance-based incentive schemes is proper 
assessment of performance. Therefore, there is also criticism of appraisals as employees some-
times regard them as unfair, subjective and divisive in the ways in which they are applied 
(Pilbeam, 1998). Despite the cold and mixed reception given to the scheme, PRP has since been 
extended to other management and non-management grades and now covers the whole of the 
service (ibid.).  
Criteria for Success 
The inherent objectives in introducing a reward system such as PRP scheme can have a 
significant impact on the success, or otherwise, of the scheme itself. Armstrong and Murlis 
(ibid.) suggests that “each scheme needs to be assessed in the light of each organisation’s 
objectives.” Furthermore, the manner in which a reward system and incentive scheme is 
formulated and implemented, and the extent of employee participation in this process, will also 
have significant impact on the success of the scheme.  
Empirical research (Lawler and Hackman, 1969) suggests that plans will be more conducive to 
both acceptance and success if employees are involved in their formulation. As Lawler (1995) 
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puts it, pay-for performance reward systems ‘must create a clear line of sight between an 
employee’s behaviour and the receipt of important amounts of money’. In particular, Lawler 
suggests the following success criteria: 
1. individuals need to be clear about the targets and standards of performance required, 
whatever they may be 
2. they must be in a position to influence their performance by changing their behaviour or 
decisions 
3. they should be clear about the rewards they will receive for achieving the required end-
results 
4. the rewards should be meaningful enough to make the efforts required worthwhile – and the 
communication of the rewards should be positively handled 
5. the incentive or bonus formula should be easy to understand 
6. fair and consistent means are available for measuring performance – it can be said that ‘you 
can’t pay for performance unless you can measure performance’ 
7. it is appropriate to the type of work carried out and the people employed on it and fits the 
culture of the organisation;  
8. the reward follows as closely as possible the accomplishment which generated it;  
9. individuals should be able to track performance against targets and standards throughout the 
period over which performance is being assessed. 
These are demanding criteria, and it is no wonder that performance pay schemes often fail to 
meet expectations. 
4.4.4. The issue of performance measurement schemes  
There has been little prior research into performance measurement and accountability systems 
in the British local governments. Therefore, this research is designed, among other things, to 
fill in this research gap. From an internal control perspective, performance measurement and 
accountability systems are designed to monitor the implementation of an organisation’s plans 
and determine when the plans are unsuccessful and how to improve them (Atkinson, et al., 
1997). These systems are used to focus attention on the organisation’s objectives, to measure 
and report on performance and to understand how the process of performance affects 
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organisational learning (ibid. 1997). Identifying operational problems, which can be resolved 
by adjusting existing processes, and pinpointing more potential problems, which require an 
adjustment to the strategies of the organisation, are further uses of performance measurement 
and accountability schemes (Argyris, 1977). 
The quality of performance measurement process alone also promotes managerial 
accountability to stakeholders, particularly in PSOs where the nature of ‘stake-holding’ is 
homogenous. That is many parties are interested in monitoring whatever is happening within 
PSOs. There is a great deal of literature on performance measurement in government, and 
governments around the world have made large investments to develop performance 
measurement systems, frequently related to notions of accountability (see for example 
Thompson, 1995; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  
4.4.5. Issues relating to perceptions of equity of PRP schemes  
The success of a reward system does not lie solely with employees’ involvement in the initial 
designing stages, or indeed even with a particular set of procedures designed to administer such 
schemes. Without the presence of perceived fairness, trust in a reward system or incentive 
schemes such as PRP is likely to be low. Most importantly, there is the potential and distinct 
risk that the contingent link between performance and pay will not be accepted. For example, it 
has been noted that managers are often unhappy with their wage system because they do not 
perceive the relationship between how hard they work (productivity) and how much they earn 
as equitable (Harlow and Lawler, 2000). The issue of fairness is even more critical in steeper 
organisations such as local authorities where opportunities for promotion may be limited or 
remote.  
In a broad perspective, the issue of ‘perceived fairness’ entails three aspects: fairness in terms 
of attempts by the employer to satisfy the intrinsic needs of employees, meeting 
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their expectations, and in terms of equitable distributions of reward packages across the board. 
Several solutions for this problem of `perceived unfairness' have been suggested. These include 
the extent to which employees have the opportunity to participate in pay design decisions, the 
quality and timeliness of information provided, the degree to which the rules governing pay 
allocations are consistently followed, the availability of channels for appeals, and the 
organization's safeguards against bias and inconsistency (Hall, 1987).  
Harlow and Lawler (op, cit.) point out that the `more frequent the formal and informal reviews 
of performance and the more the individual is told about the reasons for an increase, the greater 
his preference for a merit increase system and the lower his preference for a seniority system.' 
Frequent reviews, coupled with the opportunity to air grievances through a formal appeals 
process, may therefore eliminate many of the difficulties associated with employees' 
perceptions of unfairness.  
Issue of short-termism 
In addition to the issue of fairness, problems associated with PRP include a tendency toward a 
short-term focus on quantifiable goals to the neglect of more long-term issues. There may also 
be measurement difficulties, in terms of both difficulty in measuring the work of professionals 
and attaining a fair and consistent means of assessing employees which will avoid the risks of 
subjectivity (Kessler and Purcell, op. cit.; Beer, 1985). Lack of communication identified as the 
principal failing and lack of agreement on objectives and standards of performance and 
insufficient feedback may create further difficulties (Armstrong, 1993; Mabey and Salaman, 
1995).  
Storey, op. cit.) argue that PRP would appear to undermine utterly the whole concept of 
teamwork spirit. From research in multinationals operating in Ireland, Mabey and Salaman (op. 
cit.) found contradictory evidence of management's strategy which attempted to develop 
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simultaneously a collective identity focused around teamwork, while discriminating between 
individual contributions. Current trends towards PRP systems pose a potential threat to the 
pursuit of greater gender pay equality as discretion in pay determination increases and there is 
no clear relationship between earnings and job grade (Rubery, 1995). This study has not 
examined the basis for this view drawing upon the now widespread literature and research into 
performance-related pay in the UK.  
Issue of gender equality in PRP 
The argument is made that the problem for gender equality lies both in the nature of the 
payment system and in the context in which it is being applied, including the changes in the 
nature of employment relationships that are accompanying these developments. While some 
women may benefit, overall the moves towards widening income dispersion and the increased 
importance of management discretion and appraisal are likely to disadvantage women. 
However, the individualisation of pay is likely to lead to further fragmentation of the interests 
of women, reducing the likelihood of collective resistance. Opportunities to monitor pay trends 
will also decrease as the spread of PRP reduces transparency of labour market (Farnham 1993; 
LGTM/LACSAB 1990; Donaldson 1992; Young 1996).   
Several questions raised by empirical studies about this contemporary practice of linking pay to 
performance in PSOs remain unreciprocated (Horton and Farnham, 1999; Isaac-Henry, op. cit; 
OECD 1993, 1996, 1998). This study is an attempt to examine some of these issues.  
4.5. Conclusion 
Performance pay schemes are part of a wider set of reform “add-ons” to the structures and 
managerial processes of PSOs that have been implemented in many OECD countries during the 
last two decades. These reforms have been described as the “new managerialism” because of 
their frequent adoption of techniques from the private sector and the elevation of 
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managerial skills, relative to policy and advisory skills (Flynn, 1990). The comprehensive 
process of change to PSOs has emphasised on modernisation of public services, decentralised 
managerial and financial control and the fostering of what is described as a “performance 
culture.” This study examines the role of motivation theories in bringing about this ‘culture’ in 
public sector organisations. PRP incentive schemes are one of the strategies transposed from 
private sector into public services as an integral package of NPM strategy to improve the 
quality of service provision.  
This chapter has examined the context for introducing PRP schemes in public services across 
various countries. The chapter has also reviewed cases that have addressed the issue of 
implementation of PRP schemes in the British PSOs with a view to exploring what is known so 
far about these schemes and the gaps towards which to contribute. It may be concluded that in a 
pragmatic perspective the five areas of PM model framework as identified in the literature are 
not novel. Studies addressing aspects of them have been part of the management control and 
wider management literature for many years. However, the integration of the five areas to 
provide a description of the overall PM and control systems of an organisation is relatively 
novel.  
It may also be argued that the five areas are heavily inter-connected and procedures introduced 
to address one question may well impact upon the other areas identified. The PM model 
strategy is not intended to provide a normative or prescriptive framework, but rather to provide 
a more comprehensive descriptive framework within which the features of an overall 
motivational policy and PRP scheme in particular can be assessed and evaluated. 
Several empirical studies reviewed here suggest that the implementation of PRP schemes has 
faced a host of operational upheavals in the private sector and in various central government 
agencies. In particular, there are three categories of issues of concern that have 
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not been adequately addressed by previous studies. First, the capacity and operating 
environment in terms of the overall organisational culture and prevailing values within which 
these market-based motivational initiatives have had to be implemented. Secondly, the 
‘goodness of fit’ of the performance measurement and accountability processes; and thirdly, the 
perceived equity of the PRP incentive schemes. The main argument of this study is that the 
motivational and satisfactional value of any performance-based rewards and incentives policy 
is a function of these three issues. The design of the methodology to attest this hypothetical 
proposition is the concern of the next chapter.   
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Chapter Five 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.0. Introduction 
This study argues that, unless fundamental issues of capacity, performance measurement and 
accountability, and expectations of the key stakeholders are acknowledged and adequately 
addressed at the designing stage, the ‘off-the-shelf’ performance-pay incentive schemes will 
remain vulnerable to failure. In this perspective, the study examines logistics of the ‘wholesale’ 
implementation of private sector oriented performance-based reward systems and incentive 
schemes (PBIs) using the case study of the British local authorities.  
Various theories and empirical studies on employee motivation, reward systems and incentive 
schemes have informed this study. The research hypothesis is derived from literature reviews 
on performance management systems and their practical implications in public sector 
organisations (PSOs). This hypothesis was originally used by Beer, et al. (1984) with only the 
third variable, i.e. perception of equity. As a contribution to knowledge, this study has modified 
Beer’s model by incorporating two variables: organisational culture and objectivity of 
performance measurement and accountability processes. This chapter is concerned with 
research design and is organised into two main parts: first, research hypothesis, approaches and 
methods; and secondly, the analytical framework strategy.  
5.1. Hypothesis of the Study 
Hypotheses are normally at two levels – a general hypothesis to express the broad idea of 
interest, and a working or experimental hypothesis, which contains more specific, but also 
limited, concepts or indicators which can be measured. According to Yin (1994), four 
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characteristics of a research hypothesis are: should contain two concepts (clear, identifiable, 
measurable in degree); should propose a causal-effect relationship between the two concepts; 
the concepts used must be capable of being reduced to a level where they can be measured 
objectively, or at least recognised consistently; and a research hypothesis should always, or 
nearly always, relate to an existing wider body of knowledge or theory.  
5.1.1. The general hypothesis 
The general hypothesis of this study is that a performance-based incentive scheme such as PRP 
may be introduced by a local authority wholesale as a means of raising organisational 
performance, but doing so without tackling the issues of culture operational capacity and 
stakeholders’ perception of equity carries a serious risk of failure. Failure means inflating wage 
bill without securing the desired benefits of the scheme.  
5.1.2. The Operational hypothesis 
The operational proposition of the thesis is therefore that irrespective of the typology of an 
organisation, the motivational and satisfactional value of an employee compensation and 
reward systems policy is a function of:  
• an organisation’s capacity to absorb and accommodate the challenges of change (OC);  
• the objectivity of performance measurement and accountability framework within 
which an incentive scheme is operating processes (PMA); and  
• the perceived equity (PE) of the installed performance-based reward system and 
incentive scheme by the stakeholders as measured by its characteristics of success such 
as general acceptability, motivator, purpose, appraisal objectivity, feedback systems, 
joint consultations (goal setting), organisational culture (Vroom, op. cit; Kelly and 
Monks, op. cit.) as advocated by Adams (1965). 
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5.2. Approach of the Study 
A field within case study approach is used in this study as this is regarded to be an exploratory 
research of a contemporary phenomenon. Field studies and interviews during case studies 
provide richer data than can be gained from survey research, and can explore causal effects 
more closely (Abrahamson, 1983). Primary data gathered from the interviewees during case 
studies have been used to give meaning to the results. The study is qualitative but the strategy 
for analytical framework is both quantitative and qualitative. Three main research instruments 
are used to collect and collate data from the field. First, responses were collected from case 
studies using semi-structured interviews, observations and discussions instruments. Secondly, 
data were collected from the survey using the questionnaire instrument. Finally, secondary data 
was sourced through desk research, which included the Internet.  
Using the ‘survey or field within case study’ approach (Holloway, 1997), the follow-up 
interviews were carried out based on the responses provided by the questionnaires. Making an 
inquiry with a view to learning a lesson from the experience of a practitioner of a contemporary 
phenomenon requires that the researcher be closely integrated with the unit or subject of 
analysis for a considerable length of time. In such circumstances, the case study approach is 
said to be more appropriate than other qualitative research methods of surveys and 
experimental (Holloway, ibid.). What is a case study; what are its limitations and justifications? 
The next subsections attempt to define what a case study is and justify the choice of the 
approach used in this research.  
5.2.1. Definition of a Case study 
A case study in research is an entity, which is studied as a single unit and has clear boundaries; 
it is an investigation of a system, an event, a process or programme (Merriam, 1988). However, 
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the term has changed its meaning over time (Platt, 1983). It is used for a variety of research 
approaches (Yin, 1994), both qualitative and quantitative, but in this study, it describes the 
qualitative study.  
Case studies differ from other qualitative approaches because of their three key distinguishing 
features of specificity, boundedness, and multiplicity of evidential sources (Holloway, 1997; 
Yin, op. cit.). According to Yin a case study as an empirical inquiry is preferred when the 
subject to be investigated is a contemporary phenomenon with its real-life context; when 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used.  
In addition to this Holloway argues that case studies always have a specific focus of inquiry 
and concentrate on the examination of individual cases e.g. one, two or three local authorities, 
each one of which stands as a case. The contemporary phenomenon to be investigated in this 
study is the practice of private sector-oriented performance management model, incentive 
schemes and reward systems in public sector organisations. The study is bounded within the 
British local authorities. The use of the survey within case study approach coupled with desk 
and Internet research exhibit the multiplicity of evidential sources of data to justify the use of a 
case study approach.  
5.2.2. Justification for the Survey within Case Study Approach 
As in other qualitative research, a case study is a way of exploring the phenomenon in its 
context. A single case study may not be generalisable, but if it confirms the findings of 
previous studies, then it is a step towards generalisation. Researchers use a number of sources 
in their data collection, for example observation, documents and interviews, so that the case can 
be illuminated from all sides to achieve generalisability or internal and external validity 
(Merrian, op. cit.).  
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Observation and documentary research instruments are the most common strategies used in 
case study researches (Holloway, op. cit.).  However, when the purpose of the study is to 
understand the context of a contemporary phenomenon and extract lessons, a case study 
research approach can be an invaluable exploratory device (Gill and Johnson, 1997). It can 
stand on its own right and involve intensive observation and in-depth interviews. According to 
Preece (1994), and Sharp & Howard (1996), a case study is a complex research activity, which 
may combine a number of general research instruments, such as interviews, observations, 
discussions, questionnaires, focus groups etc.  
Of course, other approaches are frequently used in an academic research such as the laboratory 
experiment, the field experiment, and the surveys. The laboratory is relevant to all the major 
research subject groupings (with the possible exception of humanities) but is primarily used in 
physical science, life science and engineering research (Sharp & Howard, 1996:12), therefore 
unsuitable for this study.  
In the context of research method a field experiment entails controlled investigation conducted 
in a non-laboratory condition (Abraham, op. cit). There are some similarities between the 
survey and field experiment in that, techniques relevant to the latter may also be used in the 
former (op. cit., 1996).  
However, whereas field experiment implies controls and need not necessarily involve people 
the survey is a method of extracting peoples’ attitudes and opinions from a sizeable sample of 
respondents (Holloway, ibid.). There are inherent controls implied in a field experiment 
method, and there is a need for a large sample in a survey method. Therefore, all these three 
approaches to research were not considered suitable for this study due to the following reasons:  
(i) Firstly, the field experiment could be adopted in this study but it implies controls and 
conditionalities that are not applicable in this type of research agenda 
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(Holloway, ibid., Abrahamson, 1983).  
(ii) Secondly, the survey approach is very common in most social science researches (May, 
1993, Fowler, 1993). A fundamental feature of the survey approach is that it requires a 
relatively sizeable sample of respondents (de Vaus, 1993; Oppenheim, 1995) which 
requirement has not been met by this study due to financial constraints.  
(iii) Thirdly, some researchers claim that large sample size, far from being useful, prevents 
examination of meaning and context (Banister, et al., 1994).  
This at least justifies why the case study approach has appeared to be the most appropriate and 
suitable for this study despite its shortcomings. 
5.2.3. Limitations of the Study 
The concern of this section is to pinpoint, in a nutshell, the limitations of the study due to the 
research approach adopted. The case study approach is not free from critics. It lacks academic 
rigor (Larbi, 1998) and external validity (Holloway, ibid.). While the results of case studies 
may also tend to confirm or reject general ideas (Preece, op. cit.), it is unlikely that sufficient 
information will be presented to enable generalisations to be made.  
The purpose of this qualitative research is to draw lessons from the experience of the British 
local authorities in the practice of PM model and PBI schemes. Although not all councils have 
been studied, still generalisations can be made from a few units of analysis that have been 
selected. This is supported by Payne & Cuff (1982), whom argue that generalisations from a 
few cases are possible - just as a small group of statements can establish generalisations about 
an entire language, so individual cases can do the same for a subculture.  
However, considerable care has been taken in the collection, collating and analysis of all the 
evidential matter in order to minimise the impact of these shortcomings. In particular, 
specificity and boundedness of the research approach adopted has significantly reduced the 
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generalisability deficit of the study by conducting a survey within case study.  
5.3. Methodology and sample of the survey 
In practice, the choice of either qualitative, quantitative or a combination of the two research 
methods depends on the nature of the phenomena being investigated, the research objectives 
and the state of existing knowledge (Preece, op. cit.; Sharp & Howard, op. cit.). This study was 
not able to use both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection because of the 
nature of the research problem and hypothesis of the study. However, in the data analysis both 
techniques were used. Data gathered were qualitatively analysed based on the PM model 
framework. Responses to the survey questionnaires were analysed using the Statistical Package 
for Social Science (SPSS) computer software. The procedure is described next.   
5.3.1. Methodology 
Three main variables were derived from the hypothesis of the study consisting of: (i) 
organisational capacity (OC), (ii) the performance measurement and accountability, and (iii) 
stakeholders’ perception of equity (PE). In a PM perspective, these variables were translated 
into an open-ended topic guide from which close-ended questions were generated in the form 
of questionnaires. Then, these questions were numerically labelled to suit requirements of the 
SPSS computer programme.  
Finally, responses to every question were coded for the convenience of the SPSS. For example 
a YES response was coded as ‘1’, NO coded as ‘2’, NOT APPLICABLE coded as ‘3’, and too 
busy to respond coded as ‘0’.  There were questions requiring responses such as Strongly 
Agree, Agree, Not applicable, Disagree and so on. These were also coded accordingly in order 
to simplify the collation and final analyses.  
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During case studies, interviews and discussions were conducted according to key research 
guiding questions (see paragraph 5.4 below). A cross-section of managers in each participating 
British local authorities (see Appendix D) was contacted and their views are discussed later in 
Chapter Six, Seven, Eight and Nine of the thesis.  
5.3.2. Why British local authorities? 
Unfortunately, Tanzania is one of the poorest sub-Saharan African countries. Formally, a 
British colony, Tanzania obtained her independence in 1961 and pursued socialist policies of 
planned economy under the leadership of the late Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere. Despite various ‘off-
the-shelf’ Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) pioneered by the World Bank, IMF, 
donor countries, NGOs, and other international management consultants, the country’s 
economic performance did not improve. The quality of public services especially in urban areas 
deteriorated drastically. This provided the thrust or drivers for public sector reforms and change 
of policy from planned to market economy.  
Although the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) has not formerly 
pronounced the end of socialist policies, and the beginning of the new era of market economy, 
new public management (NPM) practices enforced by globalisation policies have rendered 
socialism and self-reliance policy in Tanzania automatically redundant.  
NPM practices include, among others, privatisation, contracting out, downsizing, and 
performance management to mention just a few. However, for obvious reasons Tanzania is 
experiencing an acute shortage of skilled personnel capable of implementing these public sector 
reform policies. This study has singled out one icon of the NPM practices i.e. the PM model, 
which has become commonplace in the public sector in OECD countries. Because the public 
sector reform in general and local government reform in particular is still at an infancy stage, 
Tanzania is obliged to depend heavily on foreign expertise to train, manage and 
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monitor these public sector reform initiatives – which is a costly option.  
Generally, the experience of the British is relevant, not only to Tanzania, but also to other 
developing countries in their thrust to modernise public services through market-type 
managerial practices in their local government systems. Therefore, it is anticipated that the 
lessons gathered from the British local authorities in the implementation of performance 
management principles and performance-based incentive schemes will make a valuable 
contribution to knowledge and reforms in Tanzania and perhaps other DTEs. In particular, the 
choice of the British local authorities as the main case study was carefully made on the basis of 
a number of motives. First, the historical ties between Britain and developing countries as 
narrated above were the foremost impetus. Most of the current Laws and Ordinances governing 
local authorities in Tanzania were inherited from or written by the British.  
Secondly, UK is one of the OECD Member countries where both performance management 
and PRP schemes have been practised in the local government system. In addition, the UK is 
more advanced in the use of PM approaches than most OECD countries except perhaps 
Australia and New Zealand. Thirdly, insights from developed market economies indicate that 
UK has attained furthest achievements on reforms based on the application of market 
mechanisms in the public sector management (Kickert, ibid.). Therefore, most importantly 
‘information richness’ of the British local government system, and awareness of the lessons and 
best practices from the UK experience rather than direct transfer of this experience to Tanzania 
were considered significant driving factors. 
5.3.3. Time Frame 
The data collections exercise for the pilot study lasted for about three months with effect from 
9th January 1999 through 25th March 1999 inclusive. The main study lasted for about five 
calendar months with effect from 8th March 2000 to end of August 2000. Originally, 
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the study was planned to last for about four calendar months but due to local General Elections 
in May 2000, some of the interview visits were postponed. A longer time-scale was not 
possible due to the scope of the study and financial constraints.  
5.3.4. The sampling frame  
Preliminary inquiries or the pilot study of the research questions was based in Solihull and 
Birmingham local authorities for three months from January to March 1999. This helped to 
revise, review and recast the questions with a view to making them adequately address the 
focus of the research problem. The main study was focussed on four local authorities of 
Redditch, Sandwell, Birmingham and Warwickshire local authorities. These councils were 
purposively selected for interviews, discussions and observations because of their proximity 
and convenience of the study. They were operating either a PM system with or without PRP 
schemes. However, in order to achieve the external validity of the study survey questionnaires 
were used to elicit views from other knowledgeable personalities outside the selected councils. 
The sample size in qualitative research is relatively small but consists of ‘information-enriched’ 
cases – in practice large samples are rarely selected (Holloway, ibid: 142).  
A purposive sampling technique was used in this study (Peil, et al. 1992). In fact qualitative 
sampling is generally purposive or purposeful (Holloway, ibid). LeCompre & Preissle (1993) 
prefer the term criterion-based sampling, because qualitative researchers choose certain criteria 
in advance of their study on which the selection of a sample is based. In purposive sampling 
generalisability is less important than the collection of rich data and understanding of the ideas 
of the people chosen for the sample (Holloway, ibid.). Holloway says that in purposive 
sampling researchers seek to gain as much knowledge as possible about the context, the person 
or other sampling units of analysis. This means that the sampling is not fixed in advance but is 
an ongoing process guided by emerging ideas and observations.  
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In-depth interviews and immersion in a culture make large sample unnecessary, particularly as 
qualitative researchers rarely seek to generalise. Maxwell (1996) adds that only when 
qualitative researchers aim for generalisability, might random sampling be used. Therefore, as 
qualitative researchers do not know the number in the sample before the research starts, the 
sample may change in size and type during the research. Also, Sandelowski (1995) 
recommends that researchers should use their judgement about the numbers in the sample.  
5.3.5. The survey sample 
A nation-wide electronic questionnaire survey was conducted among 400 UK local authorities. 
The target sample consisted of three sub-samples, drawn as follows: 
• A stratified random sample of  266 small, medium and large authorities was drawn from the 
Municipal Year Book 1999/2000 Database to whom Questionnaire series I survey was sent 
(see Appendix B) 
• A stratified random sample of (379 including the 266 above) public-sector organizations in 
local government was drawn from the 1990/2000 Municipal Year book. to whom 
Questionnaire series II survey was sent (see Appendix C)  
• Then, a random sample of 55 consenting respondents from the total of 122 officers was 
selected for follow-up interviews (see Appendix D).  
5.3.6. Response rate 
Overall response 
Overall of a total of 420 questionnaires sent out electronically, 122 were returned in good and 
usable form. This accounted for about a response rate of 29.0 per cent. In addition nine letters 
(2.1 per cent) were received giving reasons for non-participation. A further seventeen 
questionnaires (4.0 per cent) were returned as ‘Unknown at this address’. Another twelve (2.9 
per cent) returned questionnaires were unusable, rendering a final survey sample of 160 
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organizations. This breakdown gives an overall response rate of 38.1 per cent, albeit an 
effective response rate of 29.0 per cent.  
Questionnaire series I response 
The first version of questionnaires (Appendix B) was designed to elicit a general overview 
about organisational capacity issues. In this phase, 52 out of 147 purposively selected local 
authorities responded positively. This was about 35.4 per cent response rate, which was 
considered adequate for studies of this nature.  
Questionnaire series II response 
The second version of the questionnaire (see Appendix C) was designed to collect data 
necessary to assess the attributes of a successful performance-based reward system and to 
survey the perceptions of local government managers about equity of such an incentive scheme.  
This questionnaire was also sent out online and by post to 273 local government CEOs. Of 
these 70 questionnaires were completed and returned, implying a 25.7 per cent response rate 
which was also acceptable. 32 of these 70 actually came form the main case studies for which 
the postal facility was used to send bundles of questionnaires. Most of these also consented for 
the follow-up interviews. The CEOs from the main case studies recommended some of these 
other chief officers as having a vast experience in the implementation of PRP schemes. The 
completed transcripts were analysed using the computer software called Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS) Version 10.0 to determine the recurring themes.  
5.3.7. Data Collection  
The research utilised a combination of both qualitative and quantitative techniques in the 
collection and analysis of data, respectively. The Senior Managers and Directors (see Appendix 
D) responsible for HRM were consulted and interviewed about their perception on debatable 
and controversial issues surrounding the research problem. To supplement the 
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selected four main case studies, the survey was carried out using two complementary series of 
questionnaires.  
The first version of the questionnaire (see Appendix B) was designed to elicit data necessary to 
address issues of capacity and the practice of performance management principles in general. 
The following questions provided the study with the pivotal guidance during the data collection 
process: 
(i) What organisational capacity do local authorities need in order to undertake strategic 
direction in bringing about in-house organisational cultural change commensurate 
with performance management and PRP schemes? 
(ii) What conditions are in place in the British local government system to sustain the 
effective implementation of PRP given the qualitative nature of performance in the 
sector?  
(iii) What is the degree of goodness of fit of performance measurement and accountability 
processes in the British local government system? To what extent are PBIs acceptable 
in these councils? 
(iv) What characteristics constitute a successful performance-pay incentive scheme for 
public sector managers in local authorities? 
(v) What lessons can developing countries like Tanzania learn from the British 
experience in operating performance-based incentive schemes within the framework 
of performance management model?  
In each of the local authorities studied at least one contact (a ‘focus front-liner’) was 
established as a link to other targeted respondents within the council. In four cases, the 
respective Chief Executives recommended these key front-liners, while in one case study the 
front-liner was the Borough Director herself. With the help of the focus front-liners and a topic 
guide, a combination of research instruments was used to collect data from the field. These 
included among others, semi-structured interviews, observations, discussions with 
knowledgeable personalities, and source documents.  
The main purpose of the case studies was to obtain in-depth understanding of the controversies 
surrounding the introduction and implementation of performance-based incentives and reward 
systems, which are discussed in the HRM literature (refer s.4.1 & 4.2 of Chapter 4 
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above). In contrast, the survey questionnaires were intended to obtain a broader picture of three 
sets of issues identified as the variables in the hypothesis of this study (see s.5.1 above). First, 
was to survey the organisational capacity variable of British local authorities to implement PM 
practices. Secondly, was to examine the degree of ‘goodness of fit’ or the logistics and 
objectivity of the process of measuring performance and accountability in the British local 
government system in relation to implementation of PBIs and reward systems. Thirdly, was to 
survey the perception of local government managers about equity and attributes of successful 
PBIs and reward system in general.  
5.4. Analytical Framework Strategy 
The analytical framework strategy for this study is based on two important theorems. The first 
is the acknowledgement of the role of theories of motivation in the design and implementation 
of a policy for rewarding and compensating employees and the second is the application of the 
PM model as a research tool. The next two subsections attempt to outline how these theorems 
are going to facilitate the analysis of research findings in response to the issues and questions 
already raised in the literature review and summarised in s.4.4. above.  
5.4.1. The PM model as a tool for research analytical framework    
The PM model can be used as a research tool for the purpose of eliciting data from the field. 
The thesis argues that there are five main sets of issues that need to be addressed in developing 
a framework for managing organisational performance that are represented as a set of questions 
in a PM context.11 The questions are phrased in a normative tone, reflecting a managerial 
perspective, but can easily be re-phrased descriptively for use as a research tool.  
                                                 
11 These questions represent a development of the analytical framework approach first put forward in Otley (1987) 
and utilised and developed by Fitzgerald and Moon (1996). 
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The questions themselves appear to remain constant, but organisations need to continually 
develop new answers to them. This is because the context in which organisations are set is 
constantly changing and new strategies need to be developed to cope with new operating 
environments. 
The questions are linked to the five dimensions of the PM model as in Table 5.1 below: The 
first dimension questions in the PM framework are designed to explore and elucidate 
organisational aims and objectives12, and the mechanisms that have been put in place to 
measure and monitor goal attainment 
Table 5.1: Research issues in a 5-DPM model analytical framework13 
Dimensions Focus of Study The 5-DPM model Research Questions 
1 
 
Objectives 
 
(a) How are the key objectives that are central to the organisation’s overall 
future success determined? 
(b) How does the council go about evaluating the achievement for each of 
these objectives?  
2 Strategies and plans 
(c) What strategies and plans has the organisation adopted and what are the 
processes and activities that it has decided will be required for it to 
successfully implement these?  
(d) How does it assess and measure the performance and accountability of 
these activities?  
3 Targets 
(e) What level of performance does the organisation need to achieve in a 
given time frame in each of the areas defined in the above two 
dimensions?  
(f) What level of resourcing is thought necessary to allow such 
achievement?  
(g) How does the council incorporate the consumers’ priorities and 
preferences at this level?  
(h) How does it go about objectively setting and measuring appropriate 
performance targets for them?  
4 Rewards 
(i) What rewards and incentives14 do managers (and other employees) gain 
by achieving these performance targets (or, conversely, what penalties 
do they suffer by failing to achieve them)?  
(j) What technique does the council use to link rewards (if any) to 
achievement of performance level?  
(k) How does this approach apprehend equitable distribution of these 
                                                 
12 No assumption is made about the nature of these goals. The framework is quite compatible with a stakeholder 
perspective, which views organisations as seeking to meet the, potentially conflicting, requirements of different 
stakeholders. 
13 The PM model is used as a research analytical framework for a study of this nature for the second time after 
Kloot and Martin (op. cit.).  
14 Rewards and incentives should be understood in the widest possible sense, and not be restricted to just short-
term financial rewards, important though these may well be. 
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rewards across the board in order to sustain teamwork spirit amongst all 
employees?  
(l) What are the characteristics of a successful incentive and reward 
system? 
5 
 
Feedback 
 
(m) What are the information-flows (feedback and feed-forward loops) that 
are necessary to enable the organisation to learn from its experience, 
and to adapt its current behaviour in the light of that experience?  
(n) Does management accounting information system has any role to play 
in this regard at all? 
NB. See Appendices A & B for a List of specific research questions “Phase One” and “Phase 
Two” 
The second dimension questions are designed to explore and document the connections the 
organisation has made between its strategic intent (primary objectives) and the means 
(secondary objectives) by which it hopes to realize them.  
The third dimension questions raise issues of both effectiveness (to what extent are objectives 
expected to be achieved in a given time-frame?) and efficiency (what level of resourcing is 
thought necessary to allow such achievement?). Motivation and incentives are the focus of the 
fourth dimension questions. These seek to examine the consequences that follow from the 
achievement (or the failure to achieve) the performance targets, which have been set. 
Information is the necessary final ingredient to complete the performance management 
framework for control process. Therefore, the fifth dimension question focuses on the role of 
performance information in managing performance in PSOs. The next subsections attempt to 
present a summarised account of the five key research issues for the purpose of this study. 
5.4.1. Organisational aims and objectives 
More recently, literature on the role of strategy as a specific contingent variable has emerged 
[see, for example Langfield-Smith (1997)]. This suggests that different types of organisational 
plans and strategies will tend to cause different performance management control systems 
configurations. However, the empirical studies conducted to date have not yielded any firm 
conclusions about the nature of the most appropriate connections between 
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strategies and performance management controls (Otley, 1999).  
In essence, strategies can be seen as the means by which an organisation has decided that its 
aims can be achieved. It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate upon the procedures 
neither by which strategies are developed, nor on the relative roles of espoused (top-down) and 
emergent (bottom-up) strategies [see Mintzberg, op. cit.]. Rather, it takes as given the 
organisation’s current strategies and seeks to investigate the means by which their achievement 
is pursued and monitored. The formal PM system is seen as a major mechanism that can be 
used to make explicit the set of means-end relationships that the organization has developed as 
the methods it will use to implement its strategic intent.  
5.4.2. Organisational strategic intent and the means to realize them  
In practice, it is anticipated that the process of exploring issues raised by this question will 
often lead to senior managers feeling the need to elaborate their strategies more precisely in 
order to maintain a good ‘fit’ between objectives, plans, performance measures and rewards. 
Strategies involve a time frame as a key component. Many business strategies are designed to 
effect ‘improvement’, often driven by competitive pressures (Otley, 1999). Even in public 
sector, the continual need to justify the use of resources produces similar pressures for 
improvement and efficiency.  
5.4.3. Organisational effectiveness and efficiency 
There are a host of approaches and techniques currently deployed in practice that have the aim 
of increasing goal attainment and reducing the consumption of resources, such as continuous 
improvement, benchmarking, concurrent engineering and target-costing (ibid: 367). Such 
approaches not only involve the technical specification of goals, which are required to be 
attained (in many cases, developed from roots which go back to the Scientific Management 
movement), but are also necessarily concerned with issues of motivation and employee 
  
 
- 157 -
behaviour [see Merchant and Manzoni (1989) for one example of such a study]. In popular 
management theory, goal-setting and performance measurement play a pivotal role, expressed 
in phrases, such as ‘what gets measured, gets done’15.  
Drawing on theories of motivation, both the process of goal-setting (e.g. employee involvement 
and participation) and the content and nature of specific goals (e.g. ‘stretch’ targets; difficult 
but attainable goals) have been studied in considerable detail in the psychological literature 
(Anthony, 1965). In addition, the encouragement of employees to suggest improvements to 
production processes or product design, driven by the imperative of improvement, has also 
received attention, with Japanese practices being particularly prominent (Austin and Gittell, 
1999). 
5.4.4. Question of motivation and incentives 
Motivation and incentives are issues that are clearly related to the structures and processes of 
measuring performance and accountability that exist within the organisation, and even to the 
overall governance procedures of the total organisation. Increasingly, (in the U.K.) these 
consequences may involve explicit financial rewards (in terms of salary increases or one-off 
bonus payments), but will also involve less tangible consequences, such as recognition, status 
and reputation. Although there is a developing literature on the impact of payment schemes on 
employee and managerial performance, this is dominated by U.S.-based work, which may not 
transfer easily across cultures.16  
                                                 
15 However, it should not be assumed that explicit systems of performance measurement based on common-sense 
design principles are always effective. See, for example, Austin and Gittell (1999) for some interesting 
examples of counter-intuitive outcomes. They suggest two very different categories of models of performance 
measurement, one based on compliance, the other based on ambiguity. 
16 For example, the contrast between the openness about pay in the U.S. and the secrecy which exists in the UK 
may cause significantly different reactions to performance-related rewards. 
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Moreover, in practice, the design of payment systems is very much the province of the 
personnel or human resources function in most organisations, and these systems may not be 
well-articulated with the extant performance measurement systems. In any case, the intent of 
the question is to enable such connections as do exist to be documented and, ultimately, for 
their motivational impact to be assessed and evaluated. 
5.4.5. Question of performance information flows  
In its traditional feedback form, information on actual performance is compared with pre-set 
targets, standards, and deviations used to indicate the need for corrective action. In addition, 
feed-forward (or planning) information may be used to predict the need for corrective action 
before adverse consequences are observed. In both cases, there is a role for immediate 
corrective action to rectify the perceived problem, but also for double-loop learning to take 
place to improve the system in such a way that errors do not recur in the same way.  
Such uses of information are universal in the contemporary organisation, ranging from quality 
control charts to financial budgets, and from improved training to the ‘learning organisation’. 
Nor should the less formal uses of information be neglected; organisational cultures and values 
form the basis of approving and disapproving feedback signals of many types.  
A final key issue in documenting such feedback loops is to distinguish the different timescales 
and learning processes involved. These timescales may range from the instantaneous (in real-
time production control systems) through hours, days, weeks, months, quarters, years and 
beyond. The learning processes range from simple corrective action through to the revision of a 
corporate strategy if it becomes apparent that the current strategy is proving ineffective. 
In general terms, answers to all these issues are required in the design and construction of 
organisational performance planning and control systems. The first question defines acceptable 
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outcomes and results (often solely in profit or cost-terms); the second is concerned with the 
development of plans by which the results are expected to be delivered; and the third is 
concerned with the performance standards which can be expected.  
A budget can only be drawn up when quantified answers to all three questions are developed. 
However, the questions are not restricted to just financial measures and procedures. They may 
include many of the managerial processes that operate within the organisation and cross the 
functional divisions that may exist. Many of the measurements involved may be non-financial 
(e.g. production process measures, such as defect rates and cycle time; customer service 
measures, such as on-time delivery statistics, etc.), or qualitative (e.g. measures of employee 
morale, customer satisfaction and service modernisation).  
The study by Coates et al. (1992) gives many examples of the wide variety of measures that are 
used by companies in different countries. Finally, some aspects of performance, which are 
believed to be important, may not even be measured, perhaps because the level of measurement 
available is inadequate or distorts the process being measured (e.g. employee attitudes, 
customer preferences, R&D creativity).  
The framework of questions should not be taken to imply that precise quantitative measurement 
and defined target-setting procedures are universally desirable; it provides, first and foremost, a 
framework within which the full range of extant practices may be described, perhaps as an 
antecedent to attempting to evaluate their effectiveness. 
5.5. Conclusion 
Having reviewed the literature in Part II, this chapter has developed an appropriate research 
design and analytical framework based on the PM model to enable the examination of the 
research issues spelt out in sections 1.3, s.4.4 and s.5.4.above in light of the main 
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argument of the study as stated in ss.1.2.2 and 5.1 above. The study has adopted the ‘Survey 
within Case Study’ approach to examine the research problem. Field studies and interviews 
during case studies provide richer data than can be gained from survey research, and can 
explore causal effects more closely.  
The study has adopted largely a qualitative approach in the collection of both primary and 
secondary data. A combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques have been 
used to collate and synthesise the evidence gathered from the field. Quantitative techniques 
have also been used to collate responses from the field based on the Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS) Version 10.0 Programme. A variety of primary evidence has been 
gathered from the survey questionnaires, follow-up interviews & discussions, the Internet, field 
observations, desk research and other secondary sources of research instruments. The main 
units of analysis or respondents (See Appendix D) are the British local government managers.  
Overall the thesis has developed a theoretical justification for the research issues addressed in 
this study and has presented them in this chapter as a strategic framework designed to simplify 
their analysis. Finally, as a contribution to knowledge the framework for analysing and 
interpreting the evidence has been based on a multi-theoretical approach. This means that the 
research questions have been developed in light of the five dimensions of the PM framework. 
These questions are then examined and analysed in light of a combination of motivational 
theorems. The research is conducted at managerial level to gain a senior management 
perspective of the issues being investigated. Part IV below presents the data collection and 
analysis of research findings in light of the research methodology developed in this chapter. 
Finally, it is important to take note that most of interviewees and respondents to the 
questionnaires preferred anonymity. Therefore, for reasons of confidentiality references for the 
quotes as presented in next three chapters will not disclose specific names of individuals 
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or their authorities. Instead such quotes will be distinguished in terms of seniority level or 
status of particular interviewees or respondents.   
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Data Collection & Analysis 
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Chapter Six  
CASE 1: SURVEY ON CAPACITY ISSUES AND PRP IN 
BRITISH LAS 
6.0. Introduction: Background to pay-reforms 
The literature review in Chapter Three and Four argued that in recent years there has been a 
widespread adoption of market-type approaches to managing performance in PSOs. This trend 
has raised an academic debate amongst scholars not only about the ‘goodness of fit’ of these 
practices as transposed from the private sector but also, the degree of organisational culture 
present on the ground to support their implementation.  
This chapter examines and analyses the practice of strategic approach to managing performance 
in British local authorities. The main questions guiding this examination are: 
(a) What organisational capacity do local authorities need in order to undertake strategic 
direction in bringing about in-house organisational cultural change commensurate with 
performance management and PRP schemes?  
(b) What necessary conditions are needed to be in place prior to installing a performance 
management system and performance-pay reward system?  
The chapter is organised into two main sections. First, it examines the background and 
organisational framework of British local authorities within which these PM and PRP schemes 
operate. The main focus is on the emergence of pay reforms in the local government system 
and the purposes for which they are operated. Secondly, the Chapter presents research findings 
from interviews and questionnaire surveys. The focus of the interviews is about the issue of 
organisational capacity to implement private sector-oriented managerial practices with 
particular reference to PM and the role of performance-pay incentive schemes. Please note that 
where applicable for reasons of confidentiality references for the quotes from interviews etc 
will not disclose specific names of individuals or their authorities. 
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6.1. The emergence of Pay Reforms in UK’s public service 
(a) Change in organisation and management 
Since the 1970s the scope, organisations and management of the public services in UK have 
changed radically. Political forces, spearheaded by global economic, social and technological 
factors have been the drivers of these changes. The expansion of most public services was 
fuelled by the growing expectations of the electorate and their demands for more public 
spending on welfare services.  This led to increase in public employment and rises in taxation 
and public borrowing to finance this expenditure.   
(b) Public-private partnership 
With governments unable to manage the economy successfully or to curb public expenditure, 
the Government was forced to borrow from the IMF and to accept ‘wholesale’ the conditions 
attached to the loan. Cutting down public spending was one of the conditions. From then 
onwards, the ideas of the government assuming new roles emerged. The need arose to delegate 
the responsibilities of the provision of public services and to work in partnership with the 
private sector and voluntary agencies. The objective was to chart out a strategy for the 
government to be more responsive to public needs and wants. New institutional arrangements 
were necessary in terms of capacity, managerial skills, and attitudes. There was a need to 
redress the way performance was being managed in the public sector generally in order to cope 
with public demands for technological advancements and competition uproar.  
(c) New managerial practices 
This trend resulted into the proliferations of market-oriented practices across public sector 
organisations. Public managers were recruited from the private sector. Private ownership and 
entrepreneurial capitalism were held to be the foundations upon which a successful market 
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economy and a healthy liberal democracy should be built.  This new era of public management 
enforced public service competition through compulsory competitive tendering (CCT), market 
testing and the creation of ‘internal’ markets. Along with these initiatives private sector 
management techniques such as Performance Management and PRP schemes were introduced 
into public services. Not only in UK but also other OECD member countries were reforming 
their services because of concerns about economic performance, the changing needs and 
demands of citizens and institutions, and a massive decline in confidence in government. 
Discussions with knowledgeable personalities revealed that, initially, many countries have been 
introducing managerial reforms primarily as a strategic process to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector. That is, transforming a managerial culture and values from 
the traditional style of bureaucratic processes, rules and commands into a new management era.  
(d) Client-focused approach  
The new approach to public management focuses on the results, rather than on the inputs, in 
terms of Value for Money (VFM) or Best Value. It is client-oriented and emphasises on 
accountability measures in terms of the three E’s of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
Foremost, it is characterised by management by objectives (MBO) and performance 
measurement, the use of market-type techniques in place of centralised authority. This means 
shifting the state from being a monopoly provider of traditional public services and goods to 
being a regulator and facilitator, and creating a mixed economy of welfare comprising private, 
voluntary and public agencies. Not all contemporary public policies were successful. Some 
were modified or abandoned.  But the overall effect was a radical change in the scope, size and 
role of the state. This has had significant consequences for the ways in which public services 
are financed, organised and managed today. 
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(e) The cultural incompatibility  
The UK local government system was in the forefront to seeing these changes through. Her 
traditional culture and style of managing performance was compelled to interact with these 
‘New Public Management’ practices. Then, performance management and PRP schemes in UK 
LGS were introduced from mid 1980s onwards. Initially most councils were rather sceptical 
about introducing market-type managerial practices for the fear that the change would be 
incompatible with the culture and values of local governments. However, with time many 
authorities were either operating or planning to introduce the schemes, while others were 
abandoning them. In an attempt to investigate why some authorities were fazing them out, no 
straight answers were readily from some of the respondents.  
However, one important finding is that PRP schemes in UK local authorities were introduced 
on experimental basis and in most cases such schemes were applied only to senior managerial 
staff. During the implementation, complaints have been consistently raised mainly from 
employees who have not been covered by the schemes. This suggests that introducing 
discriminatory PRP schemes is unlikely to achieve its intended objectives. This finding 
suggests that in order to be successful a PRP scheme should cover all employees in an 
organisation. 
6.2. Capacity to implement managerial changes  
The key issue now is about the capacity of local authorities to undertake a strategic direction in 
bringing about in-house cultural change necessary for implementing performance-pay incentive 
schemes transposed from the private sector. For the purpose of this study, capacity refers to the 
conditions, organisational structures processes put in place in the local government system to 
allow effective implementation of performance-pay reward structures. The main assumption is 
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that rewarding performance is one of the key dimensions of a PM.  
In order to assess the capacity of British local governments to implement private sector oriented 
PM techniques a topic guide was used (see Appendix B). In particular, the guide focussed on 
the capacity of local authorities to apply strategic management techniques in managing 
organisational change.  The following sections present responses to questions examining this 
type of capacity issues. Some these responses are presented in both tabular and graphical forms 
and comments on some of them are summarised in s.6.9 below.  
6.3. The Issue of Strategic Approach  
The adoption of strategic approach to managing performance is felt to be the stepping-stone in 
the process of assessing the issue of capacity of British local authorities to implement private 
sector based managerial reforms. Capacity is about ‘the ability to do something properly’ 
(Larbi, op. cit.). Therefore, a vision or mission statement is an important signpost of the 
existence of this capacity. The survey questionnaire began by finding out if local authorities 
had ‘a statement of corporate objective’ or ‘mission statement’.  
6.3.1. The existence and origin of mission statement 
To assess this first indicator of capacity issues, a cross-section of local government managers 
was asked the question “Does your authority have a corporate objective (mission) statement?”  
98 per cent of these local government managers agreed that they do, and only one respondent 
for some reason declined to participate.  This response rate was significant enough to assert that 
all councils have a corporate objectives statement in their policy documents. 
Essentially, the origin of corporate objectives suggests the nature of priorities that are 
entrenched within such statements.  Therefore, the study was also prompted to find out whether 
these objectives are internally developed or are imposed from above. The managers were 
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asked how the corporate objectives statement was developed and the tabular and graphical 
responses to these questions are presented in Table 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 below. 
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Table 6.3.1: If authority has Corporate Objectives Statement, does management internally develop them? 
The graphical presentation of Table 6.3.1 is as follows: 
82.7%
15.4%
1.9%
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
 
Table 6.3.2: If authorities have corporate objectives statement, do councillors politically determine them? 
88.5%
9.6%
1.9%
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
 
The study further examined whether or not these corporate objectives are then broken down 
into manageable departmental or functional objectives. Therefore, the managers were asked this 
question and their responses are presented below. 
Table 6.3.3: Are corporate objectives broken down into departmental objectives? 
92.3%
5.8%
1.9%
Yes
No, @ dept develops
Too busy to respond
 
The comparative analyses of these responses are presented later in the chapter. 
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6.3.2. Articulation of all about change 
The second dimension of organisational capacity to implement managerial changes examined is 
about the articulation of all employees and members of the reasons for introducing change and 
the communication of the same message across the board. Therefore, the study asked local 
government managers how these objectives are communicated to all employees. Tabular and 
graphical presentations of the responses to these questions are presented below.  
Table 6.3.4: Are the objectives communicated to employees through public means such as meetings, notice boards, 
news bulletins etc? 
63.5%
34.6%
1.9%
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
  
This response indicates that there is a significantly high degree of effort made by local 
authorities to communicate organisational objectives to their employees. It is important that 
employees are made aware of what the corporate objectives are and what is expected of them to 
achieve these objectives.  Public approaches to communicating these objectives are most ideal 
as they are more inclusive and transparent. They also give other interested members of the 
public an opportunity to know what is going on within their councils and how much priority is 
given to their primary needs. 
Table 6.3.5: Are the objectives communicated to employees through their line managers? 
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90.4%
7.7%
1.9%
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
 
The verdict on this question is that about 90% of the 
respondents are opposed to the rather ‘closed approach’ to communicating council objectives to 
their employees. This confirms the fact that an alternative public approach is more practical and 
open rather than communicating through line managers. Another important advantage of the 
public means approach communication is that consistence and reporting standards are 
maintained across the board.   
Table 6.3.6: Are the objectives communicated to employees through informal means? 
82.7%
15.4%
1.9%
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
  
Table 6.3.7: Are the key objectives not communicated to employees at all? 
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This question appeared to be irrelevant to the respondents as it did not apply to the majority of 
them. However, this response was important for research because it signifies the degree of 
relevance attached to the importance of communicating key objectives of councils to 
employees. Finally, based on the evidence presented above, we may argue that that formal 
public means and openness approach to communication of the key organisational objectives to 
employees is commonplace in British local authorities. The existence of a transparent two-way 
communication between management and employees is a ‘primary indication’ of capacity of 
the authorities to adopt market-type managerial practices.  
6.3.3. Corporate objectives and strategic plans linkage 
A strategic approach to managing performance is demonstrated when corporate objectives are 
linked to an organisation’s long-term plans and individual key accountabilities. To assess this 
dimension, the respondents were asked whether or not this link exists, and if strategic plans 
normally do indicate how achievement of these objectives will be evaluated. They were also 
interviewed to find out if the key objectives are influential to the development of employees’ 
individual accountabilities or job descriptions. The presentations that follow indicate how the 
managers responded to questions about linkage between objectives and strategies for achieving 
them.  
Table 6.3.8: Are corporate objectives linked to council strategic plans? 
90.4%
3.8%
3.8%
1.9%
Yes
not applicable
No
Too busy to respond
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Table 6.3.9: Do strategies and plans indicate how achievement of organisational objectives will be 
evaluated? 
59.6%
30.8%
7.7%
1.9%
Yes
No
not applicable
Too busy to respond
 
Table 6.3.10: Are key objectives translated into individual job descriptions or targets as a means of achieving 
them? 
57.7%
30.8%
5.8%
3.8%
1.9%
Yes
No
Not applicable
Both,  yes and no
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.3.11: Are key objectives linked to specific measurable individual tasks or accountabilities? 
61.5%
19.2%
17.3%
1.9%
Yes
No
not applicable
Too busy to respond
 
Please note that texture descriptions and syntheses for these presentations are given in s.6.8 of 
this chapter. 
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6.4. Scale and Scope of PMS and PRP Schemes  
Supported by empirical studies, an assumption is made that PRP scheme is an important 
dimension of a PM system (Hughes, op. cit.). Therefore, the existence of PM systems and the 
implementation of PRP schemes within these systems could suggest that basic conditions are 
actually in place in British local authorities. Otherwise, they are not.  
6.4.1. Existence of the Schemes 
One of the dimensions of an effective PM system is to reward performance by linking 
employees’ pay to performance. Respondents were therefore interviewed to find out the scale 
and scope of PRP schemes within the BLGs. To test this claim, therefore, a cross section of 
managers randomly selected from the sample frame was interviewed and their responses are 
presented in graphics and Tables 6.4.1 though Table 6.4.13 inclusive. Table 6.4.1: Does the 
authority have a Performance Management System (PMS)? 
69.2%
26.9%
1.9%
1.9%
Yes
No
not applicable
Too busy to respond
Table 6.4.2: Will the authority retain the existing PMS in future? 
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69.2%
26.9%
1.9%
1.9%
Yes
not applicable
No
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.4.3: Does the authority plan to introduce PMS in future? 
73.1%
15.4%
7.7%
1.9%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
under review
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.4.4: Does the authority operate a Performance Related Scheme (PRP)? 
88.5%
9.6%
1.9%
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
Table 6.4.5: Will the authority retain the existing PRP scheme in future? 
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88.5%
7.7%
1.9%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
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Table 6.4.6: Does the authority have a plan to introduce PRP in future? 
46.2%
28.8%
23.1%
1.9%
No
Yes
not applicable
Too busy to respond
 
If we compare the responses presented in Table 6.4.6 above to that of Table 6.4.3 we find that 
there are 15 managers who say that they would introduce PRP in the future. However, only 8 of 
them agree that they would introduce PMS in future. This difference can be explained by the 
fact that PRP schemes can be introduced without PMS 
Table 6.4.7: Is PRP scheme specifically linked to the system of Performance Management? 
73.1%
11.5%
11.5%
1.9%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
under review
Too busy to respond
Table 6.4.8: Does the authority operate an incentive scheme other than PRP for the employees? 
57.7%
38.5%
1.9%
1.9%
No
Yes
not applicable
Too busy to respond
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6.4.2. Coverage of the PRP Schemes 
It is claimed that PRP is divisive. It is also claimed that this shortcoming is attributable to the 
fact that the schemes are not normally designed to cover all the employees in an organisation. 
Therefore, the respondents were asked questions testing this claim. The following tables and 
pie charts present their responses.   
Table 6.4.9: Are all categories of employees covered by the PRP scheme? 
71.2%
17.3%
9.6%
1.9%
Not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
Table 6.4.10: What categories of employees are covered by PRP scheme - all chief officers? 
69.2%
15.4%
13.5%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.4.11: What categories of employees are covered by PRP scheme - Some senior officers? 
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71.2%
13.5%
13.5%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.4.12: What categories of employees are covered by PRP scheme - Manual employees? 
71.2%
21.2%
5.8%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
Table 6.4.13: What categories of employees are covered by PRP scheme - None of the above, please specify? 
84.6%
7.7%
5.8%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
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6.5. Consultations for Setting Performance Targets 
Since 1993, all local authorities are required to publish annually in December details of their 
performance against a set of indicators agreed with the Audit Commission. Having collated and 
analysed the information from each council, the Commission publishes a set of national 
performance indicators, allowing authorities and the public to chart out their yearly progresses 
and compare their performance with others. Performance indicators are publicly available 
online through the official website of the Audit Commission at (http://www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/ac2/PI) in a spreadsheet format. To abide by this requirement all British 
local authorities have performance targets set at the beginning each period. The attainment of 
these targets is measured using performance indicators, which are either national or local.  
This study is interested in the process of developing local rather than national performance 
targets. Consulting employees during the performance target setting process increases the 
chances of their achievement. Therefore, the respondents were asked to respond to questions 
assessing the extent and mode in which these consultations are made. Tabular and graphical 
responses are presented below. 
Table 6.5.1: Are performance targets agreed at higher level and communicated to job holders? 
40.4%
40.4%
17.3%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
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44.2%
26.9%
26.9%
1.9%
Yes
not applicable
No
Too busy to respond
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Table 6.5.3: Are performance targets arrived at through other means than above? 
82.7%
9.6%
5.8%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.5.4: Does every employee have a written copy of his/her job description 
(responsibilities/accountabilities)? 
82.7%
9.6%
5.8%
1.9%
Yes
No
not applicable
Too busy to respond
 
 
6.6. Role of Management Accounting Information System 
The core dimensions of the PM model, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Chapter Three in this 
thesis, include all the processes of performance planning, target setting, performance 
contracting, performance evaluation, rewarding performance and feedforward/feedback loops. 
The effective functioning and co-ordination of these dimensions depend on, among other 
things, the extent to which management accounting information system (MAS) is proactive. 
Therefore, the study has sought to understand from local government perspective the role 
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played by MAS during the various stages of managing performance in the councils.  
Table 6.6.1: How important is the role of management accounting data when developing corporate objectives? 
19.2%
19.2%
15.4%
15.4%
13.5%
9.6%
7.7%
important
least important
not applicable
mostly important
Not important at all
very important
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.6.2: How important is the role of management accounting data when developing departmental objectives? 
25.0%
19.2%
15.4%
13.5%
13.5%
11.5%
1.9%
Least important
mostly important
not applicable
Important
Not important at all
very important
Too busy to respond
 
Table 6.6.3: How important is the role of management accounting data when evaluating performance against each 
of the corporate and departmental objectives? 
25.0%
17.3%
17.3%
15.4%
13.5%
9.6%
1.9%
least important
mostly important
important
Not important at all
not applicable
very important
Too busy to respond
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l e a s t  i m p o r t a n t  1 0  1 9 . 2  8 0 . 8  
i m p o r t a n t  1 0  1 9 . 2  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
  F r e q . %  C u m  ( % )
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6  1 1 . 5  1 3 . 5  
N o t  
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7  1 3 . 5  2 6 . 9  
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Table 6.6.4: How important is the role of management accounting data when developing individual performance 
indicators? 
23.1%
21.2%
17.3%
17.3%
15.4%
3.8%
1.9%
not important at all
least important
mostly important
important
not applicable
very important
Too busy to respond
 
 
 
Table 6.6.5: How important is the role of management accounting data when monitoring achievement of 
performance targets? 
23.1%
23.1%
15.4%
15.4%
13.5%
7.7%
1.9%
least important
not important at all
not applicable
mostly important
important
very important
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.6.6: How important is the role of management accounting data when decisions are made about individual 
incentives and reward structures for employees? 
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  F r e q  % C u m %
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  
4  7 . 7  9 . 6  
i m p o r t a n t  7  1 3 . 5  2 3 . 1  
m o s t l y  
i m p o r t a n t  
8  1 5 . 4  3 8 . 5  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
8  1 5 . 4  5 3 . 8  
n o t  
i m p o r t a n t  a t  
a l l  
1 2  2 3 . 1  7 6 . 9  
l e a s t  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 2  2 3 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
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25.0%
19.2%
19.2%
13.5%
11.5%
5.8%
5.8%
not important at all
not applicable
least important
important
mostly important
very important
Too busy to respond
 
Table 6.6.7: How important for this authority is the management accounting information system? 
 
23.1%
21.2%
21.2%
11.5%
11.5%
7.7%
3.8%
least impportant
very important
mostly important
not applicable
not important at all
important
Too busy to respond
 
6.7. Significance of Quantitative and Qualitative data 
Finally, the study was interested in understanding how qualitative and quantitative performance 
data were crucial for managing performance in a public sector environment in terms of 
planning, control and decision-making processes. Responses to questions relating to this issue 
are presented in the following tables and pie charts. 
Table 6.7.1: How important are qualitative performance targets for this council? 
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T o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
3  5 . 8  5 . 8  5 . 8  
v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  
3  5 . 8  5 . 8  1 1 . 5  
m o s t l y  
i m p o r t a n t  
6  1 1 . 5  1 1 . 5  2 3 . 1  
i m p o r t a n t  7  1 3 . 5  1 3 . 5  3 6 . 5  
l e a s t  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 0  1 9 . 2  1 9 . 2  5 5 . 8  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
1 0  1 9 . 2  1 9 . 2  7 5 . 0  
n o t  i m p o r t a n t  
a t  a l l  
1 3  2 5 . 0  2 5 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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V
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t 
T o o  b u s y  
t o  
r e s p o n d  
2  3 . 8  3 . 8  3 . 8  
i m p o r t a n t  4  7 . 7  7 . 7  1 1 . 5  
n o t  
i m p o r t a n t  
a t  a l l  
6  1 1 . 5  1 1 . 5  2 3 . 1  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
6  1 1 . 5  1 1 . 5  3 4 . 6  
m o s t l y  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 1  2 1 . 2  2 1 . 2  5 5 . 8  
v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 1  2 1 . 2  2 1 . 2  7 6 . 9  
l e a s t  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 2  2 3 . 1  2 3 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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36.5%
34.6%
13.5%
7.7%
3.8%
3.8%mostly important
very important
not applicable
important
least important
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 6.7.2: How important are quantitative performance targets for this council? 
38.5%
26.9%
19.2%
9.6%
3.8%
1.9%
very important
mostly important
important
not applicable
least important
Too busy to respond
 
6.8. Discussion of key survey findings 
The following subsections present a summarised analysis of the findings about capacity issues 
as examined in this chapter. 
6.8.1. Rewarding Performance: A new managerial culture? 
In their attempts to create a modern managerialist culture in public services, governments have 
not only facilitated renewed confidence by managers in their right to manage but 
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t o  r e s p o n d  
2  3 . 8  3 . 8  3 . 8  
l e a s t  
i m p o r t a n t  
2  3 . 8  3 . 8  7 . 7  
i m p o r t a n t  4  7 . 7  7 . 7  1 5 . 4  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
7  1 3 . 5  1 3 . 5  2 8 . 8  
v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 8  3 4 . 6  3 4 . 6  6 3 . 5  
m o s t l y  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 9  3 6 . 5  3 6 . 5  1 0 0 . 0  
T o t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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T o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
l e a s t  
i m p o r t a n t  
2  3 . 8  3 . 8  5 . 8  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
5  9 . 6  9 . 6  1 5 . 4  
i m p o r t a n t  1 0  1 9 . 2  1 9 . 2  3 4 . 6  
m o s t l y  
i m p o r t a n t  
1 4  2 6 . 9  2 6 . 9  6 1 . 5  
v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  
2 0  3 8 . 5  3 8 . 5  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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also have created a new ‘culture of management.’ This has aimed at getting public service 
managers committed to organisational change and greater efficiency within the limits set by 
given resources, especially in higher levels of management. Governments have sought to do 
this by: emphasising management’s key role in achieving efficiency; individualising the 
contracts of service for senior managers; and providing them with reward packages that 
incorporate market-type ‘fringe benefits’ including private medical care, life insurance, 
company leased cars and pension options. Individualised (or personal) renewable contracts of 
employment are now provided for a range of public service managers, especially the chief 
executives. Many of these employment contracts, though renewable, are for fixed-terms by 
periods and renewable subject to satisfactory performance.  
Pay scales of chief officers are now sufficiently flexible to provide room for performance-based 
rewards. In the early 1990s, the PRP schemes in particular appeared to be prospering well 
across the British local authorities, and variations of discretionary increments in existing scales, 
merit bonuses or awards for exceptional performance were used. However, from the last quarter 
of the 1990s to date the trend has been that most of these authorities have been abandoning the 
schemes in favour of single status incentive packages, which are broad-banded, skill-based 
alternative incentive schemes.  
The general attitude against PRP schemes is that they are divisive, subjective, and therefore 
incompatible to political institutions such as local governments. Important ingredients of a 
performance management scheme are performance agreements, performance measurement, 
rewards, sanctions, and most importantly the performance information flows. Contrary to the 
expectation of this study, the vast majority of the respondents did not agree to subscribe to the 
statement that performance-pay incentive schemes do help organizations to develop clear, 
specific, and measurable performance objectives. This is a clear indication of 
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cultural incompatibility of such schemes in PSOs. 
To develop the necessary capacity for organisational cultural change or in order to ‘seed the 
change process’ the literature recommends that certain features have to prevail on the ground 
(Collinge and Leach, op. cit). These include the articulation by leaders (politicians as well as 
officials) of the need and implicit advantages for such a strategic change of vision; the creation 
of interactive environment i.e. conducive bodies, structures and communication systems at 
corporate level, to facilitate greater co-operation and breakdown duplication; and the 
development of a culture which rejects short-termism and departmentalism and is more 
conducive to a more integrated approach. 
6.8.2. Corporate Objectives 
In a summary form the responses to three questions relating to the origin of corporate 
objectives and their departmental linkages are presented in Table 6.8.2 below. 
Table 6.8.2: If authority has Corporate Objectives Statement,  
Therefore, based on this evidence, we may deduce that authorities have corporate objectives 
that which originate from within with full consent of the members. Most importantly, these 
organisational objectives are translated into implementable departmental objectives. This is 
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that BLGs do have a conducive operating 
environment appropriate for strategic PM. 
N u m b e r  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s  5 2  
Y e s   
%  
N O  %  To o  B u s y  %  
D o e s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n t e r n a l l y  d e v e l o p  i t ?  8 2 . 7  1 5 . 4  1 . 9  
D o  t h e  m e m b e r s  p o l i t i c a l l y  d e t e r m i n e  i t ?  8 8 . 5  9 . 6  1 . 9  
A r e  c o r p o r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s  b r o k e n  d o w n  i n t o  d e p a r t m e n t a l  
o b j e c t i v e s  t o  e a s y  t h e i r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ?  
9 2 . 3  5 . 8  1 . 9  
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6.8.3. Dissemination of information 
Table 6.9.3 below presents the summary of responses of how BLGs disseminate information 
relating to corporate objectives.  
Table 6.8.3: Communication of corporate objectives 
Table 6.8.3 above indicates that not only do BLGs have mission statements in place, but also, 
both informal and formal means of communication are used to ensure that all employees and 
members are aware of what the authority’s objectives are and what each one of them is 
expected to achieve at departmental/sectional levels. There is a very small chance (0.038) that 
key objectives are not probably communicated to all employees. 
6.8.4. Existence of PMS and PRP Schemes 
Table 6.8.4 below summarises the responses relating to the issue of existence of PM systems 
and PRP schemes in the British LG system. 
Table 6.8.4: Existence of PM and PRP schemes 
The study found that 69.2 per cent of the 52 respondents agreed that their councils operate PM 
N  =  5 2  Y E S  %  N O  %  N A  %  T B  %  
A r e  c o r p o r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s  c o m m u n i c a t e d  t o  
e m p l o y e e s  t h r o u g h  t h e i r  l i n e  m a n a g e r s ?  
9 0 . 4  7 . 7  0 . 0  1 . 9  
A r e  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s  c o m m u n i c a t e d  
t o  e m p l o y e e s  t h r o u g h  i n f o r m a l  m e a n s ?  
8 2 . 7  1 5 . 4  0 . 0  1 . 9  
A r e  t h e  k e y  o b j e c t i v e s  n o t  c o m m u n i c a t e d  t o  
e m p l o y e e s  a t  a l l ?  
3 . 8  3 4 . 6  5 9 . 6  1 . 9  
S u m m a r y  o f  q u e s t i o n s  
Y e s  
%  
N o  
%  
N A  
%  
T B  
%  
D o e s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o p e r a t e  a  p e r f o r m a n c e  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m  
( P M S ) ?  N  =  5 2  
6 9 . 2  2 6 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
I f  y e s ,  w i l l  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  r e t a i n  t h e  P M S  i n  f u t u r e ?  N = 3 6  8 0 . 6  1 1 . 1  8 . 3  0 . 0  
D o e s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o p e r a t e  a  p e r f o r m a n c e - r e l a t e d  p a y  s c h e m e ?  
N  =  5 2  
9 . 6  8 8 . 5  0 . 0  1 . 9  
I f  y e s ,  w i l l  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  r e t a i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  P R P  s c h e m e ?  N = 5  8 0 . 0  2 0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
I f  n o ,  d o e s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  h a v e  a  p l a n  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a  
p e r f o r m a n c e - b a s e d  i n c e n t i v e  s c h e m e  i n  f u t u r e ?  N = 4 6  
3 2 . 6  5 2 . 2  1 5 . 2  0 . 0  
I s  P R P  s c h e m e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  
m a n a g e m e n t ?   N = 5 2  
1 1 . 5  1 3 . 5  7 3 . 1  1 . 9  
D o e s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o p e r a t e  a n  i n c e n t i v e  s c h e m e  o t h e r  t h a n  P R P  
f o r  t h e  e m p l o y e e s ?  N = 5 2  
3 8 . 5  5 7 . 7  1 . 9  1 . 9  
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systems and 81 per cent of whom agree that plans were in place to retain the systems in future. 
Although, the literature argues that PRP is an important dimension of a PM system (Horton and 
Farnham, op. cit.; Hughes, op. cit.), the overwhelming majority of local government offices 
responding to this questionnaire indicate that this is not necessarily the case. Only 9.6 per cent 
of the responding managers have PRP schemes installed.  
Surprisingly the findings also suggest that the majority of councils (52.2 per cent of 46 
respondents) not currently operating the systems have NO plans to introduce PRP schemes in 
future. Even where both PMS and PRP schemes are operated it is not automatic that these two 
must be linked. A sizeable minority (38.5 per cent) also operate incentive schemes other that 
PRP.  
6.9.5. Coverage of PRP schemes 
Coverage of the PRP schemes is one of the issues raised in the literature review as being 
responsible for the failure of the schemes in some organisations (Kelly and Monks, ibid; Kloot 
and Martin, ibid.; OECD, 1997). In this study, the responses to questions addressing this issue 
where applied are summarised in Table 6.9.5 below: 
Table 6.9.5: Coverage of PRP scheme summary 
Based on the evidence presented in Table 6.9.5 above, it is clear that a small proportion of the 
respondents have PRP schemes installed. However, where PRP scheme is installed, it 
disproportionately covers some employees. This finding is consistent with the findings in other 
N  =  5 2  
Y e s  
%  
N o  
%  
N A  
%  
T B  
%  
A r e  a l l  e m p l o y e e s  c o v e r e d  b y  t h e  P R P  s c h e m e ?  9 . 6  1 7 . 3  7 1 . 2  1 . 9  
D o e s  t h e  P R P  s c h e m e  c o v e r  a l l  c h i e f  o f f i c e r s  
o n l y ?   
1 5 . 4  1 3 . 5  6 9 . 2  1 . 9  
D o e s  t h e  P R P  s c h e m e  c o v e r  o n l y  s o m e  o f  t h e  
s e n i o r  o f f i c e r s ?  
1 3 . 5  1 3 . 5  7 1 . 2  1 . 9  
D o e s  t h e  P R P  s c h e m e  c o v e r  m a n u a l  e m p l o y e e s  
o n l y ?  
5 . 8  2 1 . 2  7 1 . 2  1 . 9  
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empirical studies that the scheme does not cover all employees. This is arguably an indication 
that there will be a potential risk of failure of a PRP scheme if the issue of coverage of the 
scheme is not adequately addressed.     
6.9.6. Target-setting and performance evaluation 
Table 6.9.6 below summarises the responses of 52 managers to questions addressing issues 
relating to target setting, performance contracting and evaluation. 
Table 6.9.6: Performance targets, contracts and measurement processes 
N  =  5 2  
Y e s  
%  
N o  
%  
N A  
%  
T B  
%  
D o e s  e v e r y  e m p l o y e e  h a v e  a  w r i t t e n  c o p y  o f  h i s / h e r  a g r e e d  
p e r f o r m a n c e  t a r g e t s  o r  c o n t r a c t ?  
3 2 . 7  5 5 . 8  9 . 6  1 . 9  
D o e s  e v e r y  e m p l o y e e  h a v e  a  w r i t t e n  c o p y  o f  h i s / h e r  a g r e e d  
p e r f o r m a n c e  t a r g e t s  o r  c o n t r a c t ,  w h i c h  s e t s  o u t  s p e c i f i c  
r e w a r d s  a n d  s a n c t i o n s ?  
1 7 . 3  5 9 . 6  2 1 . 2  1 . 9  
D o e s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  h a v e  a  f o r m a l  s y s t e m  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  a p p r a i s a l  o r  m e a s u r e m e n t ?  
7 1 . 2  2 5 . 0  1 . 9  1 . 9  
D o e s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  h a v e  a  p e r f o r m a n c e  m e a s u r e m e n t  s c h e m e ,  
w h i c h  l i n k s  e m p l o y e e s ’  T r a i n i n g  N e e d s  A s s e s s m e n t  ( T N A )  w i t h  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p e r f o r m a n c e  a p p r a i s a l  r e s u l t s ?  
6 3 . 5  2 1 . 2  1 3 . 5  1 . 9  
KEY:  NA = Not Applicable, TB = Too busy to respond 
Target setting is not taken seriously at individual level and this is potentially a risky situation as 
it diminishes the degree of personal commitment to goal attainment. The study found a vastly 
increased use of individual performance evaluation throughout the local government sector. 
Some of the general comments are as follows: (Please note that personal identities of 
respondents are withheld for confidentiality reasons. Instead all interview quotations are 
referenced on status basis e.g. CEO, Chief Officer, etc) 
“… now we have a system of personal performance measures – new to this council – we 
have developed action plan out of last year’s corporate plan … and we have developed 
individual responsibility for corporate goals. Now everyone is appraised by his/her 
supervisor.” CEO. 
“Each manager has a list of performance objectives, which are linked to the corporate 
plan – part of the incentive scheme.” CEO. 
Based on Table 6.9.6 above, only one council out of 52 respondents does not have some form 
of individual performance evaluation system in place. The HR manager for this council said 
that this is because the authority is developing a human resources system to allow it to 
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undertake performance evaluation. The tendency is to have two types of performance 
evaluations, one for managers and another one for other employees.  
6.9.7. Significance of quantitative, qualitative data & management accounting systems 
 Difficulty in measuring qualitative performance indicators  
Most of performance in local authorities is qualitative. The need for qualitative indicators has 
been apparent throughout all the interviews, with interviewees commenting on the need to 
develop key performance indicators for quality, quantity and workload, and to move to 
outcome-based measures rather than budget-based measures. Most interviewees suggested that 
services can and should be measured in quality terms, but the development of appropriate and 
useful quality measures is difficult and time consuming.  
Mismatch between practice and textbooks 
The practice which prevailed in individual local governments in the past has not always been in 
accordance with text book processes, and certainly did nothing to enhance accountability. For 
example, when one CEO commenced work at his council, his first action was that of changing 
a tendency in which budgeted figures were changed so that the budgets matched with the actual 
figures and variances were avoided. A finance director in another case, when newly arrived in 
her council had not found any budget reports other than the annual report to council and the 
regulatory bodies. Financial performance was not monitored for either management control or 
accountability purposes between annual reports, and probably not even then. 
Budgetary reports not informative 
Other authorities did use budgetary data in a constructive manner to measure performance. 
Even so, it was often felt by senior managers that budgetary reports were lacking some vital 
information – they may for example have contained “year-to-date” expenditure against the total 
budgeted amount, but not have given any indication of the expected timing of budgeted cash 
flows over the year. 
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Increased relevance of financial data 
Accounting indicators have assumed new importance in this era of increased financial 
accountability to the state government and the local community, and managerialist 
philosophies. Accounting data is used to measure the organisation in efficiency terms. It is seen 
as crucial in performance measurement by all the interviewees in this research – if the budget is 
met, then at least one aspect of performance is good. Without exception, the interviewees 
reported that managers in this new era of accountability are required to manage their budgets. 
Comments such as the following were widespread: 
“…performance against budget is a key result area for every manager.” CEO. 
“…the ability to maintain budget is a generic skill which is one of our key performance 
criteria.” CEO. 
 
Need for management accounting skills 
Both expense budgets and revenue budgets are used, depending on the purpose of the 
individual departments. One respondent suggested that there would be more of an emphasis on 
non-budget but still financial-based data if such data existed. However, there are problems in 
developing such data17. There is a lack of appropriate financial information processes and 
systems throughout the sector, resulting from a history of inappropriate accounting regulations. 
Good management accounting systems are now in the process of development as indicated in 
the following Table 6.9.7. 
N u m b e r  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s  5 2  
I m p o r t a n t  
%  
N o t  
i m p o r t a n t   
%  
N A  
%  
To o  
B u s y  %  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  r o l e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  d a t a  w h e n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o r p o r a t e  
o b j e c t i v e s ?  
6 3 . 4  1 3 . 5  1 5 . 4  7 . 7  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  r o l e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  d a t a  w h e n  d e v e l o p i n g  
d e p a r t m e n t a l  o b j e c t i v e s ?  
6 9 . 2  1 3 . 5  1 5 . 4  1 . 9  
                                                 
17 See Kloot et al. (1999) for a discussion of accounting and financial information problems in local government.  
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H o w  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  r o l e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  d a t a  w h e n  e v a l u a t i n g  p e r f o r m a n c e  
a g a i n s t  e a c h  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  a n d  
d e p a r t m e n t a l  o b j e c t i v e s ?  
6 9 . 2  1 3 . 5  1 5 . 4  1 . 9  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  r o l e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  d a t a  w h e n  d e v e l o p i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  i n d i c a t o r s ?  
5 9 . 6  2 3 . 1  1 5 . 4  1 . 9  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  r o l e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  d a t a  w h e n  m o n i t o r i n g  a c h i e v e m e n t  
o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  t a r g e t s ?  
5 9 . 6  2 3 . 1  1 5 . 4  1 . 9  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  r o l e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  d a t a  w h e n  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  m a d e  
a b o u t  i n d i v i d u a l  i n c e n t i v e s  a n d  r e w a r d  
s t r u c t u r e s  f o r  e m p l o y e e s ?  
5 0 . 0  2 5 . 0  1 9 . 2  5 . 8  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h i s  a u t h o r i t y  i s  t h e  
m a n a g e m e n t  a c c o u n t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  s y s t e m ?  
 
7 3 . 2  1 1 . 5  1 1 . 5  3 . 8  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  a r e  q u a l i t a t i v e  p e r f o r m a n c e  
t a r g e t s  f o r  t h i s  c o u n c i l ?  
8 2 . 7  0 . 0  1 3 . 5  3 . 8  
H o w  i m p o r t a n t  a r e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  p e r f o r m a n c e  
t a r g e t s  f o r  t h i s  c o u n c i l ?  
8 8 . 5  0 . 0  9 . 6  1 . 9  
 
The sector has been freed from the restrictive requirements of the past and is now expected to 
comply with accounting standards, which also apply to the private sector. There is still some 
dissatisfaction with the quality of budget reports, and with the difficulty in restructuring reports 
so that managers receive performance data, which relates to their areas of responsibility. To 
overcome data problems, some local governments develop financial indicators outside the 
accounting system using raw accounting data and manipulating it on a spreadsheet or similar 
facility. 
6.10. Conclusion 
Generally, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that circumstances giving 
rise to pressures for managerial reform were based on mismanagement and poor records of 
public service performance, combined with difficult industrial relations. Pay reform is one of 
the strategies which were adopted by the BLGs to attract skilled managers from the market. 
However, further evidence consistently indicates that the adoptions of market-type managerial 
and pay reform processes in local governments have not been easy to implement due to 
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inappropriate institutional capacity to do so.   Despite having most of the conditions and 
processes in place as the dimensions of capacity to allow, for example, effective 
implementation of performance-pay motivational structures, lack of technical know-how and 
cultural incompatibility have been the main constraints. Overwhelmingly, the evidence has 
demonstrated that adequate skills needed to apply private sector based managerial techniques 
are still lacking. Consequently, a very small proportion of local authorities in UK have 
managed to install both PMS and PRP schemes. Even those in PRP schemes place are 
gradually being abandoned.  
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Chapter Seven 
CASE 2: SURVEY ON PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT & 
PRP IN BRITISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
7.0. Introduction 
There is no doubt that the new markets and new strategies that have emerged over the last few 
years demand new and different performance measures. The so-called three Cs – customers, 
competitors and change – plus the amazing speed of technological change have had a profound 
effect on the way organisations develop their performance measurement systems. Effective 
performance measurement is of key importance in ensuring the successful implementation of 
an organisation’s strategy. In a public sector environment the main objective of performance 
measurement systems is to support better PM decision-making process leading to equitable 
PRP decisions, improved quality of services for the community, and to meet external 
accountability requirements.  
Most importantly, all instruments of performance management are to a greater or lesser extent 
based on measurement of performance. Performance measurement – i.e setting objectives and 
targets – was perceived as a basis for better management and way of ensuring a clear discharge 
of accountability, which is clearly crucial iin a sector which delivers some 40 per cent of 
national gross domestic product (GDP). For this reason the practice of measuring performance 
and accountability (PMA) in the British local government system is thus increasingly seen as 
an integrated part of many management strategies, rather than being seen as an isolated 
approach. This Chapter presents research findings that are responding to the whole range of 
issues relating to the process of measuring and rewarding performance in British local 
government system.  
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7.1. Performance Measures in British Local authorities  
The senior officers interviewed about the practice of measuring performance in local 
government describe the approach as being relatively different from that of the private sector 
counterparts. This is because some had been appointed from the private sector, and others had 
been working in different local and central government agencies. So, they were making 
comparisons based on their previous experiences. When interviewed about the impact of 
organisational culture of local authorities on the process of measuring performance and 
accountability, all suggested that they had to tackle the issues of culture in their organisations in 
order to implement the changes required by the central government and the market alike. The 
changes they are making relate to all aspects of management, and include new perspectives on 
PM, measurement and conditions of service. Cultural change as examined in chapter six above 
is a process that has to be cultivated very gradually before real ‘fruits can be reaped’.  
During the survey and discussions with respondents it became clear that there were no 
systematic differences in the views expressed by the officers about issues of PMA in local 
government. There were also no systematic differences between the typology of authorities in 
terms of political and administrative compositions and structures.  The discussions and 
interviews centred around four key issues about PMA processes: (1) the extent to which 
performance measures are applicable, (2) factors affecting the use of performance measures, (3) 
performance contracting and measurement, and (4) Rewards and sanctions in performance 
measurement. The responses to these issues are summarised in the following subheadings. 
Please note that where applicable for reasons of confidentiality references for the quotes from 
interviews etc will not disclose specific names of individuals or their authorities. 
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7.1.1. The scope of performance measures in local government 
The interviews revealed a substantially increased use of performance measurement systems in 
local government since previous studies were undertaken (Kloot and Martin 1995; Kelly and 
Monks, op. cit.). The use of performance measures has increased across a range of dimensions. 
Financial performance measures, including budgetary and other data and non-financial 
performance measures are being calculated and used in the management process to improve 
performance of both individuals and councils. Apart from the National Performance Indicators 
(PIs) developed by the Audit Commission, all councils have developed their own local BV 
performance indicators and are using them, although to different extents. Financial measures 
are the most developed, followed by customer service measures. The factors affecting measures 
being used are discussed in detail below. 
7.1.2. Factors affecting the use of performance measures in LGs 
Systematically, respondents explained that the increased use of performance measures appears 
to have been driven by two factors. The first factor is increased accountability to environmental 
and process stakeholders (as discussed in Chapter Three), including both the central 
government and the local community. The emphasis on accountability mandated by the 
government has significantly altered the perceptions of managers as to the need for and efficacy 
of performance measurement. Lack of accountability, which was endemic in the industry until 
the latest round of restructuring, is no longer the norm. The new emphasis on accountability is 
being assisted by the use of performance measures. In particular, one of the respondents 
emphasised that:-  
“The problem has been a pathological lack of accountability in local government in the 
past – now [we] need meaningful performance evaluation.” CEO. 
The second factor is from an internal or managerial control perspective. There is an 
appreciation by recently appointed executives and managers of the implicit value of 
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performance measures in enhancing performance. The use of performance measures has been 
related to the managerial changes imposed on local authorities by the central government, in 
particular the introduction of practices such as Best Value, contracting-out, market-testing, etc. 
These changes have resulted in the need to compete with private sector organisations in service 
provision and to measure performance to allow local governments to compete on equal terms. 
Local government managers recognise that they must measure their own performance, as they 
need to justify what they are doing, both to stakeholders and in relation to the market. 
The most compelling reason given for implementing performance measurement has been the 
introduction of New Public Management (NPM) and the more business oriented culture, which 
accompanies it. Interviewees frequently referred to the importance of performance management 
(PM): 
“PM requires an emphasis on performance measures.” Chief Officer. 
“Performance evaluation has only just come in, because of PM and a need to develop 
indicators to monitor contracts.” Chief Officer. 
“PM has been the catalyst for performance measurement – previously managers were 
on a more secure employment basis.” Chief Officer 
“Performance evaluation is driven by PM and whatever clients specified was in the 
service agreements.” Chief Officer 
“We use key performance indicators as a result of competitive tendering.” Chief 
Officer  
“Business areas have to monitor their competitiveness.” CEO. 
Many of the performance measures developed since the introduction of contracting-out as a 
package of NPM are designed to monitor contract performance, regardless of whether or not 
the contractors are employed by the council. The measures are generally related to specification 
of service agreements. As such there is recognition that they should be output based rather than 
input based, but this is not always achieved. PM requires internal business units to compete 
with private sector organisations, so that performance measurement takes on a results-based 
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focus, as it does for the private sector. 
Another reason given for the introduction of performance measurement is its relevance to the 
annual Corporate Performance Plans as a requirement by the central government. Chief 
Executives are reporting performance against the corporate plan for long-term strategic reasons, 
in addition to the need to satisfy statutory requirements: 
“Performance measures are coming out of the corporate planning process – it is the 
first time performance measures have been used this way.” CEO, 2000 
“Substantial change … measure progress against the corporate plan.” CEO, 2000 
“We use MBO and establish key results areas driven by corporate plans.” Chief 
Officer. 
“… performance measures are linked to the corporate plan – some quarterly 
performance indicators for quarterly reporting our progress.” CEO, 2000 
7.1.3. Performance contracting and measurement 
Issues being examined in this study include the nature and meaning of contractual relationships 
in a public sector environment, and the extent to which it is possible or desirable to incorporate 
required performance arrangements into a contract. A PM system to be effective needs to have 
a performance agreement (contract) with detailed statements of accountabilities and 
performance measurement scheme. This assures stakeholders of Best Value performance and 
makes employees feel valued and committed to what they are doing in an organisation. A 
performance contract gives employees an opportunity to be clear of what they are expected to 
deliver. A performance measurement scheme ensures that both organisational objectives and 
individual objectives are actually being achieved. Where this is not happening, then areas for 
improvement through training and development are identified sooner rather than later. In 
addition to this general observation about performance contracting and measurement, the 
managers were asked specific questions about their practical experience and the possible 
problems encountered.  Their responses to questionnaire questions are presented in Tables 7.1.1 
though 7.1.6 and corresponding pie charts. 
Table 7.1.1: Does every employee have a written copy of his/her agreed performance targets or contract? 
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55.8%
32.7%
9.6%
1.9%
No
Yes
not applicable
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 7.1.2: Does every employee have a written copy of his/her agreed performance targets or contract which 
sets out specific rewards and sanctions? 
59.6% 21.2%
17.3%
1.9%
No not applicable
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1.3: Does the authority have a formal system of individual performance appraisal or measurement? 
71.2%
25.0%
1.9%
1.9%
Yes
No
not applicable
Too busy to respond
 
 
 
 F r e q  P e r c e n t  
V a l i d  
P e r c e n t  
C u m  
P e r c e n t  
T o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  5  9 . 6  9 . 6  1 1 . 5  
Y e s  1 7  3 2 . 7  3 2 . 7  4 4 . 2  
N o  2 9  5 5 . 8  5 5 . 8  1 0 0 . 0  
T o t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 F r e q  P e r c e n t  
V a l i d  
P e r c e n t
C u m  
P e r c e n t  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
Y e s  9  1 7 . 3  1 7 . 3  1 9 . 2  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
1 1  2 1 . 2  2 1 . 2  4 0 . 4  
N o  3 1  5 9 . 6  5 9 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
T o t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1  1 . 9  1 . 9  3 . 8  
N o  1 3  2 5 . 0  2 5 . 0  2 8 . 8  
Y e s  3 7  7 1 . 2  7 1 . 2  1 0 0 . 0  
T o t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
  
 
- 204 -
Table 7.1.4: Does the authority have a performance measurement scheme which links employees' Training Needs 
Assessments with their respective performance appraisal results? 
:   
63.5%
21.2%
13.5%
1.9%
Yes
No
not applicable
Too busy to respond
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To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  7  1 3 . 5  1 3 . 5  1 5 . 4  
N o  1 1  2 1 . 2  2 1 . 2  3 6 . 5  
Y e s  3 3  6 3 . 5  6 3 . 5  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 7.1.5: Where discontent has arisen within the authority, has been the question of the process of appraising 
individual performance? 
71.2%
15.4%
11.5%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
 
Table 7.1.6: Where discontent has arisen within the authority, has been the question of the ranking of individual 
performance? 
The trend analysis of the responses in Table 7.1.6 above 
is presented in a Pie Chart format as follows:   
76.9%
15.4%
5.8%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
7.1.4. Rewards and sanctions in performance measurement 
There are rewards for the achievement of performance targets which are not necessarily in a 
form of cash payments. Most officers expressed concern over performance-based pay in all 
cases, arguing that this form of incentive is extrinsic and divisive. Bonus payments for 
managers also depend to some extent on the ability to pay of an individual local government. 
Here are some of the comments in relation to rewards and sanctions in performance 
measurement: 
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1  1 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
N o  6  1 1 . 5  1 1 . 5  1 3 . 5  
Y e s  8  1 5 . 4  1 5 . 4  2 8 . 8  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3 7  7 1 . 2  7 1 . 2  1 0 0 . 0  
T o t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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1  1 . 9  1 . 9  1 . 9  
Y e s  3  5 . 8  5 . 8  7 . 7  
N o  8  1 5 . 4  1 5 . 4  2 3 . 1  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  4 0  7 6 . 9  7 6 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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“Previously we had no reward system – now everyone down to third tier managers18 
and further down in future have their performance measured.” CEO. 
“There is scope for performance-based pay, assuming the council has the financial 
capacity to deliver up to a 10 or 15 per cent bonus.” Chief Officer 
PRP has resulted in the use of contracts which include specific key results areas, against which 
the performance of senior managers is measured. In all the councils taking part in this research, 
all senior staff had key results areas written into their contracts, and their performance in these 
areas was frequently monitored, on a quarterly or half-yearly basis. Bonus calculations however 
are usually done on an annual basis. Bonuses may be paid either in addition to annual 
increments based on length of service, not performance, or in place of such increments. 
Key results areas vary between councils, with a range of financial and non-financial areas in the 
agreements. However, they always include the ability to manage a budget as a specific skill, or 
as one of the generic management skills expected of all managers. Other key result areas, which 
are being referred to, include leadership style, and customer satisfaction. Some of the 
comments are as follows: 
“Managers are evaluated on ten key areas against targets in each area. Some of the 
measures revolve around budget and financial data but others are broader … not 
measured in the past.” CEO. 
“… major area is financial management.” CEO 
Employees are more likely (than managers) to be evaluated for the purpose of establishing 
training and development plans tailored for individuals. Their performance interviews are 
designed to establish training needs: there is no mention of bonuses for employees below the 
fourth tier of management. However, training and development courses are seen as a form of 
reward by the interviewees. Here are some of their comments: 
                                                 
18 There are four tiers of managers in most of the local governments in this study – CEO, directors and two levels 
of middle management. 
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“Individual performance evaluation at employee level is about skills and training 
needs.” Chief Officer 
“…review performance against plans … do people need any further training?” Chief 
Officer  
“For lower level staff, it [evaluation] is about personal development.” Chief Officer 
“Staff are reviewed for development purposes and training requirements every 12 
months.” Chief Officer 
“For staff there are two parts. Firstly, they are evaluated on generic skills and second 
part on specific goals aligned to organisation’s goals … review done at least half 
yearly.” Chief Officer 
Staff development plans are now primarily for lower level staff, not managerial staff. 
Managerial staff are expected to bring the requisite skills with them to their positions, and 
should not require further training. However, one council still uses development plans for 
managerial staff. 
“… for senior managers look at generic management skills which are linked to full key 
performance targets for each position … still section [in performance appraisal] on 
personal development, as for lower level staff.” Chief Officer 
Overall, individual performance measurement has vastly increased from a base of virtually zero 
measurement just a few years ago to the current position of widespread performance 
measurement for accountability, performance-based rewards (not necessarily cash) and staff 
development purposes. 
7.2. Performance Indicators: The balanced scorecard approach 
Each year The Audit Commission draws up a list of indicators for measuring the performance 
of local authorities, police and fire authorities. The authorities must then publish details of how 
they perform in terms of these indicators. Once they have done this, the Commission collects 
the information together at a national level, analyses it and then publishes this comparative 
data, along with year-on-year comparisons, together with a commentary. There are two main 
types of indicators – financial and non-financial. 
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7.2.1. Financial Indicators  
A financial performance indicator in terms of accounting or budgetary data plays a vital role in 
the process of measuring performance in organisations. The same trend can be observed in the 
British local government system. Interviewees said that this is partly because the central 
government regulatory agencies, the Local Government Management Board (LGMB), and the 
Audit Commission, always require accounting reports so that they could monitor the 
performance of local government authorities. 
7.2.2. Non-financial indicators  
Therefore, although there is a heavy emphasis on financial indicators, non-financial indicators 
are also commonly used in such public sector environments. As is becoming common in the 
private sector with the use of the balanced scorecard approach (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 
1996), non-financial performance indicators are used to create a more balanced view of the 
organisation and how it achieves its service provision: 
“We started with financial performance measures and are moving on to non-
quantitative. In the management group we stress that the social implications are 
important – quality of life, community needs.” CEO 
One local government which used non-financial indicators when they were “amenable” to the 
situation was trying to develop a more comprehensive set of indicators linked to the corporate 
plan, but felt that:  
“the corporate plan needs to be less of a mission statement and needs to ensure that 
things happen before good indicators could be established.” CEO 
The difficulty of developing good qualitative performance indicators was often referred to as  
“… [it] will be 3-5 years before we can develop proper qualitative measures.” 
7.2.3. Customer focus indicators.  
Customer focus performance indicators are directly commensurate with the PM model, which 
emphasises on development of end-user orientation culture. Measuring 
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performance related to customer satisfaction is one way of maintaining the focus on community 
service and being accountable to the local community. Customer focus is the second of Kaplan 
and Norton’s (1992) balanced scorecard key perspectives, and it is of apparent importance in 
local government as one of the surrogate measures of effectiveness. 
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Use of customer attitudes surveys 
Respondents reported that measuring quality should be customer focused. Most of the 
respondents indicated that they were using customer surveys to gauge community response to 
the council’s performance. They were working towards enhanced customer-focussed measures. 
Here are a couple of their comments during discussions: 
“…we are using customer surveys but not yet at a sophisticated level.” CEO 
“…looking towards incorporating a customer satisfaction index into the annual 
report.” CEO 
 
Community needs assessment 
Interviewees stressed the need to ensure that there is a focus on community needs in local 
government, not just on financial targets. Several interviewees pointed out that they had to 
balance the new emphasis on financial performance and financial accountability to the 
government with community service obligations and non-financial accountability to the local 
community. One of the managers stressed that: 
“…they [business unit managers] are not there to be profit centre managers and to 
make a profit.” Chief Officer 
7.2.4. Innovation and learning indicators  
Encouraged but not measured! 
Like customer focus, innovation and learning is one of the key perspectives identified by 
Fitzgerald et al. (1991) and Kaplan and Norton (1992). In examining this aspect of the balanced 
scorecard approach to performance measurement in British local authorities, the study observed 
that various managerial changes taking place require new organisational perspectives, new 
processes and a new culture throughout the sector.  
This could reasonably be expected to lead to local governments seeking innovation in the way 
they undertake these changes. However, on the ground the reality is that it is a small proportion 
(about 23.8 per cent) of the 52 of the respondents in this research are focusing on innovation as 
a key performance indicator. One of the officers in these councils generally 
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reported that: 
“…innovation is listed as a key value of the organisation … we encourage selective risk 
taking.” Chief Officer. 
Another officer suggested that innovation is encouraged, even if it is not measured: 
“People are encouraged to be innovative and take risks and step outside the norm.” 
Chief Officer. 
Whilst innovation and learning are occurring in the sector, they are not being formally 
measured in the majority of local governments. Interviewees gave examples of where they 
thought their councils were innovative. A number of respondents quoted their customer service 
practices as being innovative. Some of the respondents said that: 
“…we are the first council to use customer surveys on the Internet and provide a 
community wide information system.” Chief Officer 
“…our other innovation is talking to community groups and landowners.” Manager, 
2000. 
“…customer service desk is an innovation...” Chief Officer 
“…electronic service delivery.” Chief Officer 
“…innovative work in improving customer relations and reducing complaints.” Chief 
Officer. 
“…innovation in terms of programs for mental health and in art and cultural area.” 
Chief Officer. 
Misconceptions of innovation 
Others looked to internal processes as being innovative. They gave a number of examples of 
what they thought were innovative practices: 
“…would be amazed if anyone is doing the basic things better than us.” 
“… award for innovative management skills.” 
“…structuring the organisation and developing a style of thinking.” 
“… viewing performance – we measure correct decisions and take away incorrect 
decisions – we don’t concentrate only on wrong decisions.” 
“…benchmarking in ABC, culture change work.” 
“…our electronic technical stuff is state of the art.” 
“… the way BV is implemented – real competition with high number of services 
outsourced.” 
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“…financial and management reporting, computerisation, linkage of corporate plan, 
operating budget …” CEO 
As these examples demonstrate the importance of innovation and learning for local government 
lies in the subsequent implementation of better processes and services. Better processes will 
lead to more flexibility, enhanced quality and improved efficiency and effectiveness. Local 
governments, which learn, should ultimately be more accountable to their local community 
through better management practices. Measuring innovation is a step towards achieving this 
end. 
7.3. Measuring Performance & Giving Feedback 
The managers’ responses to performance pay across a range of public sector organisations 
indicate that the process used to measure performance are critical to the success of performance 
pay schemes.  When responding to the statement 'my work objectives are clear and specific. I 
know exactly what my job is', 87 per cent of managers considered that their set objectives were 
'clear and specific'. Nevertheless, 78 per cent still ranked 'measurement of performance' as one 
of the top three disadvantages with the system, indicating that clarity and specificity of 
objectives do not necessarily result in an adequate measure of performance. In both, the 
comments on the questionnaires and in the follow-up interviews, measurement of performance 
emerged as the primary cause of concern and dissatisfaction with the PRP. 
“I think that personalities will always play a big role in any individual's assessment and 
until somebody devises a method to overcome this then I think we will have to live with 
under-performance and over-performance but I think that it is where a potentially very 
good system will become unstuck” (CEO).  
Managers expressed concern about the extent to which the maximum reward was achievable. 
Additional difficulties with the measurement of performance were evident in the comments 
which reflected the problems involved in defining and measuring goals for managerial 
positions: 'True goals are hard to clarify and harder still to judge' (CEO).  
The task of measuring managerial performance is a difficult one. However, a number of 
  
 
- 213 -
mechanisms have been suggested as a means to overcoming this obstacle. Although less than 
half of the respondents agreed with the statement 'I receive a considerable amount of feedback 
concerning my quantity of output on the job' in the follow-up interviews, the study revealed a 
heightened awareness of the importance of feedback in the PRP process. Another interesting 
observation is that while in the follow-up interviews, a correlation existed between an 
improvement in communication with the managers' immediate supervisor and an improvement 
in performance, in the survey only 27 per cent of the respondents actually felt there was an 
improvement in communication between themselves and their immediate supervisor. 
Therefore, it would appear that the extent of feedback available was limited for many or else, 
the individuals who completed the questionnaires were not the same persons who participated 
in the follow-up interviews. 
Performance measurement is the cornerstone of any performance-pay incentive scheme. 
Arguably, performance measurement is at the heart of the debate and controversies surrounding 
the implementation of the PRP scheme especially in the public sector. Therefore, to survey the 
perception of local government managers about equity of PRP schemes in as far as 
performance measurement process issues are concerned, respondents were asked to give their 
personal views on five different statements (see question 7.0 in Appendix C). Their responses 
are presented in Tables 7.3.1 through 7.3.5 inclusive below 
Table 7.3.1: As a result of operating a performance-based incentive scheme, my work objectives are clear, 
specific, and measurable. 
The trend analysis of the responses in Table 7.3.1 above is presented in a Bar Chart format as follows:   
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Table 7.3.2: Feedback and feed-forward loops are most important aspects of a performance measurement scheme 
in local authorities 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
60
58
55
53
50
48
45
43
40
38
35
33
30
28
25
23
20
18
15
13
10
8
5
3
0
13
51
24
7
 
Table 7.3.3: The task of measuring managerial performance is a difficult one 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
403835333028252320181513108530
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Table 7.3.4: The process of linking pay to performance is ambiguous and very subjective 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
not applicable
Percent
50403020100
6
14
4
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  F r e q  P e r c e n t
C u m .   
P e r c e n t  
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 7  2 4 . 3  3 1 . 4  
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n o  v i e w  9  1 2 . 9  9 5 . 7  
d i s a g r e e  1  1 . 4  9 7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
1  1 . 4  9 8 . 6  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1  1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
  F r e q u e n c y  %  
C u m u l a t i v e  
P e r c e n t  
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  
2  2 . 9  1 0 . 0  
a g r e e  2 4  3 4 . 3  4 4 . 3  
n o  v i e w  1 4  2 0 . 0  6 4 . 3  
d i s a g r e e  1 4  2 0 . 0  8 4 . 3  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
7  1 0 . 0  9 4 . 3  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
4  5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
  F r e q .  %  C u m  ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n s e  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  2 0  2 8 . 6  3 5 . 7  
A g r e e  2 8  4 0 . 0  7 5 . 7  
N o  v i e w  3  4 . 3  8 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  1 0  1 4 . 3  9 4 . 3  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  4  5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 7.3.5: A number of mechanisms are possible to overcome difficulties in measuring managerial performance 
in a public sector environment 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
not applicable
Percent
50454035302520151050
4
21
46
20
7
 
7.4. Discussion about performance measurement in BLGs 
Significant organisational changes are occurring in the local government sector. In general 
these changes in Britain have focused attention on organisational and managerial 
accountability. There is now a requirement (legislated by the central government through the 
Audit Commission) to compete within the local government sector in order to enhance financial 
and political accountability. These changes have brought about the need for BLGs to more 
appropriately measure their performance. The main observed problem is resistances of 
organisations to changes or the pace at which the changes are taking momentum.  
The Audit Commission has suggested a performance measurement regime for local 
governments in Britain for which there has been little prior research. This research project was 
designed to examine, among other issues, the nature and use of performance measurement 
schemes in this branch of public sector as a fundamental dimension of PM in general and PRP 
in particular. Reflections from this survey suggest that from an internal control perspective, 
performance measurement systems are designed to monitor the implementation of an 
organisation’s plans and determine when the plans are unsuccessful and how to improve them. 
  F r e q .  %  C u m  ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n s e  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 4  2 0 . 0  2 7 . 1  
A g r e e  3 2  4 5 . 7  7 2 . 9  
N o  v i e w  1 5  2 1 . 4  9 4 . 3  
D i s a g r e e  1  1 . 4  9 5 . 7  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3  4 . 3  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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These systems are used to focus attention on the organisation’s objectives, to measure and 
report performance and to understand how process performance affects organisational learning.  
The study has observed that identifying operational problems, which can be solved by adjusting 
existing processes, and indicating more fundamental problems, which require an adjustment to 
the strategies of the organisation, are further uses of performance measurement. There is also a 
general consensus that performance measurement promotes accountability to stakeholders, 
particularly in PSOs where the nature of stake-holding is homogenous.  
7.4.1. Practical implication of measuring performance  
This chapter has examined the extent to which performance measurement systems are currently 
being used in British local government, the factors that lead to the use of performance 
measurement, and the extent of non-financial indicators. The survey results have revealed a 
substantial increase in the level of use of performance measurement in the sector related to 
increased emphasis on accountability and organisational changes imposed on the sector by the 
central government and the market alike. The performance of both people and programs is now 
being measured. Although there is an emphasis on financial and budgetary measures for 
financial accountability, the use of non-financial measures in determining outcome 
accountability is increasing through Best Value Performance Indicators (PIs). Customer service 
and quality are two of the areas in which non-financial performance measures are being 
developed rapidly. These are required by the government to be published by every British local 
authority annually. In some cases there is a tendency for local governments to develop a 
corporate plan which was then “placed unused in a bottom drawer” until the next time a plan 
was required to be written.  
7.4.2. Performance assessment and allocation of pay awards 
There are numerous variations in how performance is assessed and how the 
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assessment is linked to the allocation of performance pay awards. In some schemes 
performance appraisal is a detailed and formalised process, with performance pay linked in a 
mechanistic fashion to performance ratings. In others, performance rating is informal, no 
written appraisal may be required, and there is a large element of managerial discretion in the 
allocation of performance pay awards. The study observed also that systems of performance 
appraisal based on management-by-objectives are becoming more widespread, although there 
are practical variations in approach. 
7.4.3. Factors attributable to increased used of performance measures 
The study has observed a substantially increased use of performance measurement systems in 
local government since previous studies were undertaken. The use of performance measures 
has increased across a range of dimensions. Despite this increased use of performance measures 
the authorities are consistently experiencing difficulties in developing and using performance 
measures for accountability purposes. However, the factors that have motivated the councils to 
continue adopting them are such as: 
(a) The increased accountability of managers to environmental and process stakeholders, 
including both the central government and the local community; 
(b) The recognition by the managers of the implicit value of performance measures in 
enhancing performance and accountability. In particular the introduction of practices 
such as Best Value, contracting-out, market-testing, etc.; and  
(c) The relevance of performance measurement and accountability processes to the annual 
Corporate Performance Plans as a requirement by the central government.  
7.4.4: The balanced approach to measuring performance 
Finally, though in a superficial way, the evidence gathered suggest that many authorities in this 
study are using the Kaplan and Norton’s balanced scorecard approach (BSA) to develop 
performance indicators for measuring performance. The BSA has also featured 
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to be a useful analytical tool in measuring performance. There are four dimensions of the 
balanced scorecard model as illustrated in Figure 3.2 of Chapter Three of this thesis: i.e. 
financial; community or customer; internal business processes; and growth or innovation and 
learning.  
(i) Financial focus dimensions 
Budgetary data plays a vital role in the process of measuring performance in organisations. 
Although some authorities are using budgetary data in a constructive manner to measure 
performance, the type of budgetary reports prepared are not informative enough to enable 
objective performance measurement for accountability processes to take place in the long run. 
Accounting indicators have assumed new important roles in this era of increased financial 
accountability to the government and the local community.  However, the majority of managers 
responding to this research insist that there is a need for acquiring current management 
accounting skills necessary for preparing timely and more informative performance reports.  
Financial and non-performance measures are calculated and used in the management process to 
improve performance of both individuals and councils. Financial measures used include those 
mostly reflecting customer service measures. The authorities started with financial performance 
measures and are moving on to non-quantitative despite difficulties encountered in measuring 
qualitative performance indicators. 
(ii) Customer or community focus dimensions 
Most of performance in local authorities is qualitative. Therefore, the quest for qualitative 
performance data has brought non-financial indicators in the limelight of local authorities. 
Measuring quality of services is the concern of customer focus performance indicators. 
Assessment of community needs is the strategy used by the local authorities to develop 
customer or community focussed performance indicators. They are attempting to strike a 
balance between the new emphasis on financial performance and financial accountability 
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to the government with community service obligations and non-financial accountability to the 
local community.  
Formal quality assurance (ISO 9000) with its associated performance measurement is not a 
priority. It is viewed as expensive and time consuming, with too much focus on process and 
documentation and not enough on the quality of the services as perceived by the end user. 
However, some councils are quality assured under ISO 9000, and believe regular performance 
audits assist in process improvement. Despite the lack of formal quality measurement in other 
councils, an internal focus on quality of service was evident throughout the sector. 
(iii) Internal business processes  
Internal process reform in the British local governments is being driven by two factors: the 
need for cost reduction in a time of financial stringency, and the need to perform to business 
standards to be competitive and win tenders in a Best Value environment. Consistent with the 
need to demonstrate financial accountability, there is recognition that services must be 
delivered in a cost effective, high quality manner. This requires significant reform of processes 
and systems to reduce operation costs, requiring cost-based performance measures. However, 
lack of financial information on specific processes and the effect of process change on costs 
hampers reform. Managers are uncertain about how to proceed when the effects of change 
cannot be estimated. Lack of information and performance measures is a critical problem and a 
recurring theme in all councils. 
Benchmarking, both formal and informal, is a popular method of process improvement. Formal 
benchmarking requires performance measurement, whilst informal benchmarking may take 
place in informal networks without formal indicators being available. Informal networking and 
benchmarking is valuable for local government to exploit opportunities to enrich management 
perspectives (Corrigan and Joyce 1997). Again, lack of valid information for accurate 
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benchmarking was observed to be a recurring theme. 
Councils are largely following some form of business improvement program and system 
redevelopment. All councils in this study have a business improvement program based around 
documentation of processes, performance indicators and analysis of variances between target 
and actual performance indicators. Senior managers are emphasising the need for process 
reform at all levels as a strategic priority, linking processes to strategy as suggested by 
Atkinson et al (1997). Performance measurement in these councils is leading a process reform. 
The councils are also undertaking a formal program of process mapping for continuous quality 
improvement. This is an important initiative which would be of benefit to other councils. 
As described earlier, councils are generally developing service charters, which requires analysis 
of internal processes and community perceptions of outputs. Writing contract specifications is a 
powerful process to review the way things are done, and on performance management. 
Recognition of the need to work towards customer satisfaction has lead to new processes 
replacing those which don’t meet customer needs. Performance measures designed to enhance 
internal processes related to customer satisfaction include telephone answering performance 
and tracking the time taken to respond to letters.  
Other methods which councils use to improve processes include formal monthly meetings to 
focus on process improvement and cost reduction, gain-sharing of ‘profits’ in provider units 
(especially in Warwickshire) and market testing. Market testing, whether or not formally part of 
BV, requires full specification of services and thorough analysis and review of the processes 
through which they are delivered. 
Lack of performance measures has resulted in business process change being reactionary rather 
than strategic. However, business unit planning has been widely introduced, and this is being 
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undertaken within the strategic framework provided by the corporate plan. It is thus likely that 
process change will be more strategically oriented in future, if suitable performance measures 
are developed. 
(iv)  Innovation (growth) and learning Indicators 
Continued organisational success depends on the ability of organisations to learn and to 
innovate (Senge, 1990) and managerialism requires a shift from a bureaucratic to an innovation 
paradigm (Dixon et al op. cit.). Yet this is the very observed area in which performance 
measurement and management is weakest in local government. There are gaps between what is 
perceived to be needed and what is measured. There is little recognition of the need for 
innovation and learning in formal documentation and plans. However, a council outside the five 
targets which were the subject of this research has incorporated innovation and learning into its 
corporate plan as a key result area, with appropriate performance indicators such as the number 
of organisational development programs conducted, participation in local government forums, 
the number of initiatives and innovations implemented, and the number of staff recognised for 
effective workplace innovations. 
There is some recognition of the importance of innovation and learning. One council has 
developed a formal recognition program to encourage new ideas. It awards some cash annually 
for the best new idea, and awards movie tickets and dinner vouchers for other innovations. 
Every new idea gains some form of recognition. To encourage innovation this council gives 
staff the freedom to fail: staff may try out new ideas, and fail, but they should not repeat 
mistakes. The most important thing is that over-reliance on performance measures may 
suffocate innovation. Some councils believe that recognition rather than rewards encourage 
innovation. The benefits and motivational effects of celebrating success are recognised, 
although mechanisms for doing so are lacking. A comment made by one of the interviewees is 
that “if something goes well, the councillors get the praise”, indicating some 
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disillusionment with recognition of excellence at managerial levels. 
Some managers suggested that heavy workloads are one of the reasons why there is a low level 
of innovation. Thinking of new ways to do things takes time which is not available. However, it 
was also suggested that there may be a need to train people to reflect on what they are doing so 
they can better manage their workloads. Focussing training on continuous improvement and 
human resource development is expected to lead to innovation. 
A relatively strong emphasis on learning by individuals is evident in most councils. All 
councils have formal staff development programs used as tools to connect individuals with 
organisational goals, by enhancing skills and knowledge to equip staff to achieve these goals. 
Programs also inform staff about organisational goals and objectives. One council identified a 
range of skill shortages and training needs, such as managing work teams, holding meetings, 
and how to make decisions. Other training needs include stress management, relationship 
management, managing the balance between home and professional lives, contract 
management, financial skills, budgeting skills, and using financial performance reports. 
However, budgetary constraints mean that not all training needs are addressed.  
Learning and change 
Learning is also required to replace intellectual capital bought by the private sector, following 
significant downsizing experienced by all councils due to the mandated reforms of the 
government. The private sector has purchased the industry expertise needed to prepare tenders 
and bids for contracting out. 
One council has implemented an organisation-wide integrated learning and change program, 
implemented through focus groups and workshops. The issues discussed and resolved in these 
focus groups include the future structure of the council, how to be competitive, growing people 
in their jobs, and contributing to the planning process. Specific training needs 
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(particularly financial training) are addressed, as is encouraging managers and staff to challenge 
the status quo. This program is linked to the corporate plan, so is driven by strategic issues. In 
other councils, change and learning was observed to be ad hoc and unrelated to espoused 
strategy. 
Empowerment and learning 
Empowerment of lower level staff is necessary if government is to adopt a performance 
orientation culture (Dixon et al, op. cit.). In this study empowerment is viewed by respondents 
as an essential change to promote improvement and learning: ‘the more people are involved in 
decision making, the more they are committed to participate in future problem solving task.’ 
However, some councils have had mixed results, with hierarchical power structures still in 
evidence in supposedly empowered teams. Although empowerment is seen to be essential, 
gaining commitment from staff can be problematic. Staff may not believe that they are truly 
empowered: ‘managers believe they empower people to change processes, but they don’t 
measure this and don’t know’. The theme of lack of performance information was again raised 
and is seen as a barrier to full empowerment. Staff need information on their performance and 
on alternatives before they feel competent to make decisions. 
Cultural change and continuance improvement 
Interviewees frequently commented that cultural change is a precursor to continuous 
improvement and that cultural change programs are necessary. Several councils were 
undertaking staff attitude surveys, one on a six-monthly basis to map changes in attitudes. One 
council described the need to ‘identify where we are before we can develop change programs’. 
In different areas of the organisation, ‘tribal, rules based and consensus cultures’ are all in 
evidence. Although a change program for staff had been suggested by managers it had been 
refused funding by councillors. 
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Cultural change needs to vary within councils. Significant cultural change has occurred in 
provider groups, which are now working in a business paradigm, competing against the 
business sector for the right to maintain their jobs. These groups are subject to performance 
measurement, being evaluated against outside tenders in the initial bidding process, and 
subsequently measured on a continuing basis to ascertain any profits, which may accrue to the 
employees. 
Union presence 
By comparison, client groups are still largely working in the old public service paradigm. Their 
performance may be measured in terms in budget variances, but there are no rewards in getting 
it right and few sanctions for getting it wrong. It was noted that in councils with a heavy union 
presence, performance rewards schemes (which may help in cultural change) are difficult to 
implement for any group. During the interviews Unions were described as fighting against 
innovation, being divorced from reality and not adding value. Councils which had experienced 
a reduced union presence reported increased flexibility and innovation. 
7.5. Conclusion 
Industrial awards (i.e. universal pay structure) under which local government employees were 
employed did not provide for the measurement of individual performance for remuneration or 
evaluation purposes. Some limited performance evaluation took place for the purposes of 
deciding on staff development needs in some council, as this was permitted under the industrial 
award. Based on the survey presented in this chapter the overall individual performance 
measurement and accountability processes in the British local governments have vastly 
increased from a base of virtually zero measurement just a few years ago to the current position 
of widespread performance measurement for accountability, performance-based rewards (not 
necessarily cash) and staff development purposes. Overall, the reasons given by 
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local government officers in this study for the increased use of performance measures were: 
pressure from central government; compulsory competitive tendering; changing culture and 
attitudes among local government managers.  
The study has further observed that objectivity of staff appraisal processes leads to equitable 
assessment of PRP. Staff appraisal system provides a formal opportunity for a manager and an 
individual to reflect on last year’s performance and development. It is a system, which 
facilitates future performance plans, helps to identify skills needed to undertake these action 
plans and explore development opportunities, which in turn will encourage optimum 
performance.  
Despite this increased use of performance measures the authorities are consistently 
experiencing difficulties in developing and using performance measures. However, the factors 
that have motivated the councils to continue adopting them are: (1) The increased 
accountability to environmental and process stakeholders, including both the central 
government and the local community; (2) The recognition by the managers of the implicit value 
of performance measures in enhancing performance and accountability. In particular the 
introduction of practices such as ‘Best Value’, contracting-out, market-testing, etc.; and (3) The 
relevance of performance measurement and accountability processes to the annual ‘Corporate 
Performance Plans’ as a requirement by the central government. 
Important ingredients of a PM scheme are performance agreements, rewards and sanctions after 
the performance measurement phase. It is this attribute which was emphased in the main 
hypothesis of this study that the satisfactional value of a motivation policy is a function of, 
among other factors, an objective performance measurement scheme. The balanced scorecard 
approach has also featured to be a useful analytical tool in measuring performance. Contrary to 
the expectation of this study, overwhelming majority of respondents have disagreed to 
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subscribe to the statement that performance-pay incentive schemes help organizations to 
develop clear, specific, and measurable performance objectives.  
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Chapter Eight 
CASE 3: SURVEY ON EQUITY PERCEPTIONS ABOUT 
PERFORMANCE-PAY REWARD SYSTEMS 
8.0. Introduction 
Perception of equity of a performance-pay reward system is singled out by the main hypothesis 
of this study as one of the three robust measures of “goodness of fit” of an incentive and 
motivation policy in organisations. Others are organisational capacity and cultural issues, as 
examined in chapter six and objectivity of performance measurement and accountability 
processes as examined in chapter seven above. The essence of examining the dimensions of 
equitable performance-pay reward systems is based on the growing interest in applying PRP 
incentive schemes to public sector employees in OECD countries, and the overwhelming 
debate about the appropriateness of this practice in public sector.  
This chapter presents research findings and analyses from the survey questionnaire (see 
Appendix C), and interviews about issues relating to dimensions of an equitable performance-
pay reward system. The questionnaire is designed to elicit data necessary to address twelve key 
practical tests or dimensions of equitable performance-pay rewards systems as propounded by 
Kelly and Monks (op. cit).  
The key parameters of an equitable performance-related incentive scheme assumed to be: 
(1) Acceptability of the performance-pay linkage principle: How do local government 
managers perceive the principle of linking pay to performance? 
(2) Pay as a motivator: Is monetary incentive package a motivator in a public sector 
environment?  
(3) Objectives of the scheme: What are the common purposes or objectives of operating a 
performance-pay incentive scheme in the local government?  
(4) Success of the scheme: Do British local government managers perceive PRP as a 
successful strategy to motivating staff?  
(5) Effect on performance: What effect has PRP schemes have on individual 
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performance of local government managers?  
(6) Drawbacks of the scheme: What are the drawbacks of PRP schemes in the British local 
governments?  
(7) Short-termism: What impact has PRP have had on short-termism, target setting and 
feedback?  
(8) Objectivity of performance-reward links: Has PRP been able to establish a link between 
individual performance and pay awards?  
(9) Team spirit: What effect has PRP have had on team-spirit?  
(10) Joint Consultation: What role does joint consultation play in goal-setting within a 
performance management framework?  
(11) Impact on performance: Has the improvements or otherwise of the overall performance 
been attributable to performance-pay incentives? 
(12) Attitude and discontent survey: What is the general attitude of chief officers in the British 
local governments towards PRP schemes and what are the main sources of discontent 
about them if any?   
The thesis assumes that the success of an incentive policy is a positive indicator or dimension 
of an equitable performance-related incentive policy. Therefore, the responses to these 
questions were all expected to address the main question of what attributes of performance-pay 
scheme makes a successful employee motivation policy in an organisation.  Please note that 
where applicable for reasons of confidentiality references for the quotes from interviews etc 
will not disclose specific names of individuals or their authorities. 
8.1. The acceptability of performance-pay linkage principle  
One of the controversial issues that arose from the literature review was concerning the 
principle of linking performance to pay as a motivational device to public sector employees. 
Therefore this study has examined this issue by surveying the perception of senior local 
government managers about the degree to which the principle of linking pay to performance is 
acceptable amongst managerial staff. The managers were therefore asked to give their personal 
views about four key questions (see Appendix C, questions 1.1 through 1.4 inclusive). Their 
responses are presented in tabular and graphical format in Tables 8.1.1 through 8.1.4 inclusive 
below.    
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To start with the respondents were asked to comment on the statement: “The principle of 
relating pay to performance is essentially a good one.” Their responses were collated using the 
SPSS and are presented in Table 8.1.1 below. 
Table 8.1.1: The principle of relating pay to performance is essentially a good one 
Too busy to respond
Strongly agree
Agree
No view
Disagree
Percent
50403020100
17
7
30
39
7
 
Table 8.1.2: A performance-based incentive scheme is a good idea for managerial staff 
Too busy to respond
Strongly agree
Agree
No view
Disagree
Percent
50403020100
17
13
43
20
7
 
Table 8.1.3: The idea of performance-based incentive scheme is essentially unfair 
Too busy to respond
Strongly agree
Agree
No view
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Percent
6050403020100
14
49
14
11
7
 F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  2 7  3 8 . 6  4 5 . 7  
A g r e e  2 1  3 0 . 0  7 5 . 7  
N o  v i e w  5  7 . 1  8 2 . 9  
D i s a g r e e  1 2  1 7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 4  2 0 . 0  2 7 . 1  
 A g r e e  3 0  4 2 . 9  7 0 . 0  
 N o  v i e w  9  1 2 . 9  8 2 . 9  
D i s a g r e e  1 2  1 7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
         
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  
3  4 . 3  1 1 . 4  
  A g r e e  8  1 1 . 4  2 2 . 9  
 N o  v i e w  1 0  1 4 . 3  3 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  3 4  4 8 . 6  8 5 . 7  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
1 0  1 4 . 3  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.1.4: Working under performance contracting is a good policy in the public sector 
Too busy to respond
Strongly agree
agree
No view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
40.0
37.5
35.0
32.5
30.0
27.5
25.0
22.5
20.0
17.5
15.0
12.5
10.0
7.55.02.50.0
24.3
12.9
35.7
17.1
7.1
 
Analysis: 
The discussion of these responses are summarised as follows. The perceptions of local 
government managers about the acceptability of the principle of linking pay to performance of 
public sector employees was assessed by asking the managers to give their verdict on four 
different but similar questions. These responses are summarised and presented in a bar chart 
format as follows: 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
  S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 2  1 7 . 1  2 4 . 3  
A g r e e  2 5  3 5 . 7  6 0 . 0  
N o  v i e w  9  1 2 . 9  7 2 . 9  
 D i s a g r e e  1 7  2 4 . 3  9 7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  
1 0 0 .
0  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Frequency reaction in percentage N=70
The principle of relating pay
to performance is
essentially a good one 
A performance-based 
incentive scheme is a good 
idea for managerial staff
The idea of performance-
based incentive scheme is 
essentially unfair
Working under performance contracting is a good policy
in the public sector 
Statements of fact
8 1: Acceptability of performance-pay linkage
Positive Negative Other
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Overwhelmingly the managers have expressed general support and acceptability of the 
principle of linking pay to performance and they perceive such a scheme to be a good idea for 
managerial staff. Similarly more than half of the respondents demonstrate that they prefer to 
work under performance contracts which confirms that the policy is generally acceptable in the 
public sector. In addition to these positive responses in support of the performance-pay linkage 
principle, more than 60 percents of the managers do not perceive the schemes to be essentially 
unfair in the public sector. This demonstrates that although the performance-pay linkage 
principle is acceptable in the public sector environment, it is also fairly managed or operated.    
This was however, contradicted by the responses to the statement seeking to assess the degree 
of fairness of PRP schemes: ‘Do you think that there is a need for an appeals system?' Two 
thirds (65 per cent) replied positively while 30 per cent disagreed. The data indicates that most 
beneficiaries of the schemes are not fairly treated hence high demand for an appeals system. It 
may also explain the pressure from potential beneficiaries of the schemes who are excluded 
from the bracket and who would like the current scope of the scheme to be more inclusive.  
8.2. Pay as a Motivator and its effect on performance 
The second dimension or practical test of an equitable performance-pay reward system is its 
ability to motivate the target beneficiaries. Therefore, the respondents were asked to give their 
personal views about how they perceive the policy of pay as a performance-related incentive. 
The views were to be given in response to three different statements (see question 2.0 in 
Appendix C).  
(i) Pay as a motive for work 
Responses to the first statement “The most important thing about a job is pay” are presented in 
the following table and bar chart as they were processed using the SPSS program. 
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Table 8.2.1: The most important thing about a job is pay  
too busy to respond
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
50.0
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.00.0
15.7
47.1
14.3
10.0
5.7
7.1
 
(ii) Top salary for top job preference 
Their responses to the second statement “The kind of job I like is the one that pays top salary 
for top job” were analyzed using SPSS program and are presented in Table 8.2.2 and in its 
related Bar Chart below. 
Table 8.2.2: The kind of job I like is the one that pays top salary for top job 
too busy to respond
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
50403020100
20
6
40
24
7
 
(iii) Adequacy of Feedback, Feed-forward information system 
Finally the managers were asked to comment on the third statement “I receive a considerable 
amount of feedback concerning the quality of output on my job”.  Their responses to this 
statement are presented in Table 8.2.3 and in the corresponding Bar Chart below. 
 F r e  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  4  5 . 7  1 2 . 9  
A g r e e  7  1 0 . 0  2 2 . 9  
N o  v i e w  1 0  1 4 . 3  3 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  3 3  4 7 . 1  8 4 . 3  
S t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e  1 1  1 5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  
1 7  2 4 . 3  3 1 . 4  
A g r e e  
2 8  4 0 . 0  7 1 . 4  
N o  v i e w  
4  5 . 7  7 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  
1 4  2 0 . 0  9 7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.2.3: I receive a considerable amount of feedback concerning quality of output on my job.  
too busy to respond
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
6050403020100
7
10
54
19
7
 
Analysis: 
When respondents were asked to give their views on the statement: 'the most important thing 
about a job is pay,' a significant number of respondents (63% of 70 respondents) disagreed.  A 
minority of 16% of the same sample agreed with this statement and 21% had no view 
whatsoever (see table 8.2.4 below).  
In contrast, 64 per cent agreed with the statement: 'the kind of work I like is one that pays top 
salary for top performance', and 23 percent disagreed with the statement. This indicates the 
relevance of highly paid work to the respondents, though it may not have featured as the 
primary source of motivation for the job. The data also indicate that those who desire the kind 
of job that pays top salary for top performance also believe that PRP encourages them to give 
sustained high level of performance at work. These responses are summarised in the Table 
8.2.4 below. 
Table 8.2.4: Summary of perceptions about Pay as a motivator and its impact 
N  =  7 0  
A g r e e  
%  
D i s a g r e e  
%  
N o  V i e w  
%  
( i )  T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  t h i n g  a b o u t  a  j o b  i s  p a y   1 6  6 3  2 1  
( i i )  T h e  k i n d  o f  w o r k  I  l i k e  i s  t h e  o n e  t h a t  p a y s  t o p  s a l a r y  
f o r  t o p  p e r f o r m a n c e   
6 4  2 3  1 3  
( i i i )  P r o d u c i n g  h i g h  q u a l i t y  w o r k  i s  r e w a r d e d  w i t h  m o r e  p a y   4 7  3 3  2 0  
( i v )  P R P  h a s  n o  e f f e c t  o n  m y  w o r k  p e r f o r m a n c e   4 3  4 0  1 7  
( v )  I  r e c e i v e  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a m o u n t  o f  f e e d b a c k  o n  t h e  
q u a l i t y  o f  m y  j o b  
7 3  1 0  1 7  
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 3  1 8 . 6  2 5 . 7  
A g r e e  3 8  5 4 . 3  8 0 . 0  
N o  v i e w  7  1 0 . 0  9 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  5  7 . 1  9 7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Generally this summary presents an illustration of a rather weak positive correlation between an 
improvement in performance and improved communication with the individual supervisor. It 
would appear that PRP has provided greater opportunity to interact on a more frequent basis 
with the supervisor for discussing the focus of direction of the targets set. In addition, the 
statement 'PRP makes me focus on what I'm meant to achieve' also correlated positively with an 
improvement in performance. This trend consistently emerged as an important feature of the 
PRP system. For example, one half of the managers in the follow-up interviews mentioned that 
PRP had helped them to focus on certain objectives. 
Further analysis of the data summarised in Table 8.2.4 above shows mixed opinions as to 
whether or not the production of high quality work would actually result in more pay and 
whether the PRP scheme genuinely affected work performance. Just under half, (47 per cent), 
of the respondents agreed that producing high quality work will improve payment, while 40 per 
cent disagreed with the statement concerning the effect of PBIs on their performance.  
8.3. Objectives of PRP 
Different people perceive the same things differently. Similarly, the study wanted to find out 
how local government managers perceive the purpose for which an incentive scheme such as 
performance-pay is operated as one of the dimensions of the PM model. To do this the 
managers were asked to give their views on the reasons for introducing a performance-pay 
incentive scheme in their organisations.   
Then for simplicity, eight feasible objectives were generated (see question 3.0 in Appendix C) 
and the respondents were asked to rank them between 1 and 8 as highest and lowest, 
respectively. These responses are presented in Table 8.3.1 through 8.3.8 inclusive and also in 
their corresponding Bar Charts below.  
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Table 8.3.1: The main purpose of operating an incentive scheme is to reward good performance 
too busy to respond
exceptially highest
highest
higher
high rank
middle rank
low rank
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
50.0
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.00.0
38.6
7.1
7.1
5.7
5.7
7.1
10.0
8.6
7.1
 
Table 8.3.2: The main purpose of operating an incentive scheme is to remove the bargaining process away from 
trade unions 
too busy to respond
lowest
not applicable
Percent
6050403020100
50
43
7
 
Table 8.3.3: The main purpose is to reinforce existing culture, values and performance expectations 
too busy to respond
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
302520151050
26
14
9
10
7
9
6
13
7
 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
6  8 . 6  1 5 . 7  
H i g h e s t  7  1 0 . 0  2 5 . 7  
H i g h e r  5  7 . 1  3 2 . 9  
H i g h  r a n k  4  5 . 7  3 8 . 6  
M i d d l e  r a n k  4  5 . 7  4 4 . 3  
L o w  r a n k  5  7 . 1  5 1 . 4  
L o w e r  2  2 . 9  5 4 . 3  
L o w e s t  5  7 . 1  6 1 . 4  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2 7  3 8 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
L o w e s t  3 0  4 2 . 9  5 0 . 0  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3 5  5 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
H i g h e s t  9  1 2 . 9  2 0 . 0  
H i g h e r  4  5 . 7  2 5 . 7  
H i g h  6  8 . 6  3 4 . 3  
M i d d l e  r a n k  5  7 . 1  4 1 . 4  
L o w  7  1 0 . 0  5 1 . 4  
L o w e r  6  8 . 6  6 0 . 0  
L o w e s t  1 0  1 4 . 3  7 4 . 3  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1 8  2 5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.3.4: To promote organisational change 
too busy to respond
highest
higher
high
middle
low
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
50.045.040.035.030.025.020.015.010.05.00.0
42.9
12.9
10.0
10.0
10.0
7.1
 
 
Table 8.3.5: To motivate employees 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle
low
lowest
not applicable
Percent
302520151050
21
3
4
7
14
19
23
7
 
Table 8.3.6: To increase commitment to the organisation 
The trend analysis of the responses in Table 8.3.6 above 
are presented in a Bar Chart format as follows:   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
H i g h e s t  1  1 . 4  8 . 6  
H i g h e r  2  2 . 9  1 1 . 4  
H i g h  7  1 0 . 0  2 1 . 4  
M i d d l e  7  1 0 . 0  3 1 . 4  
L o w  7  1 0 . 0  4 1 . 4  
L o w e r  2  2 . 9  4 4 . 3  
L o w e s t  9  1 2 . 9  5 7 . 1  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3 0  4 2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
1 6  2 2 . 9  3 0 . 0  
H i g h e s t  1 3  1 8 . 6  4 8 . 6  
H i g h e r  1 0  1 4 . 3  6 2 . 9  
H i g h  5  7 . 1  7 0 . 0  
M i d d l e  3  4 . 3  7 4 . 3  
L o w  2  2 . 9  7 7 . 1  
L o w e s t  1  1 . 4  7 8 . 6  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1 5  2 1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
2  2 . 9  1 0 . 0  
H i g h e s t  1 8  2 5 . 7  3 5 . 7  
H i g h e r  8  1 1 . 4  4 7 . 1  
H i g h  1 4  2 0 . 0  6 7 . 1  
M i d d l e  r a n k  5  7 . 1  7 4 . 3  
L o w  2  2 . 9  7 7 . 1  
L o w e s t  1  1 . 4  7 8 . 6  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1 5  2 1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lowest
not applicable
Percent
302520151050
21
3
7
20
11
26
3
7
 
Table 8.3.7: To solve recruitment and retention of staff problem 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle
lowest
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
30
6
13
14
20
9
7
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  6  8 . 6  1 5 . 7  
H i g h e s t  
1 4  2 0 . 0  3 5 . 7  
H i g h e r  
1 0  1 4 . 3  5 0 . 0  
H i g h  
9  1 2 . 9  6 2 . 9  
M i d d l e  
4  5 . 7  6 8 . 6  
L o w e s t  
1  1 . 4  7 0 . 0  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  
2 1  3 0 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
  
 
- 239 -
Table 8.3.8: To improve performance of the organisation 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
lowest
not applicable
Percent
6050403020100
51
10
14
13
7
 
Analysis: 
The ranking of the managers’ views on the reasons or objectives for introducing an incentive 
scheme, which rewards employees based on performance, are summarised in Table 8.3.9 
below. The table displays the managers' views on the reasons behind the introduction of the 
scheme as proposed by the study.  
Table 8.3.9: Summary of the Ranking of Objectives of the PRP Scheme  
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
9  1 2 . 9  2 0 . 0  
H i g h e s t  1 0  1 4 . 3  3 4 . 3  
H i g h e r  7  1 0 . 0  4 4 . 3  
H i g h  1  1 . 4  4 5 . 7  
L o w e s t  2  2 . 9  4 8 . 6  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3 6  5 1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
T o t a l 7 0 1 0 0 0
R a n k e d  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  P R P  s c h e m e s   %  
R a n k  1 .  I m p r o v e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n   
5
7  
R a n k  2 .  To  r e w a r d  g o o d  p e r f o r m a n c e   
1
5  
R a n k  3 .  To  m o t i v a t e  e m p l o y e e s   9  
R a n k  4 .  S o l v e  r e c r u i t m e n t  a n d  r e t e n t i o n  o f  s t a f f  p r o b l e m   9  
R a n k  5 .  I n c r e a s e  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n   4  
R a n k  6 .  R e i n f o r c e  e x i s t i n g  c u l t u r e ,  v a l u e s  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e  e x p e c t a t i o n s   2  
R a n k  7 .  To  p r o m o t e  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  c h a n g e   2  
R a n k  8 .  To  r e m o v e  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  p r o c e s s  a w a y  f r o m  t r a d e  u n i o n s   2  
N = 7 0    
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Just over half of the 70 responding managers perceive that the primary objective of introducing 
a PRP scheme is to improve performance of the organisation. Other objectives are given less 
importance and issues such as the promotion of organisational change and the reduction in 
trade union influence, although well documented in the literature as objectives of PRP are not 
perceived to be of a significant importance in this study. Another contradictory response is the 
organisational culture and values being ranked 6th. It was postulated that this could feature to be 
one of the prominent dimensions of a satisfactional value of a performance-related incentive 
policy.  
8.4. Success of the Scheme  
The study also wanted to find out how the managers perceived the success of performance-pay 
incentive schemes in their respective local authorities. Therefore, they were asked to give their 
opinions on two different statements (see question 4.0 in Appendix C). Their responses are 
presented in Tables 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 followed by corresponding Bar Chart as generated by SPSS.  
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Table 8.4.1: Statement 1: Performance-based incentive scheme has been successful in achieving an overall 
increase in organisational performance in the local government system 
too busy to respond
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
6
6
17
14
33
17
7
 
Table 8.4.2: Statement 2: Performance-based incentive scheme has provided the authority with a useful tool in the 
delivery of quality public services 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
403020100
7
9
11
14
33
19
7
 
In addition to the responses as presented above, during the interviews there were a number of 
measures commented on by the managers which were considered to be directly linked to the 
introduction of PRP and provided a more useful tool for assessing PRP's success. Two of these 
are as follows: 
“I would quantify that success through the ISO 9000 scheme. Our reviews would 
indicate that management procedures are correct, quality scheme reviews ratings are 
being improved. Our customers...are now involved in the ISO 9000 and they are rating 
us and sending our ratings back to the ISO 9000, so customer ratings are 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  1 2  1 7 . 1  2 4 . 3  
A g r e e  
2 3  3 2 . 9  5 7 . 1  
N o  v i e w  
1 0  1 4 . 3  7 1 . 4  
D i s a g r e e  
1 2  1 7 . 1  8 8 . 6  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  4  5 . 7  9 4 . 3  
N o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  4  5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n s e  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  
1 3  1 8 . 6  2 5 . 7  
A g r e e  2 3  3 2 . 9  5 8 . 6  
N o  v i e w  1 0  1 4 . 3  7 2 . 9  
D i s a g r e e  8  1 1 . 4  8 4 . 3  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
6  8 . 6  9 2 . 9  
N o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
5  7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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improving as well.” (Chief Officer).  
“Customer service levels and marketing are very conscious of the targets being set, the 
key part of the equation. Definitely, improvement everywhere, working capital keeping 
it at most optimum level, marked improvement .” (Chief Officer).  
Analysis:  
Based on the evidence presented in section 8.4 above, table 8.4.3 summarises the responses to 
the two statements seeking to determine the success of the scheme as perceived by the 
managers.   
Statement 1: 'Performance-based incentive scheme has been successful in achieving an overall 
increase in organisational performance in the local government system.  
Statement 2: 'Performance-based incentive scheme has provided the authority with a useful tool 
in the delivery of quality public services'.  
Table 8.4.3: Summary of Managers’ Views about the Success of PRP  
As Table 8.4.3 above shows, a half of the respondents agreed with both statements, while just 
less than 20% of the respondents disagreed with the statements. However, a sizeable minority 
had no view on both statements (i.e. 27 per cent on Statement 1 and 28 per cent had no view on 
statement two). This gives an impression that a substantial proportion of the respondents are of 
the view that PRP scheme is a successful policy in the British local government system.  
Conversely, in the follow-up interviews and discussions, an improvement in overall 
performance, both organisational and individual, was stated as one of the priority objectives of 
the scheme. Although this securely indicates a measure of success, it is difficult to quantify it, 
as the statement is rather a general one; it does not specify the context of success, or indeed, 
how it is measured. The question is whether this improvement in performance was a direct 
result of the monetary incentive, or whether PRP brings additional benefits, which 
 S t a t e m e n t  1  ( % )  S t a t e m e n t  2  ( % )  
S t r o n g l y  D i s a g r e e   6  9  
D i s a g r e e   1 7  1 1  
N o  V i e w   2 7  2 8  
A g r e e   3 3  3 3  
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e   1 7  1 9  
N = 7 0     
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create the motivational force for improving performance. 
8.5. Effect of PRP on Performance  
Perception of equity of the performance-pay incentive scheme was also examined from the 
viewpoint of the effect of the schemes on performance. The assumption here is that the more 
effective the PRP scheme on performance, the more equitable the managers perceive it to be. 
Therefore, managers were asked to give their personal views on five different statements (see 
question 5.0 in Appendix C) that were necessary to assess their overall perception about the 
schemes’ effect on performance. The responses to these statements are presented in Tables 
8.5.1 through 8.5.5 inclusive along with their corresponding Bar Charts. 
Table 8.5.1: A performance-based incentive scheme makes me focus on what I'm meant to achieve 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
disagree
not applicable
Percent
6050403020100
7
10
54
21
7
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 5  2 1 . 4  2 8 . 6  
A g r e e  3 8  5 4 . 3  8 2 . 9  
D i s a g r e e  7  1 0 . 0  9 2 . 9  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  5  7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.5.2: A PBI scheme promotes improvement in organisational performance 
The trend analysis of the responses in Table 8.5.2 above 
are presented in a Bar Chart format as follows:   
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
disagree
not applicable
Percent
706050403020100
11
59
21
7
 
Table 8.5.3: An incentive scheme improves communication with the individual supervisor, the managers' 
supervisor and improvement in performance 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
50454035302520151050
6
6
19
10
41
11
7
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  
1 5  2 1 . 4  2 8 . 6  
A g r e e  
4 1  5 8 . 6  8 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  
8  1 1 . 4  9 8 . 6  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  
1  1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
r e s p o n s e s  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  8  1 1 . 4  1 8 . 6  
A g r e e  2 9  4 1 . 4  6 0 . 0  
N o  v i e w  7  1 0 . 0  7 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  1 3  1 8 . 6  8 8 . 6  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
4  5 . 7  9 4 . 3  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  4  5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.5.4: A PBI scheme helps managers to focus on certain objectives 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
50403020100
9
6
47
27
7
 
Table 8.5.5: A PBI scheme provides greater opportunity to interact on a more frequent basis with the supervisor 
for discussing the focus of direction of the targets set 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
21
20
37
10
7
 
 
Rarely have more than 20% of the respondents agreed that PRP has given them an incentive to 
change any specified form of their behaviour at work and raised organisational performance. 
Within even that total, the number of those who ‘strongly agree’ is very low, and is easily 
swamped by those who express strong disagreement. 
8.6. Drawbacks with the Scheme  
In the literature review and during the pilot study in Solihull Borough Council it was observed 
that performance-pay incentive schemes have had to be abandoned for some reasons. The study 
was then prompted to survey and establish if these failures were due to systematic 
  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 9  2 7 . 1  3 4 . 3  
A g r e e  3 3  4 7 . 1  8 1 . 4  
N o  v i e w  4  5 . 7  8 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  6  8 . 6  9 5 . 7  
S t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e  1  1 . 4  9 7 . 1  
N o t a p p l i c a b l e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  7  1 0 . 0  1 7 . 1  
A g r e e  2 6  3 7 . 1  5 4 . 3  
N o  v i e w  1 4  2 0 . 0  7 4 . 3  
D i s a g r e e  1 5  2 1 . 4  9 5 . 7  
S t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e  1  1 . 4  9 7 . 1  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  
1 0 0 .
0  
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drawbacks across all sectors. Therefore, the respondents were asked to rank a range of possible 
drawbacks according to their relative importance. These responses are presented in Tables 8.6.1 
through 8.6.7 inclusive below.  
Table 8.6.1: The amount of reward involved is not enough to substantiate a change in performance 
 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
302520151050
21
6
3
13
10
6
17
10
7
7
 
Table 8.6.2: PRP negatively affects team spirit, and co-operation can be jeopardised 
 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
5  7 . 1  1 4 . 3  
H i g h e s t  7  1 0 . 0  2 4 . 3  
H i g h e r  1 2  1 7 . 1  4 1 . 4  
H i g h  4  5 . 7  4 7 . 1  
M i d d l e  r a n k  7  1 0 . 0  5 7 . 1  
L o w  9  1 2 . 9  7 0 . 0  
L o w e r  2  2 . 9  7 2 . 9  
L o w e s t  4  5 . 7  7 8 . 6  
N o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
1 5  2 1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   
F r e q  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
1  1 . 4  8 . 6  
H i g h e s t  1 2  1 7 . 1  2 5 . 7  
H i g h e r  1 2  1 7 . 1  4 2 . 9  
H i g h  6  8 . 6  5 1 . 4  
M i d d l e  r a n k  6  8 . 6  6 0 . 0  
L o w  4  5 . 7  6 5 . 7  
L o w e s t  8  1 1 . 4  7 7 . 1  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1 6  2 2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lowest
not applicable
Percent
302520151050
23
11
6
9
9
17
17
7
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Table 8.6.3: Performance pay encourages employees to exercise a narrow focus on short-term quantifiable goals, 
neglecting long-term issues 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
302520151050
27
13
7
4
7
19
11
3
7
 
Table 8.6.4: Performance-based pay incentives are not successful in improving employee motivation 
 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
302520151050
19
14
3
20
23
7
4
7
 
 
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%)
To o  b u s y   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p t i o n a l l y  h i g h e s t  2  2 . 9  1 0 . 0  
H i g h e s t  8  1 1 . 4  2 1 . 4  
H i g h e r  1 3  1 8 . 6  4 0 . 0  
H i g h  5  7 . 1  4 7 . 1  
M i d d l e  r a n k  3  4 . 3  5 1 . 4  
L o w  5  7 . 1  5 8 . 6  
L o w e r  1  1 . 4  6 0 . 0  
L o w e s t  9  1 2 . 9  7 2 . 9  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1 9  2 7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
e x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
1  1 . 4  8 . 6  
H i g h e s t  1  1 . 4  1 0 . 0  
H i g h e r  3  4 . 3  1 4 . 3  
H i g h  5  7 . 1  2 1 . 4  
m i d d l e  r a n k  1 6  2 2 . 9  4 4 . 3  
L o w  1 4  2 0 . 0  6 4 . 3  
L o w e r  2  2 . 9  6 7 . 1  
L o w e s t  1 0  1 4 . 3  8 1 . 4  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1 3  1 8 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.6.5: It is principally unfair in discriminating between individual contributions 
 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
50403020100
39
4
4
19
14
7
7
 
 
Table 8.6.6: Difficult to measure individual performance objectively 
 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lowest
not applicable
Percent
50
48
45
43
40
38
35
33
30
28
25
23
20
18
15
13
10
8
5
3
0
39
7
11
14
11
6
7
 
 
Table 8.6.7: Assumes that money is the best reward 
too busy to respond
exceptionally highes
highest
higher
high
middle rank
low
lower
lowest
not applicable
Percent
50
48
45
43
40
38
35
33
30
28
25
23
20
18
15
13
10
8
5
3
0
46
10
10
7
7
7
7
 
 
 r e s p o n s e s  Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
e x c e p t i o n a l l y  
h i g h e s t  
5  7 . 1  1 4 . 3  
H i g h e s t  1 0  1 4 . 3  2 8 . 6  
H i g h e r  1 3  1 8 . 6  4 7 . 1  
H i g h  2  2 . 9  5 0 . 0  
m i d d l e  r a n k  3  4 . 3  5 4 . 3  
L o w  3  4 . 3  5 8 . 6  
L o w e r  1  1 . 4  6 0 . 0  
L o w e s t  1  1 . 4  6 1 . 4  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2 7  3 8 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
r e s p o n s e s  Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e .  h i g h e s t  4  5 . 7  1 2 . 9  
H i g h e s t  8  1 1 . 4  2 4 . 3  
H i g h e r  1 0  1 4 . 3  3 8 . 6  
H i g h  8  1 1 . 4  5 0 . 0  
m i d d l e  r a n k  5  7 . 1  5 7 . 1  
L o w  2  2 . 9  6 0 . 0  
L o w e s t  1  1 . 4  6 1 . 4  
n o t  a p p l i c .   2 7  3 8 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
E x c e p .  h i g h e s t  2  2 . 9  1 0 . 0  
H i g h e s t  5  7 . 1  1 7 . 1  
H i g h e r  5  7 . 1  2 4 . 3  
H i g h  5  7 . 1  3 1 . 4  
m i d d l e  r a n k  7  1 0 . 0  4 1 . 4  
L o w  7  1 0 . 0  5 1 . 4  
L o w e r  1  1 . 4  5 2 . 9  
L o w e s t  1  1 . 4  5 4 . 3  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3 2  4 5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
T o t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Analysis:  
Based on the summary of responses in Table 8.6.8 below, 42 per cent of managers ranked the 
measurement of performance as the greatest difficulty process when operating the PRP scheme. 
The second greatest (21 per cent) drawback with the scheme involved a short-term focus on 
objectives, to the neglect of longer-term issues. This is discussed in the next subsection. 
Table 8.6.8: Summary of Ranked Drawbacks with the PRP scheme 
The third greatest (12 per cent) drawback with the scheme involved a lack of reward. That is 
the pay package is normally far below the prevailing market rate. This coincides with concerns 
reiterated in the literature that pay being an extrinsic reward system, will only have a significant 
impact on performance, as a motivational device if the amount involved is substantially large 
enough to attract the attention of the managers.  The other drawbacks listed received relatively 
little attention among the managers.  
8.7. Short-term Objectives, Targets and Feedback 
Equity of an incentive scheme based on performance may be perceived to be in existence if 
there is a plausible balance between short and long-term performance objectives.  That is long-
term objectives should not be ignored for the sake of maximising short-term objectives 
designed to facilitate the easy earning of performance-pay rewards. In order to survey the views 
S t a t e m e n t  %  
R a n k  1 .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m e a s u r e  i n d i v i d u a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  o b j e c t i v e l y   4 2  
R a n k  2 .  P R P  e n c o u r a g e s  e m p l o y e e s  t o  e x e r c i s e  a  n a r r o w  f o c u s  o n  s h o r t - t e r m  q u a n t i f i a b l e  
g o a l s ,  n e g l e c t i n g  l o n g  t e r m  i s s u e s   
2 1  
R a n k  3 .  T h e  a m o u n t  o f  p a y  i n v o l v e d  i s  n o t  e n o u g h  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  a  c h a n g e  i n  p e r f o r m a n c e   1 2  
R a n k  4 .  I t  a s s u m e s  t h a t  m o n e y  i s  t h e  b e s t  r e w a r d   9  
R a n k  5 .  I t  i s  n o t  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  i m p r o v i n g  e m p l o y e e  m o t i v a t i o n   8  
R a n k  6 .  P R P  n e g a t i v e l y  a f f e c t s  t e a m w o r k ,  &  c o - o p e r a t i o n  c a n  s u f f e r   6  
R a n k  7 .  I t  i s  p r i n c i p a l l y  u n f a i r  i n  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  b e t w e e n  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s   2  
N = 7 0    
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of local government managers about this issue, the respondents were asked to comment on the 
statement of whether in practice there is over-emphasis on short-term work objectives as a 
common difficulty with performance-based incentive schemes.  
Their views are presented in Tables 8.7.1 through 8.7.3 inclusive and in the corresponding 
trend analyses in  Bar Charts. 
Table 8.7.1: In practice, there is over-emphasis on short-term work objectives as a common difficulty with 
performance-based incentive schemes 
The trend analysis of the responses in Table 8.7.1 
above are presented in a Bar Chart format as follows:   
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
50454035302520151050
11
20
43
14
7
 
The second issue was to find out the views of local government managers about the relevance 
of performance targets upon which performance-pay packages are based. Their responses are 
presented in Table 8.7.2 and in the corresponding Bar Chart below. 
Table 8.7.2: Targets may become irrelevant as a result of circumstances beyond the manager's direct control 
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 0  1 4 . 3  2 1 . 4  
A g r e e  3 0  4 2 . 9  6 4 . 3  
N o  v i e w  1 4  2 0 . 0  8 4 . 3  
D i s a g r e e  8  1 1 . 4  9 5 . 7  
S t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e  1  1 . 4  9 7 . 1  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
not applicable
Percent
605550454035302520151050
7
53
26
7
 
During the follow-up interviews, some 
managers indicated that targets may become irrelevant as a result of circumstances beyond the 
manager's direct control. As one respondent commented:  
“It does not take into consideration the unexpected which necessitates an extremely 
high level of work on targets outside those set which might leave you in a position of not 
having achieved the set targets while having worked extremely hard .” (Chief Officer).   
This comment summed up the feeling of many respondents on this issue and appeared to be the 
cause of genuine frustration amongst the managers. It may also be linked to the extent of 
feedback available to managers. Thus, when asked for their opinions on the statement about the 
extent of feedback they receive, only 48.5 per cent agreed, 11.4 % of which strongly agreed. 
The summary of their responses is presented in Table 8.7.3 and  Bar Chart below. 
Table 8.7.3: I am provided with a great deal of feedback and guidance on the quality of my work 
 
  Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 8  2 5 . 7  3 2 . 9  
A g r e e  3 7  5 2 . 9  8 5 . 7  
N o  v i e w  3  4 . 3  9 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  5  7 . 1  9 7 . 1  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  8  1 1 . 4  1 8 . 6  
A g r e e  2 6  3 7 . 1  5 5 . 7  
N o  v i e w  1 2  1 7 . 1  7 2 . 9  
D i s a g r e e  1 4  2 0 . 0  9 2 . 9  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
4  5 . 7  9 8 . 6  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1  1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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The trend analysis of the responses in Table 8.7.3 above are presented in a Bar Chart format as follows:  
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
6
20
17
37
11
7
 
The literature highlights an over-emphasis on short-term objectives as a common difficulty 
with PRP schemes (Flynn, op. cit.; Hughes, op. cit; and Hood, op. cit.), and this difficulty was 
found in the local authorities, with an over-emphasis on short-term objectives ranked as second 
on the list of drawbacks with the current scheme. Table 8.7.1 shows that 57.2 per cent of 
managers agreed with the statement that 'there is an over-emphasis on short-term work 
objectives', while only 12.8 per cent disagreed and 20 per cent of the managers were not 
prepared to express their views about this statement. During follow-up interviews one of the 
respondents commented that: “Short-term goals can result in long-term neglect and the attitude 
of ‘let next year look after itself’ starts to creep in (CEO).” 
8.8. Performance and Reward Links  
The respondents were asked to give their views on the three statements (see question 9.0 in 
Appendix C) that were intended to elicit their perception about links between performance and 
pay awards. Their responses to these three questions are presented in Tables 8.8.1 through 8.8.3 
inclusive and in the corresponding trend analyses in Bar Charts below. 
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Table 8.8.1: Producing high quality work is rewarded with more pay 
 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
302520151050
7
13
26
27
20
7
 
 
Table 8.8.2: PBI scheme has no effect on my work performance 
 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
50454035302520151050
43
7
30
10
7
 
 
 
Table 8.8.3: The most important thing about a job is pay 
too busy to response
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
50454035302520151050
27
43
13
10
7
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 4  2 0 . 0  2 7 . 1  
A g r e e  1 9  2 7 . 1  5 4 . 3  
n o  v i e w  1 8  2 5 . 7  8 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  9  1 2 . 9  9 2 . 9  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
5  7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 
  Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  7  1 0 . 0  1 7 . 1  
A g r e e  2 1  3 0 . 0  4 7 . 1  
N o  v i e w  5  7 . 1  5 4 . 3  
D i s a g r e e  3 0  4 2 . 9  9 7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
A g r e e  7  1 0 . 0  1 7 . 1  
n o  v i e w  9  1 2 . 9  3 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  3 0  4 2 . 9  7 2 . 9  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
1 9  2 7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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8.9. Effects of PRP on Team-spirit 
During the pilot study interviews and literature reviews, it was pointed out that one of the 
reasons for abandoning PRP schemes is its negativity effects on team spirit amongst employees 
– that, it is divisive, therefore not implementable. To test the validity of this claim, 70 local 
government managers were asked to give their personal views about three different statements 
(see question 10.0 in Appendix C) that were designed for the purpose. The views of the 
managers about these statements are presented in Tables 8.9.1 through 8.9.3 inclusive and in 
the corresponding trend analyses in Bar Charts.   
Table 8.9.1: PBI schemes contribute to more effective teamwork 
The trend analysis of the responses in Table 8.9.1 above are presented in a Bar Chart format as follows:   
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
Percent
4035302520151050
9
21
27
31
4
7
 
 
 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r
e  r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  
3  4 . 3  1 1 . 4  
A g r e e  2 2  3 1 . 4  4 2 . 9  
n o  v i e w  1 9  2 7 . 1  7 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  1 5  2 1 . 4  9 1 . 4  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
6  8 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.9.2: PBI schemes negatively affect teamwork, and co-operation can suffer 
The trend analysis of the responses in Table 8.9.2 above 
are presented in a Bar Chart format as follows:   
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
24
16
29
17
4
7
 
Table 8.9.3: There is a need for an appeals system 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
9
Percent
50454035302520151050
9
10
39
34
7
 
 
Analysis: 
Among managers, there appeared to be mixed views on the benefits of PRP in relation to 
teamwork. Just under half (48.5 per cent) agreed that PRP contributed to more effective 
teamwork while 31 per cent were in disagreement. Furthermore, 48 per cent of respondents 
ranked the statement 'PRP negatively affects teamwork, and co-operation can suffer' in the top 
three disadvantages with the scheme. Comments expressed by the managers 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  a g r e e  3  4 . 3  1 1 . 4  
A g r e e  1 2  1 7 . 1  2 8 . 6  
n o  v i e w  2 0  2 8 . 6  5 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  1 1  1 5 . 7  7 2 . 9  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
1 7  2 4 . 3  9 7 . 1  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
R e s p o n s e s  Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  
2 4  3 4 . 3  4 1 . 4  
A g r e e  2 7  3 8 . 6  8 0 . 0  
n o  v i e w  7  1 0 . 0  9 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  6  8 . 6  9 8 . 6  
N o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
1  1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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did not indicate that PRP had created a positive effect on teamwork: 'Individuals will sacrifice 
team goals for their own glory' (Manager, 2000) was just one of the comments which reflected 
the views of many.  
During follow-up interviews, some managers commented on the lack of co-operation because 
of the PRP system, and its failure to achieve a sense of team spirit. However, it may be worth 
considering that the type of motivation provided by PRP, as one manager pointed out, may 
affect the issue of teamwork:  
“It helps to motivate certain individuals with competitive instincts. It doesn't motivate 
people who will do a good job come what may. It can therefore be divisive on a team 
with two types of personalities.” (CEO). 
 
8.10. Joint Consultation in goal-setting process 
The role of consultations in the formulation of performance objectives and targets is paramount 
to the effectiveness and achievement of the intended corporate objectives. Therefore, the study 
asked 70 local government managers to comment on two different statements (see question 
11.0 in Appendix C) that were designed to elicit their personal involvement in the various 
stages of objective formulation processes. Their responses are presented in Tables 8.10.1 and 
8.10.2, and in the corresponding trend analyses in Bar Charts.   
Table 8.10.1: I really have little voice in the formulation of my work objectives 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
19
34
17
19
7
 
 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r
e  r e s p o n s e s  
Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  
1  1 . 4  8 . 6  
A g r e e  1 3  1 8 . 6  2 7 . 1  
n o  v i e w  1 2  1 7 . 1  4 4 . 3  
D i s a g r e e  2 4  3 4 . 3  7 8 . 6  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
1 3  1 8 . 6  9 7 . 1  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.10.2: I am allowed a high degree of influence in the determination of my work objectives 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
50454035302520151050
13
20
43
11
7
 
Analysis:  
The importance of joint consultation to the perception of equity of PRP schemes is discussed in 
detail within the literature. According to Williams et al. (1993:144), 'employees are much more 
likely to respond to clearly defined mutually agreed individual objectives, than they are to 
grand statements about corporate values, however eloquently they are articulated.' This survey 
indicates that the extent of this difficulty within the sectors in question is relatively limited, 
with a majority of 74 per cent overwhelmingly agreeing that they have little voice in the 
formulation of their work objectives and just 10 per cent agreeing that they are allowed a high 
degree of influence in the determination of work objectives. Table 8.10.2 displays these 
responses to a couple of statements concerning the issue of joint consultation in goal-setting 
process.  
Table 8.10.2: Joint consultations in goal-setting  
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
t o o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
s t r o n g l y  a g r e e  8  1 1 . 4  1 8 . 6  
A g r e e  3 0  4 2 . 9  6 1 . 4  
n o  v i e w  1 4  2 0 . 0  8 1 . 4  
D i s a g r e e  9  1 2 . 9  9 4 . 3  
s t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
2  2 . 9  9 7 . 1  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 
S t a t e m e n t  
A g r e e  
%  
D i s a g r e e  
%  
N o  V i e w  
%  
I  r e a l l y  h a v e  l i t t l e  v o i c e  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  m y  w o r k  
o b j e c t i v e s   
7 4  2 0  6  
I  a m  a l l o w e d  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
o f  m y  w o r k  o b j e c t i v e s   
1 0  8 2  8  
N = 7 0      
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8.11. Improvement in Performance 
Finally, the study surveyed the perception of local government managers about the overall 
improvement in performance that may be attributable to performance-pay incentive schemes. 
The managers were asked to give their personal views on eleven key statements (see question 
12.0 in Appendix C). Their responses are presented in the following Tables 8.11.1 through 
8.11.11 inclusive and in the corresponding trend analyses in Bar Charts. 
Table 8.11.1:  With PBI scheme my individual efforts and achievements are recognised 
 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
4
4
14
17
37
16
7
 
Table 8.11.2: With PBI scheme, my work objectives are clear and specific. I know exactly what my job is all about 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
50454035302520151050
6
4
21
44
16
7
 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 1  1 5 . 7  2 2 . 9  
A g r e e  2 6  3 7 . 1  6 0 . 0  
N o  v i e w  1 2  1 7 . 1  7 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  1 0  1 4 . 3  9 1 . 4  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
3  4 . 3  9 5 . 7  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3  4 . 3  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 1  1 5 . 7  2 2 . 9  
A g r e e  3 1  4 4 . 3  6 7 . 1  
N o  v i e w  1 5  2 1 . 4  8 8 . 6  
D i s a g r e e  1  1 . 4  9 0 . 0  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
3  4 . 3  9 4 . 3  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  4  5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.11.3: With PBI scheme I can see how my work contributes to the organisation as a whole 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
6
6
17
24
33
7
7
 
 
Table 8.11.4: With PBI scheme I have a clear idea about how the organisation is performing overall 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
605550454035302520151050
49
20
14
7
 
 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  
5  7 . 1  1 4 . 3  
A g r e e  2 3  3 2 . 9  4 7 . 1  
N o  v i e w  1 7  2 4 . 3  7 1 . 4  
D i s a g r e e  1 2  1 7 . 1  8 8 . 6  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
4  5 . 7  9 4 . 3  
N o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
4  5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
R e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y   5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r .  A g r e e  3  4 . 3  1 1 . 4  
A g r e e  1 0  1 4 . 3  2 5 . 7  
N o  v i e w  1 4  2 0 . 0  4 5 . 7  
D i s a g r e e  3 4  4 8 . 6  9 4 . 3  
S t r.  d i s a g r e e  3  4 . 3  9 8 . 6  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1  1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
T l 7 0 1 0 0 0
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Table 8.11.5:  I am generally told what is going on in the organisation 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
not applicable
Percent
605550454035302520151050
34
53
7
 
Table 8.11.6: I have got a clear idea of what this organisation's goals and plans are for the future 
 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
not applicable
Percent
605550454035302520151050
34
54
7
 
 
Table 8.11.7: PBI scheme has yet to overcome some of the difficulties in this organisation 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
50454035302520151050
6
43
21
14
7
7
 
 
 Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  
Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  3 7  5 2 . 9  6 0 . 0  
A g r e e  2 4  3 4 . 3  9 4 . 3  
N o  v i e w  2  2 . 9  9 7 . 1  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  2  2 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  3 8  5 4 . 3  6 1 . 4  
A g r e e  2 4  3 4 . 3  9 5 . 7  
N o  v i e w  2  2 . 9  9 8 . 6  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1  1 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
 
 Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s  Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  
5  7 . 1  1 4 . 3  
A g r e e  1 0  1 4 . 3  2 8 . 6  
N o  v i e w  1 5  2 1 . 4  5 0 . 0  
D i s a g r e e  3 0  4 2 . 9  9 2 . 9  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
1  1 . 4  9 4 . 3  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  4  5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.11.8: Increased communications with the boss as a result of PBIs 
too busy to response
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
50454035302520151050
4
6
29
46
9
7
 
 
 
Table 8.11.9: PBIs makes me show more initiative 
too busy to response
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
16
23
34
14
6
7
 
 
Table 8.11.10:  PBIs makes me focus on what I'm meant to achieve 
too busy to response
strongly agree
agree
no view
disagree
strongly disagree
not applicable
Percent
4035302520151050
7
10
36
13
26
7
 
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
A g r e e  6  8 . 6  1 5 . 7  
N o  v i e w  3 2  4 5 . 7  6 1 . 4  
D i s a g r e e  2 0  2 8 . 6  9 0 . 0  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
4  5 . 7  9 5 . 7  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  3  4 . 3  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
A g r e e  4  5 . 7  1 2 . 9  
N o  v i e w  1 0  1 4 . 3  2 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  2 4  3 4 . 3  6 1 . 4  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
1 6  2 2 . 9  8 4 . 3  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  1 1  1 5 . 7  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1  1 . 4  8 . 6  
A g r e e  1 8  2 5 . 7  3 4 . 3  
N o  v i e w  9  1 2 . 9  4 7 . 1  
D i s a g r e e  2 5  3 5 . 7  8 2 . 9  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
7  1 0 . 0  9 2 . 9  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  5  7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  
1 0 0 .
0  
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Table 8.11.11:  I have a clear idea of the council's goals and plans for the future 
not applicable
strongly disagree
disagree
no view
agree
strongly agree
too busy to response
Pe
rc
en
t
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
7
66
14
44
16
7
 
 
Analysis: 
In the follow-up interviews, although PRP had disadvantages for some managers, there were 
others who supported both its principles and operation. Individuals indicating a positive 
response to the statement 'With PRP my individual efforts and achievements are recognised' 
seemed to be far clearer about their work objectives and how their work contributed to the 
organisation. They also appeared to be well informed about the authorities' plans and 
performance, and had few difficulties with PRP.  
In an effort to establish the most effective way of improving on performance, a detailed 
analysis of those who had perceived an improvement in performance was carried out. Three 
quarters of respondents agreed with the statement, 'PRP has contributed to a general 
improvement in performance.' This proportion of managers appeared to have found increased 
communication with their supervisors and a more focused direction in their work. They also 
seemed to have a clear idea of their organisations’ goals for the future of the organisation, and 
have found PRP to have affected the extent of initiative shown in their work. Managers who 
agreed with the statement 'with PRP my individual achievements are recognised' similarly 
agreed with the statement 'PRP gives an incentive to work beyond the requirements of the job.' 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
5  7 . 1  7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  a g r e e  1 1  1 5 . 7  2 2 . 9  
A g r e e  3 1  4 4 . 3  6 7 . 1  
N o  v i e w  1 0  1 4 . 3  8 1 . 4  
D i s a g r e e  4  5 . 7  8 7 . 1  
S t r o n g l y  
d i s a g r e e  
4  5 . 7  9 2 . 9  
N o t  a p p l i c a b l e  5  7 . 1  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  7 0  1 0 0 . 0   
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This indicates the possibility that recognition gives incentive to increase performance, lending 
support to the argument that the key to increasing performance may be obtained through, not a 
monetary incentive, but through the recognition element of an incentive policy. 
8.12. Attitude and Discontent Survey  
Finally, the study conducted an attitude survey amongst 52 local government managers about 
the effectiveness of PRP schemes. The responses are as follows:  
Table 8.12.1: How would you rate the attitude of employees covered by the PRP about the effectiveness of the 
scheme? 
The graphical presentation of Table 8.12.1 is as follows: 
80.8%
7.7%
5.8%
3.8%
1.9%
not applicable
mixed feelings
mostly happy
mostly unhappy
Too busy to respond
 
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e s p o n s e s   Freq % Cum(%) 
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
m o s t l y  u n h a p p y  
2  3 . 8  5 . 8  
m o s t l y  h a p p y  
3  5 . 8  1 1 . 5  
m i x e d  f e e l i n g s  
4  7 . 7  1 9 . 2  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  
4 2  8 0 . 8  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.12.2: How would you rate the attitude of employees NOT covered by the PRP scheme about its 
effectiveness? 
not applicable
mixed feelings
mostly happy
very happy
mostly unhappy
not happy at all
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 8.12.3: Where discontent has arisen within  has it been the question of the scope of the PRP scheme? 
76.9%
11.5%
9.6%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
 
Table 8.12.4: Where discontent has arisen within the authority, has it been the question of the perceived fairness 
of individual performance targets? 
76.9%
13.5%
7.7%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
 
Ty p e  o f  
r e s p o n s e  
F r e q  %  
C u m u l a t i v e  
P e r c e n t  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
n o t  h a p p y   1  1 . 9  3 . 8  
m o s t l y  
u n h a p p y  
1  1 . 9  5 . 8  
v e r y  h a p p y  1  1 . 9  7 . 7  
m o s t l y  h a p p y  2  3 . 8  1 1 . 5  
m i x e d  
f e e l i n g s  
4  7 . 7  1 9 . 2  
n o t  a p p l i c .   4 2  8 0 . 8  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
 T y p e  o f  
r e s p o n s e  
F r e q u e
n c y  
P e r c e n t  
C u m u l a
t i v e  
P e r c e n
t  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
N o  5  9 . 6  1 1 . 5  
Y e s  6  1 1 . 5  2 3 . 1  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
4 0  7 6 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
 T y p e  o f  
r e s p o n s e  
F r e q u e n c y  P e r c e n t  
C u m u l a
t i v e  
P e r c e n t  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
Y e s  
4  7 . 7  9 . 6  
N o  
7  1 3 . 5  2 3 . 1  
N o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  4 0  7 6 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
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Table 8.12.5: Where discontent has arisen within the authority, has it been the question of the process of 
appraising individual performance? 
71.2%
15.4%
11.5%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes
No
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 8.12.6: Where discontent has arisen within the authority, has it been the question of the ranking of 
individual performance? 
The graphical presentation of Table 8.12.6 is as follows: 
76.9%
15.4%
5.8%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
Table 8.12.7: Where discontent has arisen within the authority, has it been the question of adequacy of the linkage 
of pay to individual performance? 
 T y p e  o f  
r e s p o n s e  
F r e q .  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
N o  
6  1 1 . 5  1 3 . 5  
Y e s  
8  1 5 . 4  2 8 . 8  
N o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  3 7  7 1 . 2  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
Ty p e  o f  
r e s p o n s e  
F r e q .  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  
1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
Y e s  3  5 . 8  7 . 7  
N o  8  1 5 . 4  2 3 . 1  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  
4 0  7 6 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
 T y p e  o f  r e s p o n s e  F r e q .  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  r e s p o n d  1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
Y e s  5  9 . 6  1 1 . 5  
N o  6  1 1 . 5  2 3 . 1  
n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  4 0  7 6 . 9  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
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The graphical presentation of Table 8.12.7 is as follows: 
76.9%
11.5%
9.6%
1.9%
not applicable
No
Yes
Too busy to respond
 
 
Table 8.12.8: Where discontent has arisen within the authority, has it been the question of none of the above? 
 
90.4%
5.8%
1.9%
1.9%
not applicable
Yes, please specify
No discontent at all
Too busy to respond
 
 
8.13. Key findings: Stakeholders’ perceptions on PRP schemes 
The long-standing debate about the compatibility of market-based management techniques in 
PSOs and what motivates public sector managers has by no means been resolved through this 
study as further research is still called for. However, some interesting conclusions about the 
following six key issues can be drawn.   
 (a) It is essential to relate pay to performance but the schemes are unfairly operated – principle 
vs. process   
Except for the idea of PBIs being perceived to be unfair, more than half of the respondents have 
Ty p e  o f  
r e s p o n s e  
F r e q .  %  C u m ( % )  
To o  b u s y  t o  
r e s p o n d  1  1 . 9  1 . 9  
N o  
d i s c o n t e n t  a t  
a l l  
1  1 . 9  3 . 8  
Y e s ,  p l e a s e  
s p e c i f y  3  5 . 8  9 . 6  
n o t  
a p p l i c a b l e  4 7  9 0 . 4  1 0 0 . 0  
To t a l  
5 2  1 0 0 . 0   
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agreed that the policy and principle of relating pay to performance is essentially a good one. 
More than half of the respondents have agreed that, where properly operated, the PBIs have 
been successful in achieving an overall increase in organisational performance in the local 
government system, and have provided the authorities with a useful tool in the delivery of 
quality public services. Only 47% of the respondents are of the view that a PBI scheme 
provides greater opportunity to interact on a more frequent basis with the supervisor for 
discussing the focus of direction of the targets set. 
(b) Pay is an irrelevant motivator if the package is unattractive and feedback is ineffective 
The most important thing about a job is not pay. However, the respondents unanimously agree 
that pay can be a motivator if: (i) the package is competitively substantial; and, (ii) employees 
receive a considerable amount of feedback concerning the quality of their output.  
(c) The main purpose of a PBI scheme is to cultivate organisational achievement culture 
Highly ranked purposes for which an incentive scheme is operated to reward good performance 
are: (i) to promote organisational change; (ii) to motivate employees; and (iii) to solve the 
problems of recruitment and retention of staff.  
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(d) The main drawbacks with the PRP are attributable to coverage of the schemes 
The highly ranked drawbacks with the schemes are: (1) the effects of the PRP schemes on team 
spirit where only some of the employees are covered; (2) the inadequacy of amount of reward 
involved; and (3) the difficulties in measuring individual performance objectively. 
(e) PBIs contribute to short-termism objectives 
The study also observed that rewarding employees based on performance makes them focus 
mainly on short-term work objectives rather than long-term, and performance targets may 
become irrelevant as a result of circumstances beyond the manager's direct control. The 
challenge for policy makers is to recognise the importance of process measures and innovation 
and learning strategies for genuine, long-term quality improvement in the delivery of Best 
Value services. Genuine improvement over the long-term rather than ‘short-term fix’ will only 
occur when managers and policy makers pay attention to the way people work and the attitudes 
and beliefs they hold while performing this work. 
(f) Goal-setting process encourages joint consultation and is a significant incentive 
Responses about joint consultation in objective and goal setting indicate that most of employees 
participate in the formulation of work objectives and are allowed a high degree of influence in 
the determination of work objectives. This is a huge source of motivation which may result in 
high performance as pointed out above. 
(g) The general perception about PRP schemes 
Finally, the general perception of the respondents about PRP is that the schemes do motivate 
some individual efforts and achievements are recognised. About 40% of the respondents feel 
that the schemes help them to see how their work contributes to the organisation as a whole and 
only 22% of them think that the schemes have yet to overcome some of the difficulties in their 
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organisations. However, almost all of them agree that the schemes do help them to figure out 
what the goals and plans of their organisations are for the future. Surprisingly, the minority of 
the respondents (9%) are of the view that PRP schemes have helped to increase 
communications with their line managers.  This suggests that there is a communication barrier 
between the parties involved due to (may be) lack of consultation. 
8.14. Conclusion 
The examination of 12 parameters of equity dimensions of a performance-related incentive 
policy in the British LGs indicates a skewed support of the strategy. The main conclusion to be 
drawn is that the schemes are installed on a flawed environment on one hand and are not 
organisation specific on the other. This exposes them to criticisms of being unfair, divisive and 
incompatible with traditional values of political institutions such as local governments. 
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Chapter Nine 
CASE 4: THE CASE STUDY OF PRP SCHEMES IN BRITISH 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
9.0. Introduction 
This chapter is a closer look at issues examined in the survey using questionnaires in chapter 6, 
7, and 8 above. Most importantly it seeks to test the generalisations of motivation theories of 
AGREE in a public sector perspective as already discussed in the literature review in chapter 
two above. The chapter consolidates these theorems with the experience of implementing PRP 
schemes in public sector environment using the case study of British local government system 
and sets the scene for conclusions in the next final chapter. The case study research provides 
valuable insights of issues which arose during the survey phase about which in-depth 
information was not provided due to the nature of the data collection instruments used. The 
interviewees (mainly senior managers – see Appendix D) were mainly drawn from five local 
authorities of Solihull, Redditch, Birmingham, Warwickshire and Sandwell. The chapter is 
organised into four main parts. 
Firstly, the chapter highlights the overall context of PRP schemes. Secondly, it analyses 
interviews and discussions held during case study visits about the practice of PRP schemes in 
BLGs. The interviews revolve around three key issues: (i) PRP effects on individual and 
organization performance; (ii) Fairness aspects of the schemes; and (iii) PRP’s links with 
financial and PM.  Thirdly, the chapter looks at issues relating to service quality in local 
government with a view to drawing some lessons for developing countries.  Finally the chapter 
examines the implication of the schemes and the strategic approach to managing performance. 
Please note that where applicable for reasons of confidentiality references for the quotes from 
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interviews etc will not disclose specific names of individuals or their authorities. 
9.1. The overall context of PRP schemes in PSOs   
The past thirty years have seen some fundamental shifts in the types and mix of jobs in the 
economy. Just as fundamentally, the nature of competition has altered and become much more 
intense. Both these changes have been accompanied by changing fashions in pay systems. The 
ways in which people are paid have often developed haphazardly, with different schemes being 
introduced for different sets of people at different times and with different motives. Although 
there have been enormous advances in technology, particularly automation, there are still a 
significant number of repetitive jobs with a high labour content, for example in garment and 
footwear manufacturing, where piecework incentive systems are still relatively common. 
The 1950s saw the payments of piecework as techniques of work measurement were refined to 
set standards for less repetitive tasks, this process continued and eventually peaked in the early 
1980s. In a public sector environment, the growing emphasis is on quality and ‘right first time’, 
and there are schemes to stimulate commitment and interest by giving people broader and more 
rewarding jobs by, for example, the introduction of team working. Pay has now become related 
more to the total job than to elements of the job, and the individual’s responsibility for quality 
has started to be formally recognized in other ways than by simply imposing pay penalties for 
re-work.  
During the 1970s attention had turned towards greater white-collar workers. This trend was 
reinforced by the growth of jobs in the service sector. Work-output was more difficult to 
measure in a non-manufacturing sector and this called far a new approach to incentive pay. A 
large number of white-collar workers were on incremental payment systems based on the belief 
that the contribution of white-collar workers increased with experience, and it was 
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therefore appropriate to pay more as their length of service increased. To relate effort, 
qualification and other aspects of jobs more clearly to pay, job valuation systems were often 
introduced. 
An accelerating rate of change and the search for savings in ‘non-productive’ jobs during the 
1980s often made it difficult to maintain highly analytical systems with detailed job 
descriptions and job evaluation committees. Simultaneously the changing social climate put 
greater emphasis on individualism. The emphasis has shifted from analysis of job content and 
effort (inputs) to individual achievement (outputs). Pay systems have reflected this, although 
because changes have occurred gradually many organisations still have a variety of payment 
systems.  
Payment systems and changes to them are products of a changing environment. Piece-rate pay 
systems were linked to manufacturing philosophies prevailing at the time. The current decline 
of individual payment-by-results (PBR) and the rise of PRP and profit-related pay are linked 
with the management preoccupations of the moment: for example, improvements in quality, the 
development of just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing, greater focus on the customer, 
decentralisation of businesses, flatter organizational structures and increases in individual 
accountability.  
These considerations are not limited to the private sector or to manufacturing or service 
industries, and are making an impact in the public sector too. It is interesting to note that the 
preoccupation with pay systems is a feature in life in the UK and the USA. There seems to be 
more stability of approach in the rest of Europe and in Japan, although this suggestion is based 
on subjective rather than empirical evidence. In the UK the next stage may be greater attention 
to careers and the development of skills.  
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In some organizations, there has been a move towards systems that reward individuals for 
acquiring new skills – in other words, pay systems that not only reward individuals for their 
contribution today but set out the reward for their potential contribution tomorrow. Against this 
is the nagging suspicion harboured by some that the complexities of many incentive and skill-
based systems are themselves counterproductive and that, looking to Europe and Japan for 
examples, given the right culture, incentives - could be superfluous and might be abandoned. 
The aims of pay systems have widened in line with the changing circumstances and 
philosophies mentioned above. Whereas pay systems were once probably designed to do 
nothing more than motivate, reward, recruit and retain employees, they now have wider 
expectations thrust upon them: improving quality and skills, changing the work culture and 
promoting co-operation are now included in their possible aims, which can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. To increase effort:-  motivation and reward 
2. To compete in the labour market:- recruitment and retention 
3. To improve quality:- right first time and continuous improvement. 
4. To change culture:- innovation and customer service. 
5. To promote co-operation:- team working. 
6. To improve skills and flexibility:- upgrading competence and personal development. 
The extent to which the new motivational pay systems have met these expectations provides 
some of the themes addressed in this thesis.  
Motivation is generally taken to refer to a willingness to act in certain ways, e.g. a willingness 
to work harder, or a willingness to focus on one thing rather than another. To achieve this 
mission, five important motivation theories of AGREE need to be borne in mind when 
designing and implementing a performance-related incentive policy. These theories raise at 
least four fundamental questions about the structure and mechanics of PRP regimes 
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in general, and about those other issues addressed in this study in particular. First, is goal clarity 
likely to be secured? Second, is goal commitment likely to be secured? Third, are people likely 
to be confident that they will be given the rewards if they deliver on their objectives? Fourth, 
are the rewards on offer sufficiently attractive? Therefore, these topic guide questions formed 
the basis for most interviews and discussions presented in this chapter. 
9.2. Analysis of Interviews and discussions: The Practice of PRP 
PRP is very different from the earlier forms of incentive schemes, because it relates more to the 
evolution of Management by Objectives (MBO). It starts with the need to achieve targets – 
through performance improvement systems – in the relatively long term (usually a twelve-
month period) rather than in the short term. In this PRP is similar to profit-related bonuses, but 
the specific targets to which PRP applies usually relate to individuals and not to groups, let 
alone the organization as a whole. And the focus is often on inputs such as skills and teamwork.  
Individual payment-by-results (PBR) and group PBR are basically concerned with effort and 
output. In good times and bad, bonuses can be earned. Group profit-sharing and company-wide 
bonus schemes generally relate to total output and profit. While bonuses may rise when output 
is high, they tend to fall when the organization hits a bad patch, whatever the effort being 
expended by individual workers. PRP can be different. When the organization is well, some 
individuals may receive small bonus because they achieve little while trying hard (and vice 
versa). Conversely, when the organization is doing badly individuals who are judged to have 
achieved much may be rewarded comparatively well. 
While some of the six possible aims of pay systems set out in the overall context above are 
clearly relevant to PRP, not all of them are. The interviews analysed in this section show that it 
is not usually a prime objective to provide an edge in the labour market, but that PRP 
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does offer a rationale for rewarding individuals who, as high achievers, may otherwise look 
outside to other employers who offer PRP. On the other hand, some employers specifically 
include ‘a market rate’ element when fixing and reviewing PRP. It can be an influence on 
improving quality, but only to the extent that quality issues are defined in the context of 
personal objectives. In the literature PRP is very strongly associated with changing the culture 
in an organization and with greater individual responsibility. Co-operation within the work 
force, teamwork, improvements in skill and greater flexibility may be encouraged by PRP if 
they are required objectives. 
The rest of this section looks at the evidence of PRP’s success in its own terms rather than 
against the wider objectives. It asks what evidence there is that PRP improves performance, and 
works as a motivator. It looks at the difficulties of defining individual performance. It asks 
about the effects of splitting work forces into achievers and non-achievers. It asks what happens 
when low economic growth affects people’s performance pay especially in developing 
countries such as Tanzania.  
These questions overlap to some extent – for example, the issue of motivation keeps recurring – 
but considering the issues discussed in this chapter should help those who want to make sure 
that PRP works as positively as possible within their own organization. The aim is to give a 
sense of how well and equitable the schemes are perceived to be working in practice, the 
problems some have come up against, and what steps (if any) can be taken to counter such 
problems. For the purpose of this thesis the questions addressed during the interviews are 
categorized into three main groups:  
(a)  PRP’s effects on individual and organization performance: 
1. Does it work as a motivator? Can it be a demotivator? 
2. Does it encourage short-termism? 
3. What effect does it have on team working? 
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4. Is it appropriate to all organizational cultures? 
5. Does it really improve performance? 
6. What about monitoring of the schemes and attitude surveys? 
(b) PRP’s fairness: 
1. Can individual performance be measured objectively? 
2. What about factors outside employees’ control? 
3. Can PRP give rise to sex discrimination? 
4. What are the reservations about discrimination of PRP awards? 
(c) PRP’s links with financial and performance management: 
1. What are its effects on pay costs? 
2. How can its proper distribution be reconciled with budgetary control? 
3. How closely is it linked with performance management systems? 
Even if some of these questions may be of a rather leading nature, they need answering, 
because from the 1980s to date so many governments and organizations have placed such high 
expectations on PRP. Are these expectations justified? And if expectations are not always 
realized, what are the underlying attributes of a successful PRP? 
9.2.1. Individual and organizational performance 
9.2.1.1. Does PRP work as a motivator? Can it be a demotivator? 
As a motivator 
The local government managers interviewed for this research were by no means certain that 
PRP schemes succeeded in motivating people. Most of them were not convinced they could 
plainly confirm that PRP was increasing either individual or overall organizational 
performance. Some put it in terms such as ‘It’s an article of faith.’ Or, as one chief executive 
puts it,  
‘We have no clear evidence either way on whether our schemes improve motivation 
and morale by rewarding good performance, or whether they serve to demotivate 
employees who are not motivated.’  
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Another interviewee pointed out that, traditionally, the greatest motivator was promotion, and it 
was still probably the most important. 
In particular, there was widespread uncertainty about the precise role of money, and 
particularly of the effects on motivation of the relatively small amounts of monetary 
inducement entailed in most PRP schemes. Only twelve per cent of the managers interviewed 
were strongly of the view that money was of prime importance, as quoted:  
‘I think money motivates. I think that’s what bonus schemes do, they motivate people, 
because they think they can earn more money and they make them concentrate on the 
things the organisation thinks are important. If they’ve only got so many hours in the 
day, and you do this or that, and this affects your bonus and that doesn’t, you’re likely 
to do this.’ 
Others had more ambiguous views. A typical response was:  
‘We obviously consider money to be a motivator in support of performance and 
management schemes. If not, we wouldn’t use it. Perhaps, though, with some 
reservations. How much of it is money? There is generally a feeling that, if you pay 
money people who are generally considered to be striving, this meets people’s 
general view of fairness and equity.’  
Others felt that:  
‘Up to a certain level it’s a motivator. Once a manager has got certain level of pay 
and can manage a life style he feels he ought to have, then other things start to come 
in the limelight.’  
One manager, having questioned whether in fact the scheme in his council made any 
difference, said,  
‘But I think there are cases where if there was no merit increases certain managers 
would be very disappointed, feeling that they had worked extremely hard and had a 
successful year.’  
This is clearly a reflection of the Herzberg (op. cit) principle: the real motivation comes from 
the job, not things like money and the conditions under which they work. Most respondents 
qualified their view of money as a motivator by saying it was only one of several factors. PRP 
was seen as also motivating by giving recognition, feedback and clear direction; money would 
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motivate if the targets set were realistic and achievable, especially, if there was no pay increase 
‘of right’ and everything had to be earned in terms of performance. 
A manager who had crossed over from an organization which was privatised in the l980s, 
argued that money might become more important as job security became more threatened.  
‘Money is not the main motivator, just one of many. We used to be a large company 
offering job security, career progression and good rates of pay. Now that people are 
feeling 1ess secure maybe pay will become more important.’  
Another interviewee said,  
‘There are so many factors to motivation. It all depends on the threat at the time. If 
your job is insecure then job security is the biggest motivator you get.’ 
The issue of whether money motivated related, for some interviewees, to the type of persons 
employed and/or their individual circumstances. However, none of the interviewees took their 
views on the motivational effects of money to what might be seen as a logical conclusion by 
suggesting that they looked to recruit the sort of people who might be motivated mainly by 
money for certain jobs, and people who might be motivated by different factors for other jobs. 
For others, it was more of a question of the amount of pay at stake. For money to be effectively 
used to change the performance of higher-level members of the organization - substantially, it 
had to be, according to almost all the managers interviewed, a fairly large proportion of salary. 
The issue for them was not how much of it had to be at risk – i.e. a matter of negative reward – 
but rather whether the additional money would yield qualitatively different spending power. As 
one interviewee put it,  
‘… …If it does not affect the life style, it’s not significant.’ 
In making these judgments, the managers interviewed were heavily influenced by their own 
attitudes and perceptions to pay. As one of them put it,  
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‘For money to become a big incentive/motivator, it must be 10 per cent and probably 
nearer 20 per cent above for it to make a real difference to what I do.’  
In her council, with the exception of a profit bonus, none of the systems of pay did this. The 
same was true of the majority of PRP schemes in the cases studied.  
Several interviewees felt that, once monetary reward was at a satisfactory level, recognition 
became the major factor. Recognition was usually defined along the lines, ‘that somebody feels 
you are doing a good job.’ As one put it,  
‘If there is good basic pay, then recognition is the greatest motivator - especially 
feedback on performance from the manager.’  
Or, as one chief executive responded,  
‘What has been found to be a motivator has been ‘actual feedback you’ve got on 
performance and the fact that if somebody said to you, “You are in band 2,” it means 
something!’ 
Money and recognition were not however, totally unrelated. The two were perceived to be 
linked.  
‘They say, you’ve met your objectives – here’s fifteen thousand quid.” 
You’ve not only got recognition, you have greater clarity of objectives, why objectives are here 
and why you’re being paid. To quote one manager,  
‘Money is the reinforcer of the underlying philosophy of performance management 
system. The business is that we must strive to get business up, reduce costs, we don’t 
reward the under-performer.’ 
Some respondents saw the way payment systems were being operated as a facility in creating 
commitment by developing in employees favourable views of their organization. If PRP 
schemes were operated fairly, and were seen to be so, this could leave employees, as some 
interviewees said, well disposed towards the company. In so far as PRP did this, it could be 
motivating, or at least, ‘it eliminates things which can interfere with motivation’. 
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However, references made to employees looking favourably on PRP schemes were very much 
in terms of equity, and not just in terms of money as a motivator. For example, one manager 
reported that their experience was that,  
‘PRP was increasingly being welcomed. But, I must say, in a rather negative way: it 
is not that people are motivated to work harder in order to get more money, it is more 
that they are content about working harder if they think that other people who work 
less hard are getting less than they are.’ 
This is the evidence of the logic of the expectancy theory of motivation although in the public 
sector there is definitely more questioning of the role of money in motivation. One interviewee 
believes that PRP was not a motivator, because ‘by and large people are not working in the 
public service for the money.’ She argued that this view was borne out by a communications 
survey carried out by an external consultant in the health authority which revealed that job 
satisfaction was the main motivator. Other motivators included ‘doing something worthwhile’ 
and working with people.  
9.2.1.2. What about demotivation?  
While views about the motivational aspects of PRP were distinctly ambiguous, virtually all the 
managers interviewed considered that PRP could be a demotivator for those not getting high 
pay increases. Yet through all the interviews there was only one instance where the 
demotivating effect of PRP had caused management to amend the scheme. The problem had 
arisen because the organisation classified people into four bands and predetermined the 
numbers to be covered by each band.  
The effect was that 80 per cent were classified either in band 3 or in band 4, and consequently 
saw themselves as labelled ‘average’ or below. Moreover, when the council had first introduced 
the scheme it had talked in terms of motivation in its publicity and in the briefings about it. 
Subsequent feedback had told management that this was demotivating, because the 
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implication was that senior management felt people were not already motivated. As a result the 
banding system was abandoned, the language was amended so as to use more positive terms, 
and greater emphasis was put on changing the organizational culture through PRP.  
Some councils consciously aimed at rewarding the exceptional or high performers 
disproportionately. One organisation for example, assumed that most people would get the 
middle grade, C, and wanted to make sure that the average performer was able to achieve a 
certain level of recognition. So management rejected a philosophy of giving massive pay 
increases to the very high performers and very mediocre pay rises to the average. Instead the 
management felt that the average should also have a reasonable level of award, otherwise PRP 
could end up by demotivating 80 per cent of its people. 
Underlying many responses was the concern that PRP schemes demotivate those who are not 
placed at the higher ends of pay or rating scales, whilst the amount of money given to others 
might be insufficient really to motivate them. The perceptions also suggest that staff felt that 
the amount of money was not large enough to justify a change in behaviour. 
In one council the interviewee reported that anybody who got less than the maximum of  6 per 
cent felt insulted.  
‘So instead of feeling pleased that they got 3 per cent (the second point) because 
everybody had recognized their performance was good, they would be demotivated 
because they had not got the 6 per cent that was excellent.’  
Several respondents suggested a figure between 15 per cent and 25 per cent as a proportion of 
salary at risk which might genuinely act as a motivator. 
However, it was precisely because effort and business performance might not always coincide 
that several authorities did not want to have too much pay at risk. One council explicitly had a 
  
 
- 282 -
policy of not wanting the senior executives’ bonuses to be too high a proportion of salary,  
‘because the down side of a big bonus is that if you get people used to it, and you get 
a recession, and that money goes to other good causes, the marketable ones will leave 
because they are used to getting that money.’ 
A small bonus is more likely to be seen as an ‘extra’. The personnel director of the above 
authority illustrated it thus:  
‘In our business, what we have seen this year with our 10 per cent bonus – some of 
the senior executives feel positively guilty. They said, “The way things are going, we 
thought you’d withdraw it.” So they clearly see it as nice to have. When times are 
good we should all get 10 per cent, but when times are tough we should not really get 
it.’ 
9.2.1.3. What about average and poor performers? 
Several respondents said that the introduction of PRP had encouraged the identification of poor 
performers. As one manager put it,  
‘It has meant that people are being forced to address people who are not performing, 
which to be honest, has been an issue which has been dodged in the past.’ 
The demotivating effect of low or zero pay increases on poorly rated people was not perceived 
by many to be a serious problem. Indeed, in several cases managers specifically reported 
welcoming it, on the grounds that it might ‘buck them up’, motivate them to improve or, as in 
fact was more common, motivate them to leave. 
There was however a feeling that PRP was not used sufficiently to motivate poor performers. In 
one case (and it was not an isolated instance) the criticism levelled by the interviewee at the 
operation of the scheme pointed not to the organization abandoning PRP but rather to a 
tightening up of the operation of the existing scheme. In particular he was unsure about the 
effects of the continuation of a cost of living element:  
‘I don’t like this. I am not sure that it’s giving the right messages, to go on paying [a 
cost of living element] to poor performers.’  
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The message he particularly wanted to give was, if you don’t perform, it is going to hit you in 
the pocket. PRP needs a down side as well as an upside and we don’t do this enough. 
This respondent felt that line managers were rating too generously; in his terms, they were a 
‘soft lot’. The council had a five-point rating scale, and though 50 per cent were typically on 
box 2 (1 is the top), there was a perception that people getting box 3 - 40 per cent did so – were 
likely to feel demotivated, as they received only the normal increment. Someone on the scale 
maximum, on the other hand, whose increase was limited even under PRP, was likely, in the 
interviewee’s words, to;  
‘Plod along being inefficient, and sit there picking up his cost of living revision until 
retirement when he gets his index-linked pension. The person plods along, not taking 
advantage of incentives to do well, but we don’t have a stick if he doesn’t come up to 
scratch.’ 
Interviewees’ responses tended to focus on the two ends of the performance spectrum. PRP was 
seen as a device to reward and retain the high performers and to motivate (often to motivate to 
leave!) the low performers. But, there was little reference to the middle range of performers, 
who may constitute 80 per of any organization. Some have obviously given thought to what 
motivates such people by ensuring that they are included in PRP schemes, but few interviewees 
seemed to know whether PRP motivated or demotivated them or whether its impact was simply 
neutral. 
9.2.1.4. Does PRP encourage short-termism? 
In one council the possibility of PRP tending to encourage short-termism had become an 
important issue. The ‘senior management and directors’ bonus scheme tends to have a short-
term impetus which might adversely affect the medium to long term prospects of the business. 
The bonus scheme was designed to achieve budgeted profit and is in effect ‘an incentive to 
achieve the single year’s profit in isolation and at the expense of building a future’. 
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This interviewee also offered an example to illustrate the dangers of short-termism.  
‘You might have to reach a profit target of x million pounds, and you look three-
quarters of the way through the year and you say to yourself, “No way am going to 
get this by normal trading. What I’ll do is have a sale and I’ll make my goods very 
attractive I’ll reduce them by 20 per cent, which will encourage my customers to 
stockpile my products.” And by doing these things you get a fat nice bonus. But next 
year the trade is stacked to the gunnels with your products and next time they want to 
buy they say, “Don’t tell me your prices are so much. You let me have that for £8 last 
time. Now you say it’s £10 and you have to give me a discount.” It might be £9, but 
your margin is attacked. That’s a real problem’ 
Other interviewees expressed similar concern, and some organizations had taken steps to tackle 
them. For example, in reviewing its direct services’ bonuses one local authority was concerned 
that they were neglecting the development of relations with local residents to make a ‘fast 
buck’. As the interviewees put it,  
‘We’ve started to ask, “Do we just want our customer services-representatives to sell, 
or do we want them to make a fuss of the customer?” Customer care, and all that sort 
of thing.’  
The problem with this, though, the interviewee continued, was that ‘performance becomes less 
quantifiable’. 
Only a few organizations had pursued the logic of these concerns and introduced specific long-
term objectives, although one interviewee talked of the ability to set three-year objectives to run 
alongside shorter-term targets. One example from the private sector was of a company, which 
had introduced a long-term incentive plan for its top forty managers, based on the growth of 
earnings per share (EPS) over a four-year period. If the target for this was achieved over the 
period, a bonus would be paid of twice annual salary for directors and of one year’s salary for 
the remaining senior managers. 
For some managers short-termism was not, however, perceived as a problem, precisely because 
individual objectives are set in the light of business plans. An example of a longer-term 
approach to objectives and rewards was given by a manager in a financial services 
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organization. A chief officer of one of the councils covered by the study was given the task of 
getting his administrative systems right, and his boss told him,  
“Don’t worry about increasing turnover this year – just keep standards ticking over. 
Concentrate on getting your administration right so you can break-even in the 
future.”  
A key objective for this year became overhauling the administration, and it was a major part of 
the person’s appraisal. One council, worried that bonuses for area managers based on 
performance targets might lead to short-termism, tried to offset this by giving them in addition 
a set of core managerial activities. These included appraisal, staff development and customer 
care. 
9.2.1.5. What effect does PRP have on team working? 
The possible negative effect of PRP and bonuses on team building was acknowledged in 
around half the interviews. As one interviewee put it,  
‘It is a bit of a down side. Some staff in our council argue that PRP is actually 
detrimental to team working because people are assessed as individuals and work for 
an increase almost in competition with their colleagues.  
In one case it was reported that one group of employees (in the mailroom) had actually asked 
their manager to give everyone the same increase to avoid internal conflict. In another authority 
the senior managers’ targets were imposed on them, having been devised by the chief executive 
from the business plan and given to them in a way which encouraged them to  lean their heads 
down and singularly go for their own objectives without regard to others. 
There seems to be a feeling in some public-sector organizations that PRP is driving people to 
achieve objectives regardless of the cost in terms of co-operation. As one respondent put it,  
‘PRP was seen as not helping team-working, and indeed one of the stated intentions 
behind its introduction was that there is a competitive element to it.’ 
Often, however, individual bonuses or PRP and team working are not seen as antithetical, and 
sometimes bonuses are determined by a mixture of individual and group 
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incentives. Interviewees reported how increasing teamwork and team-building are often 
included in managers’ objectives. One manager said,  
‘If it [PRP] does cut across team working, then there is something wrong with the 
target-setting or the appraisal.’  
In one case (a senior executive bonus scheme) each manager’s targets were set in conjunction 
with each other’s, and each manager was deliberately given at least one objective which 
another had too. All the executives were involved in this target-setting process. It was claimed 
that the introduction of the bonus scheme, two years ago, had increased team-building and that 
collective working made managers focus on broader objectives than those of their own 
function. 
A different view of the relationship between PRP and team working was provided by another 
respondent in a different authority,  
‘I think we encourage people to work in teams because that’s part of our working 
atmosphere and we don’t necessarily reward them to work in teams, that’s taken as 
read. What we want is for them to give their individual utmost to team work, so, by 
encouraging people to work as individuals, that tends to generate good team 
performance as well.’ 
PRP was seen by some managers as positively encouraging team-building by providing clear 
objectives.  
‘PRP has had considerable impact on co-operation and team-building. Again, 
because we’ve got greater clarity, you’ve got an acceptance that you need to be clear 
on what is wanted and what fits which part of the puzzle where, and, to have greater 
awareness of what different managers are doing.’ 
There were some examples of schemes which had been abandoned because of the difficulty of 
attributing good or bad performance to individuals. For example, to cope with the problems of 
rewarding, attracting and retaining investment analysts following deregulation, a department 
for education in one authority had introduced a complex individual bonus scheme based on 
individual targets. It subsequently abandoned the scheme in favour of an objectives-based 
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approach similar to a scheme introduced for other employees, because of the difficulty of 
attributing success to any one individual. 
One authority preferred group bonuses to individual commission on the assumption that a 
‘good team ream, pulling together’ could increase customer service. Group bonuses also dealt 
with the problem of customers ‘reconnaissance shopping’, when one office assistant is spoken 
to initially but the service is finalised by a different officer on a different day. 
9.2.1.6. Is PRP appropriate to all organizational cultures? 
Some, although by no means all, public-sector organisations (and certainly most of the public-
sector unions) have expressed disquiet at the spread of PRP on the grounds that it is 
inappropriate to the idea of public service. For example, one local authority officer said,  
‘If you have an organization which has service to the public as a major plank in its 
culture, that doesn’t fit comfortably with the sort of highly financially motivated, 
driven approach which obviously is felt to work by those who are involved in 
business. Obviously in a business context the prime measure of performance is going 
to be profit, and the concept of sharing in the results of the bonuses I think actually 
hangs together much more logically than PRP in local government, which is actually 
grafted on to a very different sort of value system.’  
However, other similar interviewees found aspects of PRP valuable, particularly its role in 
reinforcing appraisal systems. 
Perhaps the real issue is whether PRP should be used by itself to effect the sorts of cultural 
change referred to in the previous chapter - for example, to make organizations more customer 
or performance-oriented - or whether it needs be combined with other changes (which might 
perhaps be introduced ahead of PRP). Putting the question the other way round, how far does 
PRP have to fit the prevailing culture to be successful? 
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9.2.1.7. Does PRP really improve individual or organizational performance? 
By and large, personnel managers appeared to rely on informal methods of assessment, based 
on their involvement in the process, to sense how their schemes were working. Few evaluated 
the schemes formally and sought evidence of links between the running of a scheme and 
performance. For example, when talking about the impact of a sales bonus on individual 
performance, one manager said it ‘cultivates it’. Another, asked about the impact of PRP on 
output and individual performance, said, ‘I have no straight forward way of answering.’  
Most managers were not convinced that they could pinpoint the effect of PRP on individual or 
overall organizational performance. One said, ‘I don’t have any way of assessing it, and I can’t 
conceive of one.’  
For some - especially in the service sector - there are difficulties in measuring output and 
individual performance. Many organizations, in both the public and private sectors as the 
literature indicates, do not appear to have very reliable measures of output or of individual 
performance. 
In some situations the relationship between individual performance and organisational 
performance can seem problematic if an employer has no clearly thought out objectives. If 
individual performance were assessed on speed in processing claims, and employees were paid 
on that basis, it could increase the flow of funds out of the firm. As one interviewee in one large 
authority said, ‘They could be working five times harder than usual, but effectively they are 
giving our money away.’ Using PRP for such staff was viewed as ‘very difficult’. 
Most managers freely admitted that they did not evaluate pay systems. One manager, who had 
introduced performance appraisal for workers in his council, said,  
‘I don’t think we have actually looked at its success, partly perhaps because 
we might not want to know the results.’  
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Another respondent just sensed that PRP was working.  
‘I don’t think there is anything measurable by which we can judge the impact of PRP 
on performance; because all the external factors are much more to do with effective 
management, as seen by the top management, than anything else.’ 
Some managers were sceptical about being able to evaluate PRP in any decisive way. As one 
personnel manager in a council which had just introduced PRP argued,  
‘The fundamental problem we have is that you can’t compare [what we have done] 
with how it would have been had we not done it.’  
Another argued,  
‘It’s difficult for me to tell, because I haven’t seen the alternative, and I’m not in the 
sort of game where it’s easy to assess things - it’s not like a production line [where] 
you could say that under the old system we used to produce 100 cans a day and now 
we produce 110 cans a day. I can’t tell you that, and anyway the situation is changing 
all the time.’ 
9.2.1.8. Monitoring schemes 
Some managers based their judgements on more concrete evidence, either from exit interviews 
or from attitude surveys. For example, one said,  
‘We carry out exit interviews and [these show that employees’] primary interests are 
the challenge of the job, job content and job interest. The pay has to be right, but after 
that it is other factors that count. Money is a secondary motivator.’ 
Many PRP schemes have monitoring built-in; personnel departments co-ordinate all the 
appraisals and projected increases before they are agreed by senior management. Often the 
personnel department may query certain suggested payments prior to their being finalized; for 
example, if the appraisal does not square with the pay. In this way the personnel function acts 
as what one interviewee called an umpire, trying to guarantee consistency and reducing the 
number of demotivated people. As one manager recalled,  
‘For example, we had a situation a few years ago when a manager was very tight in 
his allocation of merit pay and we had to lean on him to be fairer. He did not even 
attempt to use the allowable increase in the salary budget. He expected more from his 
people than perhaps the average manager would have done. That was obviously 
going to be a very demotivating factor for the people involved.’ 
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It was difficult to establish the precise nature and extent of the monitoring of schemes in the 
organizations visited. In some cases statistics are compiled - for example, breaking down pay 
increases by gender, ethnicity, length of service and education level. In one authority, a 
department does a report each year on the way the salary review has gone and comments on the 
variability of scoring from one department to another. This is fed back to departments. Another 
authority, having just introduced PRP, planned to interview a selection of managers and 
employees about the conduct of appraisals and any problems arising from it. In this authority, 
as in others, all the appraisal forms are sent to the personnel department after the pay round, so 
the personnel function can discuss with the appraisers any particular career needs or problems 
expressed on the forms. 
9.2.1.9. Attitude surveys 
In the interview programme only one example was found of an authority which regularly uses 
attitude surveys to ascertain the views of employees. There were two sources: a remuneration 
opinion survey and a general opinion survey. The following questions illustrate the sort of 
questions which dominated most of the interviews in respect of attitude surveys:  
• How well do you feel the organisation is doing in matching pay to performance? - I am 
clear about the results expected of me doing my job. 
• To what extent do you agree with your manager’s appraisal of your performance? - I agree 
with my manager’s appraisal of my performance. 
• What is your view as to your last pay increase in relation to the percentage available and 
your performance? - The most important factor upon which salary increases should be 
based (the choices were: experience; performance; potential; hard work and commitment; 
internal relativities; the external market place). 
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9.2.2. PRP and fairness 
9.2.2.1. Can individual performance be measured objectively? 
(i) Problems of setting objectives 
One of the most commonly quoted problems with PRP is the objective-setting process. In the 
interviews, personnel managers reported how their line managers, often very new to setting 
targets, had sometimes said how difficult they found setting objectives which were, in the 
words of one,  
‘challenging but not unachievable, and so payments are motivating rather than 
demotivating’. 
The problem of objective-setting seems especially acute in the public sector, which until 
recently has not appeared to make extensive use of Management by Objectives. For example 
one manager who was working with The Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) before 
joining the local government said that, in a submission to a National Audit Office inquiry into 
the civil service appraisal scheme, said,  
‘The CCSU accepts that staff need to know what is expected of them. However, we 
doubt whether objective-setting is realistic in the case of some grades and posts, and 
there are genuine fears that it is being used simply to ratchet up productivity. There is 
too much of a focus on quantity to the exclusion of quality. We are concerned also 
that the setting of unrealistic objectives may lead to disciplinary action on inefficiency 
grounds’ (quoted in Labour Research Department, 1990). 
And one local authority personnel manager revealed,  
‘We are finding that managers are not very good at defining measurable targets and 
how to set realistic ones. Some targets are too easy and some too difficult.’  
There is also the problem that there are some jobs in which there is an opportunity to shine, 
while in others there is less opportunity – described by one interviewee as ‘the full-back/centre 
forward syndrome’.  
Underlying the move to objective-setting was the worry that some managers were setting easy, 
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not hard, targets. Another problem reported is inconsistency between managers, some setting 
softer targets than others. The fear of soft objectives being set was not, however, one which all 
managers shared. For example, one manager put it this way:  
‘There is no danger of soft objectives, because they are related to the business plan, 
and the business plan is never a soft target.’  
To achieve fairness and objectivity in certain organizations each appraiser is overseen by his or 
her superior. For example, each person appraised may be given both a ‘parent’ (the immediate 
superior) and a ‘grandparent’ (usually the superior’s immediate superior) who actually see all 
the objectives of their subordinates to assess whether they are reasonable. This is not seen as a 
complete answer. Senior managers are often insufficiently familiar with operational details to 
be able to pass such judgements. 
In schemes which do not use objectives, managers are often given guidelines setting out the 
kinds of criteria by which they should judge subordinates. But in other cases it is left to 
managers to decide the criteria themselves as an interviewee in such a situation said,  
‘It’s up to the manager, but I suppose managers consider how they’ve performed, how 
they’ve done their job, what their attendance has been like, to what extent they’ve met 
targets, and so on.’ 
Most authorities seemed to want to have quantitative measurable objectives and hence were 
especially attracted to financial targets. Clearly, this may be more difficult in the public sector, 
although not always. As one chief executive of an authority which gives priority to such 
objectives put it:  
‘If something matters sufficiently to the business that it is a key objective, then it 
matters to find a way to measure it’  
The danger of this approach, which the interviewee acknowledged, is that managers may shy 
away from objectives which are not readily measurable. The particular firm was facing up to 
the fact that, compared with all its world-wide competitors, its performance over the past ten 
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years had been very poor. Consequently the desire to quantify objectives ‘fitted in with the 
present approach, which is to compare the firm’s performance with others, to isolate the causes 
of the problems’. 
Participation in objective-setting by the individuals being assessed does not appear to be 
something which firms consider absolutely necessary for successful performance management. 
But, equally, few if any impose objectives from above. The process of goal-setting seems in 
general to be a process initiated by superiors but involving ‘some discussion’, as several 
respondents put it, between superiors and subordinates. 
The most commonly perceived administrative problem, or potential problem, is setting 
objectives in time. In one case the interviewee actually began by saying, ‘I’ve not had mine set 
yet.’ The first year of his council’s new incentive scheme was supposed to have started five 
weeks before. The problem of getting objectives out on time is not a simple question of 
managerial competence or speed of response: if managers aim to link individual targets and 
objectives with overall business plans, the determination of those objectives must await the 
publication of the business plan. 
(ii) Appraisal 
PRP linked to objective-setting implies the use of some form of appraisal, although if all the 
objectives are financial targets (as in many senior executive bonus schemes) then there is no 
necessary reason for an appraisal: the payment can be formula-based. 
With reference to a study of Inland Revenue reviewed in Chapter Four, it was found that 87 per 
cent felt that ‘PRP had made staff question the fairness of the appraisal system’, 63 per cent 
believe that ‘a good appraisal is too often overruled by someone higher up’; and 35 per cent 
felt that ‘people get a good box marking not so much because of their performance but 
  
 
- 294 -
because managers want to reward their favourites’. Findings like these lead the researchers to 
conclude not only that there was widespread doubt about the fairness of the appraisal system 
but that PRP, by being attached to a well established appraisal system, had undermined its core 
objectives. A similar sentiment was echoed in this local government study. The personnel 
managers interviewed in this study were clearly aware of these sorts of potential problems: one 
of the reported difficulties with appraisals was that, whilst ‘managers may be trained in the 
procedures and encouraged to observe correct marking standards’, they have their own agenda 
and feel more comfortable being generous to the lower performers than rewarding the high 
performers. Managers can also set easily attainable objectives, or phrase them in general terms 
which make it easy to show that they have been achieved. 
A further observed danger in linking appraisal with the pay review is that appraisals can turn 
into individual negotiations, though managers say that the danger is minimized if appraisals are 
based on pre-set objectives. This was a common reason for wishing to move from ‘merit pay’ 
systems, under which managers’ assessments are not related to the achievement of pre-set 
objectives. 
Generally, formal appraisal systems were said to be working well. In most, through training and 
monitoring, managers had been encouraged not to concentrate solely on the previous year’s 
performance but to discuss personal development and to identify training needs. Some appraisal 
forms had two distinct sections, one dealing with past performance, the other with 
developmental needs. This was a hard evidence of the existence of a performance management 
framework in public services. 
However, one manager argued that, because the bottom categories of scales are rarely used, 
PRP and appraisals were not fully effective. He thought that this practice was difficult to 
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reverse. Because less than 5 per cent of employees were placed in the lowest category it 
became associated with desperate failure and people singled out. But, he argued, if a larger 
proportion – he suggested the figure of 30 per cent – were placed in lower bands they would 
not be regarded (or regard themselves) as being singled out and ‘managers could use it as a 
constructive category’. 
Some authorities were attempting to counter the problem by separating the timing of the 
appraisal/performance review from the salary review. The appraisal could then provide an input 
to the salary review. One firm contemplating introducing PRP to replace its incremental system 
envisaged keeping appraisal separate. As its compensation manager put it,  
‘Appraisal is so important in its own right. It has immense value in itself and it should 
not be bastardized by linking it to pay.’  
One of the reasons for maintaining a separate appraisal scheme in this case was that 
management wanted the trade unions to be involved in the process. They were seen as having a 
contribution to make to the improvement of the process, its redesign, selling it to employees, 
and even in bringing stubborn managers (i.e. those who did not take appraisal seriously) into 
line. Appraisal was seen as having considerable value, particularly in terms of providing 
recognition for individuals, and identifying development needs. 
9.2.2.2. What about factors outside employees’ control? 
Changes outside individuals’ control, happening after targets or objectives have been set and 
sending them off course, are acknowledged to create problems. An example of an 
environmental change creating problems of measuring performance was offered by an 
interviewee previously working a manager in a pharmaceutical firm.  
‘The classic occasion occurs when an organisation has a sales target or a market 
share to achieve, and a competitor releases a new product on to the market.’  
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Another case is the influence of the recession on retail sales, resulting in managers having to 
work harder than ever to offset its adverse effects. One company tried to overcome the problem 
by awarding one-off bonuses which were not permanent additions to salary (and hence were 
non-pensionable) to people who had done exceptionally well in difficult circumstances. As the 
manager there put it,  
‘Someone may have worked very hard but failed to achieve his/her targets owing to 
factors totally beyond his/her control.’ 
The problem of performance-related bonus schemes in a recession raises the question of 
whether sales bonuses are in fact fair-weather schemes. One personnel manager – and he was 
not alone – in an authority which aims to motivate people through bonuses linked to target 
volumes believed that it was almost inevitable that motivation would be affected by downturns 
if linked to performance. As he put it,  
‘In a sense it’s paradoxical. Very often when bonuses are doing badly and people are 
working twice as hard to achieve anything it’s usually when they are not going to get 
bonus – and I think that’s depressing and a shame. If you lower the targets it raises 
another question: can management afford to pay a bonus?’  
The dangers of pay not being adequately linked with effort highlighted for the manager 
concerned ‘why it’s important to have the base pay right against the market’. It also raises the 
question whether, at least in some organizations, PRP may be really a form of profit-related 
pay. 
In this study factors apparently beyond individuals’ control were not, however, seen as valid 
reasons to make allowances for under-achievement. Apart from the harm which can be caused 
by paying bonus when the organization is doing badly, there may be less obvious links between 
individual performance and results. To illustrate this, one manager who gave ‘the government 
cutting off funding for the project you are working on’ as an example of a factor beyond an 
individual’s control, added that  
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‘This may reflect the failure of the people inside the organization to convince the 
customer of its merits.’  
The problem of outside influences did not carry much weight in another local authority. Taking 
exchange rates as the ‘classic’ example, the interviewee argued,  
‘Of course managers cannot control them. But we expect exchange rates to influence 
their budgets and business plans. They should take cognizance of this factor when 
planning. They have to make judgements about it. We pay them to get it right.’  
Another interviewee took a slightly softer line:  
‘whilst you take account of things which happened beyond the individual’s control 
and ‘apply sound judgement’ you also ‘look at whether the manager took steps to 
mitigate it or just let it happen’. 
In most of the local authorities surveyed there was similar scope for flexibility in the operation 
of many of the procedures. Managers were encouraged quickly to flag up any changes that 
meant they would be unable to meet their objectives, as one particular objective became 
irrelevant or another needed to take precedence. 
In some cases there were formalized procedures for reviewing objectives throughout the year. 
For example,  
‘There are continuous reviews during the year, and formal performance appraisal at 
the end of the year, so if objectives need to be changed, or reset, that will happen part of 
the way through the year. If something else comes up that is considered to be more 
urgent, I have to renegotiate objectives and time scales.’ 
It is usually intended or formally stated that managers should meet their subordinates at certain 
stages of the year to review objectives. However, in practice this did not always happen 
because ‘of pressure of time’, as interviewees invariably put it. As one said,  
‘reviewing objectives can be a lengthy process. Assuming you’ve got a reasonable 
boss, then lateness should not affect your assessment.’ 
A good example of objectives changing to reflect changing circumstances is the way in which 
one organization relying on quantifiable targets to award bonuses for senior managers had 
added the reduction of working capital to its prime objective (operating profit) in 
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order to reflect the fact that although sales were down – as they were in the 1990/1 recession – 
managers could still improve the overall return on capital by reducing stocks and debtors. The 
company, though not operating a formal individual objective-based PRP scheme linked with an 
appraisal system, looked at its bonus schemes every year to see whether particular things, e.g. 
reducing stock in a particular year, should be targeted. 
9.2.2.3. Does PRP give rise to sex discrimination? 
To respond to this question we have to reflect back in early 90s. Desk research reveals that at 
the 1991 Trades Union Congress the Association of First Division Civil Servants (FDA), the 
union representing senior civil servants, alleged that official figures showed that 52 per cent of 
male civil servants in Grades Five to Seven qualified for extra performance-related payments, 
while only 38 per cent of women did so. This claim followed an examination of performance 
awards to about 16,000 civil servants, taking only those of equal seniority at the top of the pay 
scales. The disparities between men and women were the same for the three grades, in which 
women make up about 20 per cent of employees. At the time of writing the FDA was reported 
to be seeking legal advice on whether the pay system was in breach of European law.  
However, civil service management said they were satisfied that on the strength of the 
information available there was no evidence of discrimination against women generally in the 
award of performance pay to staff in Grades Five to Seven and that any imbalances could be 
attributed to structural factors. They also said that, if civil service performance pay 
arrangements were extended, it would be important to install adequate monitoring and review 
mechanisms in order to ensure as far as possible that discrimination did not occur. 
In addition, union monitoring of PRP at the insurance company General Accident showed that, 
following a successful appeal to the Central Arbitration Committee, awards varied between 
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locations and discriminated against women, part-timers and older workers. Similarly, union 
monitoring at British Rail is alleged to have found wide disparities between different locations, 
individuals with the same appraisal rating not infrequently receiving different awards. 
The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) has warned that PRP may discriminate indirectly 
where it is limited in its application to grades or sections of the work force in such a way as to 
exclude women disproportionately, and where PRP is available only after an extended period of 
service, which women are less likely to achieve. The EOC says that the rights of part-time and 
temporary workers must be safeguarded if pay is performance- related, and such workers 
within the job category covered by the scheme must be included. A clause excluding part-
timers from a PRP scheme for NHS managers was removed after a complaint to the EOC in 
1987. 
Public-sector employers were made aware of the possibility of sex discrimination: in a report 
published in November 1990 (PRP Report No. 4), the Local Authorities Conditions of Service 
Advisory Board (LACSAB) said,  
‘So far as the coverage of PRP schemes [local government] is concerned, they are at 
present mainly applied to senior employees, who are primarily male, and even where 
PRP has been extended down the organization more generous payments tend to be 
available to those at the top of the hierarchy. In many cases, therefore, it is probable 
that the introduction of PRP will widen internal pay relativities and will also widen 
the salary gap between male and female local government officers, because of the 
disproportionate concentration of women in lower grades. It remains to be seen how 
these arrangements will be viewed under the Equal Pay legislation.’ 
Apart from the General Accident case, all exposed instances of possible sex discrimination 
appear to have arisen in the public sector and all the cases which have earned publicity have 
been in unionized environments. In only one of the interviews, where there was explicit 
monitoring by gender of the results of appraisal, did it emerge that these concerns had surfaced 
as yet. However, LACSAB’s conclusions seem sensible and would appear to be applicable to 
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sectors other than local government. LACSAB argued that, especially where PRP extends 
below senior management grades and covers an increasing proportion of women,  
‘It will be advisable for procedures to be developed specifically to monitor the 
distribution of performance payments between men and women; and to pay specific 
attention to equal pay in the design of PRP procedures. The operation of an appeals 
procedure and the involvement of unions in PRP schemes may also help to ensure that 
equal pay requirements are met. Management need to have awareness and to take 
positive steps to eliminate discrimination, in order to avoid the possibility of PRP 
schemes being operated unfairly and to the detriment of women employees.’ 
9.2.2.4. Reservations about discrimination of PRP awards 
Lack of discrimination in awards may be the result of group norms regarding equity or equality 
of treatment. It may also be due to the manager lacking the confidence or ability to discriminate 
effectively between employees or to gain acceptance by employees of performance pay awards 
that do discriminate. Discriminating in favour of those whose performance is more than fully 
satisfactory or outstanding increases the-risk of demotivating the majority of staff whose 
performance is rated as fully satisfactory.  
A second potential problem with schemes that allow managers the discretion to discriminate 
widely in their allocations of increments is that practices will diverge between work units or 
departments. This could lead to gross inequities as staffs with similar histories of performance 
ratings come to have significantly different earnings.  
The discretion allowed under this scheme in which there are no specific links between 
performance appraisal and pay awards, allows individual managers or departments much 
greater flexibility in their use in a critical resource, monetary rewards. At the same time, 
however, it increases the risk of bias and inconsistencies in the allocation of awards. Another 
potential problem under discretionary systems is a lack of adequate discrimination between 
individuals whose performance clearly warrants different levels of awards. 
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Standardising the links between appraisals and pay awards is one response to the potential 
problems that arise when individual managers or departments are allowed full discretion in 
their allocation of merit increments and bonuses. There are, however, alternative planning and 
control mechanisms for managing the potential risks associated with decentralised systems that 
allow greater discretion to individual managers. These include consensual decision processes in 
the allocation of awards, and regular monitoring and review of the operation of systems.  
9.2.3. Financial and performance management 
9.2.3.1. What are PRP’s effects on pay costs? 
With respect to this question few interviewees believed that PRP had added to the overall salary 
bill. In some cases managers said that wage costs might actually have been reduced. In one 
organisation, for example, it was reported,  
‘The overall spend is lower than on the old cost-of-living and merit structure. We 
have been able to contain costs better, as we save on poor performers.’  
The director of finance argued that with the improved identification of poor performers, some 
of whom had left the council under an early retirement scheme, the total salary bill had gone 
down, as their replacements had joined on a lower salary. The general conclusion was that the 
organization got better value for money with performance-related pay. As the interviewee said,  
‘By rewarding for contribution you are looking at how pay impacts on the bottom 
line. In other words, if you are paying an extra pound you are getting better 
performance for it.’ 
Although some interviewees found it difficult to assess the impact of PRP on the overall salary 
bill, the general view was that PRP was self-financing, that it had not led to higher overall 
wages for average performers, and that the linking of pay to performance had meant that 
‘Managers are much more conscious of the costs of their salary budgets.’ 
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9.2.3.2. Do budgets constrain PRP’s proper distribution? 
Few organizations have ‘forced distributions’, limiting the percentage of employees who 
receive each assessment grade so that, for instance, only 5 per cent are rated ‘outstanding’, 15 
per cent as ‘highly effective’, and so on. But most interviewees recognized that the budgeted 
salary bill acted as a constraint on the overall distribution (so that managers might be reluctant 
to put too many in the top assessment grade because that would result in their having to put 
more than they would like in the lower grades), and many interviewees said that in practice a 
typical distribution emerged each year. For example, one organization’s ‘normal distribution’ 
was 40-50 per cent in ‘fully acceptable’ (the second category) and 20 per cent in ‘above 
standard’. 
However, ‘Manager MN to pay subordinate PQ’ was reported to be a problem in one 
organization and was seen ‘not to be fair’ by the interviewee there.  
‘If you think about it, it’s actually penalizing a division that might be performing 
extremely well. You might have got a group of people who are performing extremely 
well, all would be entitled to get the top increase, but you couldn’t actually pay them 
all that.’ 
Consequently, very few people were receiving the top grade of PRP, which was causing ‘a lot 
of frustration’. In this regard public-sector managers compared their treatment unfavourably 
with that which they thought happened in the private sector. As the manager quoted above 
confirmed,  
‘There is a fair bit of frustration around, because it’s actually seen as penalizing the 
high performers. And also the actual percentages are really quite low. You can be 
flogging yourself to death and end up with a fairly low percentage, compared to 
outside industries.’  
The survey of Inland Revenue staff referred to earlier in the chapter showed that 74 per cent of 
respondents believed that ‘Staff are frequently denied the box marking they deserve because of 
a quota system’. 
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9.2.3.3. How closely is PRP linked with performance management systems? 
Wright as quoted in Neale (1991) argues that even the most ardent supporters of PRP recognize 
that it is extra-ordinarily difficult to manage well. The interviewees have also reinforced the 
same view. In many cases there has been insufficient clarity about the aims and objectives of 
PRP, that schemes have not always been drawn up with sufficient care or forethought, and that 
more attention needs to be paid to evaluation, monitoring and improvement. This is discussed 
in the next section.  
Moreover, not all modern management theory points so explicitly to PRP as its proponents 
often imply. The theories underlying Deming’s quality management (Scherkenbach, 1990) and 
the Harvard School’s version of human resource management (Beer et al., 1984; Kanter, 1990) 
both advise against PRP, as well as against over-emphasizing pay and its link with ‘successful’ 
performance. Some modern psychology’s emphasis on the importance of goal setting in 
performance may suggest that better results may be achieved without the frustration and 
potential demotivation of PRP, that is, with a high basic rate plus well specified targets (Locke 
et al., 1991).  
Relatively few organizations put PRP in the context of performance management systems 
(PMS), which emphasize objective-setting and formal appraisal. Yet there is evidence, most 
notably from a survey carried out by Bevan and Thompson (1991), that  
‘In terms of the effectiveness of performance-related pay, respondents perceived it to 
be more effective when sitting alongside policies to manage employee performance 
either as part of a PMS or as part of a more general approach. . . . There was also 
some evidence that performance management could be effective when not linked to 
PRP.’  
This raises the question of whether PRP is actually necessary to improve performance: might 
not other policies associated with PMS be enough to achieve this without PRP? The issue is 
echoed in one of the conclusions of the Inland Revenue survey, that very many staff feel 
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they are already working to the right standard and that they cannot improve. This may or may 
not be true but, if it is untrue, it would seem that management has to do much more than merely 
offer cash. 
9.3. Quality issues: the British local government experience  
The general consensus of respondents in this case study is that ‘quality’ is important in local 
government for four reasons: (1) it is a way of ensuring that services are ‘fit for purpose’ and 
meet the needs, consistently and sensitively, of the immediate consumer and of the society as a 
whole; (2) Good quality services increase satisfaction of both consumers, who gain greater 
confidence in the local authority; and of producers, who can take pride in their work if they feel 
it is of a good standard. This is good for morale, and a further stimulus to improvement; (3) 
Attention to quality draws attention to the effective use of resources. The thesis stresses that a 
quality programme should not be a hidden agenda for cuts, but savings from eliminating ‘non-
conformance’ and from better coordinated processes can be directed to achieving better and 
more effective outcomes for the local people; (4) If attention is not given to quality locality, 
poor performance could draw in external intervention and provoke the transfer of services away 
from local government control.  
These are four good reasons for developing policies to develop better quality services in a local 
government system. They may seem self-evident. Why has it proved so difficult to put these 
ideas into practice, and what could be problems in the future? A number of lessons can be 
derived from the experience of the British model and are briefly highlighted in ss.10.2.2.4 of 
the next chapter. 
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9.3.1. Service quality in local government 
A focus on service quality is part of the general direction of public management reforms being 
pursued by OECD Member countries. The main reason for this is to improve the 
responsiveness of public sector institutions to their clients. The British local authorities pursue 
this strategy by requiring and encouraging a greater emphasis on performance and results. The 
client is seen as an agent in evaluating performance and as an agent of change complimenting 
more traditional mechanisms. 
Follow-up interviews indicate that nearly every British local authority is doing considerable 
work on service quality. Some authorities have chosen to mount specific and high-profile 
initiatives while it has been an ongoing and implicit aspect of wider performance management 
initiatives in others. Examples of components of service quality include timeliness, amount or 
volume, accessibility and convenience, availability or continuity, accuracy, safety, and 
appropriateness or suitability. Other qualitative factors are also important like pleasantness and 
simplicity. 
It is unfortunate that quality initiatives have often been introduced piecemeal, top-down and 
without clear purposes. This has meant that they have been misunderstood, misapplied and 
have been dropped before they have had a chance to prove their worth. Councillors have been 
relatively little involved in quality programmes. As a consequence opportunities have been 
missed to integrate quality with the mainstream of policy development, to ensure that specific 
initiatives reflect council values, and to be part of the project of democratic renewal at the local 
level. Quality policies have often been regarded as managerial ‘add-ons’ rather than 
programmes of fundamental change and reorientation. 
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9.3.2. Developing a framework for managing service quality 
For many years in Britain it has often been difficult for people - staff and councillors - to make 
a distinction between a quality method and the idea of quality itself. This may be the fault of 
the missionaries, who tend to oversell the benefits of their particular approach. But it is also 
because it is usually hard to see where a particular initiative fits into a broader whole. This is 
because the ‘whole’ itself is unclear.  
The study therefore tries to provide the ‘glue’ that brings the whole thing together. Whether the 
emphasis at one time or in one place is on, say, developing written standards, on performance 
measurement, or on a particular system such as quality assurance or customer care, the 
framework can locate this within a wider picture. This helps bring the detail into perspective, 
and provides clues as to what needs to be done next.  
Quality is not about appointing a lead officer and telling them to get on with it, though lead 
officers can and do make an important contribution to developing ideas and supporting staff to 
try them out. Far more important is the notion that, since services are produced as a result of a 
whole series of actions, involving different actors at different points in the ‘service chain’, it is 
crucial to generate a process where all those involved and affected are and feel a part of it. This 
is the route to ownership and commitment, to cross-departmental and multi-disciplinary 
working, and to the attention to detail at every stage of the service process that is essential for 
real and lasting improvement. 
The authorities responding to this study have taken different and distinct approaches to quality 
improvement. This diversity reinforces the idea that there is ‘no one way’ of tackling ‘quality’. 
All have, however, addressed quality issues corporately and as a major priority. Some chose 
BS5750 as their primary vehicle, gaining recognition for all council services in 1993 and 
council wide 1S09001 in 1994. Under new (Labour) leadership these councils are 
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now shifting towards a community orientation, linking this with the existing internal quality 
systems. Some authorities carried out pilot projects starting in 1990/1, providing a ‘template’ 
and corporate support, but expecting each project to develop its own approach. A wide range of 
methods have been used in practice, linked with the ‘community government’ policy developed 
at the time.  
Other respondents have similarly linked quality developments with democratic issues and 
decentralisation. A central unit has led the developments, acting as internal consultants and 
pushing the corporate aspects of service delivery. A key issue there is ‘diversity consistency’ - 
how to respond to different needs at the same time as achieving some basic standards. In one 
authority, ‘continual improvement’ (arising out of the Deming approach) is the starting point, 
explicitly aiming to achieve an integrated, holistic and long term approach to quality 
developments.  
These are all complex matters, to which there are no simple answers, and certainly not ‘one’ 
answer. Authorities right across the U.K. have been working to improve the quality of their 
services over the last decade. The subject is not new. However, much of the work has been 
done in relative isolation, focusing on different aspects of quality and quality processes, often 
without the chance to compare notes or to see how the pieces of the jigsaw might be fitted 
together. The concluding remarks consider the role of key actors – councillors, senior 
managers, middle managers and front line staff - in developing and sustaining service quality. 
The main conclusion is that they all have an important role to play as a team with a common 
goal. 
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9.4. Research implications for performance management 
Though in assorted ways, this research has implications for performance measurement and 
management in local government. These may be classified into six levels as follows: measuring 
performance and collaboration; the balanced approach to strategic PM; culture implications for 
PM; performance measurement implications for PM; increased demand for accountability to 
community; and perceived pay-to-performance relationship.  
9.4.1. Measuring Performance and Collaboration 
(i) Measuring performance  
At level one, this research provides evidence of the measurement of both efficiency and 
effectiveness. There is no doubt that local government is extremely concerned with the 
measurement and management of cost efficiency. Given the British Government’s emphasis on 
reform to modernise public services and achieve efficiency, particularly through private-public 
partnership and BV philosophy, this is not surprising. The study shows a tendency for the use 
of accounting controls such as financial performance measures to increase as the intensity of 
competition increases. Greater clarity around financial performance is essential in the drive for 
the efficient provision of Best Value or value for money services in a competitive environment. 
(ii) Community collaboration 
There is also emphasis on managing effectiveness of outcomes, in terms of customer 
satisfaction, and in specifying outcome measures during the planning process. Significant 
community input at the planning stage ensures outcomes are much more in line with 
community expectations. Community collaboration in much of the local government strategic 
and other planning processes results in specifying and delivering services which meet the needs 
of the local community. There has been a change from government to governance, brought 
about by the interaction between government and society. 
(iii) Political Accountability to the local community and consultation  
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Political accountability of a local government to the local community is to enhance, strengthen 
and widen the role of the members of the public in setting forth their own development plans. 
In this respect, the study observed that local authorities in Britain are very much aware of the 
importance of community perceptions of their performance, and of their accountability to the 
community. They are measuring and managing their performance in relation to community 
standards, and taking a strong community focus with significant consultation and information 
provision to the community. It is also interesting that in this perspective, local governments are 
managing areas such as community consultation, which are critical to achieving effective 
outcomes. Community consultation in the corporate planning process further suggests that there 
is a strong strategic focus to PM as consultation helps set strategic goals. 
9.4.2. The balanced approach to strategic Performance Management 
At the second level this research examined the issue of the comprehensiveness of performance 
management and its linkages to long-term strategy. There is evidence that performance 
measures cover the four dimensions as specified in the Kaplan and Norton’s (ibid) balanced 
scorecard approach (BSA), although they are not balanced over the categories.  
(i) Community focus dimensions 
Overall, the study has found that British local governments have a range of measures which are 
used to manage performance across financial and community focus dimensions – the results 
dimensions or primary objectives. These measures are also linked to strategic priorities - 
financial measures are tied to long term corporate plans, and there is a strong sense of 
community input into long-term strategic plans. In contrast, based on the evidence gathered the 
research concludes that whilst there are good examples of managing performance in the 
innovation and learning and internal processes dimensions, these determinant dimensions are 
much less well developed. 
(ii) Financial performance implication for long-term survival 
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Financial performance is linked to the wider organisational context. It is strongly linked to long 
term strategy, in that annual budgets are prepared in the context of long term financial plans 
which are themselves part of the corporate plan. The strategic implications of financial 
performance are enhanced by having financial performance as a key result area for performance 
based bonuses for managers. Financial performance management is essential for long term 
survival in the context of reduced revenue expenditure and increased community expectations. 
PM requires performance indicators but simply measuring performance is not sufficient for 
performance management. Some performance indicators required by the Audit Commission 
(AC) are dysfunctional as they do not add to the information which is needed to manage. 
Preparing them requires time and effort which would be better used elsewhere. On the other 
hand, lack of useful financial performance information hampers the management of 
performance in a number of areas. 
  
(iii) Internal process reviews (IPR) 
IPR ultimately determine the success of council strategies.  There is a need for more integration 
of the strategic framework into internal process review. Continuous internal process reviews are 
important in the continuing emphasis on cost reduction and efficiency management, which is a 
strategic priority for all councils and in reviewing service provision to customers in a customer 
focussed environment. While process reviews are being undertaken, lack of measures to 
determine internal process performance is a hindrance to managing them. The development of 
better performance measures may provide the impetus for councils to be more proactive in 
managing internal processes. 
Workload indicators are one way of measuring internal process performance. At the managerial 
level, it may be that workload indicators are not perceived to be particularly important. A 
limitation of this research may be that insufficient evidence was gathered about 
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the use of workload indicators at lower levels in councils, which may have indicated that more 
emphasis is placed on internal processes at these levels. Process mapping is another way of 
assessing internal processes, and there is a lead given by one council which has embraced this 
technique enthusiastically. 
(iv) Innovation and learning process is not systematic 
Finally, the study observed that innovation and learning occur largely on an ad hoc basis in 
local government, with few formal performance indicators or attempts at an organisational 
level. The managers and directors largely agreed that innovation and learning is important, but 
the creation of a learning environment is not formally addressed. However, there are 
documented guidelines as to how such an environment can be created: awards for innovation, 
heavy emphasis at senior levels on training and work-shopping ideas and strategies for the 
shape of the council in the new millennium.  
9.4.3. Corporate culture implications for PM 
The issue of corporate culture is the third level at which the results of this research can be 
implicated. Councils that are best managing their performance are those in which management 
is actively engaging with employees: where there is a connection between the managers and the 
employees. The research observed that there is a culture of openness and access in these 
councils. Information is freely available throughout the organisation. These results confirm and 
reinforce an argument that a public agency’s traditional ideals, norms and values must change if 
it is to inculcate a performance oriented culture (Martin, 1999; Dixon, et al., op. cit.). The 
balanced scorecard/results and determinants models encourage a performance centred culture. 
They emphasis quality, adaptability, the leeway to make mistakes and learn from them and a 
commitment to stakeholders. 
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9.4.4. Performance measurement implication for PM 
At the fourth level, this research questioned whether performance measurement per se is a 
source of motivation which leads to enhanced PM. Some aspects of performance may be 
measured but ignored in the management process due partly to conflicting accountabilities to 
different stakeholders. A number of measures required for accountability to the central 
government were ignored in day-to-day management, whilst other performance measures were 
clearly used to drive performance and accountability to the community. Conversely, 
performance cannot be well managed without measurement. The study observed that financial 
and community measures are measured and well managed, but internal process, innovation, and 
learning are not measured to the same extent and are less well managed.  
9.4.5. Increased demand for accountability to community 
At the fifth level, consistent with the growing literature on government accountability, this 
research demonstrates an increased demand for accountability by all ‘environmental’ and 
‘process’ stakeholders (the community, employees and central government) of local 
government. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the increase in accountability to the 
community is that it is being driven by managers who want to be more accountable to the local 
community, and who exhibit positive attitudes to those government requirements which 
increase accountability to the local community. Improved performance measurement systems 
allow them to better demonstrate their achievements to the community and to the government. 
However, performance measures which do not contribute to the management process are 
considered to be dysfunctional. 
9.4.6. Perceived pay-to-performance relationship 
A commonly stated objective for PRP schemes in both public and private sectors is to 
strengthen the belief amongst managers that rewards are linked to performance and thereby to 
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make them feel more accountable for their individual contributions. According to AGREE 
theorems that underpin PRP, a perceived relationship between performance and pay awards is a 
necessary condition for employees covered by the schemes to be motivated to higher levels of 
performance (Vroom, op. cit; Milkovich and Newman, op. cit). The assumption is that the 
stronger and more widely held the perceived relationship between pay and performance, the 
greater will be the effect of pay awards on individual motivation and performance.  
The evidence gathered in this study shows that ambiguity regarding the relationship between 
pay and performance leads to diminished performance effects at organisational levels. 
Ambiguity about the determinants of performance pay also leads to lower levels of perceived 
pay equity and lower levels of satisfaction with pay. Therefore, the relationship which staff 
perceives to be existing between performance and pay awards provides a measure of the likely 
effects on performance-based pay scheme. The interviews examining the perceived pay-to 
performance relationship have also covered issues relating to the following: (i) Factors 
affecting perceived performance-pay linkage which may be related to performance appraisal 
mechanisms and/or pay related.; and (ii) Importance of perceived link between pay and 
performance 
9.4.6.1. Objections to performance-pay linkage 
There are those who object to any link between performance appraisal ratings and pay awards. 
Their objections are based on one of two concerns. First, that PRP will lead to a preoccupation 
with the monetary awards during the performance planning and review process and will subvert 
the developmental purposes of appraisal. Further that, this may also create an added pressure 
for lower levels and inflated ratings in appraisal. One approach to dealing with this problem is 
to conduct the performance review at a different time from the pay review. The second concern 
relates to the reliability and validity of appraisals as a basis for discrimination. 
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Adequate managerial skills are crucial if this concern is to be properly alleviated.  
9.4.6.2. Appraisal ratings and pay awards linkage 
One potential benefit of a standardised relationship between performance ratings and pay 
awards is that it can strengthen the incentive value of the awards by providing a clearer link 
between performance and pay. There is likely to be greater ambiguity regarding the relationship 
between performance and pay in more discretionary schemes in which the award for a given 
level of performance is decided after the fact. This argument, of course, assumes that 
performance appraisal system distinguishes between different levels of performance.  
Against this must be weighed the evidence discussed earlier which indicates that the appraisal 
systems used in at least some schemes are not effectively discriminating between managers. 
Added to this is the fact that performance appraisals are used for purposes other than salary 
decisions, such as motivation and development of staff. Performance ratings which serve these 
other purposes may not provide the level of discrimination required for pay allocation deci-
sions. Judgements of an individual’s contribution may also include a range of factors that are 
not included in specified performance criteria or appraisal plans. Non-standardised 
relationships between performance ratings and pay allow greater latitude for these supple-
mentary factors to be taken into account in the decisions on pay awards. But they carry the risk 
that decisions will be based on factors that conflict with the criteria used in the appraisal 
process so that pay awards do not appear to be related systematically to performance ratings. 
9.4.7. Motivation of public sector managers 
 By and large, the evidence gathered indicate that a number of factors may have been 
responsible for inspiring motivation for increased performance, including the symbolic status of 
a pay increase signifying recognition of well accomplished work and the increased and more 
effective channels of communication opened by the introduction of PRP schemes.  
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The evidence further indicates that in this case the ability of pay to motivate a typical public-
sector manager was more likely to succeed in certain environments. The ethos of paying for 
performance appears to be widely accepted in some organisations, whereas in others, it is 
resented. Although no variables such as length of service, or age of employee were found 
affecting this viewpoint, it may be considered that ‘system’ rather than ‘person’ factors (see 
section 3.2.2 of chapter 3 on factors affecting performance) may have a direct impact on the 
acceptability of PRP.  
The follow-up interviews indicate that culture tailored to a particular organisation is considered 
a significant factor in the determination of a successful strategy to motivate performance 
managers. This confirms one aspect of the hypothesis of this study that the satisfactional and 
motivational value of a PBIs policy is a function of organisational capacity to accommodate 
such a change. 
9.5. Conclusion 
Generally, this chapter has examined the practical implication of PRP as a motivational strategy 
in British local government. The initial motive for introducing PRP is two-fold: first to improve 
labour supply (focusing on the pay side), and secondly, as a tool for raising performance in 
service delivery. The process of introducing PRP did not involve trade unions but rather a 
direct appeal to individual employees to join the scheme. This kind of approach left the future 
of industrial relations in the local government system unclear, especially with respect to 
collective bargaining. Also the process had external management consultants playing a vital 
role in the designing of PRP schemes where they had encouraged the use of results-orientated 
assessment often coupled with to a salary matrix. 
The coverage and definition of PRP, the techniques of performance review and the magnitude 
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of performance payments differentiates the types of PRP scheme. The research shows that pay 
can be linked to individual performance in a number of ways and that PRP can be applied to a 
wide range of occupational groups. What this suggests is that before introducing PRP an 
organisation must examine the various options available, survey employees’ attitudes, and then 
select those which support its objectives and which match organisational constraints and 
management.  
In managing PRP the research observed that it is important to match the scheme with 
management style. That is advancing a policy of strengthening the position of line management 
and devolving decision-making. The rationale behind a flexible management style is that 
managers will perform at higher level if they are given greater control over resources, but are 
then held to account through robust indicators of effective output, equal opportunities and 
objectivity. 
The chapter has attempted to integrate the conceptual framework of motivation theory with the 
reflections from case study interviews and discussions within British local governments. The 
interviews were guided by three generalisations of motivation theories of goal-setting, 
expectancy, reactance, achievement and equity due to their relevance to this study. Important 
themes recurring from this case study are that individual PRP systems inevitably change the 
distribution of wages within a profession, which may raise inequity issues leading to some 
degree of de-motivation for those who think the new distribution is unjust.  
Secondly, although PRP is perceived to be one of the sources of motivation it can also be a 
demotivator if the conditions are not right. Organisational culture, managerial skills to measure 
performance, size of awards, the purpose and scope of the scheme are key examples of such 
conditions. People need to feel that a change in behaviour will produce sufficient reward and 
vice-versa. Some ill-thought-out schemes may have adverse affects on medium and 
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long-term well being of organisations as they may encourage shortermism. PRP can have a 
negative effect on team working by over-emphasising individualised incentives. As long as the 
basic measure is not exclusively individualised this can be countered by including team-
building and in interactive objective-setting.  
The issue of fairness of PRP schemes as examined in this chapter is in the context of objectivity 
of individual performance measurement, externality aspects, and as a source of discrimination 
of employees. In respect of objectivity, the experience is that it can be difficult to set 
measurable and realistic targets, particularly where financial targets cannot be used or are 
inappropriate. It can be difficult to achieve consistency between managers, both in terms of 
setting targets and in terms of appraising people. PRP thus puts a new emphasis on the 
relevance of formal appraisal schemes. This requires training and monitoring. Some authorities 
attempt to counter problems of appraisal being turned into negotiating sessions by separating 
the performance review from the pay review. 
Identifiable factors outside employees’ control (i.e. externalities) such as downturns in the 
economy can reduce individuals’ performance pay, though they may be working harder to 
compensate. Thus it is important to have the base pay right against the market. But people 
should try to mitigate outside influences, and this can be taken into account when assessing 
performance. Some organizations allow objectives to be reviewed in the light of outside events 
or changed priorities; others do not encourage this.  
Issues arising from PRP’s links with financial and PM were the schemes’ effects on pay costs, 
the funding of the schemes and their integration with PM framework. PRP is perceived to be 
self-financing when it provides better value for money by encouraging better performance. 
Others, however, find it difficult to assess PRP’s impact on the overall salary bill. Equitable 
distribution of PRP awards is limited by budget constraints. PRP is not closely 
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linked with PM systems which emphasize objective-setting and formal appraisal, or have 
seriously attempted to monitor PRP schemes. There are also some claims that PM could be 
effective when not linked to PRP.  
Thirdly, service quality initiatives in British local authorities cover a wide range of issues. 
These include, among others, determining who are the clients, consultation mechanisms, the 
setting of service standards, and the provision of information to the public. Others include the 
provision of choice, the development of complaint and redress mechanisms, development of 
quality management, and quality awards.   
The practical implications of the schemes and the strategic approach to managing performance 
are the final focus of the chapter. By and large, the enthusiasm expressed amongst public sector 
employees who have experienced PRP tends to be modest. In this sense, real antipathy amongst 
staff is more common than real enthusiasm. In addition, the respondents have consistently been 
of the view that these schemes seriously threaten team-working and co-operation. Hence this 
finding suggests that individual PRP in the public sector has been, variously, counter-
productive, or, occasionally, has scored a very modest success. Although in theory PRP is 
believed to promote cultural change in organisations, the general perception on the ground is 
that in isolation it is not an appropriate strategy. 
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PART V 
 
Conclusions, Research Implications,  
and Areas for Further Research 
  
 
- 320 -
Chapter Ten 
CONCLUSIONS: A VIGILANT APPROACH FOR DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES 
10.0. Introduction  
The study was set-up after observing that for researchers the ‘quiet managerial revolution’ 
taking place in public service performance management practice has created tensions between 
those who manage the services and those who are managed within them. Consequently, this 
trend has prompted an academic debate for and against the novelty, objectivity and 
compatibility of market-type motivational strategies in public sector domain towards which this 
study seeks to contribute.  
The problem addressed in this research is “How compatible are market-type motivational 
strategies in managing performance in political institutions such as local authorities?” In 
order to address this problem and for operational convenience, the thesis argues that the general 
goodness-of-fit of market-type motivational strategies in public services is attributable to three 
main issues: (i) capacity of PSOs to regulate and monitor ‘imported’ market-type managerial 
principles and practices; (ii) objectivity of performance measurement and accountability 
processes; and (iii) equity perceptions of stakeholders about performance-related incentive 
schemes. A topic guide (see Appendix A) was generated highlighting key research issues about 
which data has been collected.   
Responses to these issues are, not only indicative of the degree of managerial acceptance of the 
PBIs, but also signify the capacity of PSOs to adapt to contemporary managerial reform 
practices transposed from the private sector. Most importantly such responses attest the 
generalisability of process motivational theorems of AGREE. This chapter has three main aims: 
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(i) to summarise the key research findings and conclusions; (ii) to synthesise the theoretical 
implications of the study; and (iii) to pinpoint potential areas for further research. 
10.1. Summary of key research findings and conclusions   
The long-standing debate about the compatibility of market-based management techniques in 
PSOs and what motivates public sector managers has by no means been resolved through this 
study as further research is still called for. However, some interesting conclusions and lessons 
about the subject matter can be drawn. Overall, this research is guided by a multi-theoretical 
framework of motivation (AGREE) to examine the research problem. The key findings and 
related conclusions in response to research questions as outlined in Appendix A can be 
classified into six categories as presented below. 
10.1.1. Capacity of PSOs to accommodate imported changes 
The first key finding is about the emergence of a ‘new’ culture of rewarding managerial 
performance in the public sector. The structural change and institutional arrangements have 
greatly enhanced the capacity of BLGs to deliver value for money public goods and services. 
This has also made it easier to introduce new private sector management techniques in local 
government system. Other new techniques have also influenced the local government 
managerial attitude in the delivery of public service in UK. For example, CCT, contracting out 
and internal markets have significantly accelerated competition and forced public services to 
adopt PM strategies and techniques with or without PRP schemes. Skills in designing and 
managing service contracts have become imperative, as services are ‘exported’ to private sector 
or as contracts are used amongst internal business units, within the local government system. 
Based on this finding we can make two major conclusions about capacity of PSOs to 
‘accommodate’ the emergence of a ‘new’ culture of managing and rewarding performance in 
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the public sector.  
(1) The change process in public sector, which comprises such techniques as PM, is not a 
"quick fix" involving one universally applicable model. Such massive organisational 
change processes should be conceived as an incremental learning process in which the 
limitations of five dimensions of PM model techniques must be recognised.  
(2) Developing goal-oriented employees in local authorities requires the following 
ingredients:  
o transparent processes of recognition and rewarding individual contributions;  
o understanding and satisfying their intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) motivational 
desires; and  
o a fair and equitable linkage of their performance to pay packages.  
However, an interesting “by-product” question is that: does this contemporary tendency of 
rewarding performance imply the beginning of a ‘new era’ of managerial culture or does it 
signify the beginning of the end of a conventional gulf between private and public sector 
management styles? 
10.1.2. Attributes of a successful PRP scheme 
Based on the discussions with the interviewees, it appears that organisation specific PM and 
PRP schemes are viewed positively by local government managers as effective management 
tools for improving the quality of performance. They argue that management of quality reflects 
acceptance by public managers that the users of public services are their "customers" and 
“clients”. However, with various factors such as service quality or productivity, employee 
satisfaction, increased motivation and competition at stake, it is difficult to assess which criteria 
contributes to the success of a PRP scheme. Perhaps the achievement of the original objectives 
of the schemes could be offered as a starting point.  
Given this scenario, it is obviously worth considering whether its evident achievements in some 
labour markets can carry over to others such as local governments. The available 
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evidence from this research suggests that it does not. More precisely, the evidence indicates 
that not all forms of PRP schemes succeed everywhere. In particular, individual PRP does not 
seem to have a strong motivational impact on people who work in public services in UK unless 
the pay package is really substantially attractive. 
PRP scheme are perceived as contributing to increased motivation and an increase in 
organisational performance. However, in contemplating what exactly constitutes a successful 
scheme, it seems worthwhile to point out the implications of defining the success of the 
schemes. Lack of significant empirical evidence as a means of monitoring the schemes’ success 
leaves little guidance in finding a point of evaluation. Therefore, the dilemma of choosing the 
most appropriate criteria on which to judge a scheme's success remains a misery.  
10.1.3. Motivation of public sector managers 
The research also found that PRP was most successful in motivating the most junior grades and 
those with the shortest service, although, even among these groups, most of them reported no 
motivational effect. The effects on motivation were generally weakest among the more senior 
grades and the longer-serving staff.  
The reason for this could be that as a percentage of salary, a PRP award was more valuable to 
staff on the lower grades, and because many in senior grades have a somewhat different view of 
their work, with already higher levels of motivation. If this finding could be shown to apply in 
other organizations, it could cast doubt upon one of the conventional wisdoms of PRP: that it 
should be introduced for senior staff first and gradually extended down the hierarchy.  
Three conclusions are possible based on the preceding evidence.  
(a) Firstly, it is suggested that the flexible adaptability of the reward scheme in the 
implementation of PRP in various departments is considered the most appropriate 
source of motivation of public sector managers;  
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(b) Secondly, it is highly important to take into consideration an organisation's history 
and culture when designing and implementing a performance-related reward package 
so that the two are compatible with each other; and 
(c) Thirdly, in conjunction with the goal-setting theory, the degree to which public sector 
managers are involved in the setting of corporate objectives is another key source of 
motivation. 
10.1.4. Linking pay to performance: principle versus process  
The vast majority of respondents are in favour of the principle rather than the process of linking 
pay to performance. These positive attitudes are more widely demonstrated by public managers 
who have had some direct experience of PBI schemes such as PRP, even when those schemes 
have been judged as being failures. Such attitudes appear to be motivated by beliefs that 
performance-based reward systems do enhance the performance of PSOs and that it is more 
equitable to allocate rewards on the basis of managerial contributions to organisational outputs 
and outcomes. 
Overall there is a general perception that the process of linking pay to public service 
performance is ambiguous and subjective. Besides, it is beyond the scope of this study to 
evaluate whether this principle is practically effective or not. It is important to make a clear 
distinction between the ‘principle’ and ‘process’ of linking pay to performance. 
10.1.5. The balanced approach to performance measurement 
Of the four dimensions of the Kaplan & Norton’s balanced scorecard approach to measuring 
performance the study found that innovation and learning indicators are encouraged but not 
measured. Performance measurement for accountability has three basic building blocks: the 
dimensions of performance which an organisation is seeking to encourage; the standards to be 
set; and the rewards or penalties associated with achieving performance targets. There is a 
widespread recognition that the dimensions of performance are broader than financial 
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performance alone, that financial performance indicators measure and make visible only 
limited aspects of an organisation’s performance.  
Accounting systems are used to measure performance because they are considered to be 
reliable and consistent. Also because they mesh with the primary objective of ‘value adding’ 
for stakeholders. However, there is a growing concern amongst local government managers that 
concentration on financial measures is inadequate for strategic decision making, and indeed for 
full internal management and control. 
Local governments, as learning organisations, are ultimately accountable to the local 
community through better PM practices. Measuring innovation is a step towards achieving this 
end. Long-term survival is linked to an organisation’s chosen strategy, and the strategy 
determines what must be measured. Measuring short-term financial results only can have 
dysfunctional consequences to organisational long-term survival. 
10.1.6. Equity perceptions of PRP schemes 
There is a general perception that through PBI schemes individual efforts and achievements are 
recognised. With less than half of the respondents feeling that the schemes help them to see 
how their work contributes to the organisation as a whole, about a quarter of them think that the 
schemes have yet to overcome some of the difficulties in their organisations. However, 
although a minority are of the view that PRP schemes have helped to increase communications 
with their line managers, the majority agree that the schemes have helped them to figure out 
what their organisation's goals and plans are for the future.  
Examination of further equity dimensions indicates a general consensus that it is essential to 
relate pay to performance although the schemes are practically unfairly operated. Pay is 
perceived to be an irrelevant motivator if the package is unattractive and feedback is 
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ineffective. The main purpose of a PBI scheme is to cultivate organisational achievement 
culture and its main drawback is attributable to coverage of the schemes. The respondents are 
concerned that PBIs contribute to short-termism objectives and accept that goal-setting process 
encourages joint consultation and is a significant incentive.  
One of the major requirements for designing of an equitable performance pay schemes is that 
the award differentials between high and low performers be sufficient to emphasise to 
employees that high performance is well rewarded and that low performance is not rewarded at 
all. There are two components to these differentials. First, there must be a dispersion of awards 
across individuals so as to reward a range of performance levels. Second, there must be 
significant variations in the size of awards given to staff whose performance is at different 
levels in a given period. In order for a PRP scheme to operate equitably it requires a supporting 
infrastructure. No single programme, policy or system is likely to have much impact on one 
organisation. For the human resource approach to the management of culture to have any 
realistic chance of success an integrated package of initiatives will be required.  
In general, the examination of various parameters of equity dimensions of a performance-
related incentive policy in the British LGs indicates a skewed support of the strategy. The main 
conclusion to be drawn is this that the schemes are installed on a flawed environment on one 
hand and are not organisation specific on the other. This exposes them to criticisms of being 
unfair, divisive and incompatible with traditional values of political institutions such as local 
governments. 
In political institutions like local governments a vigilant approach needs to be adopted when 
formulating and implementing an incentive and reward policy for employees based on 
performance. The process motivation theories of AGREE have an important role to play, if and 
only if, all parties involved in this process are aware of practical implications of these 
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theories. A PBI scheme such as PRP generally becomes ineffective when imposed as an ‘off-
the-shelf’ ‘stand-alone’ incentive package without prior consideration to both process 
(establishment) and environmental factors (external stakeholders).  
Overall there are mixed research observations.  On the positive extreme the study has observed 
that when pay awards are based directly on performance ratings, there is a reciprocal pressure 
on managers to use the appraisal process effectively and to be able to justify their ratings of the 
staff. Without this pressure, managers often fail to spend adequate time or effort on appraisals, 
and related benefits of the process such as work planning and staff development are lost. 
Against this position is the argument that linking performance appraisal process to pay awards 
induces behaviours directed at improving ratings without necessarily improving performance. 
Inflation in ratings may be a by-product of such behaviours.  
10.2. Implications of the study: The theoretical contribution 
This thesis contributes to this debate in three perspectives:   
(a) By testing the generalisability of motivation theorems of AGREE through which 
we have a proposition of the ‘environmental contingency’ motivational approach 
to managing performance in PSOs;  
(b) By applying the PM model as a research analytical framework - the case of PRP 
schemes being one of the key dimensions of this model. Key issues addressed in 
applying the PM model relate to organisational aims and objectives; organisational 
strategic intent and the means to realising them; organisational effectiveness and 
efficiency; motivation and incentives; and the issue of performance information 
flows. 
(c) By extracting lessons relevant for local authorities in developing countries; and  
The first and third perspectives are elaborated further in the next two subsections. The second 
perspective on the PM model has already been covered in the literature and methodology 
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chapters of this thesis.  
10.2.1. The environmental contingency motivational approach   
The concept of environmental contingency approach referred to here is not novel as it was part 
of the systems theory movements in the 1970s. The contribution of this thesis towards such 
approaches as result of this research is the perspective with which it should be looked at when 
considering various motivation options for public sector managers.  Therefore we are arguing 
that as a prime purpose of all incentive schemes and reward systems is to enhance the 
motivation of individual employees, some consideration needs to be given to the differing 
contingency theories of employee motivation. The thesis concedes that motivation theory has a 
‘revised’ role to play in improving the performance of public services. However, as a result of 
this research this role needs to be conceptualised in a different way from the traditional 
approaches of needs and behavioural or cognitive-based motivation theories. Each of these 
classical theories has its advocates and supporters, although all are subject to some conceptual 
uncertainties or question marks and in all cases some of the empirical evidence is not fully 
supportive.   
Interviewees have consistently stressed informal sources of motivation which are not 
subscribed to by the mainstream theory of motivation. This entails that there exist alternative 
theories, which stress the key importance of environmental contingencies, whereas these five 
(the AGREE) are overwhelmingly driven by some internal psychological processes.  
This new vision is a contemporary motivational approach to rewarding performance in a public 
sector environment and signifies the emergence of a new approach – which we shall refer to as 
an environmental contingency-based theory of motivation. This is due to the volatility of the 
nature of performance in a public sector environment. It is always a dilemma to whom public 
sector managers are really accountable for their performance – to the taxpayers or to the 
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central government. This may significantly influence their motivation indices because from 
what has been gathered in this study, the achievement of primary objectives is a fundamental 
source of motivation in an organisation. 
Finally it is useful to consider some of the more recent general changes in compensation and 
reward systems that academics feel are or should be taking place in individual organisations. 
Kanter (1992), for example, points to a variety of economic, social and organisational 
pressures, which are gradually shifting the basis for pay from that of status to that of 
contribution. This change is indicated by the increased attention being given to merit pay, gain-
sharing plans, pay for knowledge schemes and comparable worth issues. In contrast, however, 
it can be argued that new compensation-reward systems should increasingly address, not just 
the issue of distributive justice, but also the issue of procedural justice.   
In the view of this study compensation-reward systems need to be (and are indeed slowly 
beginning to be) concerned with establishing consistent, accurate, ethical, representative and 
inclusive, ground rules for determining the size of employee rewards. In fact the concern for 
procedural justice has arisen as a result of increased product and service market competition 
limiting the ability of individual organisations to keep on providing ever-larger increases in 
wages. 
10.2.2. Lessons 
Generally, the lessons may be classified into five main categories as follows: (i) attributes of a 
successful PBI scheme; (ii) community involvement in decision-making processes; (iii) lessons 
about the PM model approach to improving public service quality; and (iv) lessons about 
performance measurement.  
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10.2.2.1. The attributes of a successful scheme 
The research shows that a PRP scheme is generally perceived as contributing to an increase in 
performance of the organisation. However, it is important to identify well in advance the 
attributes of the scheme that will prevail in order to judge that it is effective. Perhaps as stated 
above, the achievement of the scheme's original objectives could be offered as a starting point. 
As demonstrated by the research the culture and values pertinent to individual organisations, 
the objectivity of the performance measurement processes, transparency and the perceived 
equity of the incentive scheme are all considered to be significant factors in the determination 
of the success of PRP schemes.  
The importance of establishing a multi-skilled and flexible workforce is frequently stressed in 
the HRM literature. To this end, the role of reward and compensation systems are seen by most 
interviewees in this study to be particularly important in view of their potential for encouraging 
certain aspects of functional flexibility. Such aspects include multi-skilling (via pay for 
knowledge schemes) and team working (via group performance payments), while the very 
notion of financial flexibility pivots on the idea of contingent compensation systems in which 
individuals share in the rewards of overall organisational performance.  
Finally, the major HRM demands are seeking to move from a ‘workforce control’ to a 
‘workforce commitment’ approach. These demands include compensation policies involving 
individual pay being linked to skill attainment, gain-sharing and profit-sharing schemes and 
minimum status differentials in order to de-emphasize the hierarchy of organisational 
arrangements and practices. 
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10.2.2.2. Community involvement in local authorities decision-making processes 
Greater emphasis on accountability and value for money services has demanded better financial 
management systems and more effective community involvement. They are far less focussed 
on understanding, measuring and managing the secondary objectives or means to do this. 
Although PM systems in this research are not fully integrated, there is sufficient evidence of 
public involvement in local decision making to ensure that primary objectives reflect 
community concerns. Other PSOs in the developing and transitional world (DTEs) can learn 
from the focus on community collaboration and consultation as found out in this research.  
10.2.2.3. The PM model approach to improving public service quality  
Various public sector reform initiatives are taking shape in all developing countries. Among 
other things, these countries are attempting to make local authorities and their staff much more 
accountable to councillors and people for their work and achievements. Hence, an important 
lesson for these countries is that better ways have to be found to define and measure the 
effectiveness of local governments and their managers. The PM model approach as applied in 
this research offers an invaluable ‘management solution’ to achieving this good course.     
If local authorities and staff are to respond successfully to the enormous challenges which face 
them, they will need to take stock of everything that they presently do. One way of taking this 
strategic analysis (i.e. identify its current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, risks and threats 
– the SWORT analysis) is to carry out a regular, careful and systematic audit of the work of the 
council as a whole. This should embrace not only what it is delivering to the public but also 
how it is functioning as an organisation – its climate, ethos, structural arrangements, 
management processes etc. This will enable the authority to come up with a viable mission 
statement. 
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Once the mission statement has been drawn up and agreed upon by all stakeholders, then the 
PM process can be applied as a ‘conversion belt’ to ensure that departments and individuals act 
upon the council’s strategic plan. In essence, the PM process will play and facilitate the 
allocative role of primary accountabilities to departments and individual jobholders. It will set 
up performance review processes and define how achievements are to be measured and 
recognised through rewards and sanctions. Above all the PM model will activate management 
information flows with a view to learning and thereby improving the quality of service 
delivery. 
The main question now is that can local government systems world-wide benefit from this 
lesson and adopt a strategic approach to PM which provides for the long term organisational 
development of council organisations and the communities they serve? There are a number of 
strategic choices, which affect this outcome, as shown in this self-constructed Table 10.1 
below. 
Table 10.1: Strategic Choices in Local Government PM    
T r a d i t i o n a l  A p p r o a c h  V s  P M  m o d e l  a p p r o a c h  
To p - d o w n  C e n t r a l  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
c o u n c i l l o r  i m p o s e d ,  c o n t r o l  
o r i e n t e d  p e r f o r m a n c e  m e a s u r e m e n t  
v s  
 
S t r a t e g i c ,  c o l l a b o r a t i v e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  
p e r f o r m a n c e  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m  i n v o l v i n g  
a l l  s t a k e h o l d e r s  –  p r o c e s s  +  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l   
I m p o s i t i o n  o f  u n i v e r s a l ,  i n d u s t r y  
w i d e  m e a s u r e s  w i t h  l e s s  v a l i d i t y  
f o r  s p e c i f i c  c o u n c i l s  
v s  
 
 
I n - h o u s e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  v a l i d ,  c o u n c i l  
s p e c i f i c  m e a s u r e s  t o  b e  u s e d  f o r  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  i m p r o v e m e n t  a n d  
b e n c h m a r k i n g  w i t h  l i k e  c o u n c i l s  
P e r i o d i c  r e p o r t i n g  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  
o f   m e e t i n g  c o n t r o l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  
s e n i o r  m a n a g e m e n t ,  c o u n c i l l o r s  
a n d  C e n t r a l  G o v e r n m e n t  
v s  
 
 
R e a l - t i m e ,  u p - t o - d a t e  p e r f o r m a n c e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  a l l  s t a k e h o l d e r s  t o  m o n i t o r  
p r o g r e s s ,  d e m o n s t r a t e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ,  
m a n a g e  a n d  r e w a r d  o u t c o m e s  
P i e c e m e a l ,  m y o p i c  a p p r o a c h  w i t h  a  
f o c u s  o n  t h e  m e a s u r e m e n t  p r o c e s s   
v s  
 
I n t e g r a t e d  P M S  a c r o s s  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
f o c u s s e d  o n  B V  f o r  m o n e y ,  s e r v i c e  d e l i v e r y  
a n d  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  +  i n d i v i d u a l  
i m p r o v e m e n t  
F o c u s  o n  f i n a n c i a l  m e a s u r e s  o n l y ;  
a n d  r i g i d  s e n i o r i t y  p a y  s t r u c t u r e s  
V s  
F o c u s  o n  b o t h  f i n a n c i a l  &  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  
m e a s u r e s :  a  r e s u l t s  a n d  d e t e r m i n a n t s  +  
b a l a n c e d  s c o r e c a r d  a p p r o a c h e s ;  a n d  
f l e x i b l e  p e r f o r m a n c e / s k i l l  b a s e d  p a y  
s t r u c t u r e s  
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10.2.2.4. Lessons about performance measurement and service quality in local government 
 As regards performance measurement an important lesson from this study is that what is 
measured is visible and important in organisations, and what is not measured becomes 
inevitably invisible. Consequently, these ‘invisibilities’ may be an impediment to the continued 
success of the organisation. Innovation and learning are invisible because they are not 
measured, but in local government performance, this is a dimension that is crucial in future 
viability. 
A key to maintaining a sustainable service quality is to see quality as a negotiable concept, 
involving all key stakeholders, especially councillors the public (as consumers and citizens) and 
front-line staff. These are groups that have traditionally had ‘quality’ done to them, yet they are 
the keys to the success of any quality programme because they know what suffices their 
intrinsic needs better. 
Important lessons for developing countries about quality services in local authorities, which 
adopt a corporate approach  to managing performance are: 
(a) There is no single definition of quality - indeed, it is necessarily a negotiated concept. 
Trade-offs’ have to be made to accommodate different interests and priorities, and to enable 
the local authority to work within the set legal, financial and policy framework;  
(b) There is no ‘one way’.  In fact there are many ways and any authority is likely to be using a 
mix of approaches, depending on the nature of the service and the nature of the problems it 
suffers from. Eclecticism and flexibility are vital, combined with a constructively critical 
approach to the transferability of techniques originally developed for other purposes 
(mainly manufacturing industry); 
(c) Quality is a local issue. National standards help set the parameters but essentially the 
definition of quality, and the way it is put into practice should reflect local conditions, needs 
and abilities; 
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(d) Quality can flourish in an authority where work has already been done to develop a culture 
of trust and collaboration. Conversely, it does not flourish in a ‘blame and fear’ culture, 
which is generally hierarchical and divided departmentally and professionally; 
(e) Leadership from the top politically and from senior managers, is essential. It is vital for 
those delivering services to be confident that they will be supported through change, and 
that they will be supported and encouraged to try out new things. Leadership has not only to 
be visible, it also has to be sustained over a considerable period needed to develop quality 
as ‘part of the furniture’;  
(f) Seeing quality as a corporate priority enables and encourages parts of the organisation to try 
things out and to learn from the experience; and  
(g) A democratic approach to quality involving local people in developing and monitoring 
standards, making suggestions and giving feedback, debating priorities and needs is 
consistent with and helpful to the democratic nature of local government. A consultative 
and participative approach gives weight and credibility to a quality programme. 
10.2.3. The Main Contribution: Contractualism: an organisational change 
implementation model 
Traditionally, countries might have balanced between two management models. One model 
promotes a single (government-wide) management solution imposed across the board to ensure 
consistency and expediency in implementation. A second model lets managers manage within 
the generic framework allowing each government agency to choose its own reform tools and 
when and how to implement them. This second model has the benefit of maximising staff 
ownership of changes, but can result in a very patchy and inconsistent situation where some 
agencies are much more advanced or advantaged than others.  
As a contribution to knowledge, this study argues that the current move towards 
‘contractualism’ offers a third alternative we may refer to as ‘an organisational change 
implementation’ model. Sufficient analysis and operational framework mechanisms have to be 
put in place if agencies do not want to "reinvent the wheel" or make the same 
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mistakes as others who have tried these methods before them. The model one chooses has to be 
aligned with, among other things: the aims of a reform policy; the differences between the 
missions and "professional identities" of the agencies involved; the individual organisational 
values, cultures and capacities; the stakeholders’ perceptions of equity; and the underlying legal 
framework.  
There is no single model though applicable to all countries or even to all agencies within a 
single country. Hence, an important contribution to knowledge that arises from the proceedings 
of this study is that there is a need to develop a change-management strategy using a balanced, 
incremental and learning approach with the three management models in perspective. A 
market-type motivational devices such as PRP schemes should be adopted with vigilance 
because as demonstrated in this study they cannot turn an ineffective management into an 
effective one. Most importantly such schemes should be regarded as secondary level 
management tools rather than primary and should not be entirely relied upon to bring about the 
‘achievement culture’ attitude within an organisation. A conducive operating environment in 
the context of PM needs to be in existence prior to their installations. In particular institutional 
and organisational reform need to guarantee that the following ingredients are in place: 
transparent processes of recognition and rewarding individual contributions ; understanding and 
satisfying their intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) motivational desires; and a fair and equitable 
linkage of their performance to pay packages.  
10.3. Direction for further research 
By and large global information and communication technology (ICT) advancement, market 
forces and changes in the role of governments in the provision of public goods and services 
have necessitated the implementation of market-type managerial practices in PSOs. This 
implies that both primary and secondary objectives of PSOs today have changed. 
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They are more devolved and consumer-oriented and they need, not only different approaches to 
their attainment, but also new management accounting reporting skills. The frontiers of 
management accounting techniques such as Activity-Based Costing (ABC), Total Quality 
Management (TQM), cost of quality, Just-In-Time (JIT), Financial Management Initiative 
(FMI), Benchmarking, etc are just a few of such examples.  
Therefore, further research called for about the response of management accounting 
information system to the ‘new’ information needs of public sector managers in response to 
current reform initiatives taking place. A revised set of management information is required for 
managing, evaluating, and rewarding individual performance under the new regime of public 
management. In order to achieve these objectives and earn a competitive edge, the focus of 
public sector managers now is on issues attributable to improving organisational performance. 
Does this trend imply that PSOs’ planning, decision-making, and control processes of 
individual performance today need to be more informed than before the adoption NPM 
practices? If so, does it mean that management accounting information systems in PSOs now 
have a new role to play in facilitating effective management, measurement and rewarding 
processes of individual performance?   
By disseminating enhanced management information as widely and frequently as possible an 
organisation is likely to be in a better position to modify employees’ behaviour and build a 
stable intellectual tax base (capital) in the current turbulent political environment. So far 
inadequate attention has been paid to this area and how accounting systems should reinvigorate 
in response thereto. Therefore, the thesis concludes by proposing the ‘new’ role of management 
accounting system as a means of meeting ‘information needs’ of modern public sector 
managers as a potential area for further research. 
  
 
- 337 -
Appendices 
Appendix A: Topic Guide   
1. What PSO capacity indicators are in place to accommodate market-type managerial 
changes? 
2. Is rewarding performance a new managerial culture in PSOs? 
3. What are the attributes of successful PBIs?  
4. What motivates public sector managers?  
5. Is the principle of linking pay to performance acceptable in a political institution like 
the local government?  
6. What are the implications of Kaplan & Norton’s model of ‘Balanced Scorecard 
Approach’ to measuring performance in a PSO?  
7. What are the perceptions of stakeholders about equity of PRP schemes in the BLG 
system?  
8. What are the PRP’s effects on individual and organisation performance? 
9. To what extent is PRP is perceived to be fair in a local authority environment? 
10. What are the PRP’s links with financial and performance management? 
11. What lessons are out there for developing countries to learn from the experience of 
veteran advanced systems like the UK in the implementation of market-type PBIs in a 
public sector environment?  
12. What is the theoretical and practical implication of research findings from this study?  
13. What are the potential areas for further research after this study and what is the main 
proposition of the study?    
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Appendix B: Questionnaire Series 1 [sample] 
Name of Public Sector Organisation: …The XXX Council  
Name of respondent: ……… Position………………
Contact : Email address…… Telephone .................
Responses to this questionnaire will be solely used for the purpose of this study and will be treated with 
strictest confidence. 
The completed questionnaire may be sent to me as an attachment through my email address: XXXXXX
 OR may be sent by post to the following address: John Isaac Mwita, University of 
Birmingham, [address removed] 
Please, unless requested otherwise, could you answer each question by placing a tick in the appropriate 
box [ ].  NA = Not Applicable now. 
 
1. Are corporate objectives formally linked to the council strategic plans? We are currently 
undertaking this. ………. ………………………YES …[   ]1.   NO …[   ]2. NA [ X   ] 3 
2. Do these strategies and plans indicate how the achievement of organisational objectives will be 
formally evaluated? Same as above……… ……….YES …[    ]4.  NO …[    ] 5 NA ..[ X  ] 6.   
3. Are key objectives linked to specific group or individual tasks or accountabilities as way of 
enabling performance measurement?…same as above…YES ..[    ]7.  NO …[    ] 8 NA [ X   ] 9.   
4. Does the council have a formal arrangement or scheme for performance management? … 
……...…………………………………..YES …[    ]10.  NO …[    ] 11 NA [  X ] 12. 
5. If YES, will this scheme be retained in future? …………………………………… 
………………………………………………YES …[    ]13.  NO …[    ] 14 NA [  X  ] 15. 
6. If NO, do you plan to introduce such a scheme in future?  ……. …. ………… ………. 
…………………………….………………….YES …[X  ]16.  NO [    ] 17.  NA. [     ] 18.  
7. Does the authority operate a Performance-Related Pay (PRP) 
scheme?………………………………….….YES …[    ]19.  NO [ X  ] 20.  NA [     ] 21. 
8. If YES, will it be retained in future?…… ……….. ……………….. ……… ………… 
…………….……………………………...……YES …[    ]22.  NO [    ] 23.  NA [     ] 24. 
9. Are there any resistances within the council against the policy of rewarding performance through 
PRP?………….. ………………………… ………….. ……….. …. ……. …. 
……..………………………………………….YES  [    ]25.  NO.. [    ] 26.  NA .[ X   ] 27. 
10. If NO, does the authority have a plan to introduce such a scheme in the future? … 
…………………………………………….. ..YES … [    ]28.  NO.. [    ] 29 NA [     ] 30. 
11. Does the authority operate an incentive scheme other than PRP for the employees? 
……………………………………………  YES …[    ]31.  NO …[ X  ] 32.  NA [     ] 33. 
12. Does the authority have a formal system of individual performance appraisal or measurement? 
Employee Review & Development Programme………………..…  … 
……………………………………………YES …[    ]34.  NO …[ X  ] 35.  NA [     ] 36 
13. How important are the following for this council: Please tick [ 3] against preferred rank 
between 0 and 5, where 0 = not applicable now, and 5 = very important 
 (a) Qualitative performance targets? ……………………………...………………37 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
X      
  (b) Quantitative performance targets? …………………………………..……….38 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
  X    
 ( c) Performance measurement scheme? ………………………………….………39 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
  X    
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(d) Rewarding individual performance? ………………………………….……40 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
X      
 (e) Performance-Related Pay scheme? ………………………………….………41 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
X      
 (f) Performance Management scheme? ………………………………….………42 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
  X    
 
14. How have recent managerial reforms in the public sector affected your organisational culture of 
managing and rewarding performance? 44 … 
 Comments: It has given the Managers an opportunity to consider these issues within the overall 
Best Value process. 
15. In your own assessment, what is your view about the effectiveness of performance pay schemes in 
the public sector? 45…… 
Comments: It will be very difficult to introduce due to the present culture of automatic pay raises.  
However, this may change under the Single Status Reviews. 
Please CHECK this box if you would be willing to participate in a physical follow-up 
interview ……………………………………………………………………………………[   ] 
 
 
END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Thank you for your co-operation in completing the questionnaire 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire Series 2 
Dear Sir/Madam 
This is an academic research questionnaire that is intended to obtain the general perception of public sector 
managers/officers about the appropriateness and effectiveness of ‘using market-oriented performance-based 
incentive schemes to motivate public sector employees’. Personal views rather that organisational are required and 
may not need such a scheme to be in operation in your organisation. All responses to this questionnaire will be 
used for the purpose of this study and will be treated with strictest confidence.  
 
Please, send the completed questionnaire to the following address: John Isaac Mwita, University of Birmingham, 
[Address removed] 
 Name of Local Authority: ………………………………………………  
Position of Respondent……………………………… Telephone………………………. 
Contact: Email address…………………………. 
 
1.0 Acceptability of performance-based incentive schemes for public sector managers 
What is your personal view on the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
No 
View Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1.1.The principle of relating pay to performance 
is essentially a good one  
     
1.2 A performance-based incentive scheme is a 
good idea for managerial staff 
     
1.3. The idea of performance-based incentive 
scheme is essentially unfair  
     
1.4 Working under performance contracting is a 
good policy in public sector 
     
Additional remarks, if any. …… ……… …… ……… …… ……… ……… …… …… …… 
….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2.0 Pay as a Motivator  
What is your personal view on the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
No 
View Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2.1 The most important thing about a job is pay      
2.2 The kind of work I like is the one that pays 
top salary for top performance 
     
2.3 I receive a considerable amount of feedback 
concerning the quality of output on my job. 
     
Additional remarks, if any. ……………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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3.0 Manager’s view on the reasons for introducing an incentive scheme 
Please ranked the following objectives of the any incentive scheme in your council between 1 and 8, where 
1=highest and 8=lowest rank 
What is your organisation’s main purpose of operating an incentive scheme?  Rank 
3.1 Reward good performance   
3.2 Remove the bargaining process away from trade unions   
3.3 Reinforce existing culture, values and performance expectations   
3.4 Promote organisational change   
3.5 Motivate employees   
3.6 Increase commitment to the organisation   
3.7 Improve recruitment and retention of staff   
3.8 Improve performance of the organisation   
Additional remarks, if any. …… ………… ………… ………… ……… ……. …… …… ……… 
………………………..……….………………………………. 
4.0 Success of an incentive scheme in the public sector 
There are two statements, which are designed to determine the success of the scheme as perceived by the 
managers:  
Statement 1: Performance based incentive scheme has been successful in achieving an overall increase in 
organisational performance in the local government system.  
Statement 2: Performance based incentive scheme has provided the authority with a useful tool in the delivery of 
quality public services. 
 
Additional remarks, if any. ……… ………………… … ……………………… …… … … 
.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
 Statement 1 Statement 2 
Strongly Disagree    
Disagree    
No View    
Agree    
Strongly Agree    
 
5.0 Incentive scheme’s effect on performance (service delivery) 
What is your personal view on the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
No 
View Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5.1 A performance based incentive scheme 
makes me focus on what I'm meant to achieve'      
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5.2 A performance-based incentive scheme 
promotes improvement in organisational 
performance.  
     
5.3. An incentive scheme improves 
communication with the individual supervisor, 
the managers' immediate supervisor and an 
improvement in performance 
     
5.4. A performance-based incentive scheme 
helps managers to focus on certain objectives.       
5.5. A performance-based incentive scheme 
provides greater opportunity to interact on a 
more frequent basis with the supervisor for 
discussing the focus of direction of the targets 
set 
     
Additional remarks, if any. ……………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 6. Drawbacks with performance-based incentive schemes  
Please rank the following statements relating to a performance-based incentive scheme in your council according 
to their order of degree of drawback. Rank between 1 and 8, where 1=highest and 8=lowest rank 
Statement Rank 
6.1. The amount of reward involved is not enough to substantiate a change in performance   
6.2. PRP negatively affects team spirit, and co-operation can be jeopardised   
6.3. Performance pay encourages employees to exercise a narrow focus on short-term 
quantifiable goals, neglecting long term issues  
 
6.4. Performance-based pay incentives are not successful in improving employee motivation   
6.5. It is principally unfair in discriminating between individual contributions   
6.6. Difficult to measure individual performance objectively   
6.7. Assumes that money is the best reward   
Additional remarks, if any. ……………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
7.0 Measuring managerial performance for reward purposes 
What is your personal view on the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
No 
View 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
7.1 As a result of operating a performance-based 
incentive scheme, my work objectives are clear 
and specific. I know exactly what my job is. 
     
7.2 Feedback and feed-forward loops are most 
important aspects of a performance 
measurement scheme in local authorities 
     
7.3 The task of measuring managerial 
performance is a difficult one.      
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7.4 The process of linking pay to performance is 
ambiguous and very subjective       
7.5 A number of mechanisms are possible to 
overcome difficulties in measuring managerial 
performance in a public sector environment 
     
Additional remarks, if any. ……… ………… ……… ……… ……… …… …… ……… …… …… …………… 
…………… …………… …………… …………… ………… … 
8.0. Short-term work objectives, performance targets and feedback 
What is your personal view on the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree No 
View 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
8.1. In practice, there is over-emphasis on 
short-term work ob  
jectives as a common difficulty with 
performance-based incentive schemes 
     
8.2. Targets may become irrelevant as a result 
of circumstances beyond the manager's direct 
control. 
     
8.3. I am provided with a great deal of 
feedback and guidance on the quality of my 
work 
     
Additional remarks, if any. ……………………………………………………………………. 
9.0. Links between performance and reward 
What is your personal view on the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree No View Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
9.1 Producing high quality work is rewarded 
with more pay  
     
9.2 Performance-based incentive scheme has 
no effect on my work performance  
     
9.3 The most important thing about a job is pay      
Additional remarks, if any. ……………………………………………………………………. 
10.0 Benefits of performance-based incentives in relation to team spirit 
What is your personal view on the 
following statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
No 
View Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
10.1. Performance-based incentives 
contribute to more effective teamwork 
     
10.2. Performance-based incentives 
negatively affect teamwork, and co-
operation can suffer 
     
10.3. There is a need for an appeals 
system      
Additional remarks, if any.…………………… 
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11.0. Joint Consultations in Goal/Objective Setting  
What is your personal view on the 
following statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
No 
View Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
11.1. I really have little voice in the 
formulation of my work objectives  
     
11.2. I am allowed a high degree of 
influence in the determination of my work 
objectives  
     
Additional remarks, if any. ………………………………………………………………. 
12.0 Improvement in Performance  
What is your personal view on the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
No 
View Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
12.1. With performance-based incentive 
scheme my individual efforts and achievements 
are recognised  
     
12.2. With performance-based incentive 
scheme my work objectives are clear and 
specific.  I know exactly what my job is.  
     
12.3. With performance-based incentive 
scheme I can see how my work contributes to 
the organisation as a whole.  
     
12.4. With performance-based incentive 
scheme I have a clear idea about how the 
organisation is performing overall.  
     
12.5. I am generally told what is going on in the 
organisation  
     
12.6. I've got a clear idea of what this 
organisation's goals and plans are for the future. 
     
12.7. Performance-based incentive scheme has 
yet to overcome some difficulties in this 
organisation  
     
12.8. Increased communications with boss as a 
result of performance-based incentive scheme  
     
12.9. Performance-based incentive scheme 
makes me show more initiative  
     
12.10 Performance-based incentive scheme 
makes me focus on what I'm meant to achieve  
     
12.11. I have a clear idea of the council's goals 
and plans for the future  
     
Additional remarks, if any. ………………………………………………………………. 
Please CHECK this box if you would be willing to participate in a physical follow-up interview [   ] 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE, Thank you for your co-operation 
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Appendix D: List of Respondents and Interviewees  
The classification of respondents to Questionnaires and Interviews by title is as follows: 
 
TITLE OF RESPONDENT: 
Number of 
respondents to 
Questionnaire I 
Number of 
respondents to  
Questionnaire II 
Total 
respondents   
I & II 
Number of 
respondents to  
Interviews 
Chief Executive 11 46 57 7
Assistant Chief Executive 3 1 4 -
Executive Assistant of Chief 1 1 
Chief Officer, Performance 1 1 12
Organisation Development 1 1 1
Chief Officer – Organisational 1 1 
Town Clerk & Chief 1 3 4 -
Corporate Resources Manager 1 1 
Chief Executive & Chief 1 1 
Chief Administrative Officer 1 1 -
Chief Personnel Officer 1 1 1
CEO’s Office Personnel and 1 1 
Acting Assistant Chief 1 1 
Head of Corporate Support 1 1 
Contract and Benefits 1 1 -
Corporate Head, Personnel & 1 1 1
Corporate Support Manager 1 1 -
Deputy Head of Human 1 1 1
Director of Personnel 1 1 
Director of Corporate Services 1 1 2 -
Director of Human Resources 1 1 3
Director of Strategy & 1 1 
Director of Policy and 1 2 3 5
Head of Administrative 1 1 1
Head of Corporate Policy 1 1 2
Head of County Human 1 1 -
Head of Human resources 2 2 
Head of Finance & Corporate 1 1 
Head of Corporate Human 1 1 
Head of Customer and Office 1 1 1
Head of Central Services 1 1 
Head of Personnel and 2 1 3 4
Assistant Head of Personnel 1 1 
Human Resource - Strategy 
2
2 
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Head of Personnel & Training 2 2 
Personnel Services Manager 4 4 
Personnel Officer 4 1 5 14
Personnel and Development 1 1 
Personnel Resources Advisor 1 1 1
Personnel Systems Officer 1 1 
Principal Policy Analyst 1 1 1
Policy and Administrative 1 1 
Management Services Officer 1 1 
Principal Personnel Officer 1 1 
Training Officer 1 1 
Total 52 70 
122  
(29%) 55 
 
Letters of Regrets and Apologies  
There were nine letters of regret and apologies from the following officers: 
Title of Manager No. 
Chief Executive 5 
Clerk & Chief Executive 1 
Enterprise Support 1 
Head of Human Resources 1 
PA to Chief Executive 1 
Total 9 
List of Respondents and Interviewees by Names & Local authority 
QUESTIONNAIRE SERIES I  
[names removed from this web version] 
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QUESTIONNAIRE SERIES II  [names removed from this web version]
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LETTERS OF REGRETS AND APOLOGIES  [names removed from this web version]
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Appendix E: List of Skills and Attributes 
 S k i l l / A t t r i b u t e  H i g h  R a t i n g  L o w  R a t i n g  
1 .  
P r o b l e m  s o l v i n g  
I d e n t i f i e s  p r o b l e m s  a n d  t h e i r  
c a u s e s  q u i c k l y .   
U s e s  s o u n d  j u d g e m e n t  t o  p r o d u c e  
g o o d  s o l u t i o n s  
F i n d s  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  
t h e  p r o b l e m s  c l e a r l y  a n d  
p r o d u c e  s o l u t i o n s  
2 .  
Q u a n t i t y  o f  w o r k  
H i g h  l e v e l  o f  p e r s o n a l  w o r k  
o u t p u t .  
P r o d u c e s  l i m i t e d  q u a l i t y  
o f  w o r k .  
3 .  Q u a l i t y  a n d  C o n t r o l  o f  
w o r k  
A c c u r a t e ,  h i g h  q u a l i t y  o f  w o r k ;  
b e a t s  d e a d l i n e s .  
P o o r  q u a l i t y  w o r k ;  
F a i l s  t o  m e e t  d e a d l i n e s .  
4 .  
P l a n n i n g  a n d  O r g a n i s i n g   
C l e a r  s e n s e  o f   p e r s o n a l  
p r i o r i t i e s ;  
G o o d  t i m e  m a n a g e m e n t ;  
G o o d  p r o j e c t  m a n a g e m e n t .  
M u d d l e d  a n d  
d i s o r g a n i s e d .  
P o o r  p e r s o n a l  t i m e  
d i s c i p l i n e ;   
P o o r  p r o j e c t  
m a n a g e m e n t .  
5 .  K n o w l e d g e  ( Te c h n i c a l  o r  
B u s i n e s s )  
S o u n d  k n o w l e d g e ;  
W i d e  r a n g e  o f  k n o w l e d g e .  
L i m i t e d ,  p a t c h y  
k n o w l e d g e .  
6 .  
I n i t i a t i v e  
A c t i v e l y  i n f l u e n c e s  e v e n t s ;  
K e e n  t o  p u t  f o r w a r d  i d e a s ;  s e l f -
m o t i v a t i n g .  
P a s s i v e  a t t i t u d e .  
S l o w  t o  t h i n k  t o  n e w  
i d e a s .  
A l s o  n e e d s  t o  b e  t o l d .  
7 .  
F l e x i b i l i t y / A d a p t a b i l i t y  
A b l e  t o  a d a p t  q u i c k l y  t o  c h a n g e ;  
A b l e  t o  a d o p t  n e w  a p p r o a c h e s .  
I n f l e x i b l e ;  
R e s i s t a n t  t o  c h a n g e .  
8 .  
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  ( W r i t t e n )  
A l w a y s  c o n c i s e ,  c l e a r  a n d  t o  t h e  
p o i n t .  
A b l e  t o  w r i t e  i n  a  s t r u c t u r e d  w a y .  
B a d l y  e x p r e s s e d  a n d  
p r e s e n t e d .  
9 .  
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  ( O r a l )  
P e r s u a s i v e ,  c l e a r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
i d e a s  o r  f a c t s .  
F a i l s  t o  g e t  p o i n t  a c r o s s  
e f f e c t i v e l y .  
1 0 .  
R e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  
C o l l e a g u e s  
E a r n s  r e s p e c t  o f  c o l l e a g u e s  a n d  
s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e i r  v i e w s  a n d  
f e e l i n g s  
N o t  r e s p e c t e d ;   
U n e a s y  i n  w o r k i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p ;  
P o o r  c u s t o m e r  s e r v i c e  
a t t i t u d e .  
1 1 .  
R e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  
C u s t o m e r s  
A b l e  t o  d e v e l o p  t e a m w o r k  a n d  
m a x i m i s e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
S t r o n g  m o t i v a t o r.  
A b l e  t o  d e l e g a t e .  
I n e f f e c t i v e ,  u n i n s p i r i n g  
l e a d e r s h i p .  
D o e s  n o t  d e v e l o p  s e n s e  
o f  u n i t y ,  p u r p o s e  a n d  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  t e a m .  
1 2 .  
S t a f f  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  
L e a d e r s h i p  
S m a r t ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  d r e s s .  
G o o d  t i m e k e e p i n g .  
S l i p s h o d ,  u n t i d y  
a p p r o a c h  t o  d r e s s .  P o o r  
t i m e k e e p i n g .  
1 3 .  P e r s o n a l  P r e s e n t a t i o n  
a n d  T i m e k e e p i n g  
  
The summary of a list of 13 skills and attributes for appraising performance 
 
 
  
 
- 350 -
Appendix F: Skills and Attributes Mark Sheet 
Specimen of Staff Performance Appraisal – Skills and Attributes Mark Sheet in the Department 
of Education 
Descriptive comments on the attributes (High and Low) and rating – values are explained in a 
separate document called ‘Skills and Attributes: Explanatory Notes’. 
Appraisee Name: _____________________________________________________ 
Appraiser: ___________________________________________________________ 
Dates covered by Appraisal: _____________________________________________ 
Date of Appraisal: _____________________________________________________ 
R a t i n g  A w a r d e d  ( t i c k  o n e  b o x )  
                      S k i l l s  a n d  A t t r i b u t e  
1  2  3  4  5  
1 .  P r o b l e m  s o l v i n g  
     
2 .  Q u a n t i t y  o f  w o r k  
     
3 .  Q u a l i t y  a n d  C o n t r o l  o f  w o r k  
     
4 .  P l a n n i n g  a n d  O r g a n i s i n g   
     
5 .  K n o w l e d g e  ( Te c h n i c a l  o r  B u s i n e s s )  
     
6 .  I n i t i a t i v e  
     
7 .  F l e x i b i l i t y / A d a p t a b i l i t y  
     
8 .  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  ( W r i t t e n )  
     
9 .  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  ( O r a l )  
     
1 0 .  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  C o l l e a g u e s  
     
1 1 .  R e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  C u s t o m e r s  
     
1 2 .  S t a f f  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  L e a d e r s h i p  
     
1 3 .  P e r s o n a l  P r e s e n t a t i o n  a n d  T i m e - k e e p i n g  
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Appendix G: A checklist for evaluating and revising incentive pay 
systems 
1. How should business goals link with the pay system? 
• First decide what the business wants of its people, unit by unit and group by group. 
• Communicate targets down through the organization. 
• Make sure that messages about the business (e.g. quality, ‘right first time’, customer care) are reflected in the workings of the pay 
system. 
2. What should the pay system seek to achieve? 
• Would pay incentives increase motivation? Consider everyone, not just high-flyers or poor performers. 
• How could the pay system help to improve recruitment and retention? 
• What effect should the pay system have on quality and continuous improvement of products, services and processes? 
• How might the pay system support the culture of the organization, and any desired cultural change? 
• Does the pay system need to encourage co-operation and teamwork? 
• How might the pay system encourage the acquisition and flexible use of skills? 
• Are there alternative or complementary ways of achieving these objectives? Should use of the pay system be a fundamental part of 
the approach? What additional measures should be taken to reinforce the messages given by the pay system? 
3. Who should be covered by incentive payments? 
• Only those groups and individuals where there is a direct and quantifiable link between effort and output? Or more widely? 
• How appropriate are individual incentives where team working is important? 
• What sort of people does the organization currently employ, or want to employ in the future? Those who are largely motivated by 
money, or those who get their main motivation in other ways? 
4. How much of pay should be at risk? 
There is no final answer, but in designing a pay system it is worth thinking about: 
• The need for motivation, group by group. 
• The extent to which incentives can be strictly related to effort. 
• Whether separate provision needs to be made to allow pay movements as market circumstances fluctuate. 
• What the pay system is seeking to achieve. For example, the amount )at risk may need to be relatively large if the aim ìs to 
motivate; smaller if it \j to reward achievement. 
5. How can incentive systems be made to work fairly and effectively? 
• First make sure that performance management systems are effective. 
• Ensure that personal objectives are fair and relevant to required performance. 
• Broaden objectives if team working or interdepartmental co-operation is required. 
• Ask employees and ask trade union representatives to get feedback on effectiveness and consistencies. 
• Use attitude surveys and exit interviews to monitor employees’ views. Don’t just rely on managers’ views. 
• Don’t forget to keep payments competitive in the external labour market. 
• Be careful to treat men and women equally. 
• Train managers to appraise properly and monitor markings to ensure consistency. 
• Realize that introducing incentives is insufficient, on its own, to change culture and behaviour. 
6. What about risks and problems? 
• Don’t risk demotivating the majority by implying that their work is unsatisfactory. Remember, most people think they are better 
than average. Most people will need to receive some performance payment. 
• Consider whether personal appraisal and development can be separated from incentive pay to avoid undermining appraisal systems. 
• Watch total costs (including the cost of monitoring) and control performance pay budgets. 
• Relate objectives to criteria which avoid emphasizing short-term results at the expense of long-term success. 
7. What mechanisms are there for review and evaluation? 
• Is the board involved in the process? 
• Continually monitor output measures, input costs, employee attitudes and management views in order to make improvements to the 
system. 
• Circumstances change, so keep objectives under review during the year. 
• Don’t forget to reassess the pay system’s contribution to overall business objectives. 
• It is easy to say, ‘Incentives work,’ without knowing why! 
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Appendix H: The Analytical Framework 
The research analytical framework is based on the argument that there are five interdependent 
dimensions that must be integrated for the PM model to function effectively. These are:  
(1) Corporate objectives which stipulate the purpose of existence, address community 
expectations, and incorporates cultural values and norms;  
(2) Strategic plans that address primary or corporate objectives by performing strategic 
analysis (SWORT analysis) and formulating training, development and retention policies;  
(3) Action Planning to address operational (secondary) objectives, specify key tasks & 
responsibilities, mapping or allocating resources, setting performance targets, and 
documenting performance contracts and agreements;  
(4) Performance recognition through  objective performance measurement and accountability 
processes, rewards and sanctions, conducting training needs assessment (TNA); and  
(5) Management Accounting Information System - effective feedback and feedforward loops, 
timely availability of performance information-set for planning, decision-making and 
control, and effective use of suggestion boxes. 
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Appendix I: Introduction Letter to Chief Executives
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